Thursday, February 5, 2026

Natalia Molchanova, the enigma of depths

Tribute to the life of Natalia Molchanova - get a glimpse into the life of freediving legend Natalia Molchanova.
Natalia was a freediving world champion and the holder of 42 world records.
She remains the world’s most titled freediver ever, achieving world records in all freediving disciplines.
She won a total of 22 individual gold medals and two team gold medals at Freediving World Championships during her career.
On 25th September 2009, she became the first woman ever to pass 100m (328ft) of depth on a breath-hold in Constant Weight with a freedive to 101m (331ft).
Natalia was the president of the Freediving Federation.
She designed and established its educational program from beginner to instructor level.
Natalia shared her passion and knowledge of freediving both through her courses and with her university students in Moscow.
Today, thousands of freedivers have been trained by the Freediving Federation and several hundred instructors share Natalia’s knowledge with a new generation of freedivers.
In 2015, the presidency was passed to her son Alexey Molchanov, also a freediving world champion and record holder.
Natalia led research in freediver physiology and was interested in relaxation techniques and improving freediving performance and safety.
She was the author of many articles, books, and educational materials on freediving.
Much of her work has been translated into English.
Her love and passion for the sea are also reflected in poems she wrote and a short artistic movie she created, for which she received a number of festival awards.
Natalia’s life was about freediving.
Natalia’s aspiration was always to strive for safe and efficient freediving, and to achieve this through the provision of education and training, and producing the world’s best freediving equipment.

From Pulse

Picture this: recline comfortably, shut your eyes, exhale slowly, and draw in a deep breath, filling your lungs to capacity—then hold that breath.
As seconds trickle by, your focus narrows inward, honing in on your body.
Pressure builds in your chest, and your heartbeat becomes pronounced.
As the urge to inhale intensifies, you face a choice—succumb to immediate panic or delve deeper into a calm state, attempting to steady your heart rate, quiet your mind, and quell restlessness as your body braces for oxygen.

How long can you maintain this breath?
The average adult manages about 30 seconds.
Can you extend it to one minute?
Maybe two?
But can you imagine holding it for nine minutes and two seconds?
Natalia Molchanova achieved this feat, setting the women’s world record in static apnea—holding her breath motionless in a pool—in 2013.
Two years later, Molchanova, hailed by many as the greatest free diver in history, vanished off the coast of Spain during a leisure dive on a sunny August morning.
Her body was never recovered.

Before submerging that day, Molchanova had already secured 41 free diving records across various disciplines.
She could maintain motionless stillness in water, descend over 100 meters on a single breath, and traverse hundreds of feet underwater with or without weights.
Her favorite thrill?
Descending 25 meters and unclipping from an emergency rope line, allowing herself to sink freely.

“Freediving isn’t merely a sport; it’s a path to self-discovery,” Molchanova expressed in a 2014 interview. 
“When we dive, free from thought, we realize our wholeness, our unity with the world. When we think, we create separation. On the surface, thoughts abound, cluttering our minds. Freediving helps reset this.”

Born in 1962, Molchanova initially pursued competitive swimming but paused at 20 to start a family. For two decades, she led a conventional life in Moscow, finding joy in riding scooters around the city until, at 40, she stumbled upon a magazine article about free diving, igniting a passion that catapulted her to the pinnacle of the sport within a decade.

The first 25 meters of a dive pose a challenge as our buoyant bodies resist sinking.
Free divers often use weights to overcome this.
Beyond this depth, however, pressure transforms, causing the body to descend rapidly.
Mastery of this requires disciplined control over panic and the impulse to breathe.

During dives, Molchanova entered a state she termed “attention deconcentration,” akin to meditation.
It involved relinquishing thoughts, turning inward, heightening bodily awareness, and embracing sensation over contemplation.
Chemical shifts in deep dives induce nitrogen narcosis, altering consciousness.
Molchanova’s trained mental state enabled her to navigate this, recognizing when her body had endured enough.

Her accomplishments in diving led her to study physiology, eventually joining the faculty of Moscow’s Russian State University.
Her diving prowess earned her the presidency of the Russian Free Dive Federation.

Yet, Molchanova cared little for accolades or records.
She found solace in the ocean’s depths, where she tested herself, surrendering to pressure, meditation, and an unknown world.
“Compared to the ocean, the pool is like running on a treadmill versus running in the forest,” she remarked.

Her underwater experiences inspired poetry and set records, blending academic prowess with poetic insight.

On August 2, 2015, Molchanova disappeared while diving off Formentera, Spain, with friends.
Despite her unparalleled skill, she never resurfaced.
Efforts to locate her proved futile.
Sara Campbell, a fellow free diver, lamented her loss, describing Molchanova as the greatest the world had seen.

In Molchanova’s own words:
From her poem “The Depth”
I have perceived non-existence The silence of the eternal dark, and the infinity. I went beyond the time, time poured into me And we became immovable. I lost my body in the waves Perceiving vacuum and quiet, Becoming like its blue abyss And touching on the oceanic secret. I’m going inwards recollecting What I am. I am made of light. I peer intensely: The depths reveal a breath I merge with it, And unto the world emerges.

Links :

Wednesday, February 4, 2026

Why are Arctic undersea cables going regional?


From ArticToday by Alexandra Middleton, Bjørn Rønning

Since the late 2000s, several Western countries have attempted to build optical fiber subsea cables across the Arctic Ocean.
Some projects, such as Finland’s Arctic Connect, have been suspended, while others are still years away from completion.

While the Far North Fiber and Polar Connect projects are still on the agenda, the time it will take to secure partnerships, gather findings, and build a commercial case in an unstable geopolitical climate means they are far from being realised.

At the same time, pressing security, militarization and sovereignty concerns are driving the development of regional Arctic undersea cables.
For both Norway and Greenland, recent moves to overhaul digital infrastructure reveal a shift toward digital sovereignty, where state control over Arctic fiber cables is prioritised over commercial profit.

Securing connectivity in Northern Norway


Norway is advancing a government-funded replacement for the ageing Svalbard cable system, linking mainland Bodø, Jan Mayen, and Longyearbyen before the current infrastructure’s technical lifespan ends in 2028. 
A new digital infrastructure project, “Arctic Way,” is set to extend high-speed fiber connectivity deeper into the polar north than ever before. 

Lacking a purely commercial business case, the project is primarily a strategic defense initiative designed to secure Norway’s sovereignty in the High North.
However, limited excess capacity will be released to the market.

The Norwegian Parliament approved the project on March 25, with SubCom contracted for production and laying of the cables, and the Norwegian Armed Forces designated as a primary customer for certain segments

Planned to go live in 2028, the system will span 1,567 miles (2,522 km).
Once completed, it will stand as the world’s northernmost repeated subsea cable system, securing a vital communications lifeline for communities and strategic interests in the High North.

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Major work began in 2025 with comprehensive route surveys of the seabed, followed by the manufacturing of the specialized cable in 2026.
While crews build the necessary terminal stations on land through early 2027, the critical marine installation is scheduled for May to September 2027 to avoid the worst of the Arctic winter.

Delivered by the American subsea manufacturer SubCom, the Arctic Way is designed as an open cable system — a flexible architecture that allows for easier upgrades as technology evolves.

Greenland’s push for sovereignty in connectivity


Greenland is developing its telecom landscape through a policy of digital protectionism.
The territory’s state-owned operator, Tusass, has effectively blocked low-earth orbit competitors such as Starlink — a move designed to protect the revenue streams that sustain Greenland’s expensive physical network.

These cables serve as Greenland’s lifeline, and constructing additional ones ensures the country remains connected even if issues arise.
Greenland wants to keep its digital infrastructure under sovereign control rather than relying on foreign companies.

To make this happen, Greenland is mobilising funding from several sources.
Denmark is covering the highest cost through its defense budget, paying for a secure cable link to Europe.
The EU is adding grants to help lay new cables along Greenland’s coast, and Tusass is investing its own funds to bring fiber to towns and build a new data center in Nuuk.

By combining these efforts, Greenland is creating a strong, reliable network that depends on trusted partners, not private tech giants or countries that might pose a risk.
For Greenland, this is about more than fast internet; it is about safety and sovereignty.

The recent rhetoric by U.S. President Donald Trump about acquiring Greenland further strengthens the case for Denmark financing a sovereign data cable for Greenland.
It’s part of a push for more state and military-funded submarine cables in the Arctic.

What lessons does the regional development of these cables teach us at a larger scale, transarctic projects?
The most viable pathway for these projects involves directed state funding, positioned as a strategic measure to safeguard allied interests.

Furthermore, integrating future transarctic projects into existing regional networks is likely to yield significant benefits as it will improve socio-economic opportunities of these remote Arctic places.
 
Links :

Tuesday, February 3, 2026

RIN: GNSS interference is very serious and not improving

Credit: Shutterstock 

From Safety4Sea by The Editorial Team  
… commented Maritime Captain Ivana-Maria Carrioni-Burnett and chair of the RINs Maritime Navigation Group. 

The Royal Institute of Navigation (RIN) has issued a report which exposes the vulnerability of critically important systems such as Global Maritime Distress and Safety Systems (GMDSS) and other SOLAS-mandated equipment that rely on satellite positioning and timing.

According to the “Impacts of GNSS Interference on Maritime Safety” report, intentional interference with GNSS radionavigation broadcasts takes many forms and is now a permanent feature of certain conflict zones and other geographical areas.
 
 
In the context of the report, interference encapsulates jamming (the intentional blocking of the GNSS signals), meaconing (the recording and later rebroadcasting of real signals) and spoofing (the broadcasting of fake signals designed to force a GNSS receiver into calculating an incorrect position, velocity and time).

The RIN Maritime GNSS Interference Working Group has assessed that the impact of GNSS interference on maritime safety, vessel operations, and port security is very serious, with 75% of the respondents to the survey of the opinion that the situation is not improving.

The report has highlighted serious safety concerns and has underlined the fact that these issues are rooted in significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and are not just disruptions to navigation

… said Director of the RIN, Dr Ramsey Faragher.

Key areas of concern

The publication demonstrates that the maritime industry has a widespread and deeply-integrated reliance on GNSS that needs to be carefully addressed and managed. 
Areas of urgent concern include:The vulnerabilities of Global Maritime Distress and Safety Systems (GMDSS) and International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) mandated equipment that use GNSS as their primary source of position and time.
The serious safety and liability implications associated with operating within areas of known GNSS interference using GMDSS and SOLAS equipment that are expected to fail or malfunction with high probability when in those regions.
The evidence for unnecessary dependencies between GNSS receivers and a variety of electronic systems onboard a modern vessel, many of which do not need to be connected to GNSS data to provide their primary function.
These systems include the RADAR, VHF/MF/HF radios, NAVTEX, ship’s speed log, ship’s clock, and satellite communications systems.
 
Impact on maritime operations Credit: RIN

There are many well documented examples of various systems on a modern digital vessel malfunctioning during or after GNSS interference, including systems which are not primarily navigation systems.
These issues are therefore impacts on end-user equipment of cybersecurity vulnerabilities as well as navigation vulnerabilities, and their assessment and management must be considered within cybersecurity frameworks.

The masters of these vessels are not just dealing with the loss of access to a navigation source, they are dealing with invalid data being processed by a variety of digital systems that are vulnerable to these types of wireless attack.

The corruption of GNSS data can simultaneously compromise the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), Automatic Identification System (AIS), RADAR, and autopilot.
This can lead to a loss of situational awareness and vessel control, increasing the risk of collision or grounding, especially in congested waterways.

Collisions and groundings linked to GNSS interference have included the groundings of the Meghna Princess in December 2024 and the MSC Antonia in May 2025, and the collision between Adalynn and Front Eagle in June 2025.

Retired Commodore James Taylor OBE and fellow of the RIN advised: “Despite measures to improve resistance to jamming, spoofing and other harassment measures, the threat is real and growing.
And this threat is not only to positioning and navigation; it is to every part of every transport and navigation means and to every part of national infrastructure where timing is derived from space-based timing signals.”

Key recommendations

The report’s recommendations include:

#1 Urgent addressing of the vulnerability to GNSS spoofing of SOLAS mandated systems, including GMDSS, EPIRB, AIS-SART, MOB quick-push buttons

These safety systems are mandated by the IMO but are not currently expected to operate as designed when undergoing GNSS spoofing attacks.
This impacts the safety of life at sea and puts both the mariner and rescue services at risk, including delaying assistance and rescue, which has the potential to result in the loss of life or irreparable environmental damage.

Equipment providers are urgently recommended to assess their products against these vulnerabilities and ensure their customers, the marine operator, is made aware of them.

It is further recommended that the IMO, in collaboration with the IEC, look to provide further guidance, policy and regulation on equipment standards to address the issue of GNSS interference.

#2 NAVAREA Coordinators to use the World-Wide Navigational Warning Service to issue Navigational Warnings on the subject of GNSS interference in their areas

The report demonstrates the impact of GNSS interference on safety of life at sea and deems this interference to meet the criteria for “new navigational hazards and failures of important aids to navigation” as well as “significant malfunctioning of radionavigation services and shore-based MSI radio or satellite services”, as determined by the Joint IMO / IHO / WMO Manual on Maritime Safety Information.

#3 Establishment of a real-time, global GNSS monitoring and mapping capability in order to provide timely data to the mariner, which they can use for both passage planning and situational awareness

With the advent of the new S-100 data standards from the IHO, data layers, such as a GNSS interference map, can be overlaid on an electronic chart system or ECDIS.

#4 Adoption of industry-wide improvements to GNSS receiver designs and their validation and testing, especially when to be used in safety critical applications

This will reduce the probability of GNSS receivers succumbing to simple spoofing attacks and will reduce the overall effectiveness of the current GNSS interference techniques in use.

#5 The removal of unnecessary connections to open GNSS signals by hardware manufacturers

This will reduce the number of systems that can be disrupted by processing incorrect timing or positioning data from a spoofed GNSS receiver.

The issue of GNSS interference must be taken seriously.
It cannot be overcome by traditional navigation techniques when GNSS receivers are ‘baked in’ to modern ships’ critical systems, including safety systems.
These are no longer isolated incidents and pose a real risk to life: people, property and the environment. We must do more to safeguard our seas today and the shipping of tomorrow 
 
Links :

Monday, February 2, 2026

Inside the CIA’s quest to steal a Soviet sub filled with Cold War secrets

In 1968, a Soviet nuclear submarine vanished beneath the Pacific Ocean.
Years later, the CIA launched one of the most expensive and secret missions in history — Project Azorian — to steal it back from the deep.
Disguised as a “deep-sea mining venture” led by eccentric billionaire Howard Hughes, the Hughes Glomar Explorer was built to lift a 2,000-ton submarine from 3 miles below the surface — all while the Soviet Navy watched.
This is the unbelievable true story of The Glomar Explorer: The CIA’s Billion-Dollar Secret Ship — a mission of deception, innovation, and Cold War paranoia.
 
From PopMechanics by Tim Newcomb 

Known as one of the “greatest intelligence coups of the Cold War,” the project was highly ambitious—and shrouded in secrecy.

The 619-foot-long Hughes Glomar Explorer attracted plenty of attention in 1974.
The American deep-sea mining vessel, said to be the brainchild of eccentric billionaire Howard Hughes, was one of the largest ships of its kind, so girthy it couldn’t even fit through the Panama Canal.
But it wasn’t the ship’s size that led to widespread interest; it was its mission.
Hughes was going to do the unthinkable with it: mine manganese nodules right from the ocean floor.
So, when the Glomar sailed 1,800 miles northwest of Hawaii in a vast ocean wilderness toward the Soviet Union, people took notice—including members of the Red Fleet.
As Soviet ships cruised by the Glomar, they had no clue what the ship’s real mission was.
In fact, few did.
That’s because the mining vessel wasn’t really part of an effort to mine manganese nodules from the ocean floor—that was just the cover story. Instead, Glomar was involved in a secret CIA mission dubbed “Project Azorian.” 
The goal? 
To use the ship’s hidden internal hydraulic system to drop a claw 16,500 feet into the depths of the Pacific to pull up a lost Soviet nuclear submarine thought to be full of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles and untold Cold War secrets.


CIA
The Golf II-class ballistic missile submarine K-129, hull number 722, sank in 1968. It was carrying three SS-N-4 nuclear-armed ballistic missile
s.

The cover story was fantastically complicated, a truly cheeky attempt from the CIA to make the Glomar expedition look ridiculously wild, but for all the wrong reasons. 
“With something like this you need to keep the circle of secrecy really small,” Andrew Hammond, International Spy Museum historian and curator, tells Popular Mechanics. 
“It would be ‘need to know.’ Even if you know something, you maybe don’t know everything. You have to get far up the food chain to get the whole picture.”

That picture starts with knowing that the Soviet K-129, a Golf II-class nuclear submarine, sank in 1968.
It was clear from American intelligence that the Soviets were unsure exactly where the ship went down, having spent two months searching in vain for the lost submarine and its 98 crew.
But thanks to sophisticated acoustic tracking, the United States had a clear picture of where the sub sank.
It would take the U.S. six years to devise a mission, craft the necessary equipment, and sail the Glomar to the site to secretly attempt to pull the sub up from the ocean floor.

“This is a long period of time,” Hammond says of the project.
“Think of planning an operation of that magnitude, a ship, a cover story, Howard Hughes.” 
Indeed, the Spy Museum in Washington, D.C. where Hammond works has artifacts from the event including actual whiteprints of the ship building to coveralls from the Glomar crew with unique stitching.
 “The level of detail is pretty incredible,” Hammond says. 
“It was all to make it appear it was something it wasn’t.”
 

In July 1969, the real work began. 
The CIA enlisted Hughes’ help—few would doubt the billionaire’s desire to publicly back a mission to build an oversized mining vessel and send it into the Pacific in search of manganese nodules—and then made a public spectacle between 1971 and 1972 of building the Hughes Glomar Explorer. 
Articles in trade publications detailed the real-life events of everything from the shipbuilding location in Chester, Pennsylvania, to sailing the mining vessel through the Strait of Magellan in South America because the mammoth ship couldn’t fit through the Panama Canal.

“The level of detail, the size of operation, and audacity of operation was pretty incredible,” Hammond says. 
“It took years of patient work. This is an example of playing the long game. Just the timing and logistics, there is so much going on there, the number of things you would have to think about would be incredible. The stakes are really high, you are essentially stealing a Soviet submarine from the bottom of the ocean.”


Getty Images

This archival image circa 1976 depicts the Glomar’s 179-foot-long “Underwater Transfer Platform,” as the public knew it at the time. 
The barge master had refused to divulge the purpose of the UTP, but did say that, hypothetically, it could be used in the recovery of a submarine.
Today, we know the UTP as Project Azorian’s capture vehicle.

By October 1970, CIA engineers and government-cleared contractors determined the only way to lift the submarine was a heavy-duty winch mounted on a specially modified ship.
The keel of the ship was laid in November 1971, and the Glomar construction required specially designed machinery thanks to its size.
The resulting ship resembled an oil-drilling derrick, but one that included a pipe-transfer crane, two tall docking legs, a claw-like capture mechanism, and a center docking well known as the “moon pool” with doors to open and close the well’s floor.

“The patriotism was unbelievable and there was a lot of pride in keeping things secret,” Sherman Wetmore, a lead engineer on the Glomar, later told the CIA. 
“There was a lot of respect on both sides, CIA admired the engineers’ work ethic, and contractors respected the security preparations and thoroughness of the CIA.”

The Glomar made its way to Long Beach, California for additional pre-mission prep work.
That included loading 24 vans containing classified equipment for the mission onto a barge. 
The barge then dipped underwater under the cover of night and loaded equipment—plus the steel piping and claw capture vehicle that could lower from the underbelly of the ship—via the moon pool to keep the entire process away from prying eyes on nearby ships or Soviet satellites.

“The stakes are really high, you are essentially stealing a Soviet submarine from the bottom of the ocean.”

Once finalized, the Glomar set sail toward the submarine wreck site, arriving on July 4, 1974, purposefully starting the day after President Richard Nixon returned from a trip to Moscow, as part of his agreement to signing off on the mission.
The nearly 200 crew members—all clad in specially designed Glomar gear, from patches on the apparel to belt buckles—then spent weeks in a recovery mission, eventually hovering over the exact wreckage spot and lowering the capture vehicle by extending 60-foot sections of supporting steel pipe one piece at a time.

“Imagine you are on the ship, and you see the Soviet ships coming and looking at what you are doing, taking photographs, and looking at you through binoculars,” Hammond says. 
 “That would be disorientating, I’d guess. You could never rule out that something bad would happen.” 

With any U.S. Naval protection days from the Glomar, Soviet ships monitored the crew, including a tug that stayed onsite for two weeks, at one point getting as close as 200 yards.
A Soviet helicopter circled the Glomarand the ship’s crew stacked crates on the ship’s helicopter deck to keep the Soviets from landing.
A redacted CIA document says orders were given to “be prepared to order emergency destruction of sensitive material which could compromise the mission if the Soviets attempted to board the ship.”


CIA
Project Azorian’s capture vehicle, a sub-sea grapple claw, was nicknamed “Clementine.” The claw has survived to this day, even aiding in the Francis Scott Key Bridge recovery effort in Baltimore.


As waves battered the Glomar, the crew lowered the capture vehicle and straddled the 132-foot-long sunken submarine.
Once lowered to the ocean floor with the pipe assembly, the capture vehicle snatched at the submarine’s hull.
Slowly and steadily, it worked in reverse, pulling up the entirety of the submarine.

It was all going to plan.
Until it wasn’t.

Roughly halfway back to the surface—about 9,000 feet from the ocean floor—the submarine broke apart, with the front 100 feet of the sub dropping back to the floor.
The crew kept going, eventually pulling a portion of K-129 into the Glomar.

“Why the claw broke has continued to haunt me,” Wetmore told the CIA.

It took the crew eight days to winch the submarine up.
In August 1974, they took a portion of the recovered submarine to Hawaii for examination.
The exact contents haven’t been declassified like the larger project scope was, although the CIA says that six bodies were given a formal military burial at sea.

Six years in, Project Azorian hadn’t accomplished its grand plan, completing only a portion of the effort.
As plans started for a second mission, the secrecy of the Glomar started to unravel.

In an unrelated event, activist thieves broke into Hughes’ Los Angeles office, gaining access to secret documents that tied the businessman and the Glomar to the CIA.
Amidst efforts to keep the news from reaching the public, some reporters willingly sat on the story.
That changed in February 1975, when the Los Angeles Times connected Hughes and the CIA to the Glomar, blowing up the secrecy of the mission and leading then-President Gerald Ford’s administration to distance itself from any further mission.
It also allowed the CIA to trot out the now-famed “can neither confirm nor deny” phrase.

“Although Project Azorian failed to meet its full intelligence objectives, CIA considered the operation to be one of the greatest intelligence coups of the Cold War,” the agency wrote in a blog post.
“Project Azorian remains an engineering marvel, advancing the state of the art in deep-ocean mining and heavy-lift technology.” 


Getty Images
 The Glomar in 1978
 
Despite its original mission having nothing to do with deep-sea mining, the ship would go on to live a second life advancing that industry.
Throughout the course of an 18-year drilling career, the Glomar worked in the Gulf Of Mexico, Nigeria, the Black Sea, Angola, Indonesia, and India with a number of oil companies.
Hammond says that while the Soviets were known to fight the Cold War with human intelligence, America excelled at technical intelligence, with the Glomar being the largest and most public example. 
The Glomar went on to lead a less secretive life, handling a few ocean mining voyages before going decades without use.
In the 1990s, a petroleum company restored the ship, then known as the GSF Explorer, for deep-sea oil drilling and exploration until it was finally scrapped in China in 2015.
One item that didn’t reach the scrapyard was a deck plank pulled off the Glomar in the 1970s.
The CIA planned to present it to Nixon as a memento of his backing the mission, but before the CIA could present Nixon the plank, he resigned.
The plank—along with a variety of Glomar-related items—now reside in the museum, a symbol of a mission that never fully reached its potential.
“We don’t know exactly what intelligence was and wasn’t gleaned,” Hammond says. 
“That may be something for further down the line.”
 
Links :

Sunday, February 1, 2026

The wave of my life

Congratulations @nicvonrupp on the ride of your life