Typically vessels navigate through the narrow channel (marked in purple on this navigation chart), while ships’ trajectory (shown in red) shows sailing along the Iranian coastline.Source: Windward Maritime AI™ Platform - Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains extremely limited, with only three outbound crossings recorded on March 15 and no inbound transits.
- Maritime security risk across the Gulf remains high, with 20 confirmed incidents involving commercial vessels and offshore infrastructure recorded since the start of the Iran war.
- Kharg Island remains operational despite recent strikes, with multiple tankers still present near the terminal even as export volumes remain well below pre-war levels.
- Route redistribution remains active, with Bab el-Mandeb traffic sharply reduced, Suez Canal volumes rebounding, and Cape of Good Hope diversion traffic staying elevated.
- Regional logistics strain is increasing outside the Gulf, particularly at Salalah and Karachi, while Saudi Arabia continues expanding its Red Sea crude export workaround.
- Maritime security pressure is also widening beyond the Gulf, with a tanker strike in the Black Sea and unusual Russian tanker activity near a damaged Arctic gas platform.
Operational Overview Maritime activity across the Gulf and adjacent shipping systems remained heavily disrupted on March 15 as the conflict continued to distort commercial traffic patterns, energy flows, and maritime security conditions.
Transit through the Strait of Hormuz remained near paralysis, with only three outbound vessels recorded and no inbound crossings.
While that marks a slight increase from the previous day’s full visible halt, activity remains far below normal commercial levels and underscores the continued reluctance of operators to enter the corridor.
The broader security picture remains severe.
Since the start of the Iran war, 20 confirmed maritime security incidents involving commercial vessels and offshore infrastructure have been recorded across the Northern Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman.
Cargo vessels account for the overwhelming majority of affected ships, indicating that the threat environment remains centered on mainstream commercial traffic rather than niche vessel categories.
Beyond the Gulf, global shipping routes continue adjusting.
Bab el-Mandeb traffic remains sharply reduced, Suez Canal volumes partially rebounded, and Cape of Good Hope diversions remained elevated.
At the same time, pressure is growing on alternative logistics hubs outside the Gulf, while Saudi Arabia continues
shifting crude exports toward Red Sea infrastructure.
The conflict is also increasingly influencing maritime security beyond the immediate Gulf theater.
A Greek-flagged
tanker strike near Novorossiysk in the Black Sea, together with unusual Russian tanker behavior near the damaged Arctic Metagaz platform, suggests that geopolitical maritime risk is spreading across multiple regions at once.
Strait of Hormuz Traffic
Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz remained extremely limited on March 15.
Windward recorded three outbound crossings and no inbound transits, marking the first visible movement through the Strait since March 13.
While this represents a 300% increase compared with March 14, when no crossings were recorded, activity remains only marginally above the 7-day moving average of 2.29 crossings and still far below normal commercial levels.
The vessels included one bulk carrier and two vessels classified as other or unknown.
Flag distribution included one Liberian-flagged vessel and one Guyana-flagged vessel.
One of the transiting ships was the sanctioned VLCC NORA (IMO 9237539), which loaded approximately 2.01 million barrels of crude oil at Kharg Island and departed the terminal on March 7.
The vessel is currently en route to Ningbo, China, reinforcing that limited Iranian export flows continue despite the wider disruption.
Satellite imagery of the vessels NORA, HEDY, and PING SHUN at Kharg Island on March 7, 07:31 UTC.
Source: Widnward Remote Sensing Intelligence.
Maritime Security Incidents
Maritime security monitoring indicates a sustained pattern of attacks against commercial shipping and offshore infrastructure across Gulf waters.
Since the start of the Iran war, 20 confirmed maritime security incidents have been recorded across the Northern Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman.
Map of vessel attacks since the start of the Iran War.
Source: Windward.
Cargo vessels account for the overwhelming majority of affected ships, representing 90% of all attacks.
The breakdown includes eight bulk carriers (40%), six tankers (30%), four container vessels (20%), and two service or support vessels (10%).
Ownership and flag analysis indicate that several affected vessels had Western or Gulf-state linkages.
Three vessels had a U.S.
nexus, three had a UAE nexus, and three had a UK nexus based on ownership or flag state connections.
Geographically, the Northern Arabian Gulf has been the most affected area, accounting for 45% of incidents (9 vessels), followed by the Strait of Hormuz at 30% (6 vessels) and the Gulf of Oman at 25% (5 vessels).
Recent port call analysis also suggests elevated exposure after entering the regional threat environment.
Approximately 45% of targeted vessels had recently called at UAE ports, while 20% had recent Iraqi port calls.
At the same time, the affected vessels also included ships arriving from Thailand, Vietnam, and Brazil, indicating that the risk extends well beyond regionally linked trade alone.
Taken together, the pattern suggests broad targeting of dense commercial shipping lanes rather than a narrow focus on one nationality or operator class.
Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal Traffic
Bab el-Mandeb
Transit activity through Bab el-Mandeb remained sharply reduced on March 15.
Windward recorded 10 total crossings, consisting of five inbound and five outbound vessels.
That represents a 52.4% decrease from the previous day and remains well below the 7-day average of 20.71 crossings.
The most common vessel subclasses included two bulk carriers, two oil and chemical tankers, and two oil products tankers.
Flag distribution was led by Liberia with four vessels, followed by Singapore and China with one vessel each.
The continued decline reflects persistent operator concern over missile and drone threats to commercial shipping in the Red Sea corridor.
Suez Canal
Traffic through the Suez Canal partially rebounded on March 15.
Windward recorded 39 total crossings, including 17 inbound vessels and 22 outbound vessels.
That represents a 69.57% increase compared with the previous day and places activity above the 7-day average of 34 crossings.
The traffic mix included 11 bulk carriers, six crude oil tankers, and six container vessels.
Liberia led flag distribution with 11 vessels, followed by Panama with five and Sierra Leone with three.
The rebound suggests that some operators are still willing to test Red Sea-linked routing despite the ongoing regional threat picture.
Cape of Good Hope Diversion
Diversion traffic around the Cape of Good Hope remained elevated on March 15.
Windward recorded 82 total vessel transits, including 35 eastbound and 47 westbound crossings.
That represents an 18.84% increase compared with March 14 and remains broadly consistent with the 7-day moving average of 81.57 crossings.
The traffic mix was led by 26 bulk carriers, 21 container vessels, and eight crude oil tankers.
Liberia led the flag distribution with 21 vessels, followed by Singapore with 14 and the Marshall Islands with 10.
These sustained volumes confirm that long-haul diversions around Africa remain a core alternative for operators avoiding Gulf and Red Sea risk corridors.
The result continues to be longer voyage times, higher freight costs, and increased strain on Asia-Europe trade lanes.
Port Operations Disruptions
Operational congestion is increasing across regional ports as vessels adjust routing and transshipment strategies in response to the Gulf conflict.
Inside the Gulf, Jebel Ali recorded 4 transshipment rollovers, up 100% from the previous day,though still 31.71% below the 7-day average, alongside 6 transshipment delay cases, up 200% day-on-day but still 34.37% below the 7-day average.
Outside the Gulf, Karachi recorded 8 transshipment rollovers, up 33.33% from the previous dayand 300% above the 7-day average.
Salalah recorded 26 transshipment rollovers, down 18.75% day-on-day but still 18.18% above the 7-day average, alongside 72 transshipment delay cases, up 100% from the previous day and 168.09% above the 7-day average.
The surge in delays at Salalah highlights its growing role as an alternative logistics hub outside the Gulf conflict zone.
Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Export PivotSaudi Arabia continues accelerating its crude export rerouting through the
East-West Pipeline, or Petroline, to reduce dependence on Gulf shipping routes.
Windward data shows weekly tanker port calls at Saudi Red Sea ports increasing from roughly 58 in late December 2025 to more than 90 by early March 2026.
This shift has contributed to a visible buildup of VLCCs near Yanbu, where vessels are waiting to load crude transported across the Arabian Peninsula.
The accumulation underscores the scale of Saudi Arabia’s effort to sustain exports while bypassing Hormuz-related risk.
Black Sea IncidentOn March 14, 2026, the Greek-flagged tanker
MARAN HOMER, owned by the Angelicoussis Shipping Group and operating under a U.S.
commercial manager, was struck by a suspected drone or small missile while operating in the Black Sea.
The MARAN HOMER’s vessel path.
Source: Windward Maritime AI™ Platform.
The vessel was unladen and waiting approximately 14 nautical miles off the Russian port of Novorossiysk to load crude oil when it sustained minor damage on its starboard side.
All 24 crew members were unharmed, and the vessel was able to depart the strike area under its own power.
Greek Maritime Affairs officials have indicated that the attack may represent a secondary geopolitical consequence of the broader conflict involving Iran, assessing the strike as a possible pressure tactic linked to the recent U.S.
decision to temporarily ease sanctions on Russian oil in order to stabilize global energy markets disrupted by the Gulf conflict.
The incident highlights the expanding geographic scope of maritime security risks, suggesting that commercial shipping may increasingly face asymmetric threats across multiple maritime theaters simultaneously.
Arctic Activity
Unusual Russian vessel behavior has also been observed in the Arctic.
A Russian tanker, assumed to be carrying Wagner-linked or military personnel, has been loitering near the Arctic Metagaz platform since March 9.
The platform experienced an explosion on March 3 that has been widely suspected to be linked to Ukrainian sabotage.
Russian tanker approaching the Arctic Metagaz platform, which has been loitering since March 9.
Source: Windward Maritime AI™ Platform.The vessel’s prolonged presence suggests a damage assessment, security, or support mission rather than normal commercial activity.
Emerging Iranian Logistics Activity
Satellite and AIS data indicate renewed movement involving IRISL vessels departing Gaolan Port in Zhuhai, China.
Four Iranian-flagged container ships are currently returning toward Iran.
These voyages follow the earlier departures of Shabdis and Barzin, which reportedly carried sodium perchlorate, a key component in solid-propellant missile fuel.
These movements suggest that Iran-linked logistical and industrial supply chains remain active despite sustained pressure on Gulf shipping.
Outlook
The March 16 operating picture points to a maritime system that remains disrupted rather than frozen.
Visible traffic through Hormuz remains extremely limited, reflecting continued operator reluctance to transit the corridor under current security conditions.
At the same time, the broader commercial response still reflects extreme caution.
Vessel accumulation in the Gulf of Oman, reduced Bab el-Mandeb traffic, elevated Cape diversions, and mounting congestion at alternative hubs indicate that many operators continue to avoid direct exposure to the Gulf threat environment.
Maritime security risks are expanding beyond the Gulf theater, illustrated by the strike on the MARAN HOMER in the Black Sea and Russian activity near the damaged Arctic Metagaz platform.
In the near term, maritime activity is likely to remain defined by restricted transit through Hormuz, continued route redistribution across global corridors, and growing pressure on alternative export and transshipment infrastructure.
As the conflict enters its third week, the operational consequences are no longer limited to Gulf shipping alone but are increasingly shaping wider maritime security and trade patterns across multiple regions.
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