Wind assisted propulsion on cargo ships

Wind assisted propulsion on cargo ships
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— Science girl (@sciencegirl) February 27, 2026

Master & cartographer : Greenvile Collins

 

From The History Press

 
A Life of Captain Greenv

 
‘Fascinating and elegantly written, Master & Cartographer introduces a largely forgotten naval hero of Stuart England’ – N.A.M. Rodger, author of The Safeguard of the Sea, The Command of the Ocean and The Price of Victory

This is a book about maps and map-making, about power and class, and about war, seamanship and navigation.

It is a study of wealth, patronage and money, in an England riven by religious disorder and toxic politics.

Greenvile Collins (1643–94) was a naval warrant officer who caught the attention of a King.

His seagoing career took him from Patagonia to the Arctic, into battles against Dutch men of war and Barbary corsairs, and to the slave markets and Silk Road ports of the Mediterranean.

A scientific navigator, his professional drive drew him to Shetland, the Scilly Isles and all points in between, as he undertook the most ambitious hydrographic survey of the British coastline yet attempted.

Then, even as he laboured to complete his monumental sea atlas, he was summoned yet again to the service of the Crown.

The Glorious Revolution was a campaign of crisis for a deeply conflicted Royal Navy, and a crucial test of loyalty for Greenvile Collins and his fellow officers.

Nautical chart by Collins (1698) showing the North Sea

from the Thames Estuary (left) to the Wash(right)

Reviews

‘Fascinating and elegantly written, Master & Cartographer introduces a largely-forgotten naval hero of Stuart England’
N.A.M. Rodger, author of The Safeguard of the Sea, The Command of the Ocean and The Price of Victory

‘Greenvile Collins emerges as a sympathetic hero, who served three kings while compiling invaluable charts and navigational data for his fellow sailors. Not since Patrick O’Brian’s Aubrey-Maturin novels have I enjoyed such rollicking armchair adventures at sea’
Dava Sobel, author of Longitude

‘A triumph. Far more than just the man who charted Britain, Greenvile Collins developed faster survey techniques, commanded ships, fought in battle, and ended his career as the leading hydrographer of the Navy. Alan Harper’s major contribution places Collins in a critical series of events, linking charts and navigation with wars and the fast-paced transitions that occurred after 1688, adding a significant new dimension to the naval side of that tumultuous year’
Andrew Lambert, Laughton Professor of Naval History, Kings College, London

‘Very worthwhile – the author has an excellent grasp of his material, writes well, and his seagoing experience adds colour and interest to a compelling narrative’
Dr David Davies, author of Pepys’s Navy and Kings of the Sea, chair of the Society for Nautical Research

 

What is S-100 and how will it affect the future of electronic charts?

From January 2029, retrofits must also be S-100 compatible. 

Credit: UK Hydrographic Office

From Practical Boat Owner by Laura Hodgetts

“S-100 is indeed a great step forward. However, it does not promise any new chart data in the areas where leisure boaters frequent", says the Royal Institute of Navigation (RIN) Small Craft Group chairman Paul Bryans.

S-100 “is already the foundation for the next generation of navigation systems”, Emma Wise, director of cartography at Teledyne Maritime, has explained.
This framework for data standards has been developed by the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) – an intergovernmental organisation that works to ensure all the world’s seas, oceans and navigable waters are surveyed and charted.

Wise told the RIN Small Craft Navigation in 2026 and beyond event: “Currently, many hydrographic organisations around the world are now changing their charting schemes to grids.”

Although there is no ‘universal’ gridding system – which refers to the scheming of charts, often unseen by mariners and small craft users – the worldwide move to grids should mean greater alignment as S-100 data becomes available.

Wise said S-100 will have a commercial-sector focus – it is primarily developed for commercial shipping and SOLAS – however small boat sailors can expect a benefit rollout of S-100 product groups offering ‘richer situational awareness; safer and more predictable nearshore operations; and better decision-making tools’.

The UK Hydrographic Office told PBO the S-100 framework extends across multiple systems, and users and organisations expected to benefit include ports, defence, hydrographic offices and marine users.

 

‘Layers of information’

Like Google maps shows users multiple layers from terrain, to traffic and local amenities, Wise said S-100 brings to life “layers of information like Lego.”

‘Premium’ versions will include high-resolution bathymetry, surface currents and navigational warnings.

She added: “It provides also a unique opportunity for autonomous and uncrewed vessel navigation.”

From 2027, new chart plotters and multifunction displays (MFDs) must adapt to S-100, and will need more computer power for multi-layer renderings.

The new S-100 framework aims to provide a universal data standard to enrich the next generation of products for hydrographic, maritime shipping and geographic information system communities. Credit: UK Hydrographic Office

Missing chart data

Paul Bryans, chairman of the RIN Small Craft Group, said: “S-100 is indeed a great step forward.

“However, it does not promise any new chart data in the areas where leisure boaters frequent.

“That was highlighted in the Pleasure Vessel Navigation Systems Working Group (PVNSWG) report ‘gap analysis’ and remains our main concern.

 

 

“S-100 is aimed at the 3,000GT-plus shipping market but there will be spin-off benefits for other user groups, like improved tidal data presentation.

“However, proposed new chart standards for vessels below that size should allow the ‘leisure’ chart publishers to continue to provide enhanced solutions for the small craft market.”

In the latest Electronic Navigation Systems – Guidance for safe use on leisure vessels free booklet, under a section called ‘Shortfalls of electronic navigational charts (ENCs) for leisure use, it states:

“Official ENCs, which are displayed on electronic chart display and information systems (ECDIS) and small vessel – electronic chart systems (UK MCA performance standard) (SV-ECS), were designed primarily for the shipping sector (greater than 500GT).

“Features significant to smaller vessels used to be depicted on paper charts, including features that had been shown on older withdrawn charts, but many of these were omitted when ENCs were first created.

“With a focus on the needs of larger vessels, these omissions helped to reduce screen clutter.

“New surveys commissioned by hydrographic offices for ENCs also tend to focus primarily on commercial shipping routes, commercial ports and deeper waters.

“Few new surveys are commissioned for shallower inshore waters used only by leisure vessels.

“Consequently, ENCs currently do not display all the data needed by less than 24m vessels, which frequently navigate in areas inaccessible to vessels greater than 500GT.

“Over the years, this gap has been filled by the leisure chart providers in one form or another.

“ENCs are purchased on subscription for individual chart cells and are very expensive as there is only one pricing plan for all vessels.”

Links :

• YouTube : S-100 in focus: Sea trial insights | UK Hydrographic Office

March 16, 2026: Iran war maritime intelligence daily

Typically vessels navigate through the narrow channel (marked in purple on this navigation chart), while ships’ trajectory (shown in red) shows sailing along the Iranian coastline.
Source: Windward Maritime AI™ Platform

From Windward blog

At a Glance

• Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains extremely limited, with only three outbound crossings recorded on March 15 and no inbound transits.
• Maritime security risk across the Gulf remains high, with 20 confirmed incidents involving commercial vessels and offshore infrastructure recorded since the start of the Iran war.
• Kharg Island remains operational despite recent strikes, with multiple tankers still present near the terminal even as export volumes remain well below pre-war levels.
• Route redistribution remains active, with Bab el-Mandeb traffic sharply reduced, Suez Canal volumes rebounding, and Cape of Good Hope diversion traffic staying elevated.
• Regional logistics strain is increasing outside the Gulf, particularly at Salalah and Karachi, while Saudi Arabia continues expanding its Red Sea crude export workaround.
• Maritime security pressure is also widening beyond the Gulf, with a tanker strike in the Black Sea and unusual Russian tanker activity near a damaged Arctic gas platform.

 

Operational Overview

Maritime activity across the Gulf and adjacent shipping systems remained heavily disrupted on March 15 as the conflict continued to distort commercial traffic patterns, energy flows, and maritime security conditions.

Transit through the Strait of Hormuz remained near paralysis, with only three outbound vessels recorded and no inbound crossings.
While that marks a slight increase from the previous day’s full visible halt, activity remains far below normal commercial levels and underscores the continued reluctance of operators to enter the corridor.

The broader security picture remains severe.
Since the start of the Iran war, 20 confirmed maritime security incidents involving commercial vessels and offshore infrastructure have been recorded across the Northern Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman.
Cargo vessels account for the overwhelming majority of affected ships, indicating that the threat environment remains centered on mainstream commercial traffic rather than niche vessel categories.

Beyond the Gulf, global shipping routes continue adjusting.
Bab el-Mandeb traffic remains sharply reduced, Suez Canal volumes partially rebounded, and Cape of Good Hope diversions remained elevated.
At the same time, pressure is growing on alternative logistics hubs outside the Gulf, while Saudi Arabia continues shifting crude exports toward Red Sea infrastructure.

The conflict is also increasingly influencing maritime security beyond the immediate Gulf theater.
A Greek-flagged tanker strike near Novorossiysk in the Black Sea, together with unusual Russian tanker behavior near the damaged Arctic Metagaz platform, suggests that geopolitical maritime risk is spreading across multiple regions at once. 

Strait of Hormuz Traffic

Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz remained extremely limited on March 15.

Windward recorded three outbound crossings and no inbound transits, marking the first visible movement through the Strait since March 13.
While this represents a 300% increase compared with March 14, when no crossings were recorded, activity remains only marginally above the 7-day moving average of 2.29 crossings and still far below normal commercial levels.

The vessels included one bulk carrier and two vessels classified as other or unknown.
Flag distribution included one Liberian-flagged vessel and one Guyana-flagged vessel.

One of the transiting ships was the sanctioned VLCC NORA (IMO 9237539), which loaded approximately 2.01 million barrels of crude oil at Kharg Island and departed the terminal on March 7.
The vessel is currently en route to Ningbo, China, reinforcing that limited Iranian export flows continue despite the wider disruption.

Satellite imagery of the vessels NORA, HEDY, and PING SHUN at Kharg Island on March 7, 07:31 UTC.
Source: Widnward Remote Sensing Intelligence.

Maritime Security Incidents

Maritime security monitoring indicates a sustained pattern of attacks against commercial shipping and offshore infrastructure across Gulf waters.
Since the start of the Iran war, 20 confirmed maritime security incidents have been recorded across the Northern Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman.

Map of vessel attacks since the start of the Iran War.
Source: Windward.

Cargo vessels account for the overwhelming majority of affected ships, representing 90% of all attacks.
The breakdown includes eight bulk carriers (40%), six tankers (30%), four container vessels (20%), and two service or support vessels (10%).

Ownership and flag analysis indicate that several affected vessels had Western or Gulf-state linkages.
Three vessels had a U.S.
nexus, three had a UAE nexus, and three had a UK nexus based on ownership or flag state connections.

Geographically, the Northern Arabian Gulf has been the most affected area, accounting for 45% of incidents (9 vessels), followed by the Strait of Hormuz at 30% (6 vessels) and the Gulf of Oman at 25% (5 vessels).

Recent port call analysis also suggests elevated exposure after entering the regional threat environment.
Approximately 45% of targeted vessels had recently called at UAE ports, while 20% had recent Iraqi port calls.
At the same time, the affected vessels also included ships arriving from Thailand, Vietnam, and Brazil, indicating that the risk extends well beyond regionally linked trade alone.

Taken together, the pattern suggests broad targeting of dense commercial shipping lanes rather than a narrow focus on one nationality or operator class.

Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal Traffic

 
Bab el-Mandeb

Transit activity through Bab el-Mandeb remained sharply reduced on March 15.

Windward recorded 10 total crossings, consisting of five inbound and five outbound vessels.
That represents a 52.4% decrease from the previous day and remains well below the 7-day average of 20.71 crossings.

The most common vessel subclasses included two bulk carriers, two oil and chemical tankers, and two oil products tankers.
Flag distribution was led by Liberia with four vessels, followed by Singapore and China with one vessel each.

The continued decline reflects persistent operator concern over missile and drone threats to commercial shipping in the Red Sea corridor.

Suez Canal

Traffic through the Suez Canal partially rebounded on March 15.

Windward recorded 39 total crossings, including 17 inbound vessels and 22 outbound vessels.
That represents a 69.57% increase compared with the previous day and places activity above the 7-day average of 34 crossings.

The traffic mix included 11 bulk carriers, six crude oil tankers, and six container vessels.
Liberia led flag distribution with 11 vessels, followed by Panama with five and Sierra Leone with three.

The rebound suggests that some operators are still willing to test Red Sea-linked routing despite the ongoing regional threat picture.

Cape of Good Hope Diversion

Diversion traffic around the Cape of Good Hope remained elevated on March 15.

Windward recorded 82 total vessel transits, including 35 eastbound and 47 westbound crossings.
That represents an 18.84% increase compared with March 14 and remains broadly consistent with the 7-day moving average of 81.57 crossings.

The traffic mix was led by 26 bulk carriers, 21 container vessels, and eight crude oil tankers.
Liberia led the flag distribution with 21 vessels, followed by Singapore with 14 and the Marshall Islands with 10.

These sustained volumes confirm that long-haul diversions around Africa remain a core alternative for operators avoiding Gulf and Red Sea risk corridors.
The result continues to be longer voyage times, higher freight costs, and increased strain on Asia-Europe trade lanes.

Port Operations Disruptions

Operational congestion is increasing across regional ports as vessels adjust routing and transshipment strategies in response to the Gulf conflict.

Inside the Gulf, Jebel Ali recorded 4 transshipment rollovers, up 100% from the previous day,though still 31.71% below the 7-day average, alongside 6 transshipment delay cases, up 200% day-on-day but still 34.37% below the 7-day average.

Outside the Gulf, Karachi recorded 8 transshipment rollovers, up 33.33% from the previous dayand 300% above the 7-day average.
Salalah recorded 26 transshipment rollovers, down 18.75% day-on-day but still 18.18% above the 7-day average, alongside 72 transshipment delay cases, up 100% from the previous day and 168.09% above the 7-day average.

The surge in delays at Salalah highlights its growing role as an alternative logistics hub outside the Gulf conflict zone.

Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Export Pivot

Saudi Arabia continues accelerating its crude export rerouting through the East-West Pipeline, or Petroline, to reduce dependence on Gulf shipping routes.

Windward data shows weekly tanker port calls at Saudi Red Sea ports increasing from roughly 58 in late December 2025 to more than 90 by early March 2026.

This shift has contributed to a visible buildup of VLCCs near Yanbu, where vessels are waiting to load crude transported across the Arabian Peninsula.
The accumulation underscores the scale of Saudi Arabia’s effort to sustain exports while bypassing Hormuz-related risk.

Black Sea Incident

On March 14, 2026, the Greek-flagged tanker MARAN HOMER, owned by the Angelicoussis Shipping Group and operating under a U.S.
commercial manager, was struck by a suspected drone or small missile while operating in the Black Sea.

 

The MARAN HOMER’s vessel path.
Source: Windward Maritime AI™ Platform.

The vessel was unladen and waiting approximately 14 nautical miles off the Russian port of Novorossiysk to load crude oil when it sustained minor damage on its starboard side.
All 24 crew members were unharmed, and the vessel was able to depart the strike area under its own power.

Greek Maritime Affairs officials have indicated that the attack may represent a secondary geopolitical consequence of the broader conflict involving Iran, assessing the strike as a possible pressure tactic linked to the recent U.S.
decision to temporarily ease sanctions on Russian oil in order to stabilize global energy markets disrupted by the Gulf conflict.

The incident highlights the expanding geographic scope of maritime security risks, suggesting that commercial shipping may increasingly face asymmetric threats across multiple maritime theaters simultaneously.

Arctic Activity

Unusual Russian vessel behavior has also been observed in the Arctic.

A Russian tanker, assumed to be carrying Wagner-linked or military personnel, has been loitering near the Arctic Metagaz platform since March 9.
The platform experienced an explosion on March 3 that has been widely suspected to be linked to Ukrainian sabotage.

Russian tanker approaching the Arctic Metagaz platform, which has been loitering since March 9.
Source: Windward Maritime AI™ Platform.

The vessel’s prolonged presence suggests a damage assessment, security, or support mission rather than normal commercial activity.

Emerging Iranian Logistics Activity

Satellite and AIS data indicate renewed movement involving IRISL vessels departing Gaolan Port in Zhuhai, China.

Four Iranian-flagged container ships are currently returning toward Iran.
These voyages follow the earlier departures of Shabdis and Barzin, which reportedly carried sodium perchlorate, a key component in solid-propellant missile fuel.

These movements suggest that Iran-linked logistical and industrial supply chains remain active despite sustained pressure on Gulf shipping.
 

Outlook

The March 16 operating picture points to a maritime system that remains disrupted rather than frozen.
Visible traffic through Hormuz remains extremely limited, reflecting continued operator reluctance to transit the corridor under current security conditions.

At the same time, the broader commercial response still reflects extreme caution.
Vessel accumulation in the Gulf of Oman, reduced Bab el-Mandeb traffic, elevated Cape diversions, and mounting congestion at alternative hubs indicate that many operators continue to avoid direct exposure to the Gulf threat environment.
Maritime security risks are expanding beyond the Gulf theater, illustrated by the strike on the MARAN HOMER in the Black Sea and Russian activity near the damaged Arctic Metagaz platform.

In the near term, maritime activity is likely to remain defined by restricted transit through Hormuz, continued route redistribution across global corridors, and growing pressure on alternative export and transshipment infrastructure.
As the conflict enters its third week, the operational consequences are no longer limited to Gulf shipping alone but are increasingly shaping wider maritime security and trade patterns across multiple regions.

 

Links :

• Windward blog : March 17, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily  / March 18, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily 
• CNN : Iran still exporting millions of barrels of oil through Strait of Hormuz even as other traffic paralyzed / Visualizing the US-Israeli war with Iran and retaliation in maps and charts

Liaowang-1: Chinaʻs new spy ship

🚨ALERTE INFO

Ce navire chinois, opérant près du golfe d'Oman, pourrait fournir un soutien en matière de renseignement à l'Iran en temps réel !

Le navire s'appelle Liaowang-1.
C'est un bâtiment de renseignement électronique naval de pointe, conçu pour collecter et analyser des… pic.twitter.com/RcTGhmXHYT— Tribune Populaire🌐 (@TribunePop23) March 8, 2026

JUST IN

The Chinese intelligence-gathering vessel "Liaowang-1" is currently sailing off the coast of Oman.pic.twitter.com/y4t15WSt91

— China Now (@ChinaNow24) March 8, 2026

Chinese Intelligence Ship “Liaowang-1” is supposed to be spotted near Oman

But according VesselFinder, the ship is anchored in China

From GreyDynamics

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) deployed the Liaowang-1, its newest maritime space tracking and intelligence vessel.
It marks both a technological leap forward for the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) naval capabilities as well as a strategic assertion of Chinese interests in space and naval domains.
The Liaowang-1 is designed to monitor military satellites, track missile launches, and function as a mobile command and control (C2) centre for space and naval operations.
This new class of tracking ships will replace the Yuan Wang-class ships, which have been in service since 1977.
[source]

In recent years, Beijing has been actively investing in its fleet and now constitutes the world’s largest Navy in terms of total ship count.
The deployment of the Liaowang-1 happens amid US efforts to enhance their space capabilities by deploying 160 satellites into space by the end of 2025.
[source, source]

 

 

Image of the Liaowang-1 ship.
[Image source]

1 History of the Project

The Liaowang-1 is a component of China’s larger space and military development goals.
Beijing is gradually replacing the outdated Yuan Wang-class ships–in service since the late 1970s–with the new ships.
Liaowang-1, is constructed by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), and is the result of decades of advancements in space tracking and maritime surveillance technologies.
Amid rising international tensions and China’s growing emphasis on fusing the space and marine domains for strategic benefit, the ship was officially launched in 2023.
Its advanced capabilities embody the trend towards a tighter integration of space operations with naval activities.
[source, source]
 

1.1 What is a Tracking Ship?

A tracking ship is an intelligence collection vessel that is equipped with antennas and electronic systems to track missile launches (including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)), rockets, and satellites.
As missiles and satellites often cross vast oceanic areas, tracking ships extend the reach of land-based radar by overcoming geographic and curvature limitations.
Equipped with sophisticated sensors, these ships collect telemetry data, monitor trajectories, and provide real-time C2 support for military operations.
They can also enhance electronic intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities by gathering information on adversary communications and radar emissions.
[source]
 

2 Technical Data

Many of the technical parameters of the Liaowang-1 are unknown to the public, however, available information suggest the following characteristics: Displacement: 30,000 tons
Length: 224 meters
Beam: 32 meters
Equipment: At least five (visible) radar domes with high and low-range radars, high-gain antennas, signal processing systems; likely other sensors, telemetry receivers, and ELINT/SIGINT systems on board.
[source, source]

The ship’s scale and enlarged hull reportedly allow it to host more systems and be more resilient against threats.
Its helipad can support medium-lift helicopters, allowing for better logistics, surveillance, and potential search and rescue capabilities.
With its large displacement, the Liaowang-1 is one of the largest non-combatant ships in the Chinese Navy.
[source]

That said, the specific data about the technology used remains classified.
It is thus difficult to assess how well the ship would perform in a real combat scenario.

 

 

Image of the Liaowang-1 ship.
[Image source]

3 Mission

As a tracking ship, the Liaowang-1’s mission scenario will likely involve the provision of a mobile, sea-based platform to track satellites, missiles, ICBMs, and other space assets in real-time.
Given the geopolitical tensions between the PRC and the US in the South China Sea and the Pacific, this vessel can be a counterbalance to Washington’s increasing space assets and its upcoming Golden Dome missile defense project.
[source]

The ship’s sophisticated sensors will allow it to enhance PLAN’s situational awareness and surveillance in international waters, beyond the coverage of its mainland stations.
By acting as a C2 node for Beijing’s military, it can facilitate electronic warfare and anti-satellite (ASAT) operations and potentially collect acoustic and electromagnetic data.
[source, source]

Equally important, this forward-deployed intelligence asset serves as a dominant tool for strategic power projection and Beijing’s determination to contest its adversaries far beyond its own borders.

 

 

Image of the Liaowang-1 ship.
[Image source]

3.1 Role in China’s Maritime Strategy

China’s current maritime strategy is transitioning away from its previously near-coastal focus to a more assertive posture.
This allows the PLAN to operate further away from its territorial waters to defend its global interests, access to resources, and foreign markets.
Beijing seeks to build a blue-water navy to operate far from its borders for economic and geopolitical advantages.
[source]

The Liaowang-1 can support this strategy by enhancing PLAN’s capabilities to protect critical infrastructure and secure key chokepoints.
Its Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities allow the PRC to build out its integrated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) area and challenge US dominance, particularly around Taiwan and in the wider region of the South China Sea.

 

 

Emblem of the PLAN.

4 Conclusion

The Liaowang-1 signals Beijing’s intent to be a key player in maritime and space domains, further enhancing its growing intelligence capabilities.
As a mobile space surveillance platform, it can help monitor US satellites and missile launches, providing a strategic edge in a potential conflict.

The ship is part of China’s broader maritime strategy to project power globally and integrate space and naval assets into its defense components.
Additionally, it portrays the growing importance of multi-domain warfare, where domains such as space and sea grow more intertwined and complex.

Links :

• OneIndia : Chinese Spy Ship Liaowang-1 Spotted Near Oman: Why Its Presence Near Oman Is Concerning For US Military
• Shanaka Anslem Perera : The Invisible Siege: How Insurance Markets, Not Missiles, Closed the Strait of Hormuz