From The Diplomat by Darshana M. Baruah
Small islands dotting the Indian Ocean are emerging at the center stage of great power politics.
The rise of China, changing power dynamics, territorial disputes in
the East and South China Sea, and the U.S. rebalance to Asia have all
led to the re-emergence of the Indian Ocean as the center stage for
power politics in the Indo-Pacific.
Much has been written about China’s assertive behavior in the South
and East China Seas and it remains a cause of concern for all key actors
in the region.
However, looking beyond these islands in Southeast Asia
to the ones in the Indian Ocean, one realizes that Beijing has been
working incessantly to secure its strategic interests and strengthen its
role as a major player in the Indo-Pacific — alarming other regional
powers such as India and the U.S.
The conflict in the South China Sea can be describe as a frozen
situation with no dispute resolution in sight.
While a number of
mechanisms exist, none has been successful in solving the territorial
claims.
Apart from the occasional confrontation and verbal protests,
Beijing seems to be in good control over the South China Sea.
Trade Routes and Straits Over half of the
world's commercial shipping passes through the waterways of the
Indo-Pacific region.
The Strait of Malacca, in particular, is one of the
most important shipping lanes in the world.
The strait
links the Indian and Pacific Oceans and carries approximately 25% of all
traded goods.
It also carries approximately 25% of all oil that travels
by sea.
At its narrowest point just south of Singapore, the Strait of
Malacca is only 1.5 nautical miles wide, making it one of the world's
most noteworthy strategic chokepoints.
Having
fairly secured its interests in the Western Pacific, China is now
looking to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean.
While Beijing has the capabilities to venture out into the Indian
Ocean, alarming a host of other nations in the region, it does not have
the means to sustain its presence, especially in the event of a
conflict.
What China now seeks to do is court and improve relations with
the small island nations in the India Ocean to facilitate its
increasing presence in those waters.
Beijing is thus using commercial
initiatives to achieve its security and strategic aims in the region.
In
turn, New Delhi and Washington too are scrambling to strengthen
relationships with their friends and allies and re-assert their
influence over the small island nations.
This essay looks at the
geo-strategic competition unfolding between China, the U.S., India, and
their friends in the Indian Ocean.
The Malacca Dilemma
China is well aware of its challenges in projecting power in the
Indian Ocean.
South China Sea LNG Flows
One-third of the world’s liquefied natural gas passes through the Straits of Malacca and into the South China Sea, with the bulk of it originating in the Persian Gulf.
LNG also flows into the region from Southeast Asia and Oceania.
Much of this imported LNG is bound for Japan and South Korea.
Beijing has always been concerned about the security of
its oil and gas imports from the Middle East and Africa transiting
through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca.
Trade and Resources in the Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean is not the site of nearly as many territorial or maritime disputes, but it is nonetheless inseparable Pacific assets and interests.
Eighty percent of Japanese and 39 percent of Chinese oil imports pass through the Indian Ocean en route from the Middle East. Chinese firms also have billions of dollars of investments in East Africa, concentrated primarily in the oil and gas, railways and roads, and other mining sectors.
What is emerging as a
greater concern is the reliance on American forces to secure the sea
lines of communications (SLOCs) and chokepoints along the route.
With no
sustainable presence in the Indian Ocean, Beijing’s energy imports are
highly vulnerable in the event of a military standoff with New Delhi or
Washington.
Former Chinese President Hu Jintao talked of the “Malacca
Dilemma” and the need to secure China’s strategic and economic interests
in the region.
For China, the debate boils down to two key points —
either they find a way to reduce their dependency on the Malacca Strait
or they maintain a credible presence in the Indian Ocean to equally
secure the SLOCs.
This is perhaps one of the driving factors behind
China’s aggressive pursuit of good relations with the island nations in
the Indian Ocean.
In an effort to moderate its strategy and avoid
attracting attention, Beijing is relying more on economic initiatives to
strengthen its ties with small but critical islands in the Indian
Ocean.
Kyauckpyu, Myanmar
Kyauckpyu is a small port town in Myanmar and possibly Beijing’s
answer to its “Malacca Dilemma.”
The Chinese presence in Myanmar and the
Bay of Bengal is too close for comfort for policymakers in New Delhi.
However, undeterred by Indian concerns, China has continued to invest in
Myanmar, resulting in two gas and oil pipelines ferrying Chinese energy
imports straight from the Indian Ocean without crossing the Straits of
Malacca.
The first project to materialize was the gas pipeline
connecting Kyauckpyu to Kunming in 2013.
The pipeline enables Beijing to
completely avoid using the Malacca Strait and tap directly into
Myanmar’s offshore gas fields.
The second project is an oil pipeline
starting from Maday Island in Kyauckpyu and transiting to China’s Yunnan
province.
The oil pipeline entered its operational stage as recently as
January 2015.
This oil pipeline runs parallel to the gas pipeline,
directly transferring Beijing’s oil imports from West Asia and Africa.
The gas and oil pipelines help solve China’s “Malacca Dilemma,”
increasing its energy security tremendously.
While the pipelines have
great economic benefits for Myanmar as well, the underlying strategic
dimension of the project cannot be overstated.
Coco Islands
Geographically a part of the Andaman group of islands,
Great Coco Island and Little Coco Island are controlled by Myanmar.
Since the early
1990s, there have been frequent reports of China using those islands
for military and naval purposes but there is no certain proof of whether
the islands are actually under Chinese control.
Thus, Chinese presence
on the Coco Islands, developing intelligence systems and other naval
facilities, is unnerving for nearby India.
While it is yet not certain
whether the Great Coco island hosts Chinese intelligence systems, there
is greater
acknowledgement on the building of runways and other connectivity infrastructure on the Cocos.
The
Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI), controlled by India, are
located southwest of the Cocos, closer to Indonesia and to the busy sea
lanes of the Malacca Strait.
The islands give India a strategic
advantage in the Indian Ocean Region — perhaps why New Delhi established
there its first and only tri-command (Army, Navy and Air Force) service
in 2001.
India’s control over the islands has proved instrumental in
collaborating with the navies of the region and carrying out critical
exercises such as MILAN and MALABAR.
Chinese control of the Coco Islands
in Myanmar would mean that Beijing would have the advantage of
monitoring the Indian Navy in close proximity.
With growing Chinese investments in Myanmar and developing ties
between the two nations, Beijing’s military presence in the Cocos is
definitely a possibility over time, if not an overnight development.
A
military presence in the Coco Islands,if truly established, would give
China the edge to monitor India’s naval activities with other powers in
the region.
It will also affect other regional powers such as Australia
and the U.S. and strengthen China’s foothold in the Indian Ocean.
In February 2014, China carried out naval exercises through the
Lombok Strait near Indonesia, deploying its largest landing ship, the
Changbaishan.
The drill was closely watched by countries like India, Australia, and
the U.S., as it underlines China’s ability to project power beyond its
shores.
While as of now China is only projecting into the Indian Ocean,
Beijing’s growing ties with the island nations of the Indian Ocean will
allow the PLA Navy to maintain a more sustainable presence in the IOR.
Conscious of Beijing’s Indian Ocean strategy, the Indian government
under Prime Minister Modi is paying a considerable amount of attention
to maritime security and to strengthening ties with the IOR islands and
littorals.
With a new government coming into power in Sri Lanka, India
is eagerly looking to step up its security ties with the island nation.
Chinese infrastructure and development projects such as the Hambantota
port and the frequent docking of Beijing’s submarines at Colombo for
“re-fueling and refreshment” is a growing concern for India.
Capitalizing on the new opportunity extended by the Maithripala Sirisena
government (India was the destination of Sirisena’s maiden overseas
visit), Modi is scheduled to travel to Colombo in March to discuss key
issues of interest and concern between the two countries.
Modi will also
travel to the Maldives and Seychelles during the same leg of the trip,
strengthening New Delhi’s Indian Ocean act.
While India cannot block
Beijing’s entry into the Indian Ocean game, New Delhi is in dire need of
strengthening its own.
Cocos (Keeling Islands) NASA
The Cocos (Keeling) Islands lie in the eastern Indian Ocean, about 2,900
kilometers (1,800 miles) northwest of the Australian city of Perth.
Comprised of coral atolls and islands, the archipelago includes North
Keeling Island and the South Keeling Islands.
Cocos (Keeling) Islands
The
Cocos (Keeling) Islands are an Australian Indian Ocean territory
and an area of strategic importance given the critical SLOCs that pass
through the region.
While at present there are no military
establishments in the islands, the Cocos could serve as a U.S. military
base in the future as a result of competition for strategic space in the
Indian Ocean. According to Australian Defense analyst
Ross Babbage,
the Cocos (keeling) Islands can “extend Australia’s reach into the
surrounding region for surveillance, air defense, and maritime and
ground strike operations.
The islands could, in effect, serve as
unsinkable aircraft carriers and resupply ships.”
These islands could
prove critical to Australia and its allies during a time of emergence in
the Indian Ocean.
According to a report by the
Wall Street Journal
in February this year, Washington is looking to expand its maritime
ties with Australia and India and hence is looking for a feasible
Australian port and base to function out of.
The report quotes U.S.
Chief of Navy Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert as saying “We’re doing a
study… to see what might be feasible for naval cooperation in and
around Australia, which might include basing ships.”
The U.S. military
presence in a base outside of Darwin is already set to increase, given
Obama’s announcement in 2011 that the U.S. will deploy 2,500 marines at
the base on a rotational basis.
As a part of the U.S. rebalance strategy
and growing defense ties with Canberra, American presence in the Indian
Ocean will only increase, especially in the face of a stronger China.
Small islands dotting the Indian Ocean are emerging at the center
stage of great power politics unfolding in the Indian Ocean Region.
These islands are critical in sustaining credible presence in the vast
Indian Ocean outreach, encompassing the key SLOCs forming the backbone
of the global economy.
Control and authority over the Indian Ocean will
help a nation emerge as true maritime power. Access to and control of
islands (through military and commercial initiatives) seems to be a key
part of China’s strategy to establish itself as a maritime power.
However, unlike in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean cannot be
controlled by one particular nation because of the sheer vastness of the
area and the presence of multiple regional powers (or, as one may say,
middle powers).
What the Indo-Pacific region needs is a security
architecture that can contain the territorial disputes in the Western
Pacific and stop the hostility from spilling over to the other side of
the Malacca strait.