With a large sea swell forecast I spent the last 2 days out taking photos at the #cliffsofmoher … take a look at this, can’t believe I held the camera steady for so long 💪🏻.
— Elaine Farrell Photography (@_EFarrellPhoto) September 26, 2026
Best watched large and landscape to see all the detail.
Enjoy, and follow for more!… pic.twitter.com/xtJ134d8sA
Saturday, October 3, 2026
Cliffs of Moher, Doolin, Ireland
Friday, October 2, 2026
Why China opposes the Japan–Philippines maritime boundary process
Figure 1.
Map of the 350-Nautical-Mile Limit East of Taiwan
Map of the 350-Nautical-Mile Limit East of Taiwan
Source: Created by the author
From Eastisred by Yuxuan Jia
Chinese maritime scholar builds legal case for China’s participation in maritime delimitation east of Taiwan.
Earlier this month, China disclosed that it had conducted a seabed survey in waters east of Taiwan from August 10 to 31, while the China Coast Guard carried out what it described as its third “routine law-enforcement patrol” in the area since June.
The growing Chinese presence has been portrayed outside the country as part of Beijing’s effort to assert its sovereignty and jurisdictional claims; Beijing, for its part, has explicitly linked such activities to the maritime-boundary negotiations launched by Japan and the Philippines, insisting that China has an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the same waters and therefore cannot simply be excluded from the process.
That difference in framing is important.
Much of the outside discussion begins with the premise that Tokyo and Manila are conducting an essentially normal bilateral delimitation and then asks why China is objecting—and why Chinese survey vessels and coast-guard ships are appearing there.
The article below, by Zheng Zhihua, starts from the opposite end of the problem: if, as Beijing maintains, Taiwan’s eastern coast generates Chinese maritime entitlements that overlap with those claimed by Japan and the Philippines, can the proposed boundary really be treated as an exclusively bilateral one? Its central argument is that, because no negotiating map, controlling base points, coordinates or endpoints have been made public, Japan and the Philippines have yet to demonstrate that the area they intend to delimit is legally separable from the maritime claims China derives from Taiwan.
Zheng Zhihua’s article offers a detailed reconstruction of the logic behind Beijing’s position: China regards its diplomatic protests, surveys and maritime patrols not as the opening move in a new dispute, but as measures intended to prevent an undelimited area from gradually hardening into bilateral coordinates, enforcement zones and eventually security arrangements from which China has been excluded.
That is the argument worth understanding as activity east of Taiwan becomes an increasingly visible—and consequential—part of the region’s maritime politics.
The article was originally published by the South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI) on 2 September 2026.
The SCSPI is a research network directed by Hu Bo, research professor & director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Studies, Peking University.
SCSPI’s Editor’s Note:
This Article examines the legal and geopolitical implications of the 2026 decision by Japan and the Philippines to negotiate exclusive-economic-zone and continental-shelf boundaries in waters east of Taiwan.
It asks whether the contemplated area is legally separable from China’s claims, whether a bilateral line could prejudice third-party rights, what responses remain open to China, and which actor is altering the status quo.
Beginning from the principle that the land dominates the sea, the Article argues that coastal projections from Taiwan’s eastern coast, Japan’s Sakishima/Yaeyama Islands, and the Philippines’ Batanes Islands may substantially overlap.
The fact that Japanese and Philippine features lie less than 400 nautical miles apart establishes a possible bilateral overlap, but not an exclusively bilateral geography; continental-shelf entitlements may also extend beyond 200 nautical miles under Article 76 of UNCLOS.
Because Japan and the Philippines have disclosed neither a negotiating map nor controlling base points, coordinates, or endpoints, they have not demonstrated the separability of the proposed delimitation area.
Although a bilateral treaty cannot bind China without its consent, a fixed endpoint and the incorporation of coordinates into charts, licences, enforcement practices, or security arrangements could prejudice China’s legal and practical position.
International jurisprudence therefore supports geographic restraint, open endpoints, and effective non-prejudice safeguards.
China may preserve its claims through diplomatic representations, protests, and maritime presence according international and domestic law.
Finally, the parallel expansion of Japan–Philippines defense cooperation creates a risk of securitizing the boundary and may blur their one-China positions by implying who is entitled to represent Taiwan-facing coasts.
On May 28, 2026, Japan and the Philippines upgraded their bilateral relationship to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” in Tokyo.
The same Joint Statement also outlined the initiation of formal negotiations to delimit the boundary between their respective exclusive economic zones and continental shelves.
Concerning defense matters, the statement confirmed that the Reciprocal Access Agreement had entered into force and had already been utilized in exercises including Balikatan 41-26.
Moreover, the two countries signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement in January of the same year, launching discussions on an agreement for the protection of classified military information and promoting transfers of defense equipment such as destroyers, TC-90 aircraft, and coastal radar systems.
On May 31, the two defense ministers struck a deal to proceed with the transfer of decommissioned Abukuma-class destroyers and a TC-90 aircraft, while continuing consultations on personnel training, maintenance support, equipment management, and information cooperation.
The Japan–Philippines maritime delimitation process has thus unfolded in parallel with the development of the two countries’ defense mechanisms, joint operations, and maritime-capability cooperation.
On June 2, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China stated that, as the contemplated waters lie east of Taiwan Island where China has an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, China’s participation in the delimitation is indispensable; and that Japan and the Philippines, by commencing negotiations without China, had violated international law and infringed upon China’s maritime rights and interests.
On June 6, the Ministry of Transport of China organized forces of maritime administration, navigation support, and rescue to launch a special law-enforcement operation targeting maritime traffic in waters east of Taiwan Island.
The China Coast Guard subsequently announced regular law-enforcement patrols in the relevant waters.
On August 14, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. expected that the negotiations could be concluded by the end of the year, regarding no major obstacles and characterizing the contemplated agreement as essentially a “bilateral matter” between Japan and the Philippines.1
There arise five interrelated questions: Are Japan and the Philippines entitled to proceed unilaterally with the delimitation of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in waters east of Taiwan?
Earlier this month, China disclosed that it had conducted a seabed survey in waters east of Taiwan from August 10 to 31, while the China Coast Guard carried out what it described as its third “routine law-enforcement patrol” in the area since June.
The growing Chinese presence has been portrayed outside the country as part of Beijing’s effort to assert its sovereignty and jurisdictional claims; Beijing, for its part, has explicitly linked such activities to the maritime-boundary negotiations launched by Japan and the Philippines, insisting that China has an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the same waters and therefore cannot simply be excluded from the process.
That difference in framing is important.
Much of the outside discussion begins with the premise that Tokyo and Manila are conducting an essentially normal bilateral delimitation and then asks why China is objecting—and why Chinese survey vessels and coast-guard ships are appearing there.
The article below, by Zheng Zhihua, starts from the opposite end of the problem: if, as Beijing maintains, Taiwan’s eastern coast generates Chinese maritime entitlements that overlap with those claimed by Japan and the Philippines, can the proposed boundary really be treated as an exclusively bilateral one? Its central argument is that, because no negotiating map, controlling base points, coordinates or endpoints have been made public, Japan and the Philippines have yet to demonstrate that the area they intend to delimit is legally separable from the maritime claims China derives from Taiwan.
Zheng Zhihua’s article offers a detailed reconstruction of the logic behind Beijing’s position: China regards its diplomatic protests, surveys and maritime patrols not as the opening move in a new dispute, but as measures intended to prevent an undelimited area from gradually hardening into bilateral coordinates, enforcement zones and eventually security arrangements from which China has been excluded.
That is the argument worth understanding as activity east of Taiwan becomes an increasingly visible—and consequential—part of the region’s maritime politics.
The article was originally published by the South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI) on 2 September 2026.
The SCSPI is a research network directed by Hu Bo, research professor & director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Studies, Peking University.
SCSPI’s Editor’s Note:
This Article examines the legal and geopolitical implications of the 2026 decision by Japan and the Philippines to negotiate exclusive-economic-zone and continental-shelf boundaries in waters east of Taiwan.
It asks whether the contemplated area is legally separable from China’s claims, whether a bilateral line could prejudice third-party rights, what responses remain open to China, and which actor is altering the status quo.
Beginning from the principle that the land dominates the sea, the Article argues that coastal projections from Taiwan’s eastern coast, Japan’s Sakishima/Yaeyama Islands, and the Philippines’ Batanes Islands may substantially overlap.
The fact that Japanese and Philippine features lie less than 400 nautical miles apart establishes a possible bilateral overlap, but not an exclusively bilateral geography; continental-shelf entitlements may also extend beyond 200 nautical miles under Article 76 of UNCLOS.
Because Japan and the Philippines have disclosed neither a negotiating map nor controlling base points, coordinates, or endpoints, they have not demonstrated the separability of the proposed delimitation area.
Although a bilateral treaty cannot bind China without its consent, a fixed endpoint and the incorporation of coordinates into charts, licences, enforcement practices, or security arrangements could prejudice China’s legal and practical position.
International jurisprudence therefore supports geographic restraint, open endpoints, and effective non-prejudice safeguards.
China may preserve its claims through diplomatic representations, protests, and maritime presence according international and domestic law.
Finally, the parallel expansion of Japan–Philippines defense cooperation creates a risk of securitizing the boundary and may blur their one-China positions by implying who is entitled to represent Taiwan-facing coasts.
On May 28, 2026, Japan and the Philippines upgraded their bilateral relationship to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” in Tokyo.
The same Joint Statement also outlined the initiation of formal negotiations to delimit the boundary between their respective exclusive economic zones and continental shelves.
Concerning defense matters, the statement confirmed that the Reciprocal Access Agreement had entered into force and had already been utilized in exercises including Balikatan 41-26.
Moreover, the two countries signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement in January of the same year, launching discussions on an agreement for the protection of classified military information and promoting transfers of defense equipment such as destroyers, TC-90 aircraft, and coastal radar systems.
On May 31, the two defense ministers struck a deal to proceed with the transfer of decommissioned Abukuma-class destroyers and a TC-90 aircraft, while continuing consultations on personnel training, maintenance support, equipment management, and information cooperation.
The Japan–Philippines maritime delimitation process has thus unfolded in parallel with the development of the two countries’ defense mechanisms, joint operations, and maritime-capability cooperation.
On June 2, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China stated that, as the contemplated waters lie east of Taiwan Island where China has an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, China’s participation in the delimitation is indispensable; and that Japan and the Philippines, by commencing negotiations without China, had violated international law and infringed upon China’s maritime rights and interests.
On June 6, the Ministry of Transport of China organized forces of maritime administration, navigation support, and rescue to launch a special law-enforcement operation targeting maritime traffic in waters east of Taiwan Island.
The China Coast Guard subsequently announced regular law-enforcement patrols in the relevant waters.
On August 14, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. expected that the negotiations could be concluded by the end of the year, regarding no major obstacles and characterizing the contemplated agreement as essentially a “bilateral matter” between Japan and the Philippines.1
There arise five interrelated questions: Are Japan and the Philippines entitled to proceed unilaterally with the delimitation of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in waters east of Taiwan?
Is the contemplated Japan–Philippines delimitation separable from China’s claims?
Would such a delimitation encroach upon or appropriate China’s exclusive-economic-zone and continental-shelf entitlements east of Taiwan Island?
Is China entitled to make diplomatic representations and protests and to conduct maritime law-enforcement patrols in the relevant waters?
And which side, ultimately, is attempting to change the status quo there?
I. The Claims of China, Japan, and the Philippines in Waters East of Taiwan Substantially Overlap
In maritime delimitation, “the land dominates the sea” is a fundamental principle: maritime entitlements are derived from the geographical projection of coasts.
The relevant Japanese and Philippine land features are located less than 400 nautical miles apart.
That fact may indicate that their respective maximum 200-nautical-mile entitlements overlap, but it does not mean that projections from other relevant coasts are excluded from that area.
Publicly available geographical materials show that Taiwan’s eastern coast is a long and continuous main-island coast facing the Philippine Sea Basin.
Japan’s claimed entitlements would come principally from the Sakishima/Yaeyama island chain, while the Philippines relies on the Batanes Islands to its north and on its archipelagic baselines.
If the Japan–Philippines boundary were extended westward or southwestward and enclosed the tripoint, the resulting cut-off could affect not only the projection of an isolated offshore island, but also the maritime space generated by Taiwan’s continuous eastern coast together with Orchid Island(Lan Yu) and Green Island(Lü Dao).2
Figure 2.
Seafloor Topographic Map of the Waters East of Taiwan
Seafloor Topographic Map of the Waters East of Taiwan
Source: Ocean Data Bank，
Another issue concerns what kind of effect should be given, in a concrete delimitation, to relatively small islands such as Yonaguni, Ishigaki, Iriomote, Batan, Itbayat, and Sabtang against Taiwan’s continuous coast.
Without such an assessment, no bilateral line segment drawn using those islands as basepoints can be proven to be equitable solely on the basis of geometric overlap.3
In addition, islands like Orchid Island and Green Island may also modify the local geographical relationship.
If the same waters lie within the maximum potential entitlements of three sides, Japan and the Philippines must demonstrate that the contemplated segment does not necessitate a prior determination of the effect to be accorded to Taiwan’s relevant coasts.
Likewise, placing the contemplated boundary “beyond 200 nautical miles from Taiwan” does not fully resolve the question.4 For the exclusive economic zone, 200 nautical miles may serve as an initial screening criterion.
For the continental shelf, however, entitlements that meet the requirements of Article 76 of UNCLOS may extend beyond 200 nautical miles.
It must also be clarified whether the 200 nautical miles are measured from the low-water line of Taiwan’s main island, from the applicable baselines, or from offshore islands.
A cartographic arc drawn for convenience cannot replace a complete analysis of title, baselines, and relevant coasts.
If the same waters lie within the maximum potential entitlements of three sides, Japan and the Philippines must demonstrate that the contemplated segment does not necessitate a prior determination of the effect to be accorded to Taiwan’s relevant coasts.
Likewise, placing the contemplated boundary “beyond 200 nautical miles from Taiwan” does not fully resolve the question.4 For the exclusive economic zone, 200 nautical miles may serve as an initial screening criterion.
For the continental shelf, however, entitlements that meet the requirements of Article 76 of UNCLOS may extend beyond 200 nautical miles.
It must also be clarified whether the 200 nautical miles are measured from the low-water line of Taiwan’s main island, from the applicable baselines, or from offshore islands.
A cartographic arc drawn for convenience cannot replace a complete analysis of title, baselines, and relevant coasts.
Figure 3.
Geological Map of the Gagua Ridge and Adjacent Areas
Geological Map of the Gagua Ridge and Adjacent Areas
Source: Qian, Shengping, et al.
“First identification of a Cathaysian continental fragment beneath the Gagua Ridge, Philippine Sea, and its tectonic implications.” Geology 49.11 (2021): 1332-1336.
“First identification of a Cathaysian continental fragment beneath the Gagua Ridge, Philippine Sea, and its tectonic implications.” Geology 49.11 (2021): 1332-1336.
Figure 4.
Map of the Overlapping 200-Nautical-Mile Zones East of Taiwan (Dark Purple Indicates the Overlap of the 200-Nautical-Mile Zones of China, Japan, and the Philippines)
Map of the Overlapping 200-Nautical-Mile Zones East of Taiwan (Dark Purple Indicates the Overlap of the 200-Nautical-Mile Zones of China, Japan, and the Philippines)
Source: Created by the author
II. Japan and the Philippines Have Not Demonstrated That the Contemplated Delimitation Area Is Separable from China’s Claims
In waters potentially subject to projections from more than two coasts, separability marks the outer boundary of bilateral disposition.
Japan and the Philippines may only dispose of an area where their respective potential entitlements with legal basis overlap and is separable from third-party rights.
That area cannot be determined simply by drawing two complete 200-nautical-mile arcs and treating their intersection as legally homogeneous.
The relevant coasts, applicable baselines, the capacity of islands to generate maritime zones, and possible projections from third-party coasts all affect the outer limits of the two countries’ competence to effect a bilateral disposition.
President Marcos characterized the contemplated agreement as “essentially a matter between Japan and the Philippines.”
As of the evidentiary cut-off date for this Article, however, materials made public by Japan and the Philippines disclosed none of the following: a map defining the negotiating area, the baselines to be used, controlling base points, proposed endpoints, or a mechanism safeguarding third-party rights.
The information disclosed to date therefore indicates that Japan and the Philippines have not publicly established the complete factual foundation necessary to demonstrate separability.
If they continued to exclude Beijing and proceeded to a final delimitation, they would not only breach international-law obligations of good faith, cooperation, and restraint, but could also infringe China’s maritime rights in waters east of Taiwan Island and potentially give rise to an internationally wrongful act.5
The information disclosed to date therefore indicates that Japan and the Philippines have not publicly established the complete factual foundation necessary to demonstrate separability.
If they continued to exclude Beijing and proceeded to a final delimitation, they would not only breach international-law obligations of good faith, cooperation, and restraint, but could also infringe China’s maritime rights in waters east of Taiwan Island and potentially give rise to an internationally wrongful act.5
III. Prejudgments and Effects on Third-Party Positions and Interests
According to Reuters, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara stated that any maritime-boundary agreement reached by Japan and the Philippines would not be legally binding on third parties.
Meanwhile, Philippine public statements emphasized that the negotiations would proceed in accordance with international law; President Marcos later characterized the contemplated agreement as essentially a bilateral matter between Japan and the Philippines.
Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.
This rule addresses the issue of legal binding force: as a matter of law, a Japan–Philippines agreement cannot extinguish the rights of an absent party.
However, it does not mean that the agreement cannot produce practical externalities.
Maritime-boundary coordinates may be incorporated into official charts, fishing licences, resource blocks, coast-guard patrol instructions, and security-cooperation documents.
Even if a third party is not legally bound by the agreement, it may nevertheless incur diplomatic, enforcement, and litigation costs in resisting those practical effects.
International courts and tribunals employ approaches including open endpoints, formulas terminating a line before it reaches potential third-party interests, and non-prejudice safeguards precisely because formal non-opposability must be reinforced by self-restraint in both spatial scope and practical implementation.6
Credible third-party protection must therefore operate on at least four levels: the treaty text must expressly preserve third-party rights; maps must leave potential tripartite areas undelimited; endpoints must remain open to future adjustment; and law-enforcement activity, resource licensing, and security cooperation must not treat an undelimited line as an exclusive boundary.
In international adjudication, where a court would have to determine, as a prerequisite, an absent country’s international responsibility or legal rights, and if that determination constitutes the very subject matter of the case, the Monetary Gold principle precludes the court from proceeding without that country’s consent.7
In international adjudication, where a court would have to determine, as a prerequisite, an absent country’s international responsibility or legal rights, and if that determination constitutes the very subject matter of the case, the Monetary Gold principle precludes the court from proceeding without that country’s consent.7
Although the principle directly governs adjudicative proceedings, it offers a useful analogous screening criterion: a delimitation segment cannot become a purely bilateral matter merely through mutual consent between Japan and the Philippines.
IV. China Is Entitled to Make Diplomatic Representations and Protests and to Conduct Maritime Law-Enforcement Patrols in Relevant Waters
First, the stakeholder could ordinarily preserve its rights by making diplomatic representations and protests, requesting consultations, declining to recognize prejudicial coordinates, publicizing its positions, and collecting evidence.
Second, it appears to be unexceptionable insofar as the China Coast Guard and China’s maritime authorities act in accordance with domestic law, conduct patrol and verification operations, carry out fisheries protection and rescue services, and maintain normal navigation and operational order while serving to reserve rights, establish facts, and perform jurisdictional functions relating to the relevant waters and subject matters.
An American think tank contends that Beijing inspected hundreds of merchant vessels that showed no indication of engaging in resource development or causing damage to resources in the seabed or water column.
Such inspections infringed the rights of all countries using the area and interfered with commercial navigation.
It accordingly accuses Beijing of violating UNCLOS and seeking to exercise broad and unprecedented jurisdiction over the area.
Yet no evidence establishes that the patrol and verification activities conducted by Chinese maritime law-enforcement forces amounted to unlawful interception or disrupted normal commercial navigation.
V. Which Side Is Changing the Status Quo?
One view holds that China increased its survey vessels, maritime-administration activities, and the coast guard presence after Japan and the Philippines announced their delimitation negotiations, thereby seeking to change the status quo east of Taiwan through a quasi-routine maritime presence and jurisdictional assertions.
However, it must be emphasized that Japan and the Philippines characterized the undelimited waters east of Taiwan as a Japan–Philippines “bilateral matter” and advanced that process in parallel with defense cooperation without disclosing the scope of the contemplated delimitation area, demonstrating separability, or consulting China.
They were thus the first to alter the pre-existing legal and procedural status quo, and their conduct was clearly provocative.
The security setting reinforces, but does not replace, that inference.
Delimitation is advancing alongside arrangements for classified military information and transfers of maritime-defense assets, including destroyers scheduled for decommissioning.
A line whose third-party limits remain unresolved could later organize patrols, surveillance, access expectations, or contingency planning affecting the Taiwan question.
Parallel timing does not prove such a plan.
It does make the risk foreseeable, and international objection need not await the moment when a disputed line has already hardened into operational practice.
Perhaps, the more pertinent questions are as follows: Why have Japan and the Philippines chosen this moment to advance maritime delimitation and defense cooperation in parallel? Why have they not disclosed a negotiating area and baseline assumptions sufficient to demonstrate separability? And why the haste to set a political objective of completing the negotiations within the year? China’s protests, surveys, and patrols merely preserve its position and constitute reactive measures aimed at preventing Japan and the Philippines from transforming undelimited space into exclusive coordinates, licensing regimes, enforcement zones, or security boundaries.
VI. Unilateral Japan–Philippines Maritime Delimitation Is Highly Likely to Blur Their Respective Positions on the Taiwan Question
By pressing ahead with the negotiations without disclosing their scope or publicly communicating with Beijing, Japan and the Philippines risk further obscuring their respective positions on the Taiwan question.
The fundamental reason is that maritime delimitation cannot avoid the antecedent questions of who owns Taiwan’s coasts and who is entitled to represent them.
Nor can those questions be evaded merely by describing the process as a “bilateral matter.” Under the principle that “the land dominates the sea,” maritime entitlements derive from specific land-based coasts.
Using base points located on Taiwan’s eastern coast, Orchid Island, or Green Island necessarily raises the question of which country they are taken to represent.
Excluding those coasts altogether likewise entails a choice with implications for Taiwan policy.
In the 1972 China–Japan Joint Communique, Japan recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China and stated that it “fully understands and respects” China’s position on Taiwan.
Philippine Executive Order No.
313 of 1987 reaffirmed the relevant terms of the 1975 communique establishing diplomatic relations: the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China, there is but one China, and Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory.
Against this background, if Japan and the Philippines employ baselines promulgated by the Taiwan authorities without communicating with Beijing, their conduct may readily be understood as treating Taiwan as an independent coastal country capable of generating maritime entitlements.
If they exclude Taiwan’s coasts entirely, their conduct may be understood as taking the position that those coasts cannot generate maritime entitlements for China.
If they accept that those coasts belong to China but bypass Beijing, their conduct would sit uneasily with their recognition of Beijing as the sole legal Government of China.
By neither disclosing the contemplated scope nor indicating which conception of the relevant parties and their legal status underpins their approach, Japan and the Philippines leave their Taiwan policies open to multiple interpretations.
In conclusion, the formal opening by Japan and the Philippines of negotiations to delimit exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in waters east of Taiwan has implications beyond the allocation of resources between neighbouring States; it may also affect the spatial order of key waters along the “First Island Chain.” The Joint Statement invokes UNCLOS and relevant international jurisprudence while simultaneously placing maritime delimitation, defense-related information sharing, and equipment transfers within the same partnership framework.
This is sufficient to demonstrate a real risk that the contemplated boundary will be used for securitization purposes.
Analyses of the issue should therefore neither accord the Japan–Philippines initiative a “presumption of legality” nor subject China’s response to a “most adverse strategic interpretation.” Objectively speaking, the decision by Japan and the Philippines to open delimitation negotiations at this juncture is unmistakably provocative and strategically inflammatory.
That provocation should not be concealed by the rhetoric of “normal negotiations.” In the western Pacific, where maritime boundaries remain unsettled among multiple parties, any attempt to use legal characterization as a cover for political manipulation will undermine the region’s fragile maritime order.
Links :
1 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, As Tokyo and Manila Talk Boundaries, Beijing Breaks Them (Aug. 19, 2026), https://amti.csis.org/as-tokyo-and-manila-talk-boundaries-beijing-breaks-them/(link is external).
The article characterizes the Japan–Philippines negotiations as a conventional bilateral delimitation exercise and assesses negatively the legality and purpose of certain Chinese maritime activities.
2 Michael Sheng-ti Gau & Hsien-Wen Huang, An Analysis of the International Legal Issues Raised by the Japan–Philippines Maritime Delimitation Negotiations, China Review, July 2026, no.
343, pp. 20–23 (Chinese).
3 Taiwan proper and its 21 affiliated islands have an area of 35,887.1325 square kilometres, https://www.ey.gov.tw/state/4447F4A951A1EC45/094b1d53-de8d-4393-bde6-ab092969cce4(link is external); as of July 2026, Taiwan’s population was 23,235,002, https://eng.stat.gov.tw/Point.aspx?n=4208&sid=t.9&sms=11713(link is external).
Okinawa Prefecture, Department of Planning, Regional and Remote Islands Division, 2025 Materials Relating to Remote Islands, ch. 1, p. 2, https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/_res/projects/default_project/_page_/001/033/624/01_chapter1_r7.pdf(link is external) (the inhabited islands of Miyako and Yaeyama have a combined area of 806.68 square kilometres and a basic-resident-registry population of 107,244); Philippine Statistics Authority, Province of Batanes, https://psa.gov.ph/classification/psgc/citimuni/0200900000(link is external) (2024 population: 18,937); Department of Budget and Management, Philippines, FY 2014 Internal Revenue Allotment for LGUs: Region II, https://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/Issuances/IRA/IRA2014/PCM/RO2/RO2.pdf(link is external)(Batanes Province has an area of 219.01 square kilometres).
Using statistics drawn from different years and compiled under different methodologies solely for an order-of-magnitude comparison, the land area of Taiwan proper and its affiliated islands is approximately 44 times that of the inhabited Miyako and Yaeyama islands combined and 164 times that of Batanes Province; Taiwan’s population is approximately 217 times that of the former and 1,227 times that of the latter.
Land area and population do not automatically determine maritime entitlements or delimitation ratios; the comparison merely demonstrates that the potentially affected coastal frontage cannot be disregarded.
4 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p.348, at pp.372–73, ¶¶ 86–90 (May 4), https://www.icj-cij.org/case/124/intervention;(link is external) Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl./Myan.), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 4, ¶¶ 462, 505, dispositif para. 6 (Mar.
14), https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-16/(link is external).
5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts.
74(1), 74(3), 83(1), 83(3), 300, Dec.10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf(link is external); North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. Ger./Den.; Fed. Rep. Ger./Neth.), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, at p. 47, ¶ 85 (Feb.
20), https://www.icj-cij.org/case/52(link is external); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Guyana and Suriname, Award, 30 R.I.A.A. 1, ¶¶ 459–70 (Sept. 17, 2007), https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXX/1-144.pdf(link is external).
These rules support scrutiny of the duty to negotiate in good faith and of conduct that might jeopardize or hamper a final agreement.
6 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 348, at pp.
372–73, ¶¶ 86–90 (May 4), https://www.icj-cij.org/case/124/intervention;(link is external) Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl./Myan.), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p.
4, ¶¶ 462, 505, dispositif para. 6 (Mar. 14), https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-16/(link is external)
372–73, ¶¶ 86–90 (May 4), https://www.icj-cij.org/case/124/intervention;(link is external) Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl./Myan.), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p.
4, ¶¶ 462, 505, dispositif para. 6 (Mar. 14), https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-16/(link is external)
7 Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 19, at p. 32 (June 15), https://www.icj-cij.org/case/19(link is external); cf. Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Eq. Guinea Intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 303, at pp. 421–22, ¶¶ 237–38 (Oct. 10), https://www.icj-cij.org/case/94(link is external) (the Court may address the boundary between the parties but may not determine the boundary between a party and a third State).
Thursday, October 1, 2026
The ship that was in two places at once, and what it doesn't prove
AIS SPOOFING. A Chinese research vessel identified as “JIA HAI KE 7” holds position approximately 38 nautical miles off Itbayat, Batanes in this photo taken during a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Maritime Domain Awareness flight on Monday (Sept. 28, 2026).
The PCG confirmed the vessel was falsifying its Automatic Identification System data to conceal its true movements near a corridor hosting critical undersea communication cables
From BusinessUpTurn by Vaibhav Agrawal
On Monday, the PCG said a Chinese-flagged seabed survey vessel, identified as JIA HAI KE 7, was loitering about 38 nautical miles northwest of Itbayat in the Batanes island group, the Philippines' northernmost province.
Itbayat lies roughly 160 km from Taiwan.
According to the PCG, the ship ignored repeated radio challenges asking it to identify its intentions and stop any unauthorised activity.
The agency also said the vessel appeared to be broadcasting false Automatic Identification System (AIS) positions.
Tracking data, it said, placed the ship off Xiamen and off Papua New Guinea on the same day, and then northwest of Itbayat, a sequence the PCG called physically impossible.
“Jiahai Ke 7” is classified by China Classification Society and is the first private scientific research vessel equipped with DP-2 system in China.
The vessel has a total length of 70.26m, a beam of 13.30m, a depth of 5.60m and a designed draft of 4.10m.
It adopts a steel welded structure, is equipped with an advanced electric propulsion system, and has DP-2 dynamic positioning function.
It is mainly used for offshore marine geological surveys and offshore marine scientific investigations.
It is mainly used for offshore marine geological surveys and offshore marine scientific investigations.
It is a comprehensive survey vessel with marine geological survey and research functions.
Citing open-source information, the PCG described the ship as a 2,000-ton, 70-metre vessel built for marine geological surveys and precise station-keeping.
It said the ship's behaviour matched marine scientific research rather than transit, and that it would keep monitoring.
The Chinese Embassy in Manila had not responded when the report was published.
It said the ship's behaviour matched marine scientific research rather than transit, and that it would keep monitoring.
The Chinese Embassy in Manila had not responded when the report was published.
PCG aircraft confirms the presence of Jia Hai Ke 7 northwest of Itbayat, Batanes, on September 28.
(Photo courtesy of PCG)
The allegation bundles three claims that deserve separate treatment, because each rests on a different kind of evidence.
The first is the AIS spoofing claim, which is the most testable.
AIS is a broadcast system, and a vessel's positional history can be checked against simple physics.
If the same 70-metre ship appears in two different seas on the same day, at a distance no such ship could cover, then the data is false.
The cause could be deliberate manipulation, a transmitter fault, or an error in how a tracking service aggregated the data.
The PCG's reasoning that impossibility implies manipulation is sound as an inference, but the report does not say who recorded each position or from which data source.
It also does not say how the ship's true location was established, though the radio challenges suggest the PCG had some independent means of locating it.
Comparing raw tracking records would settle the question either way.
The first is the AIS spoofing claim, which is the most testable.
AIS is a broadcast system, and a vessel's positional history can be checked against simple physics.
If the same 70-metre ship appears in two different seas on the same day, at a distance no such ship could cover, then the data is false.
The cause could be deliberate manipulation, a transmitter fault, or an error in how a tracking service aggregated the data.
The PCG's reasoning that impossibility implies manipulation is sound as an inference, but the report does not say who recorded each position or from which data source.
It also does not say how the ship's true location was established, though the radio challenges suggest the PCG had some independent means of locating it.
Comparing raw tracking records would settle the question either way.
CHINA RESEARCH VESSEL MAPPING JAPAN's & PHILIPPINES SUBMARINE CABLES - (3 Clips) - 1. New development: another PRC vessel - the twin hulled oceanographic research and survey vessel "SHI YAN 1" operated by the Chinese Academy of Sciences appears to be working closer to the Batanes. Its current activity is listed as "TOWING 1KM CABLE".
- A Chinese research vessel has spent 18 days running its fourth survey grid over trans-Pacific submarine cables since May 2024, tracked by Windward's all-source intelligence.
- Since September 11, it has made 27 low-speed research stops in the North West Pacific east of Japan, working directly across the corridor carrying the JUNO, Jupiter, FASTER, Topaz, Unity, PLCN, Pacific Crossing-1, and TGN-Pacific cables, the network linking Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines to the United States.
- The vessel is now heading southwest at 13 knots.
- A Chinese research vessel has spent 18 days running its fourth survey grid over trans-Pacific submarine cables since May 2024, tracked by Windward's all-source intelligence.
- Since September 11, it has made 27 low-speed research stops in the North West Pacific east of Japan, working directly across the corridor carrying the JUNO, Jupiter, FASTER, Topaz, Unity, PLCN, Pacific Crossing-1, and TGN-Pacific cables, the network linking Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines to the United States.
- The vessel is now heading southwest at 13 knots.
This is the vessel's fourth trip to the same area since May 2024, and the first since November 2025. Returning to the same corridor every six to 12 months builds a multi-year record of the seabed and water conditions needed to locate and reach these cables.
- This fits a wider campaign of Chinese research-vessel surveys over Pacific cables.
- At the same time, a Chinese fishery patrol vessel is running grids on both sides of the Guam cable hub. A U.S. congressional commission has separately warned that China is building dual-use capabilities to target trans-Pacific cables.
2. "Shiyan 1" Research Vessel, Capabilities - “Shiyan 1” Research Vessel has many advanced features such as excellent noise reduction and shock absorption, full automation and dynamic positioning, which supports multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research on marine science and hydro-acoustics. -
- This fits a wider campaign of Chinese research-vessel surveys over Pacific cables.
- At the same time, a Chinese fishery patrol vessel is running grids on both sides of the Guam cable hub. A U.S. congressional commission has separately warned that China is building dual-use capabilities to target trans-Pacific cables.
2. "Shiyan 1" Research Vessel, Capabilities - “Shiyan 1” Research Vessel has many advanced features such as excellent noise reduction and shock absorption, full automation and dynamic positioning, which supports multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research on marine science and hydro-acoustics. -
The second claim is that the ship was conducting unauthorised marine scientific research.
This rests on behaviour and design: the vessel held its position instead of proceeding on a steady course, and it is built for survey work.
The PCG's wording is careful, saying the behaviour was "consistent with" such research, which is weaker than confirming it.
Station-keeping fits a seabed survey, but it also fits weather avoidance, mechanical trouble, or simply waiting.
The report cites no sampling gear deployed and no data collected.
This rests on behaviour and design: the vessel held its position instead of proceeding on a steady course, and it is built for survey work.
The PCG's wording is careful, saying the behaviour was "consistent with" such research, which is weaker than confirming it.
Station-keeping fits a seabed survey, but it also fits weather avoidance, mechanical trouble, or simply waiting.
The report cites no sampling gear deployed and no data collected.
The third claim is the security concern about undersea communications infrastructure and the potential military use of collected data.
This is a risk assessment, not an observed fact.
It is credible in context, since the waters off Batanes and the Luzon Strait host key submarine cable corridors linking the Philippines with Northeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific.
Still, a concern about what a survey could enable is not evidence that any cable was surveyed or targeted, and the report does not say a cable lies near the vessel's position.
The legal framing also needs care.
The report contrasts the vessel's behaviour with innocent passage, but under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), innocent passage is a right exercised in another state's territorial sea, which extends up to 12 nautical miles.
Article 19 lists research and survey activities among those that make passage non-innocent.
This is a risk assessment, not an observed fact.
It is credible in context, since the waters off Batanes and the Luzon Strait host key submarine cable corridors linking the Philippines with Northeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific.
Still, a concern about what a survey could enable is not evidence that any cable was surveyed or targeted, and the report does not say a cable lies near the vessel's position.
The legal framing also needs care.
The report contrasts the vessel's behaviour with innocent passage, but under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), innocent passage is a right exercised in another state's territorial sea, which extends up to 12 nautical miles.
Article 19 lists research and survey activities among those that make passage non-innocent.
PH2NLZ40 ENC
At 38 nautical miles from Itbayat, the vessel was well outside 12 nautical miles of that island.
Depending on how Philippine baselines apply, the position could fall in the country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or in archipelagic waters, and the report does not say which.
That distinction matters.
In an EEZ, other states enjoy freedom of navigation, but UNCLOS Article 246 requires the coastal state's consent for marine scientific research.
So the PCG's case is stronger when framed as unauthorised research in the EEZ than as a breach of innocent passage.
This is an observation about framing, not a claim that the PCG is wrong.
China has historically taken a different view of some survey activity in EEZs, so part of this dispute is about legal interpretation and not only about facts.
The spoofing allegation also matters beyond this one ship.
Under the International Maritime Organization's SOLAS regime, many vessels must carry and operate AIS, though exemptions exist.
Broadcasting false positions undermines the system's purposes of collision avoidance and monitoring.
Spoofing by various vessels has been reported in several regions, which is why analysts routinely cross-check AIS against satellite radar and radio-frequency detection.
The phenomenon is well documented, but whether this particular vessel engaged in it remains, for now, the PCG's assertion.
Geography explains why the incident draws attention.
The Luzon Strait, including the Bashi Channel between Batanes and Taiwan, is a chokepoint for both shipping and data.
Subsea cables carry the large majority of international data traffic, and concentrated cable corridors are natural targets for surveying, since routes and seabed conditions change little over time.
The source report also ties the incident to a wider strategic debate by referencing a Reuters investigation into U.S. plans concerning China's navy and this narrow Pacific waterway.
The report also mentions that scholars at Jinan University have previously argued that Batanes belonged to China.
That is the view of individual academics, and nothing in the report shows it to be an official Chinese government position.
It is relevant only as context, since Batanes is unambiguously Philippine territory under current international recognition, and the report offers no evidence connecting those scholars to this vessel.
Several questions remain open.
It is not yet clear whether independent tracking data confirms the impossible track, or from which sources.
The vessel's registered owner or operator is unknown, and the report gives only its flag, so state affiliation cannot be assumed.
No one has said whether survey equipment was seen operating, which maritime zone the ship occupied under Philippine baselines, or whether any cable runs near its position.
China's response is also missing, so any official explanation, such as a permitted activity or a transit issue, is unrepresented.
Taken together, the strongest element of the PCG's account is the physically impossible AIS track, which is checkable and, if confirmed, hard to explain innocently.
The weakest link is the chain from loitering to confirmed survey activity to military use, which stacks inference on inference.
The episode is best read as a test of how a coastal state can document and publicise grey-zone activity when direct enforcement options are limited, and its credibility will depend on whether the evidence is released for others to verify.
Depending on how Philippine baselines apply, the position could fall in the country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or in archipelagic waters, and the report does not say which.
That distinction matters.
In an EEZ, other states enjoy freedom of navigation, but UNCLOS Article 246 requires the coastal state's consent for marine scientific research.
So the PCG's case is stronger when framed as unauthorised research in the EEZ than as a breach of innocent passage.
This is an observation about framing, not a claim that the PCG is wrong.
China has historically taken a different view of some survey activity in EEZs, so part of this dispute is about legal interpretation and not only about facts.
The spoofing allegation also matters beyond this one ship.
Under the International Maritime Organization's SOLAS regime, many vessels must carry and operate AIS, though exemptions exist.
Broadcasting false positions undermines the system's purposes of collision avoidance and monitoring.
Spoofing by various vessels has been reported in several regions, which is why analysts routinely cross-check AIS against satellite radar and radio-frequency detection.
The phenomenon is well documented, but whether this particular vessel engaged in it remains, for now, the PCG's assertion.
Geography explains why the incident draws attention.
The Luzon Strait, including the Bashi Channel between Batanes and Taiwan, is a chokepoint for both shipping and data.
Subsea cables carry the large majority of international data traffic, and concentrated cable corridors are natural targets for surveying, since routes and seabed conditions change little over time.
The source report also ties the incident to a wider strategic debate by referencing a Reuters investigation into U.S. plans concerning China's navy and this narrow Pacific waterway.
The report also mentions that scholars at Jinan University have previously argued that Batanes belonged to China.
That is the view of individual academics, and nothing in the report shows it to be an official Chinese government position.
It is relevant only as context, since Batanes is unambiguously Philippine territory under current international recognition, and the report offers no evidence connecting those scholars to this vessel.
Several questions remain open.
It is not yet clear whether independent tracking data confirms the impossible track, or from which sources.
The vessel's registered owner or operator is unknown, and the report gives only its flag, so state affiliation cannot be assumed.
No one has said whether survey equipment was seen operating, which maritime zone the ship occupied under Philippine baselines, or whether any cable runs near its position.
China's response is also missing, so any official explanation, such as a permitted activity or a transit issue, is unrepresented.
Taken together, the strongest element of the PCG's account is the physically impossible AIS track, which is checkable and, if confirmed, hard to explain innocently.
The weakest link is the chain from loitering to confirmed survey activity to military use, which stacks inference on inference.
The episode is best read as a test of how a coastal state can document and publicise grey-zone activity when direct enforcement options are limited, and its credibility will depend on whether the evidence is released for others to verify.
Links :
- GlobalTimes : Hurling insults will never win the Philippines any advantages in the South China Sea
- MarineInsight : Philippines Accuses Chinese Vessel Of Location Falsification Near Undersea Cables
Wednesday, September 30, 2026
Navy drones found with Chinese parts but MoD says no data breach
Image:A component in the K3 Scout drone was found to be sending a signal back to China.
Image: Kraken Technology Group
From Computing by Dev Kundaliya
Shows risks of long supply chains
The Ministry of Defence says there is no evidence that sensitive data or military systems were compromised, after a Chinese-made component was discovered in new Royal Navy surveillance drones.
The issue was identified during a routine cybersecurity assessment of the K3 Scout uncrewed surface vessels, which are operated by the Special Boat Service from its headquarters in Poole.
The £12m fleet of 20 drones has been in operation since March.
The vessels can conduct surveillance remotely and are designed to carry out a range of missions, from maritime surveillance and force protection to logistics and precision strikes.
Cameras fitted to the drones were found to send a "squark" – sometimes described as a heartbeat communication – to an IP address in China.
Such signals can indicate that a device has been switched on and is operating correctly. Depending on the system, they can also contain information such as location data.
However, the MoD said an investigation had found no evidence that its data or systems had been accessed, compromised or transmitted outside authorised channels.
"Our assurance and testing processes are designed to identify and address potential vulnerabilities early," an MoD spokesperson said.
The drones were supplied by British defence company Kraken Technology Group, which obtained the cameras from a third-party supplier.
Kraken said it had carried out a full audit with the Royal Navy and was confident that no sensitive information had been shared.
Cameras fitted to the drones were found to send a "squark" – sometimes described as a heartbeat communication – to an IP address in China.
Such signals can indicate that a device has been switched on and is operating correctly. Depending on the system, they can also contain information such as location data.
However, the MoD said an investigation had found no evidence that its data or systems had been accessed, compromised or transmitted outside authorised channels.
"Our assurance and testing processes are designed to identify and address potential vulnerabilities early," an MoD spokesperson said.
The drones were supplied by British defence company Kraken Technology Group, which obtained the cameras from a third-party supplier.
Kraken said it had carried out a full audit with the Royal Navy and was confident that no sensitive information had been shared.
Security concerns over Chinese technology
The discovery is nevertheless embarrassing for the MoD, particularly because Nato countries have increasingly sought to remove Chinese-made components from sensitive military systems due to concerns over espionage and cybersecurity.
The specific camera used had been approved under the US National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which restricts the use of equipment from certain Chinese manufacturers.
NDAA compliance is widely used as a procurement standard across the uncrewed systems industry, including by the US Navy.
Lee Hannaford, director of defence, national security and intelligence at consultancy Larkspur International, said Chinese-made devices could create risks because some were designed to maintain connections with their manufacturers.
"Once established, these channels can be leveraged…for data collection, command-and-control, or pre-positioning for disruption," he said.
China-linked cyber threats have become an increasing concern in recent years.
In April the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) issued a warning about covert networks built using compromised routers and other internet-connected devices.
In January, a group linked to China was accused of targeting the mobile phones of aides to former UK prime ministers.
Supply chains remain a challenge
The episode points to a broader supply-chain challenge for Western defence industries, which are under pressure to reduce Chinese reliance while keeping technology and components affordable.
Even equipment designed for military use can contain components sourced through several layers of suppliers, making it difficult to establish exactly where every part originates.
Alessio Patalano, Professor of War and Strategy in East Asia at King's College London, said the episode demonstrated the security risks created by highly interconnected supply chains: "This incident does highlight one specific challenge: the downside of deeply interdependent supply chains in which China sits at the core of elements of our everyday life.”
Governments should seek to ensure that vulnerabilities could not easily be exploited by Beijing, Patalano added.
Links :
- How do Chinese-made components create security risks in military surveillance drones?
- Can the Ministry of Defence better protect data held by contractors?
- How does Chinese cyber-espionage impact Downing Street government decision-making?
- What are the implications of China centralizing its cloud computing infrastructure?
- Why do state-sponsored hackers frequently target third-party services?
Tuesday, September 29, 2026
Seven years of coastal cleanups reveal the persistence of marine litter
From Safety4Sea
Seven years of monitoring and clean-up work along Greece’s coastline are highlighting the persistence of marine litter — and the difficulty of removing it once it enters the marine environment.
The findings point to a wider challenge for coastal and maritime pollution management: understanding where waste comes from, how it moves, where it accumulates and how it changes over time is as important as removing it from the shoreline.
The Typhoon Project, operated by the Athanasios C. Laskaridis Charitable Foundation, has carried out year-round clean-up operations along the Greek coast since 2019.
Seven years of monitoring and clean-up work along Greece’s coastline are highlighting the persistence of marine litter — and the difficulty of removing it once it enters the marine environment.
The findings point to a wider challenge for coastal and maritime pollution management: understanding where waste comes from, how it moves, where it accumulates and how it changes over time is as important as removing it from the shoreline.
The Typhoon Project, operated by the Athanasios C. Laskaridis Charitable Foundation, has carried out year-round clean-up operations along the Greek coast since 2019.
During that period, more than 25.8 million items of waste, weighing over 1.1 million kg, have been collected from nearly 5,000 beaches, providing a substantial body of data on the distribution and persistence of coastal litter.
Consistency matters more than one-off action
Coastal pollution is a continuing process, not a one-time problem. Waste can accumulate again after a beach has been cleaned, particularly where currents, weather and human activity continue to bring new material ashore.
The project reports an average improvement of around 80% on beaches where repeated cleanups have taken place.
The wider lesson is that environmental interventions need continuity. Monitoring and remediation should be planned as ongoing activities rather than isolated campaigns.
For maritime stakeholders, the principle is familiar: a control is only effective if it is maintained over time.
For maritime stakeholders, the principle is familiar: a control is only effective if it is maintained over time.
The same applies to pollution prevention.
Pollution does not respect boundaries
What reaches a coastline is not necessarily generated there.
Marine currents and weather systems can transport waste over considerable distances, meaning that the source of pollution may be far removed from where it is eventually found.
This makes local cleanup important, but also highlights the limits of purely local solutions.
This makes local cleanup important, but also highlights the limits of purely local solutions.
Marine litter needs to be treated as a connected system, involving ports, vessels, coastal communities, waste-management systems and activities on land.
The condition of one beach can therefore provide clues about pressures elsewhere in the marine environment.
The condition of one beach can therefore provide clues about pressures elsewhere in the marine environment.
Small plastics create a bigger problem
One of the more difficult challenges is what happens after larger plastic items enter the marine environment.
As plastics degrade, they can fragment into increasingly smaller pieces that are more difficult to identify, recover and remove.
This reinforces the importance of preventing plastic waste from entering the marine environment in the first place.
This reinforces the importance of preventing plastic waste from entering the marine environment in the first place.
Once material has dispersed or fragmented, the cost and complexity of remediation increase significantly.
For operators and other maritime stakeholders, containment, proper waste handling and prevention at source remain more effective than relying on recovery after pollution has occurred.
Waste can reveal where the pressure is coming from
The composition of litter is not uniform from one coastline to another.
For operators and other maritime stakeholders, containment, proper waste handling and prevention at source remain more effective than relying on recovery after pollution has occurred.
Waste can reveal where the pressure is coming from
The composition of litter is not uniform from one coastline to another.
The material found on a beach can reflect surrounding human activity, consumption patterns, shipping and fishing activity, tourism and the influence of currents.
That makes litter collection more than a removal exercise.
That makes litter collection more than a removal exercise.
Properly recording what is found can turn a cleanup operation into a source of environmental intelligence.
In practice, this means that what is collected should be measured and classified, not simply removed and discarded.
In practice, this means that what is collected should be measured and classified, not simply removed and discarded.
Consistent data can help identify recurring pollution sources and determine where preventative action is likely to have the greatest effect.
Data turns cleanups into evidence
One of the most significant outcomes of the seven-year programme is the accumulation of a large body of field data.
According to the project, its records now constitute the largest coastal-litter database in the Mediterranean.
That illustrates an important best practice for environmental programmes: every intervention should generate information that can improve the next one.
Long-term datasets can help researchers identify trends, compare locations and assess whether interventions are producing lasting improvements.
That illustrates an important best practice for environmental programmes: every intervention should generate information that can improve the next one.
Long-term datasets can help researchers identify trends, compare locations and assess whether interventions are producing lasting improvements.
They can also provide evidence for policymakers when deciding where prevention measures or infrastructure investment are most needed.
Collaboration extends the value of the work
Marine pollution rarely falls neatly within the responsibility of a single organisation.
Researchers, universities, local authorities, communities and maritime stakeholders each hold part of the picture.
Sharing environmental data and combining operational experience with scientific expertise can therefore produce results that a standalone cleanup cannot.
Sharing environmental data and combining operational experience with scientific expertise can therefore produce results that a standalone cleanup cannot.
Collaboration can also help turn field observations into research, monitoring tools and practical prevention measures.
For maritime organisations, this points to another useful principle: environmental data becomes more valuable when it can be shared, compared and applied beyond the organisation that collected it.
Cleanup should be the starting point, not the end goal
Removing waste from the marine environment remains essential, particularly in areas where pollution threatens ecosystems and coastal communities.
For maritime organisations, this points to another useful principle: environmental data becomes more valuable when it can be shared, compared and applied beyond the organisation that collected it.
Cleanup should be the starting point, not the end goal
Removing waste from the marine environment remains essential, particularly in areas where pollution threatens ecosystems and coastal communities.
But recovery alone does not address why the waste entered the environment.
The longer-term objective is therefore prevention: understanding the sources of pollution, changing practices that allow waste to escape, improving waste management and building greater awareness of the consequences of marine litter.
The longer-term objective is therefore prevention: understanding the sources of pollution, changing practices that allow waste to escape, improving waste management and building greater awareness of the consequences of marine litter.
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