Saturday, August 8, 2026

Carlo Borlenghi

 “Navigo in mari inesplorati, ma c’è una bussola nel mio cuore che conosce la strada”.… 
 E. Dickinson
 
 Carlo Borlenghi has immortalized thirteen America's Cups, portraying, with his famous and iconic shots, the evolution of the event and the boats in over thirty years of career.
The power of the foils that slice through the water, the emotion in the eyes of the crew, the tension of a match race, they all become palpable in his photos that not only fix the moment, but transform it into art.
 


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Friday, August 7, 2026

How whaling strengthens the bonds uniting nation-states and Indigenous peoples

Jerry Arey, Moses Kayotuk and Larry Arey atop a landed bowhead.
 
From Arctic Today by Barry Scott ZellenJuly 24, 2026

Remembering the Great Bowhead Hunt of 1991
 
For more than four decades, my work as an Arctic scholar has been animated by a single, foundational truth: the global arena is not merely a collection of Westphalian states competing for structural dominance.
While classical international relations theory fixates on oversimplified structures such as Kenneth Waltz’s classic “three images,” it leaves an analytical void at the foundational level of human organization.

To fill this gap, I have advanced 4th Image Theory.
This framework recognizes that beneath and before the modern state lies a deeper, older reality: the tribal, sub-state, and indigenous polities that have survived millennia of change.
These are not mere domestic minorities; they are enduring sovereign entities whose governance models, land claims, and cultural practices provide a platform for enduring regional stability.

Nowhere is the intersection of state sovereignty and indigenous self-determination more sharply defined — or more routinely misunderstood —than in the deep blue waters of our global commons.
For decades, the international community, led by urban activists far removed from the realities of life on and by the sea, has viewed the harvest of cetaceans through the singular lens of prohibition.
Whaling has been falsely cast as an archaic, ecologically destructive relic of a bygone era.

This view is profoundly flawed.
It ignores both the success of modern conservation and the deep, constitutional evolution of native land claims.



When we look past the emotive rhetoric of anti-whaling campaigns, a startling paradox emerges.
The sustainable management of whaling is not a point of permanent division.
Instead, it offers a powerful framework for bridging the gap between sovereign nation-states and Indigenous peoples, forging a shared, collaborative international order.

Alternative:

To understand how whaling can unite rather than divide, one need only look to the Western Arctic.
In 1982, Canada made the decision to withdraw from the International Whaling Commission (IWC).
This move was not an act of environmental defiance; it was a pragmatic recognition of domestic political realities.

At the time, Ottawa was deep in negotiations over comprehensive land claims agreements with Arctic Indigenous peoples —treaties that would ultimately reshape governance of the Northwest Territories and lead to the creation of Nunavut.

By stepping away from the rigid, often deadlocked dictates of the IWC, Ottawa cleared a path to restore the traditional Inuvialuit and Inuit bowhead whale hunting.
It replaced distant, centralized and neocolonial governance with an innovative domestic model based on co-management.

Through boards composed of both indigenous hunters and federal biologists, decisions on quotas, sustainability, and ecosystem monitoring were co-produced.
Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) was elevated to equal standing with Western empirical science.

The foundational proving ground for this paradigm shift occurred on Sept.
3, 1991, in the waters off Shingle Point.
For over half a century, the Inuvialuit had been denied the right to hunt a bowhead whale (Arviq), a restriction born of global conservation anxieties that completely ignored the ecological balance maintained by the original inhabitants of the coast.



The 1991 hunt was one of many fruits of the historic 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) — the first Canadian comprehensive land claim settlement north of 60.
This treaty did not merely grant land rights; it erected a revolutionary, constitutionally protected architecture for wildlife co-management.
When the Inuvialuit Game Council and the newly formed Fisheries Joint Management Committee approved a license for a single bowhead, they were putting the constitutional teeth of their land claim to the test.

The hunt itself became a masterclass in cross-generational, cross-cultural collaboration.
Because a full 54 years had passed since the last local bowhead harvest, the Inuvialuit faced a profound rupture in practical whaling knowledge.
To bridge this historical chasm, they looked across the border to their Inupiat kin in Alaska.

Experienced whaling captains from the North Slope traveled to the Mackenzie Delta, bringing with them modern safety protocols, traditional tracking techniques, and specialized harvesting equipment.
This included penthrite projectile bombs designed to ensure a humane, efficient kill.

On Sept. 4, a crew led by Inuvialuit whaling captain Danny A. Gordon successfully landed a 36-foot, 40-ton bowhead whale.
The event was a profound cultural awakening, but its political implications were even greater.

The processing of the whale on the beaches of Shingle Point required the mobilization of whole communities — Aklavik, Inuvik, Tuktoyaktuk —distributing muktuk (skin and blubber) across the region according to ancient laws of sharing that reinforce social cohesion.

For the Canadian state, this was a watershed moment in regulatory flexibility.
Federal fisheries officers worked alongside indigenous hunters — not as adversarial enforcers, but as technical partners.
The 1991 harvest proved to a skeptical international community that an indigenous polity, armed with modern legal authority and rooted in traditional ecological wisdom, could safely manage a protected species without state paternalism.
It transformed the concept of conservation from a top-down mandate into a collaborative, treaty-based partnership between indigenous peoples and the state.

This historical lesson demonstrates that when a nation-state respects the maritime traditions of its Indigenous peoples, it does not weaken its own sovereignty; it actually strengthens the fabric of its domestic peace.

The restoration of the bowhead hunt in the Western Arctic did not spark ecological collapse.
Instead, it revitalized community cohesion, strengthened food security in an economically marginalized region, and integrated indigenous governance directly into the structural machinery of the state.

In recent years, we have seen history repeating itself, with Tokyo’s decision to exit the IWC in 2019, following in Canada’s footsteps so that Japan, too, could resume coastal whaling within its own territorial waters and EEZ.

Japan’s pivot offers a compelling point of alignment with northern Indigenous communities.
Small, historic whaling towns of coastal Japan —such as Taiji, Wada, and Ayukawa — possess a deep maritime heritage that mirrors the subsistence culture of the Inuvialuit.
For coastal communities of both the Arctic and the Pacific, the whale isn’t merely a resource to be extracted; it is an economic anchor, a dietary staple, and the focus of deep cultural veneration.

When modern states like Japan, Iceland and Norway defend their right to utilize abundant marine resources sustainably under international law, they are fighting the exact same battle against eco-colonialism that Indigenous communities have waged for generations.

By reframing the whaling debate around the principles of sustainability, food security, and cultural survival, we create a powerful common denominator: sovereign nations defending their maritime rights and indigenous polities protecting their ancestral subsistence traditions find themselves standing on the same side of the geopolitical ledger.
They are united by a shared commitment to what I call constructive realism—a pragmatism that recognizes that real-world stability requires balancing ecological limits with human survival and cultural continuity.

The international community must stop viewing whaling as a binary conflict between conservationists and exploiters.
Instead, it must be recognized as a sophisticated arena for co-management, where the sovereign rights of coastal states and the inherent rights of First Nations converge.
By honoring Native traditions through robust, collaborative, and scientifically sound frameworks, we do not fracture global unity.
Instead, we ground it in the realities of our shared environment, proving that international relations are at their most resilient when they honor the tribal foundations upon which our world was built.

Thursday, August 6, 2026

From Hormuz to the Black Sea: Maritime battlefields are shaping ‘a new world order’


Satellite view of Tuapse Oil Refinery, Russia.
Ukrainian drones struck fuel storage tanks at the Rosneft‑operated facility, igniting a major fire visible for kilometers.
Gallo Images | Gallo Images | Getty Images
 
From CNBC by  
  • Attacks and threats around the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Black Sea and Sea of Azov are disrupting commercial shipping routes.
  • Roughly 80% of global merchandise trade by volume moves by sea, so chokepoint disruption can affect energy, food and consumer goods prices.
  • Shipping companies are weighing rerouting, insurance costs, inventory buffers and emerging risks around routes including the Panama Canal.
The Strait of Hormuz is rattling global trade, but the waterway is just one example of a vital maritime corridor becoming a frontline, in a new age of drones and missiles targeting economic lifelines.

From the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea to the Black Sea, attacks on commercial vessels have disrupted trade, raised insurance and freight costs, and forced shipping companies to reconsider routes once treated as dependable.

The stakes are high: roughly 80% of global merchandise trade by volume moves by sea.
Disrupting even one major route can delay cargo, tighten supplies and drive up prices for energy, food and consumer goods thousands of miles away.

How drones are changing maritime warfare

“We have a new chokepoint and a new war,” David Roche, president and global strategist at Quantum Strategy, wrote in a July report, referring to the Sea of Azov, where Ukrainian drones have been striking Russian tankers, and the Black Sea.


 
Roche described this fighting as the first maritime offensive conducted almost entirely with drones, supplemented by missiles.
Such weapons give smaller military forces a cheaper means of threatening ships, ports and other infrastructure whose disruption carries a huge economic cost.

Quantum estimates that about 25% of Russia’s grain exports and 25% to 30% of its Black Sea oil exports could be disrupted.
Russia grows more than a fifth of internationally traded wheat, magnifying the potential consequences for global food prices.

Yevgeniya Gaber, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council think tank, said Russia’s move earlier this month to suspend shipping through the Kerch Strait, which connects the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, has effectively shut down a vital maritime corridor.

“Maritime transport through the Sea of Azov had become an increasingly important alternative to the land corridor connecting Russia with occupied Crimea,” Gaber told CNBC by email.

“The economic implications are equally important,” Gaber said, adding that the Sea of Azov has been used not only to transport sanctioned crude oil and petroleum products but also grain, coal and steel.

Gaber said Ukraine’s efforts to exploit Russia’s maritime and economic weaknesses constitute “one of the most significant blows to military and commercial fleets” since World War II.
Indeed, Ukraine says it has degraded roughly one-third of Russia’s Black Sea fleet since 2022. 

Why the Panama Canal could be the next flashpoint

In the Strait of Hormuz, commercial operators are contending with attacks and rapidly shifting signals over whether passage is safe.
Governments can declare a waterway open, but shipowners make their own decisions based on the likelihood of a vessel being hit and crew members being injured or killed.

“We often treat the Strait of Hormuz, the Black Sea, or Bab el-Mandeb as isolated events.
They are not,” said Daejin Lee, global head of research at Fertistream Freight.



“These waterways are increasingly becoming battlegrounds within the broader transition toward a new world order,” he told CNBC via email.

And the next threats are already emerging.

“If you’re talking about the next flashpoint, I wouldn’t look at the Strait of Hormuz,” said Lars Jensen, chief executive officer of Vespucci Maritime.
“I would look at the Panama Canal.”

The strategic passage, which has offered a shortcut for ships transiting between the Pacific and the North Atlantic for more than a century, is already caught in a geopolitical dispute involving the U.S., China and Panama over influence.
Potential weather-related restrictions toward the end of this year and early next year could compound those tensions by reducing capacity, Jensen added.
 
Impact on shipping ‘bigger than most realize’ 

For shipping companies, the challenge is preparing for a world where the next chokepoint can emerge before the last one has reopened.

Kevin O’Marah, co-founder and chief research officer at supply chain intelligence firm Zero100, told CNBC the Strait of Hormuz became the most critical part of the U.S.-Iran war after Iran discovered merely threatening traffic there was enough to stop it.

While none of Zero100′s clients had come under attack in the strait, O’Marah said some had decided to avoid that risk by actively managing inventories and rerouting shipments.

“It has added cost and delay for some of our clients in the energy, food, and electronics industries,” he said.
“As of now, traffic through the Strait looks to be running at about half the normal flow.
The recent breakdown in the ceasefire has definitely hurt the situation but no one is surprised.
Supply chain leaders, and in particular logistics specialists like Martin Brower and Maersk, are aware and have well established protocols for dealing with the risk.”


This photo obtained by AFP from the Iranian news agency Tasnim shows an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) boat allegedly taking part in an operation to seize ships attempting to cross the Strait of Hormuz, on April 21, 2026.
Meysam Mirzadeh | Afp | Getty Images



Mitigation strategies include rerouting across the Arabian Peninsula via pipeline for oil, overland into Turkey for certain kinds of commodities and avoiding the area completely as much as possible, O’Marah said.

The war in the Middle East “does not look like an escalating conflict to most supply chain leaders, but it does look likely to be a long-term problem in terms of freedom of movement through the Strait of Hormuz,” he added.

“We are planning on a steady state of transportation uncertainty and costs associated with reroutings, inventory buffering, and shipping surcharges.”

Alain Bejjani, a Dubai-based investor, business executive and judge on “Shark Tank Lebanon,” told CNBC shipping lanes would stay at the center of the war “because they are the conflict.”

“The war has migrated from territory to logistics.
A strait does not close when missiles fly; it closes when insurers stop writing cover,” he said.
“That makes disruption cheap to sustain and hard to price, which is exactly why it persists.”
 

A spokesperson for insurance broker Gallagher told CNBC war risk insurance — an add-on that covers financial losses caused by war, terrorism, and civil unrest — is still available.
But they noted that “a handful but not many” ship owners or charters are opting to travel through the Strait of Hormuz.

“Given the challenging maritime security environment, rates have increased from levels that owners and charterers will be used to.
The cost will vary depending on the vessel type, cargo and routing, however marine insurers are continuing to provide cover and helping to ensure marine commerce can continue with adequate coverage in place,” they added.

How companies are responding to shipping risks

Bejjani told CNBC that the structural consequence of maritime warfare “is bigger than most people realize.”

“The Gulf is bracketed by two straits, not one, and the region is now designing around both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb to the maximum extent possible,” he said.

“That is new. Past crises produced hedges. This one is producing an architecture: overland corridors, bypass pipelines, forward storage near the markets that matter most. It will cost heavily, take a decade, and ripple for decades more. I expect other strait-dependent regions to follow, though few with the same urgency or resources.”


Vessels transit the Bab el-Mandeb Strait off the coast of southern Yemen on July 25, 2026.
Khaled Ziad | Afp | Getty Images


He warned that, although shipping will maintain its edge in terms of volumes, it is likely to “lose its monopoly on trust” in the business world.

“Other modes of transport will be substantially enhanced where certainty matters most, and redundancy becomes a permanent, priced feature of logistics,” he said.
“The strait will reopen. The assumption that it stays open for free will not return.”
 
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Wednesday, August 5, 2026

PH deposits Bajo de Masinloc chart with UN

Philippine Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the UN Enrique A. Manalo (center), together with Undersecretary Peter N. Tiangco, NAMRIA Administrator, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Rogelio E. Villanueva Jr., DFA Spokesperson for Maritime Affairs (right and rightmost, respectively), presenting the official copy of NAMRIA Chart No. 1567 titled 'Bajo de Masinloc and Approach' to UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea represented by Deputy Director Alice Hicuburundi (leftmost). (DFA)

From PNA by Joyce Ann L. Rocamora



United Nations (File photo)

MANILA – The Philippines has deposited its official nautical chart of Bajo de Masinloc and its surrounding maritime zones with the United Nations Secretariat, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) said on Friday.

In a statement, the agency said the move marks yet another important milestone in the country’s continuing efforts to uphold international law and reinforce the legal certainty of its maritime entitlements.

The deposit was made pursuant to Article 16 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which requires coastal states to give due publicity to official charts or lists of geographical coordinates showing the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

“By placing the chart on deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Philippines ensures that its official maritime information forms part of the public international record,” the DFA said.

 
Scarborough Shoal, known as Huangyan Dao in China, Bajo de Masinloc in the Philippines, and Democracy Reef (民主礁) in Taiwan, is claimed by all three governments.
visualization with the GeoGarage platform (NGA nautical raster chart) 
 
Bajo de Masinloc is an atoll that has long formed an integral part of Philippine territory.

The feature generates a territorial sea extending up to 12 nautical miles from its normal baselines and a contiguous zone extending from 12 to 24 nautical miles as stated in Sections 2(b), 5, and 6 of the Philippine Maritime Zones Act; Articles 3, 33 and 121 of UNCLOS, as well as the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award.


 
By depositing the chart, the DFA said Manila formally notifies the international community of its normal baselines and the geographic extent of its applicable authority and jurisdiction at Bajo de Masinloc.

The deposit, it said, strengthens transparency and legal certainty by making the Philippines’ official hydrographic information publicly available through the UN in accordance with UNCLOS.

“The deposit also carries particular significance in the face of climate change and sea-level rise. As coastlines and marine environments evolve, the preservation of official nautical charts and baseline information with the UN contributes to a permanent and internationally recognized legal record of maritime entitlements established in accordance with international law,” it said.


“The Philippines remains firmly committed to the rule of law, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the primacy of UNCLOS as the comprehensive legal framework governing all activities in the oceans and seas,” it added.

The Philippine delegation was led by Philippine Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations Enrique Manalo, who formally presented National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) Chart No. 1567, entitled “Bajo de Masinloc and Approach” to Alice Hicuburundi, Deputy Director of the United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea.

Manalo was joined by Undersecretary Peter Tiangco, administrator of NAMRIA, together with senior officials and legal experts from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, NAMRIA and the University of the Philippines. (PNA)

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Tuesday, August 4, 2026

Greenland’s strategic importance: defense, trade and minerals

From Artic Today 

This is the first instalment in a four-part series of commentaries, exploring Greenland’s mineral wealth, political and economic landscape, and the consequences of climate change.

Overview

For centuries, Greenland’s geography has helped determine its destiny.
The North Atlantic island, covered by sheet ice, has functioned at times as a barrier and, at other points, as a bridge in the global power competition—a key Arctic node connecting North America, Europe, and Asia.
Moreover, global powers during the 20th century’s world wars, the Cold War, and through to the modern day have considered Greenland a strategic defence asset.
In recent years, the island’s appeal has only increased as climate change has, and will continue, to open access to new Arctic trade routes and to critical mineral wealth.
We expect Greenland’s strategic importance to only increase over the coming decades, and this commentary will be the first in a series examining the reasons behind our view.

Greenland’s Importance as a Defensive Shield is Unlikely to Change


Greenland’s inhospitable climate for centuries limited its economic value; however, its defensive value has shaped European geopolitics as far back as during the Norse settlement 500 years ago.
More recently, sovereignty over the large landmass was used to prevent rival empires from claiming a foothold in the North Atlantic.
The Danish colonial control over Greenland began in 1721 and remained after Denmark split from Norway in 1814.

During the second world war, the U.S. invoked the Monroe Doctrine to protect it from the encroachment of Nazi Germany-occupied Denmark, which turned Greenland into a key strategic asset.
It was at that time the U.S. and the allied forces installed airfields and weather stations on the island, crucial to Atlantic naval warfare.
Additionally, Greenland’s value expanded during the cold war’s proliferation of nuclear weapons, as Greenland sat astride the shortest flight path between the Soviet Union (USSR) and North America.
When Denmark joined NATO in 1949, Greenland anchored the alliance’s northern flank and constrained the USSR’s access to North America by occupying the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, a maritime and air corridor vital for monitoring Atlantic transit of USSR submarines and bombers.

In 1951, Denmark and the U.S. signed the Defense of Greenland Agreement, which allows the U.S.
forces to operate bases on the island under NATO command.
The agreement remains the legal foundation of the continued U.S.military presence on the island.
The backbone of NATO’s Arctic defence is the Pituffik Space Base (previously named Thule Air Base, which was established in 1951).
Operated by the U.S.Space Force, it is a key refuelling station, an important monitoring site for early warning radar, and a NATO hub for long-range bombers.
In short, Greenland has served as a North Atlantic defensive shield for NATO allies to intercept threats that pass above, beneath, or around the island.

As Arctic conditions change in the coming years, we expect Greenland’s military importance to increase.
However, we do not expect a buildup of large permanent forces or direct challenges to the island’s sovereignty, despite earlier comments from the U.S. president, and his administration’s preference to take Greenland by any means necessary.
More realistically, we expect U.S. and allied forces to expand their functions and capabilities in Greenland through modernisation of early warning systems, a hardening of infrastructure, and more frequent joint allied exercises.

Trade Routes Around Greenland are Inseparable from Security

Greenland is next to one of the most important maritime corridors in modern history.
The GIUK Gap (Exhibit 1) is a key commercial shipping lane that connects North American and European industry and markets.
Over the last century, trade and military routes merged, as optimal commerce depends on the secure transit of goods.
Most transatlantic trade—including physical goods, energy flows (including the ramp of liquified natural gas from the U.S.
to Europe), and undersea cables—moves through or near the corridor around Greenland.
Moreover, any disruption to Atlantic shipping would adversely affect the economies of NATO countries.
The recent near closing of the Strait of Hormuz illustrates how the interruption of trade can be an effective war tactic.

Additionally, the transformation of the Arctic because of climate change is fundamentally altering the relevance of trade routes around the large island.
While Greenland or Denmark do not control these trade routes directly—as they are governed by international maritime law—the island serves as a gatekeeper by sitting at the entry and exit points between the Arctic and global markets.
Looking ahead as the Greenlandic ice melts, various key trade routes have and will continue to open and allow direct passage via the Arctic circle either with, or eventually without, ice-breaker cargo ships—amplifying the importance of the island for global trade.

Potential Critical Minerals in Greenland are Attractive for Technologies of the Future

Geologically speaking, Greenland might contain one of the most diverse and globally significant concentrations of critical minerals in the Arctic, with geological surveys indicating the presence of 25 out of the 34 minerals classified as critical by the European Union (EU).
This includes the potential for graphite, lithium, uranium, nickel, cobalt, copper, zinc, lead, titanium, gold, and deposits of Rare Earth Elements (REEs).
Early exploration work date back centuries, but there has been revived interest over the two decades, because of recent discoveries, including the Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez rare earth projects in southern Greenland.

REEs are essential for high-performance permanent magnets used in batteries and semiconductors that are key inputs to electronic vehicles, wind turbines, data centers, and robotics.
For example, according to Belfer Center research, an electric vehicle requires six times more minerals than a conventional car.
Currently, the global powers (including the EU, U.S., China, and Russia) have shown a renewed interest in Greenland’s potential for minerals, given their significance for the technologies of the future.

Control over the mineral potential in Greenland is also important for national security priorities.
REE are used in missile guided systems, fighter jets, and radar and sonar technologies.
Presently, China remains the dominant structural power in REE because of its mining capacity and its near total control over processing, separation, and magnet manufacturing.
China refines roughly 85% of global REE, which gives it considerable leverage over downstream production and creates supply chain risk for industries in the rest of the world.
Therefore, Greenland is considered a potential alternative to strategic mineral dependence on China.

Recently, large and middle arctic powers have accelerated policies in pursuit of increasingly strategic minerals.
For instance, the EU is structurally vulnerable, as it imports roughly 95% of its REEs and has set medium-term benchmarks for domestic mining and processing on its soil.
In addition, the EU also negotiated the Critical Minerals Agreement with the U.S. to embed transatlantic supply chains.
Likewise, the U.S.has framed REEs as a national security asset and is pursuing an industrial strategy to prioritize the import of REE from more trusted suppliers.
Other arctic countries, such as Russia, Nordic countries, and Canada have also made development of large mineral reserves a strategic importance.

Greenland’s Expanding Geopolitical Role

For many centuries, Greenland has played an outsize role in geopolitics.
Greenland’s value as a defense asset, source of critical minerals, and as a trade route are essential to this role.
And forthcoming changes to the climate, altering trade routes in the North Atlantic, and the shifting state of global powers will only continue to increase its presence on the global stage.