Thursday, August 1, 2024

El Niño forecasts extended to 18 months with physics-based model

Interactions of El Niño with other climate patterns lead to enhanced El Niño predictability.
Credit: Sen Zhao, UH SOEST.

From Phys by University of Hawaii at Manoa

Across Asia, the Pacific Ocean, and the Americas, El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) brings variations in winds, weather, and ocean temperature that can cause droughts, floods, crop failures, and food shortages. Recently, the world has experienced a major El Niño event in 2023–2024, dramatically impacting weather, climate, ecosystems, and economies globally.

By developing an innovative modeling approach, researchers from the School of Ocean and Earth Science and Technology (SOEST) at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa are now able to forecast ENSO events up to 18 months ahead of time—significantly improving conventional climate model forecasting.

Their findings, which meld insights into the physics of the ocean and atmosphere with predictive accuracy, were published in Nature.

"We have developed a new conceptual model—the so-called extended nonlinear recharge oscillator (XRO) model—that significantly improves predictive skill of ENSO events at over one year in advance, better than global climate models and comparable to the most skillful AI forecasts," said Sen Zhao, lead author of the study and an assistant researcher in SOEST.

"Our model effectively incorporates the fundamental physics of ENSO and ENSO's interactions with other climate patterns in the global oceans that vary from season to season."

Scientists have been working for decades to improve ENSO predictions given its global environmental and socioeconomic impacts. Traditional operational forecasting models have struggled to successfully predict ENSO with lead times exceeding one year.

 
A satellite image of the Earth, with visual overlays marking the areas affected by El Niño
 
AI helps power new forecast

Recent advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have pushed these boundaries, achieving accurate predictions up to 16–18 months in advance. However, the "black box" nature of AI models has precluded attribution of this accuracy to specific physical processes.

Not being able to explain the source of the predictability in the AI models results in low confidence that these predictions will be successful for future events as the Earth continues to warm, changing the currents in the oceans and atmosphere.

"Unlike the 'black box' nature of AI models, our XRO model offers a transparent view into the mechanisms of the equatorial Pacific recharge-discharge physics and its interactions with other climate patterns outside of tropical Pacific," explained Fei-Fei Jin, the corresponding author and professor of atmospheric sciences in SOEST.

"The initial states of the extratropical Pacific, tropical Indian Ocean, and Atlantic enhance ENSO predictability in distinct seasons. For the first time, we are able to robustly quantify their impact on ENSO predictability, thus deepening our knowledge of ENSO physics and its sources of predictability."
Climate model shortcomings, improvements

"Our findings also identify shortcomings in the latest generation of climate models that lead to their failure in predicting ENSO accurately," said Malte Stuecker, assistant professor of oceanography in SOEST and study co-author.

"To improve ENSO predictions, climate models must correctly capture the key physics of ENSO and additionally, three compounding aspects of other climate patterns in the global oceans: accurate knowledge of the state of each of these climate patterns when the ENSO forecasts starts, the correct seasonally varying 'ocean memory' of each of these climate patterns, and correct representations of how each of these other climate patterns affect ENSO in different seasons."

"Different sources of predictability lead to distinct ENSO event evolutions," said Philip Thompson, associate professor of oceanography in SOEST and co-author of the study. "We are now able to provide skillful, long lead time predictions of this 'ENSO diversity,' which is critical as different flavors of ENSO have very different impacts on global climate and individual communities."

"In addition to El Niño, the new XRO model also improves predictability of other climate variabilities in tropical Indian and Atlantic Oceans, such as the Indian Ocean Dipole, which can significantly alter the local and global weather patterns beyond the impacts of El Niño," added Zhao.
Future directions

The implications of this research are far-reaching, offering prospects for more accurate and longer lead time ENSO predictions and global climate model improvements.

Though ENSO originates in the tropical Pacific, we can no longer think of it as a tropical Pacific Ocean problem only, either from a modeling and prediction perspective or from an observational perspective. The global tropics and the higher latitudes are integral to improving seasonal climate forecasts.

"By tracing model shortcomings and understanding these climate pattern interactions with our new conceptual XRO model, we can substantially refine our global climate models," remarked Stuecker.

"This paves the way for the next-generation of global climate models to incorporate these findings, improving our approach to predicting and mitigating the effects of climate variability and change. Such advancements are crucial for societal preparations and adaptations to climate-related hazards."

The UH team of researchers was rounded out with contributing authors from Columbia University, NOAA, Korea, and China.

Links :

Wednesday, July 31, 2024

The indispensable ingredient for victory: defeating sea mines

 
An unmanned surface vehicle is craned aboard the Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Canberra (LCS 30), as a part of the first embarkation of the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) mission package.`An unmanned surface vehicle is craned aboard the Indepe

From CIMSEC by Capt. George Galdorisi

At no time since the end of World War II have so many nations fielded blue water navies that have roamed the globe.
Navies from Australia, China, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have regional and worldwide commitments.
Whether it is reinforcing or challenging rules-based order at sea, showing resolve to reassure allies and deter rivals, or exercising with other navies, these fleet also recognize that they must be prepared for high-end war at sea.
Comparative naval advantage has returned as a critical unit of measure in great power competition.

But despite growing threats, navies have become accustomed to traversing the oceans and littorals with near impunity.
This ability is now being increasingly jeopardized, and not necessarily by conventional high-end threats.
For centuries, sea mines have presented an affordable and effective option in naval warfare.
That threat is increasing today.
The number of countries with mines, mining assets, mine manufacturing capabilities, and the intention to export mines has grown dramatically over the past several decades.
More than fifty countries possess mines and mining capability.
Of these, thirty countries have demonstrated an indigenous mine production capability and twenty have attempted to export these weapons.
Additionally, non-state actors have used these cheap and plentiful weapons to hazard commercial vessels and disrupt commerce on the oceans.

When policymakers, military leaders, and analysts compare the qualities of various navies, they typically think in terms of numbers of ships, submarines, aircraft, and other conventional assets.
However, considering the growing threat of sea mines worldwide, the capability to employ and defeat mines forms another core consideration in gauging the balance of naval advantage.
Navies must consider how to field affordable and risk-worthy unmanned systems at scale to meet the mine threat.

A Centuries Old Challenge

Mine warfare is not new.
Precursors to naval mines were first invented by innovators of Imperial China.
The first plan for a sea mine in the West was drawn up by Ralph Rabbards, who presented his design to Queen Elizabeth I of England in 1574.
Since the invention of the Bushnell Keg in 1776 (a watertight keg filled with gunpowder that was floated toward the enemy, detonated by a sparking mechanism if it struck a ship), mine warfare has been an important element of naval warfare.
While the first attempt to deliver the Bushnell Keg from America’s first combat submarine, the Turtle, against a British warship in 1776 failed, subsequent attempts to employ these early mines were successful.

Over 150 years ago, Admiral David Farragut became famous for “damning torpedoes” (which were actually mines) at the entrance to Mobile Bay during the Civil War.3 Indeed, in the early stages of the Civil War, Admiral Farragut wrote to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles about the sea mine threat posed by the Confederacy, stating, “I have always deemed it unworthy of a chivalrous nation, but it does not do to give your enemy such a decided superiority over you.”
Farragut’s warning was eerily prescient.

The use of sea mines and countermeasures to these weapons have figured significantly in every major war and nearly every regional conflict in which the United States has been involved since the Revolutionary War.
Indeed, the naval mine has been a mainstay of modern warfare.
The North Sea Mine Barrage, a large minefield laid by the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy between Scotland and Norway during World War I, inhibited the movement of the German U-boat fleet.
During World War I more than one thousand merchant ships and warships were lost because of the 230,000 mines used.
NATO navies continue to clear these mines to this day.

Mines released by U.S. Navy submarines and dropped by U.S. Army Air Force B-29 bombers in the Western Pacific during World War II sank hundreds of Japanese warships, merchant ships, and smaller vessels.
During World War II 2,665 ships were lost or damaged by 100,000 offensive mines.

In Korea during the early 1950s, the Soviets provided North Korea with thousands of sea mines.
These were used to defend key harbors and multiple U.S. warships struck mines.
During the Vietnam War, over 300,000 American naval mines were used.
In 1972 Haiphong Harbor was seeded with 11,000 destructor mines and was shut down completely for months, and it took years to clear out all the American mines.
In the past several decades, rogue states have indiscriminately employed sea mines.
Libya used mines to disrupt commerce in the Gulf of Suez and the Strait of Bab el Mandeb.
In the 1980s Iran laid mines to hazard military and commercial traffic in the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, leading to the devastating mine strike against USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58).
During Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991, the threat of mines precluded the effective use of the Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary task force off Kuwait and hazarded all U.S.
and coalition forces operating in the Arabian Gulf.
Indeed, Operation Desert Storm highlighted the importance of mine warfare with the heavy damage dealt to USS Princeton (CG 59) and USS Tripoli (LPH 10).
The U.S. Navy has an abundant history of employing mines and striking them, but it remains unclear what the U.S. Navy’s mine strategy is for modern naval warfare.

Captain Bruce McEwen, commanding officer of amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LPH-10), inspects damage to the vessel inflicted by an Iraqi mine that the ship struck while serving as a mine clearing platform during Operation Desert Storm, February 18, 1991. 
(Photo via U.S. National Archives)

Today’s Ongoing Mine Challenge


Mine warfare remains a critical element of naval capability.
In terms of availability, variety, affordability, ease of deployment, and potential impact on naval operations, mines are some of the most attractive weapons available.

Sea mines are hard to find, difficult to neutralize, and can present a deadly hazard to any vessel—especially those ships specifically designed to hunt them.
They can also heavily shape behavior and weigh on the operational calculus of commanders, making them a source of potent psychological effects in the battlespace.

Great power rivals are likely to employ mines in any conflict with the United States.
Scott Truver highlighted the danger posed by China’s mine warfare capabilities, as well as those of other potentially hostile nations:

“The mine warfare experiences of America and other nations are not lost on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
Chinese naval analysts and historians understand the asymmetric potential for mine warfare to baffle the enemy, and thus achieve exceptional combat results.’ Mines provide what some have described as affordable security via asymmetric means.”

Seth Cropsey echoed similar challenges and highlighted the mining capabilities China and Russia would bring to the fight.
He focused primarily on the threat from China, noting:

“One of the top global mine threats comes from China.
It has been estimated that Beijing has as many as 100,000 such weapons.
Those range from the old-fashioned moored contact mine to include mines that have rocket-propelled weapons and target detection systems.
In the event of a conflict with China, the United States is unlikely to approach warfare from the land.
That leaves us with the seas as the place where conflict is most likely to play out.

Beijing would likely concentrate on creating choke points in areas such as the archipelagos that separate East Asia from the Middle East and the South China Sea.
That means that sea control and navigating around China’s anti-access and area denial capabilities will be crucial.
It’s reasonable to expect that the Chinese would use mines there, and reasonable to expect that they would use mines if they decided to use force against Taiwan.
Moving through those straits is crucial and being able to clear them of mines is equally important.”

The danger of naval mines being employed short of major war is acute in the Middle East.
In October 2020, a Maltese-flagged tanker was damaged by a mine while taking on crude oil the Yemeni port of Bir Ali.
MV Syra reportedly suffered significant damage, resulting in an oil spill.
Shortly after this event, in November 2020, a mine in the Red Sea exploded and damaged a Greek oil tanker.
In December 2020, a Singapore-flagged tanker berthed at the Saudi Arabian port city of Jeddah was damaged by a mine, with Houthi militia from Yemen strongly linked to this attack.
In January 2021, an oil tanker off the coast of Iraq discovered a mine attached to its hull.
 Regional navies, assisted by U.S. and U.K. navies, have stepped up mine countermeasures exercises in the Arabian Gulf.
Most recently, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States conducted the Artemis Trident MCM Exercise in Arabian Gulf.

As part of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia mined the waters off the Crimean Peninsula.
Some of those mines either broke loose or were cut loose and drifted into shipping lanes used by Ukrainian and NATO ships.17 Russia has continued to use sea mines extensively during the conflict in Ukraine.
One of the most prominent examples involved Russian forces laying mines along the Dnieper River to the north of Kherson city to make it harder for the Ukrainians to cross.

Other incidents have included Russian drifting mines that have been found along the coasts of Turkey and Romania, as well as elsewhere in the Black Sea.
An Estonian cargo ship in the Black Sea was sunk by a Russian mine during this war.
More recently, in February 2023, Turkish media claimed that a drifting sea mine exploded near Agva on the Black Sea coast.

The ability of the U.S. Navy to deal with the growing threat of sea mines is not getting better, it is getting worse.
The platforms that embody the U.S. Navy’s primary mine countermeasures (MCM) capability—the MH-53E AMCM aircraft and the Avenger-class minesweeper—are scheduled to retire in the next few years, which will leave the totality of the Navy’s MCM capability in the discrete number of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to be outfitted with the Mine Countermeasures mission package, which has suffered multiple delays during testing and development.

This is not the MCM capability needed by a global navy facing a pervasive mine threat.
Nor is it a solution that eliminates the extreme danger to Sailors who are forced to work in a minefield to accomplish their mission, especially when the minefield is overlayed with the advanced anti-ship and anti-air capabilities of a great power adversary.
Fortunately, technology has advanced to the point that with the proper commitment the Navy can conduct MCM remotely by leveraging unmanned systems and take the Sailor out of the minefield.

Leveraging Unmanned Technologies to Defeat Deadly Sea Mines

For all navies, there is only one way to completely take the Sailor out of the minefield and that is to leverage unmanned technologies to hunt and destroy mines from a distance.
While this principle is readily acknowledged, it is not a lack of need that has impeded the Navy’s efforts, but rather technological maturity.
In the past, unmanned vehicle technologies were not mature enough to take on the complex task of mine hunting.
But today, they are now capable enough.
These capabilities are no longer based on concepts or early prototypes.
Rather, every necessary component has been in the water and tested in operational environments.

The following proposal is based on three subcomponent candidates that can deliver a single-sortie, autonomous mine countermeasures solution with autonomous target recognition.
This design can also flexibly accommodate various towed sonars and remotely operated vehicles (ROVs).

The MARTAC Devil Ray T38 is intended as the autonomous platform for the package, and will host a communications and data transmission hub, in addition to above-water and underwater sensors.

The ThayerMahan Sea Scout Subsea Imaging System is specifically designed for missions such as mine hunting.
The Sea Scout system is based on the in-production COTS Kraken Robotics Katfish-180 tow-body mounted synthetic aperture sonar.
The system is designed to search for mine-like objects and is integrated by ThayerMahan’s remote operations and communications system.

The Pluto Gigas is an existing, standalone, third generation ROV with several systems deployed globally and with over 3,000 mines destroyed.
The Pluto Gigas deploys an acoustically armed and detonated countermine charge that is low-cost both in production and in logistics and sustainment.
Several charges can be loaded onto the T38 to enable single-sortie field clearance.

These three components can combine to deliver an effective mine hunting solution.
The driving principle of this solution is to incorporate mature hardware that will minimize risk to the host platform during execution of the MCM mission.
To that end, the weight and outside dimensions of the mission package are within a few inches of the dimensions of a common 11-meter RHIB.
Launch and recovery should be easily accomplished using standard naval small craft handling procedures for the host vessel.

While this MCM solution is component agnostic, the leading commercial-off-the-shelf candidates for the initial solution were chosen based on their technical maturity, as well as their current use by various navies.
Leveraging these commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) systems will enable this MCM solution to move forward at an accelerated pace to speedily deliver a fleet capability in the near term.

The Need to Take Action Today to Address the MCM Challenge


Because ships and Sailors operate daily in harm’s way, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps—and by extension other allied navies—would be well-served to accelerate their efforts to deal with deadly sea mines.
The essential components for such a system exist today, and a robust COTS MCM solution can reach fruition in the near-term.

While programs of record are developing next-generation technology, navies should invest in parallel-path solutions that leverage mature subsystems that are ready to provide capability today.
It is time to put a speedy solution in the hands of Sailors.

To achieve victory, navies must get to the fight in the face of anti-access area denial capabilities of adversaries.
Given the low cost, ease of deployment, and increasing proliferation of naval mines, the ability to find and clear these deadly mines makes for a major pacing challenge for navies.
Developing and fielding mine countermeasures capabilities, overlooked for too long, should be a first order priority for navies today.

Captain George Galdorisi is a career naval aviator and national security professional.
His 30-year career as a naval aviator culminated in 14 years of consecutive service as executive officer, commanding officer, commodore, and chief of staff.
He enjoys writing, especially speculative fiction about the future of warfare.
He is the author of 18 books, including four consecutive New York Times bestsellers.
His latest book, published by the U.S. Naval Institute, is Algorithms of Armageddon: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Future Wars.


Links :

  • [1] Tyler Rogoway, “The Revolutionary War Gave Birth to the Age of Naval Mine Warfare,” The War Zone, July 4, 2016, accessed at: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/4256/the-revolutionary-war-gave-birth-to-the-age-of-naval-mine-warfare.
  • [2] Christopher Hevey and Anthony Pollman, “Reimagine Offensive Mining, U.S.
    Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2021.
  • [3] Farragut’s boldness is especially striking because in 1862 a Confederate mine sank USS Cairo in the Yazoo River.
  • [4] U.S.
    Navy Fact File, “U.S.
    Navy Mines,” accessed at: https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2167942/us-navy-mines/.
  • [5] See, for example, Paul Ahn, “A Tale of Two Straits,” U.S.
    Naval Institute Naval History Magazine, December 2020 for a concise history of naval mine warfare.
  • [6] “NATO Forces Clear Mines off Port of Dieppe,” The Maritime Executive, April 9, 2020, accessed at: https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/royal-navy-clears-mines-off-port-of-dieppe.
  • [7] US Navy Fact File, “US Navy Mines,” accessed at https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=1200&ct=2).
  • [8] “Surface Forces: Mines Revisited,” Strategy Page, March 13, 2020, accessed at: https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsurf/articles/20200313.aspx
  • [9] Scott Truver, “Taking Mines Seriously: Mine Warfare in China’s Near Seas,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2012, accessed at:
  • https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1429&context=nwc-review.
  • [10] Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Navy Invests in New Mine Warfare Technology,” National Defense Magazine (online), April 6, 2020, accessed at: https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/4/6/navy-invests-in-new-mine-warfare-technology.
  • [11] Edward Lundquist, “Tanker Loading Crude Damaged by Floating Mine in Yemen,” Seapower, October 9, 2020, accessed at: https://seapowermagazine.org/tanker-loading-crude-damaged-by-floating-mine-in-yemen/.
  • [12] Ryan White, “Greek-Operated Tanker Damaged by Mine at Saudi Terminal,” Naval News, November 25, 2020, accessed at: https://navalnews.net/greek-operated-tanker-damaged-by-mine-at-saudi-terminal/.
  • [13] Sam Chambers, “Hafnia Tanker at Jeddah Becomes Latest Mine Victim,” Splash 247.com, December 14, 2020, accessed at: https://splash247.com/hafnia-tanker-at-jeddah-becomes-latest-mine-victim/.
  • [14] “Oil Tanker Near Iraq Finds Mine on Hull as Gulf Risks Mount,” Newsmax, January 4, 2021, accessed at: https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/cos-exe-gen-gov/2021/01/01/id/1003892/.
  • [15] “Saudi, UK, U.S.
    Naval Forces Conduct Mine Countermeasures Training,” Defense-Aerospace, November 29, 2020, accessed at: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/214552/saudi%2C-uk%2C-u.s.-naval-forces-conduct-mine-countermeasures-training.html.
  • [16] Naval News Staff, “U.S.
    France and UK Complete Artemis Trident MCM Exercise in Gulf,” Naval News, April 13, 2023.
  • [17] “Weapons: Naval Mines in The Black Sea,” Strategy Page, February 2, 2023, accessed at: https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htweap/articles/20230202.aspx.
  • [18] Gerrard Kaonga, “Russia Mines River as Soldiers Prepare Kherson Retreat: Kyiv,” Newsweek, October 25, 2002.
  • [19] Scott Savitz, “The Drifting Menace,” Real Clear Defense, (undated), accessed at: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/11/16/the_drifting_menace_865111.html.
  • [20] Tayfun Ozberk, “Sea Mine Explodes on Turkey’s Black Sea Coast,” Naval News, February 14, 2023.

Tuesday, July 30, 2024

How soon might the Atlantic Ocean break? Two sibling scientists found an answer—and shook the World

Image may contain: Chart, Plot, Adult, Person, Map, Box, Accessories, Belt, Glasses, Atlas, and Diagram

From Wired by Sandra Upson

A gigantic, weather-defining current system could be headed to collapse.
Peter and Susanne Ditlevsen had a simple yet controversial question: How much time might we have left to save it?


OFF THE SOUTHWEST tip of Iceland, you’ll find what’s often called a “marginal” body of water.
This part of the Atlantic, the Irminger Sea, is one of the stormiest places in the northern hemisphere.
On Google Maps it gets three stars: “very windy,” says one review.
It’s also where something rather strange is happening.
As the rest of the planet has warmed since the 20th century—less in the tropics, more near the poles—temperatures in this patch of ocean have hardly budged.
In some years they’ve even cooled.
If you get a thrill from spooky maps, check out one that compares the average temperatures in the late 19th century with those of the 2010s.
All of the planet is quilted in pink and red, the familiar colors of climate change.
But in the North Atlantic, there’s one freak splotch of blue. If global warming were a blanket, the Irminger Sea and its neighboring waters are where the moths ate through.
Scientists call it the warming hole.

The warming hole could be a very big problem.
That’s because it’s a sign that something may be wrong with the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation.
The AMOC is the main current system that crisscrosses the ocean.
It flows like a big river up, down, and across the two hemispheres.
All that moving water performs an amazing service—it’s basically a supremely massive, 1-petawatt heat pump for the North Atlantic.

The mega-current hauls warm, salty surface water from the tropics near the Americas up to northern Europe.
There the warm water meets cold air and evaporates.
The atmosphere heats up.
The water that’s left in the AMOC is now colder and saltier—which is to say, it’s much denser than the surrounding water.
And if you’re a cod swimming west of Iceland, you’re in for an astonishing show.
Here the heavy AMOC water doesn’t merely sink, it plummets nearly 3 kilometers down.
(Two miles!) Some 3 million cubic meters of water fall per second, in what amounts to the world’s most record-smashing, invisible waterfall.
This cold river joins up with other falling water—more underwater cataracts—and crawls through the depths of the ocean, following the topography of the seabed, all the way to Antarctica.
The flow intersects other currents, things get messy, and eventually the current rises to the surface near South America and continues its loop.

The big takeaway is a Europe that’s cozier than geography says it should be.
That warm gift—the one where the AMOC dumps much of its heat near Iceland—helps, for example, the Norwegian city of Tromsø to enjoy temperatures as warm as –1 degree Celsius in late January, while, at the same latitude in Canada, Cambridge Bay often gets down to –34 degrees Celsius (or 30 degrees Fahrenheit and –30 degrees Fahrenheit, respectively).
The heat delivery is also why the northern hemisphere is a few degrees warmer than the southern hemisphere and why Earth’s warmest latitude is (on average) not the point closest to the sun—the equator—but 5 degrees north of it.

But, that warming hole.
This spot isn’t feeling the full kapow of rising global temperatures because, in recent years, less heat has been arriving from the tropics.
Which means the currents must be slowing.
By some calculations, the AMOC’s flow has weakened by 15 percent since the middle of the 20th century.
Looking back further, it is the weakest it has been in a millennium.

Which is alarming.
To be sure, the worry is not that the AMOC is on the verge of a complete stop.
The fear is that it will cross a pivotal threshold, and then begin a decline that is unstoppable.

At that point, it would take many decades for the currents to grind to a halt.
Even so, a shutdown would trigger, as one paper put it, “a profound global-scale reorganization” in Earth’s climate systems.
The effects would be devastating—plunging northern Europe into a deep cold spell, crushing food systems, condemning big regions to drought.
It’s so, so bad.

It follows, then, that you’d wonder how close we humans are to that threshold.
Perhaps you’d heard about the AMOC’s frailty; the shutdown threat; maybe even the decades of fighting among scientists as they try to fathom this gigantic, interconnected, barely understood current.
But it was only rather recently that someone dared to go right to the core and ask: How much time do we have left before the AMOC breaks?

“YOU MIGHT WANT to grab your coat,” Peter Ditlevsen says as he strides across his office at the Niels Bohr Institute, where the University of Copenhagen houses its climate researchers.
We’re headed to a walk-in freezer in the basement.
Dressed in a navy sport coat and jeans, he plucks his own jacket off a black metal coat stand and throws it on.
Tall, thin, with short white hair and a lilt to his speech, Ditlevsen is a climate physicist who tried to do something bold.
Some might even say brash.
He tried to answer the big AMOC question, the “how much time” one.
And it got him into a bit of trouble.

Ditlevsen started out in pure physics—first string theory, then solid-state physics.
Then, when Danish academic jobs proved scarce, he took a gig at the Danish weather office in Copenhagen.
He’d spread printouts across his desk to look busy and secretly binge-read meteorology textbooks.
When he finally found a job at the University of Copenhagen, it was in a group studying Greenland ice cores—cylinders up to 3 kilometers long that were drilled and extracted from glaciers.
The discipline was a touch random, perhaps, coming from solid-state physics.
But the cores, they were magic, like finding the Rosetta stone in a popsicle.

I scurry after Ditlevsen down a hall and two flights of stairs.
This building, one of many belonging to the institute, opened in 1932 as a research lab linked to the Carlsberg brewing company.
The beer folks were big on science and invented the pH scale.
(“You notice this?” Ditlevsen asks, pointing at the ornate metalwork in the staircase railings—the company’s logo, which it adopted in the 19th century as a symbol of luck.
Peering at the metal’s loops and bends, I spot it: a swastika.
History in filigree.)

We head down a narrow basement hallway past old cabinets and a giant, dusty globe.
Ditlevsen pulls open the heavy metal door of a walk-in freezer, and the air, at –20 degrees Celsius, slaps me in the face.
On the right are shelves containing large polystyrene boxes.
Inside them are chunks of ice cores, cut into segments about 55 centimeters long.
Along the opposite wall is a metal workbench with ice-cutting tools.
Without thinking, I rest my hand on it.
My skin sticks to the metal.

Scientists realized that the data in the ice was big, big news: Greenland was revealing that the climate changes not only gradually but also “in great leaps.”

This freezer holds a tiny subset of the university’s massive ice core collection.
It’s here thanks in large part to a geophysicist named Willi Dansgaard, who, when he arrived at the University of Copen­hagen, installed a mass spectrometer.
One day in June 1952—in what Dansgaard later described as “a minor, but to me, fateful miracle”—an epic downpour got him pondering the composition of rain.
He set out an empty beer bottle on his lawn and put a funnel in it.
The next day a warm front passed through and he brought out pots and pitchers.
When he analyzed his samples with the mass spectrometer, he saw that rain from warmer clouds contained more of the isotope oxygen-18 than rain from higher, colder clouds.
A nice observation, but the real leap came when he started thinking about youngand old water.
He realized he could get a glimpse of the climate at different moments in history.
All he had to do was look at oxygen-18 levels: More of it meant warmer weather, less meant chillier.
The best place to find old water, of course, is inside a glacier.
When Dansgaard finally got his hands on his first ice core, he cracked open a much earlier chapter of Earth’s climate history.
He unlocked a trove of information—and work—for physicists like Ditlevsen who could devote their careers to figuring out what the ice could tell us.


Inside the ice core freezer at the Niels Bohr Institute, at the University of Copenhagen.
PHOTOGRAPH: EMILIE LAERKE
 

PHOTOGRAPH: EMILIE LAERKE

Ditlevsen lifts plastic-wrapped ice segments one by one and sets them down with a light thud on the lid of another polystyrene box.
“Aha, see here!” he says, holding up one cylinder.
Gray stripes divide clean white.
“Those are melt layers,” he says.
For the gray to form, the temperatures must have gone above zero: “Very unusual for Greenland.” An ice core from this region can contain an almost annual, sometimes even monthly, record of temperatures stretching back as far as 130,000 years.
Each core, an ancient weather station that silently recorded dust storms, wildfires, heat waves, and cold snaps for a thousand centuries.
Using the layers, “you can count your way through the ice,” Ditlevsen says.
Not only by eyeballing the melt bands, but with more precise measurements—oxygen isotopes, salinity, dust particles, more.
All tiny samples of long-ago atmospheres and the world in which they belonged.

It was in the 1970s, as Dansgaard and others studied the ancient ice, that they made a wild, monumental discovery.
In the last glacial period, Greenland warmed up to 16 degrees Celsius (61 degrees Fahrenheit) in a mere 50 years.
That’s an astonishing, rapid jump, like a normally icy winter in Chicago or Vladivostok suddenly feeling like balmy spring.
The heat blast wasn’t a fluke—abrupt, giant swings had happened 25 times.
Cooling events took a bit longer but were still swift.
As they worked, scientists realized that the data in the ice was big, big news: Greenland was revealing that the climate changes not only gradually but also “in great leaps,” as the late climate scientist Wallace Broecker wrote in 1987.
Earth isn’t so steady and reliable, as everyone assumed.
Its climate has in fact been unstable throughout the millennia.

What triggered the jumps? As Broecker guessed in the late ’80s and (after 30-some years of debate) many scientists now agree: abrupt, dramatic changes in the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation.

That the climate could change violently had huge implications.
As more carbon was being released into the atmosphere, Broecker and other scientists were getting increasingly anxious that it wasn’t degrading the planet in only the steady, humdrum, “up goes the heat” kind of way.
They worried that humans were pushing the climate toward a big jump.
“Our climate system has proven it can do very strange things,” he wrote in 1997.
“We’re entering dangerous territory and provoking an ornery beast.” What remained was a very important question: Could a leap be predicted?

In the 1990s, Ditlevsen found plain old climate change kind of dull, but this—this was exciting.
He started analyzing the ice core record in search of warning signs of a coming jump.
He was hunting for patterns that preceded those 25 cataclysms—signatures in the oxygen-18 content, say, or in calcium.
Anything that reliably preceded an abrupt change.
But the hints, if they existed at all, were easy to miss.
Finding them was ultimately a problem of statistics—what’s a real signal, what’s mere noise.
At times, Ditlevsen enlisted his dad, a math and engineering professor at another Danish university.
(The father-son pair cowrote a paper in 2009 on rapid climate shifts.) In all those years, Ditlevsen never found an early-warning sign in the ice core data.


Peter Ditlevsen lifts a segment of an ice core, at the Niels Bohr Institute.
PHOTOGRAPH: EMILIE LAERKE

But elsewhere around the planet, scientists were amassing evidence that specific parts of the climate system were nearing dangerous thresholds and big transitions of their own: the melting of the Greenland ice sheets (7 meters of sea level rise) and the Antarctic ice sheets (another 60 meters), the death of the Amazon rainforest (incalculable loss of biodiversity), the catastrophic disruption of monsoons (droughts affecting billions of people).

The International Panel on Climate Change, the 200-or-so grand arbiters of the climate canon, was devoting more pages in its reports to this type of risk.
And scientists were converging around language for what they were seeing.
They called the thresholds “tipping points.”

TIPPING POINTS ARE absolutely everywhere.
Throw water on a fire, and the flames will shrink but recover.
Dump enough water on and you’ll cross a threshold and snuff it out.
Tip a chair and it’ll wobble before settling back onto its four feet.
Push harder, and it topples.
Birth is a tipping point.
So is death.

Once you’ve pushed a system to its tipping point, you’ve removed all brakes.
No exit.
As one 500-page report recently put it, climate tipping points “pose some of the gravest threats faced by humanity.” Crossing one, the report goes on, “will severely damage our planet’s life-support systems and threaten the stability of our societies.”

In 2019 the European Union launched a project on climate tipping points.
­Fifty-some scientists from 15 countries got involved.
One big goal: to assess the near-future risk of, say, an AMOC shutdown or the Amazon turning into a savanna.
Ditlevsen signed on as the project’s leader.
His partner was Niklas Boers, a climate physicist at the Technical University of Munich in Germany.

In the panelists’ view, the AMOC had less than a 1-in-10 chance of collapsing before 2100.
One in 10.
Those odds didn’t strike him as “very unlikely.” Russian roulette is one in six, and we all agree that’s a bad idea.

Back in his PhD days, Boers had been pursuing a pure math degree before ditching it—“I don’t want to say it was meaningless, but I wasn’t interested,” he says.
The climate, though, had real stakes.
“The whole climate system is so complex that it’s where the beauty of math, of probability theory and dynamical systems and complexity theory, can really play out.” He had been investigating early warning signs in a variety of datasets, and he decided to dig into the AMOC.

Much as you have a natural walking speed, the AMOC has a preferred flow rate.
It’s measured in Sverdrups, named after the Norwegian oceanographer Harald Sverdrup, who in the first half of the 20th century modernized the study of oceans with a sweeping textbook and curriculum.
The rate varies by location, but these days at a latitude of 26 degrees north, the flow is 17 Sverdrups, or 17 million cubic meters per second.
The Sverdrups can swing up or down, but over time the flow returns to that preferred rate.
When a system approaches a tipping point, though, the characterof the fluctuations changes.
With the AMOC, you might see the flow rate increasingly struggle to regain its equilibrium.
The rate might wander farther and farther away from the comfy baseline.
And the system might take longer to settle back into its routine state.
These features—the greater meandering, the slower return to home base—are an obsession of tipping-point mathematicians.
If you were to plot the data for a system that’s about to tip, you’d see the data points first follow a nice, predictable path; then the path gets jittery, and then it goes off on wide, whiplashing swings.
The system is becoming less stable, taking longer to recover.
You can almost feel sorry for it.
You can sense a sort of sickness.

For people like Boers and Ditlevsen, though, there’s a problem: Continuous measurements of the AMOC’s flow rate go back to only 2004, when scientists installed monitoring stations at sea.
That’s nowhere near enough time for researchers to see, in the data, what the AMOC is truly up to.
So Boers decided to use something AMOC-adjacent, which also happened to be the only long-term dataset that has anything to do with the Atlantic Ocean.
He’d use sea surface temperatures.

In 1749, an English slave trader who was sailing off the western coast of Africa lowered a special bucket with valves and a thermometer into the water.
He did this again and again, hauling up the bucket and noting the depths of the sample and the water’s temperature.
He was surprised to find that deep water was always cold.
His heat-weary crew immediately used the deep water to take baths and cool their drinks.
From then on, other voyagers sporadically dropped buckets into the Atlantic and jotted down readings, either out of scientific curiosity or as a potential navigational aid—to identify a useful current or get a warning of icebergs ahead.
They collected their data in many different places, depths, times of day.
They also used all manner of buckets, thermometers, and units of measurement (Centigrade, Fahrenheit, Réaumur).
The data was a mess.
A century later a consortium of seafaring nations standardized the method of measurement.
But it was only in the 1970s, when instrument-packed drifting buoys and weather satellites were deployed, that the temperatures of the seas were systematically recorded.

Scientists and historians have spent decades cleaning and organizing all that data.
Other researchers then took that information—hundreds of thousands of temperature readings (and other measurements, namely salinity)—and used them to compute proxies for the AMOC’s strength.
They called these measurements “finger­prints.”

When Boers sat down with the data, in 2020, he picked eight fingerprints from earlier research and tried to spot meaningful changes in the patterns of temperatures and salinities over time.
He wrote up his results in a 2021 paper.
In it, all eight fingerprints showed the same thing: The AMOC was becoming less stable and looked to be “close to a critical transition.”

Ditlevsen, though, wasn’t sold on Boers’ methods.
He felt Boers was using a statistical tool that was unnecessarily weak.
Ditlevsen believed you could safely make more assumptions about the AMOC, use more powerful statistical tools, and see more clearly how the giant current was changing.
Boers didn’t like the trade-off, because an assumption can of course be wrong.
They clashed.
Ditlevsen decided to take his own whack at the data.

IN 2021, DITLEVSEN was teaching his classes online and living on a plot of land in the Danish countryside, on the northern coast of Zealand—another person who fled big-city living when the pandemic flared up.
“We all thought we’d be the new Newton,” he recalls.
The famous mathematician had, during the Great Plague of 1665, retreated to the country and had his annus mirabilis, in which he basically discovered gravity, calculus, and optics.
Ditlevsen, though, was building a house.


Peter Ditlevsen began his physics career in string theory.
PHOTOGRAPH: EMILIE LAERKE


He drew up the plans and got the materials.
Giant panes of glass, skylights, tawny wood siding.
He worked on it all year, largely alone, in a country with an annual average of 170 days of rain.
(“You really want to get the roof up,” he says.) As he measured, sawed, sanded, and hammered, he also thought about tipping points.

He coded up a quick model of an AMOC-style system, using math he felt was more useful than what Boers had chosen.
He would take it as a given that the AMOC was a certain type of tipping system.
Then, knowing that these kinds of tipping systems follow certain universal rules, he could generate artificial data to fill in the future.
That would predict the date at which the system would tip.
He plugged in the water temperatures and let the code run.
Now here he was, staring at a rather remarkable number: 2057.

The year when the AMOC might tip.
A year so close you can almost grasp it.
You can plug it into a retirement calculator.
Or schedule-send an email.

Ditlevsen felt vaguely annoyed.
The IPCC had just come out with a report that said the AMOC was “very unlikely” to shut down before 2100.
That time horizon gave people room to breathe, figure things out, chart a different course.
Ditlevsen had been hoping to confirm the panel’s estimate.
How irritating that he hadn’t.

One day, he gave an online talk on how to spot early warning signs in climate data.
He sent a link to his sister, Susanne Ditlevsen—four years younger, and with whom he grew up playing chess—and suggested she might find it interesting.
While watching the video, she says, “I got some ideas.”


Susanne Ditlevsen figured out a better way to make sense of systems with a lot of randomness.
PHOTOGRAPH: EMILIE LAERKE


Susanne is a statistics professor and, like her brother, also works at the University of Copenhagen.
Their offices are a five-minute bike ride apart.
They sometimes meet for lunch at the café in Susanne’s building.
She has striking blue eyes, thick, wavy white hair, and a strong voice that commands the room.
After finishing high school in their hometown north of Copenhagen, Susanne studied acting.
She fell in love with a Spanish theater director and left for Spain.
“She ran off, like in the movies where the circus comes through town,” her brother recalls.
Susanne spent 10 years performing in plays across the country.
She also had a baby.
It wasn’t long after that she realized she wasn’t living the life she wanted.
“I was sitting and breastfeeding, and I started thinking, I don’t want to do this for the rest of my life,” she says.
She wanted to use her brain more.
She’d always liked math, she was good at it, so now she figured she’d do some for fun.

She signed up for distance classes from a school in Spain.
“I was traveling on the tour bus with my math books,” she says.
For five years she worked as an actor, took care of her son, and studied.
She divorced the Spanish director and later returned to Copenhagen, intent on earning her doctorate and being close to her mother, a retired schoolteacher.
She got into a bio­statistics graduate program at the University of Copenhagen and in 2005 joined the faculty.
She collaborated with neuroscientists and ecologists and spent 12 years studying narwhals.
And she cowrote a paper with their father.

While Peter was obsessing over tipping points, Susanne was on the cusp of a breakthrough.
Nothing to do with narwhals or neurons.
It was pure stats.
She had figured out a better way to make sense of systems with a lot of randomness, that don’t follow straight lines, and where the underlying rules are not well understood.

Susanne realized that she could apply her method to her brother’s problems.
“A tipping point, what is that? It’s something strongly nonlinear.
It is exactly that!” she says.
The system has one way of behaving until, fwoop, suddenly it’s very different.
“It is the most nonlinear thing you can even imagine.” To use her method, you had to make a few more assumptions about how the AMOC behaved, sure, but the payoff could be great.
Using the temperature record, she could estimate some basic parameters of how the world worked before humans started messing with its climate, and some for after the AMOC started looking sick, including the time of tipping.
Peter suggested that they try out her method.
They each wrote up some code—he using Matlab and she in R—to test the technique.

The siblings spent two years refining their approach, doing more tests.
Across a thousand runs, the model cranked through the temperature data and settled on a year.
Sometimes the model spat out later dates.
Sometimes earlier.
The two scientists made a plot of the numbers and a neat cluster emerged.
Yes—2057.
But that’s just the middle point: In 95 percent of the model’s simulations, the AMOC tipped sometime between 2025 and 2095.

They were excited.
Their statistical method was holding up.
They got their paper ready for publication.
Peter came up with the title, “Warning of a Forthcoming Collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation.” Nice and direct.

They didn’t think that much about the audacity of proposing a year (so soon! a few decades away!).
Mostly it was business as usual.
They’d had an idea, tested it out, and were preparing to share the results.
Normal stuff.

Still, Peter was a little worried, his mind returning to that whole not-in-line-with-the-IPCC business.
But he reassured himself with fine print.
In footnote 4 of the IPCC’s latest big report, “very unlikely” meant that, in the panelists’ view, the AMOC had less than a 1-in-10 chance of collapsing before 2100.
One in 10.
Those odds didn’t strike him as “very unlikely.” Russian roulette is one in six, and we all agree that’s a bad idea.
Plus, the IPCC had given its prognosis only a “medium confidence” rating.
To Ditlevsen, that sounded a lot like “we have no clue.”

But the slight anxiety was there.
Ditlevsen was squarely a member of the climate community.
If the paper pissed off other scientists, he would take more heat.
He and his sister sent their final revisions to their journal editor and waited for the article to drop.
On July 25, 2023, their paper appeared on the website of the journal Nature Communications.
“That’s when …” Peter says, his voice trailing off.
“The shit hit the fan.”

I’M SITTING WITH the Ditlevsen siblings in Peter’s office at the university, at a worktable.
Several large paintings decorate the slate-blue walls, including one he painted himself, of abstract figures.
Toward the back of the room stands a large, yellowing map of the world that he scavenged in the basement.

Susanne is at the head of the table.
Her wavy hair is pulled into a low ponytail, and she’s dressed in a fisherman’s sweater in mazarine blue over jeans and sensible, gray, it’s-rainy-here ankle boots.
It’s been almost eight months since their paper came out, and they’re still gobsmacked.
“We did not even think nonscientists would ever see our paper,” she said.
Nature Communications is a mid-tier journal and not to be confused with Nature, perhaps the most prestigious journal in the world.
But “Warning of a Forthcoming Collapse” has been viewed more times than any other paper in either journal in 2023.
By a lot.

Journalists besieged them with emails and phone calls.
They gave interviews eight hours a day.
“We were completely overwhelmed by all the media attention, and then of course from all the weirdos,” Susanne recalls.
Some headlines claimed that the AMOC (or as The Guardian incorrectly called it, the Gulf Stream) could “cease to exist” or “collapse” or “totally switch off” in 2025, with implications of human catastrophe within months—not at all what the Ditlevsens had written.

A nonprofit media center in the UK compiled a set of “expert reactions” to their paper, something it does for only a few scientific studies out of the tens of thousands published every week.
Some of the reactions were positive, others measured—and some brutal.
The paper, said one scientist, “had feet of clay.” “No evidence of a slowdown,” said another expert.
Niklas Boers sent in his assessment: “I do not agree with the outcome of this study.”

“They were really top experts,” Peter says.
His eyes widened and he shook his head.
“Shit, man!”

“I remember you sending me the link” to the expert reactions, Susanne says, “and saying, this is what we should be reading carefully.” They combed through the responses together, some of them only a few sentences and others running many paragraphs long.
They figured out which ones they wanted to reply to directly.

The day after the paper came out, Ditlevsen got an email from Boers and one of his graduate students.
Attached was a 21-page refutation of their work.
The basic issue—for Boers and several others—was the sea surface temperatures.
The problem wasn’t only that the dataset relied on random men in the Age of Sail.
A more fundamental concern was that no one knows what temperatures near the ocean’s surface say exactly about the hemisphere-spanning, depths-traversing flow that is the AMOC.
The temperature data was still worth examining, as Boers had done in his own paper, but, he argued, the uncertainties are too large to ever pin down a specific ­tipping-point year.

“We have a 3D ocean, three-quarters of our planet, and a circulation system in that ocean,” Boers tells me.
“It physically does not make sense to model that as a one-dimensional time series” and try to predict the future.
Perhaps his biggest gripe, though, was with the Ditlevsens’ assumptions about the AMOC’s character.
For one thing, their mathematical framework assumed that the AMOC will tip soon.
Big assumption.
The equations behave differently when a system is far from its tipping point.

The Ditlevsens agree with many of the critiques.
They tried to capture some of the uncertainties in the paper; others they considered less pertinent.
In their view, the issue is too urgent to not try to find the date.
And their assumptions didn’t come from nowhere.
They were based on other scientists’ work—ice core data, big model runs, older theoretical models.
“The dataset is the data that we have,” Susanne says.
“Should we not try to understand the AMOC in the last 150 years? When it’s so serious!”

Peter leans back in his chair and interlaces his fingers.
He’s staring into the distance.
Susanne, though, is leaning forward on her elbows, back straight, unfazed.
“We have really been scrutinized on a level that nobody is used to,” she says.
“It’s a gift.
It’s a gift to be scrutinized.”


The siblings published their AMOC paper in July 2023.
"That’s when,” Peter says, “the shit hit the fan.”PHOTOGRAPH: EMILIE LAERKE


In January 2024, Peter happened to be reading the Wikipedia article for the AMOC.
About two-thirds of the way down the page, he came across a few lines critiquing his and his sister’s paper.
The description called their paper “very controversial.” There, again, was the “feet of clay.” Annoyed, he logged in to Wikipedia under a pseudonym and started adding sentences.
When he checked back later, another editor, someone very steeped in this corner of science, had rejected his edits.
He logged in again, now under the name “pditlev,” and gave it another go.
This time his account got banned.

“Of course you want to be proven wrong,” Peter says to me, “but you also don’t want to be a fool.”

The AMOC transports a staggering amount of energy.
Like a million nuclear power plants.
It is such a core element of the Earth system that its collapse would radically alter regional weather patterns, the water cycle, the ability of every country to provide food for its inhabitants.

For the past several months, the two have been working urgently to complete the sequel to their original paper.
Other datasets.
More statistics.
“We have to clean up after ourselves,” Peter says.

“Clean up? I don’t think so,” Susanne replies, “Consolidate.” See if other AMOC-related data leads them to a similar date.
Get at the truth of possible doom.
Because if they’re right—or even roughly right—we all might want to know a whole lot more about what comes next.

WITH ALL THE unknowns, it is of course dicey to project what happens after the currents stop.
But let’s just, for a moment, say the AMOC crosses its tipping point and starts heading to collapse.
Researchers have taken a stab at modeling what that future might look like.

First, the system would slow and slow until—well, nobody knows.
It could be headed to a full stop.
That would take about a century.
Or it might settle into a much weaker flow.
Both are bad.
The AMOC transports a staggering amount of energy.
Like a million nuclear power plants.
It is such a core element of the Earth system that its collapse would radically alter regional weather patterns, the water cycle, the ability of every country to provide food for its inhabitants.

Below the surface of the ocean, the invisible waterfalls near Iceland and Greenland would peter out.
That’s horrendous for creatures in the deep who need the oxygen the AMOC delivers to survive.
Widespread die-off of marine life: likely.
Shutting off the current would also cause the ocean’s surface to smooth out.
The flattened water level will be higher than it is now, which will mean almost a meter of sea level rise along the US northeast coast.
(That’s in addition to the sea level rise from melting glaciers.)

Without the big heat delivery that softens its winters, Europe would end up with much more intense seasons, according to a 2022 report.
A lot more snow.
Much less rain.
In the post-­tipping decades, many European cities might end up colder by 5 to 15 degrees Celsius.
In Bergen, Norway, the temps could drop a whopping 35 degrees Celsius.
Sea ice in winter might extend all the way down to the southern UK.
The summers, meanwhile: hotter and drier.

An AMOC shutdown would clobber the food system.
The fraction of land suitable for growing wheat and maize—staple crops worldwide—would drop by roughly half.
In an analysis of how an AMOC collapse would affect agriculture in the UK, the authors wrote there would be “a nearly complete cessation” of arable farming.
Goodbye oats, barley, wheat.
A massive irrigation project could salvage the land at a cost of roughly $1 billion a year, more than 10 times the yearly profit from the crops.
Food prices would spike.
Further north, in places like Norway and Sweden, food production would also plummet.
Those countries would have to rely heavily on imports.
But perhaps not from the usual sources.
The power­houses of Ukraine, Poland, and Bulgaria—Europe’s breadbaskets—would also be dealing with less rain, colder weather, and severe losses of income from the crash of their ag industry.

The worst effects, though, would be likely to hit the tropics.
The Intertropical Convergence Zone is the swath of atmosphere around the equator—centered at about 6 degrees north—with little wind and lots of rain.
Sailors called it the doldrums.
Season by season, that zone’s band of clouds migrates north or south, and those movements bring either extended dry periods or months of rain.
An AMOC collapse would push the doldrums southward.
In the Amazon, the altered Intertropical Zone could cause the wet and dry seasons to flip to the opposite times of year.
The plants, insects, fungi, and mammals below the canopy would be forced to adapt at warp speed—or die off.
Not to mention the trees themselves, which, in addition to supporting an intricate ecosystem, absorb tons of carbon from the atmosphere.
The Amazon, of course, is being logged and overheated to its own tipping point, and an AMOC shutoff could be the final shove.

But that, one might argue, is the least of it.
Research on these projections is scant, but some studies say if the rain band scoots south, then India, East Asia, and West Africa would lose much or all of their monsoon seasons.
Two-thirds of Earth’s population depends on monsoon rain, in large part to grow their crops.
These changes would happen over only a few growing seasons rather than over generations, giving little time to adapt.
In the precarious Sahel region in Africa, subsistence farmers might find that sorghum, an essential, nutrient-rich cereal, becomes nearly impossible to grow.
Tens of millions of people might need to migrate to survive.

On the other hand, Australia might enjoy a little more rain and crank out a few more loaves of bread per year.

THAT’S A LOT of mights, coulds, and shoulds.
Extrapolations on top of educated guesses.
As I spent months reading the research and making calls, I found scientists disputing the details of nearly all things AMOC.
Whether the warming hole around the Irminger Sea still mattered (maybe global warming had swallowed it up), whether the AMOC was actually slowing down (maybe the flow naturally varies a whole lot), whether the AMOC even exists (maybe it’s better understood as many smaller current systems).
For a reporter trying to tie together these strings of evidence—self-doubt, befuddlement, despair.
So I asked Peter Ditlevsen if it bothered him that data on the AMOC is so scarce.

“Noooo, no,” he replied with a grin.
“If I worked in black holes, I’d find it very exciting.
We have two photos of black holes, that’s it.” With the currents in the Atlantic, he noted, “we have this big dark area, and we are approaching it from different sides.”


Peter found an old map in the basement of the university and put it up in his office.
PHOTOGRAPH: EMILIE LAERKE

“From the point of view of climate change, we’re not saying anything new,” Susanne adds.
“We’re just saying, it’s serious.
We have to do something now.” We have to cut down on emissions.
Transition faster to renewable energy, EVs.
Give the oceans a chance to recover.
Push out the 2057 date.
That forecast drew loads of attention not because it was a staggering intellectual feat but because it had something most scientific papers lack, something precious: It had an emotional punch.
As the siblings once put it, everyone knows someone who’ll be around in 30 years.

If the AMOC can possibly break in three decades, you want the world’s best minds on the case.
You want them exploring every angle and ferreting out the least-wrong explanation for what’s happening in that big, dark area.
“It’s important that things be put out there without 100 percent certainty,” Peter says.
(He couldn’t resist adding that Albert Einstein had to wait eight years, and fix his own mistakes, before general relativity was proven right.)

I shouldn’t have been a bit surprised, then, that the scientists were in good spirits.
The paper Susanne wrote about her new statistical method, the one she used in the “Warning” paper, had been accepted in the top stats journal.
“What every statistician dreams of,” she says.

Boers, meanwhile, had submitted his multipage rebuttal to “Warning” to a journal, where, at press time, it was undergoing review.
When we spoke in late May, he was also remarkably cheerful about the disputes.
“It’s just absolutely natural for science, and I’m enjoying that,” he told me.
He seemed to relish being the voice of uncertainty: tracking down every last source of it, quantifying it, working it into his predictions of the future.

He brought a distinct caution to his work; Peter, a certain audacity.
But their goal was basically the same—to find language for the risks of extreme events.
So that everyone can talk about them more clearly, then plan, and with luck, avoid.

As for Boers’ big takeaway? He stumbled for a moment, clearly searching for the words that would be the least contestable.
“Regardless of all the uncertainties and all the disagreements,” he ventured, “99.99 percent of my colleagues and I are on the same page—increasing temperatures further increases the likelihood of an AMOC tipping.”

That’s because—and we know this for sure—the extra heat in the air has effectively cranked on a tap over the north Atlantic.
It’s making more rain pour down on that area.
It’s melting more of Greenland’s ice, which then drains into the seas—right on top of the AMOC’s engine, the mega waterfalls.
All that lightweight, salt-free water makes it harder for the currents to overturn.
Keep running the tap and the trouble compounds.
That’s why the threat of tipping seems so real.
The waterfalls could indeed trickle to a stop.
“And we just really don’t want that to happen,” Boers added.

Besides, there’s another possibility.
A remote one, sure, but one that also can’t be ruled out: The AMOC might have already tipped.
And we wouldn’t know it for years.
 
Links :

Monday, July 29, 2024

Overreliance on GPS nearly caused grounding in Great Barrier Reef

Rosco Poplar's true position next to Bond Reef (red-black, center right) and false GPS position (green, center-left) occurred early on the morning of May 4, 2022
(ATSB / ReefVTS)

The Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (ATSB) has released its investigative report on the near-grounding of the Rosco Poplar in the Great Barrier Reef, which started with a faulty GPS unit and was narrowly averted at the last minute by a marine pilot. 

The final report into the near-miss grounding of bulk carrier Rosco Poplar highlights the various concepts, techniques and attitudes that together comprise bridge resource management are essential defences against human error.
 
In the early hours of May 4, 2022, the bulker Rosco Poplar prepared to enter Hydrographers Passage, a narrow channel through the Great Barrier Reef.
 
Figure 10: The Great Barrier Reef region (Designated Shipping Areas are highlighted)

 
The ship was inbound for the Hay Point coal terminal, with the master and a coastal pilot on the bridge and the second mate on watch.
It was the 1,685th time that the pilot was transiting the passage.
Visibility was clear, and there was little traffic, just one ship ahead.
The tide was running, and an exceptionally strong tidal stream of more than five knots of opposing current would be setting the ship near the passage entrance.
The passage plan called for maximum speed in order to offset the effects of the current.
 
Navigational chart showing Blossom Bank pilot boarding ground
Figure 1: Navigational chart showing Blossom Bank pilot boarding ground
Figure 2: Entrance to Hydrographers Passage 
Entrance to Hydrographers Passage
 
 Figure 3: Navigational chart with Rosco Poplar’s radar display overlaid (grey) at 0217
Navigational chart with Rosco Poplar’s radar display overlaid (grey) at 0217
 
Figure 4: Standard planned routes near Bond Entrance (inbound tracks are blue)
 Standard planned routes near Bond Entrance (inbound tracks are blue)
 
Figure 5: Rosco Poplar’s track, as displayed on the ship’s ECDIS
Rosco Poplar’s track, as displayed on the ship’s ECDIS
 
At 0239, as they entered the passage, the master noticed that there was a difference between the heading displayed on the radar and the heading on the ECDIS units.
He discussed the discrepancy with the second mate in Chinese for the next 20 minutes, and he recalled that something similar had happened on a previous voyage, but he did not tell the pilot.
Though no one on the bridge knew it, the ship's GPS unit was generating a false position reading, and it was feeding it to the ECDIS, the AIS, the radars and the pilot's PPU tablet.
The PPU was set up to use the ship's GPS data feed for positioning instead of its own independent GPS receiver, contrary to company policy.
 
Figure 13: Radar image at 0235
Radar image at 0235
 
A 0246, the pilot ordered a turn to line up with the next waypoint and stay about 0.8 nm west of Bond Reef, a hazard on the east side of the channel.
He looked out the window and saw that the sector light ahead was white, indicating that the vessel was lined up on a safe course.
Shortly after, the vessel's master noticed that a flashing white light on the port bow was getting closer, and was now nearly dead ahead.
This was Bond Reef Light, a warning marker on the edge of the reef, but the master was not aware of its identity.
He did not notify the pilot, who was relying solely on the ECDIS and PPU for tracking the ship's position.

Figure 12: Position indicated by GPS at 0305 vs actual position (radar overlaid in grey)
Position indicated by GPS at 0305 vs actual position (radar overlaid in grey)
 
 
 
At 0311, the pilot looked out to check the sector light, and he saw that it was red.
He ordered a heading change to starboard to take the ship back to the center of the channel.
One minute later, multiple alarms sounded on the bridge indicating that the GPS had failed.
The bridge team watched Bond Reef light slide by in the night, close aboard on the port side.

When the GPS came back online, they saw that the ship's apparent position on the ECDIS - which had appeared to be normal and on course up until 0312 - had shifted to the east edge of the channel, towards the reef.
The GPS unit's position had been off by 0.92 nautical miles to the west (below).

At 0313, the VTS center for the Great Barrier Reef (ReefVTS) received a series of automated grounding warnings based on the AIS signal from Rosco Poplar.
The vessel's AIS unit was transmitting the vessel's now-accurate position next to Bond Reef.
The VTS operator assumed that this sudden position change was a system error, and he spent the next 17 minutes attempting to troubleshoot it with colleagues.
At 0336, he managed to raise the Rosco Poplar on VHF, and he confirmed with the pilot that the ship had in fact passed dangerously close to Bond Reef.
The ship completed the rest of the pilotage uneventfully and continued to the anchorage area, where an investigation began.

Figure 7: Rosco Poplar's navigational equipment bridge
Rosco Poplar's navigational equipment bridge
 
Figure 8: Diagram of bridge equipment configuration
Diagram of bridge equipment configuration
 
Over the next few days, two obsolete GPS units and their antennas were replaced aboard Rosco Poplar - a job that had been anticipated and scheduled weeks before the near-miss.
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority's inspectors then came aboard, and they detained the ship until June 9 so that the bridge officers could receive remedial training.
AMSA determined that they "demonstrated inadequate operational proficiency with respect to navigation."

Meanwhile, ATSB investigators pulled the ship's voyage data recorder and downloaded images from the bridge radar displays.
The radar return of the other ship on the display showed that the target's GPS position began to clearly deviate from the radar position at about 0235 - a sign that the GPS position was faulty.
It also showed that the ship entered the red zone of the sector light at about 0256, roughly 15 minutes before the pilot noticed that something was wrong.

Figure 9: Arrangement of the GPS units
Arrangement of the GPS units
 
The exact cause of the GPS failure could not be determined because the owner removed and replaced the GPS unit days after the casualty, but the OEM suggested that it could have been an antenna failure.
(External spoofing was ruled out, as no other disturbances were reported nearby.) 

Figure 15: Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait compulsory pilotage areas
Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait compulsory pilotage areas
 
The ATSB investigators faulted the bridge team and the pilot for failing to notice that they were standing into danger.
The agency found that if they had used the radar to check their progress, they would have picked up early signs that the GPS position was off.
Likewise, visual checks on the Bond Reef light and the sector light should have provided clear indicators that the ship was drifting off track.
As the bridge team did not adequately use these means of navigation, ATSB found, it took them about 37 minutes between the time when the GPS unit failed and the time when the pilot detected danger.

ATSB also noted basic failures of bridge resource management, beginning with a less-than-detailed master-pilot exchange.
"While a key aim of the MPX was to establish individual roles and responsibilities for watchkeeping and expectations for communication during the pilotage, these requirements were neither discussed nor implemented," the agency concluded.
A fuller MPX might have encouraged the ship's master to speak up when he began to have doubts about the accuracy of the ship's position.

ATSB also faulted Australia's pilot competency assessment program, which requires every marine pilot to undergo a "check voyage" with a "check pilot" - one of their colleagues.
The agency looked at all 490 check voyages conducted since 2017, and found that the pilots had given each other a pass rate of nearly 100 percent with zero "unsatisfactory" results.
While intended to improve pilotage, the check system "had not resulted in any significant benefit to coastal pilot competency by way of formalized corrective action," ATSB concluded.
The agency recommended reviewing and improving the assessment system.

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