We visited DEEP's campus near Bristol, UK – the company on a mission to get people to live under water, for months at a time, by the end of this decade in one of these habitats. pic.twitter.com/iuIesRZ0st
DEEP's campus near Bristol, UK – the company on a mission to get people to live under water, for months at a time, by the end of this decade in one of these habitats.
A Philippine map grabbed from the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) website.
The NAMRIA on Wednesday (Feb. 18, 2026) said its official maps and nautical charts consistently use the name West Philippine Sea and accurately represent the Philippines’ maritime boundaries, including the exclusive economic zone, based on international law and precise geospatial data.
The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) has clarified the role of official Philippine maps and the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundaries in depicting and protecting the country’s maritime jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea amid the renewed public discussion on the issue.
In a statement on Wednesday, NAMRIA said the Philippines has formally adopted the name “West Philippine Sea” in government publications since 2012. “In accordance with this policy, NAMRIA places the label consistently across its official maps and charts, including administrative maps, topographic maps, thematic maps, and nautical charts used for navigation,” it said.
These materials, the agency said, are technical reference documents used by mariners, planners, researchers, and institutions, both domestic and international, for navigation, geographic information, and maritime safety.
Under international law, NAMRIA said the country’s EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles from its archipelagic baselines.
“This creates a continuous curved boundary, similar to the edge of a circle, not a polygon made of straight lines,” the statement read.
Because of this, the agency said a short list of coordinates would not accurately define the country’s maritime limits, and the boundary is represented through “precise geospatial data derived from the archipelagic baselines defined in RA 9522”, allowing navigation systems and mapping software to compute the limits correctly.
RA 9522, signed in March 2009, and amends previous provisions, is the Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law that redefines the country's maritime territory to align with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Phlippine archipelago nuatical map (UKHO 2200)
International Standards
NAMRIA said its nautical charts comply with international hydrographic standards and are used by both Philippine and foreign vessels navigating waters under Philippine jurisdiction.
The charts are submitted to relevant international technical bodies, including the International Hydrographic Organization, integrating Philippine geographic information into the global maritime record, supporting safe navigation and responsible maritime activity.
NAMRIA said it will continue to uphold its mandate to produce accurate and reliable geospatial information, saying it will continue to uphold national sovereignty, maritime safety, disaster preparedness, and sound resource management through scientifically correct and internationally compliant maps and charts.
A country-by-country breakdown of where the global uncrewed surface vessel buildout actually stands.
That is the most consequential autonomous naval weapons milestone of 2025.
It validated a capability progression that no Western program has publicly demonstrated, and it received a fraction of the analysis generated by a US Navy solicitation document issued three months later.
That imbalance tells you something important about where the serious thinking is happening, and where it isn't.
The global uncrewed surface vessel race has entered its production phase.
Twelve months ago this was still a story about prototypes and proof-of-concept demonstrations.
Not anymore. The United States awarded its first major USV production contract. China sailed the world's largest armed USV. The UK deployed a remotely operated escort capability in weeks. Australia's Bluebottles quietly racked up 23,000 nautical miles of live border surveillance. And Ukraine destroyed more than fifteen Russian warships with systems that cost a fraction of what they sank.
What separates the countries that are winning this race from those still drafting requirements?
Speed. And the speed gap is widening, not narrowing.
UNITED STATES: Two Programs, Two Speeds
The headline program is MASC, the Modular Attack Surface Craft. The Navy merged its Large and Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel programs into a single solicitation in July 2025, issuing through Other Transaction Authority with white papers due in a matter of weeks. Three variants, commercial ABS standards, multi-shipyard repairability. First deliveries targeted within 18 months of prototype award. CNO Daryl Caudle put it plainly: “The Large Unmanned Surface Vessel was an exquisite single-mission vessel, with capabilities that made it mission-restricted and unaffordable.”
RADM William Daly added: “Designs already exist. We must not over-spec this.”
Good instincts. But MASC is still a solicitation. Prototype selection is 'early 2026' at best. Full production is years away.
The Saronic contract tells a different story. On December 8, at the Reagan National Defense Forum, Secretary of the Navy John Phelan announced a $392 million production OTA for Saronic's Corsair vessel. Nearly $200 million obligated at award. A 24-foot modular autonomous surface vessel, roughly 1,000 lbs of payload, 1,000-plus nautical miles at 35-plus knots. Prototype to production contract in under twelve months. Phelan's framing: “Prototype to production in under 12 months. The Saronic OTA proves how we'll build a hybrid manned-unmanned Fleet: open competition, real contracts, real hardware for Sailors and Marines not slides. This is now the standard.”
Saronic simultaneously announced a $300 million expansion of its Franklin, Louisiana shipyard. That's not a company hedging its bets on a pilot contract. That's a company that believes in the volume. Two 150-foot Marauder vessels are already under construction.
The tension between MASC and Saronic is the defining dynamic in US naval autonomy right now. MASC is the institutional program that will eventually matter at scale. Saronic is the acquisition model that works at wartime speed. The Navy needs both to work, and the track records so far are not equivalent.
One more number worth sitting with: the FY2026 DoD autonomy budget is $13.4 billion. The Navy's share alone is $5.3 billion, up $2.2 billion from last year. The reconciliation bill separately allocates $5.1 billion specifically for unmanned vessel fleet expansion.
The money is real. The question is delivery rate.
Beyond MASC and Saronic, the field is crowded, and getting more so. Boston-based Blue Water Autonomy announced its Liberty class this month: a 190-foot, 800-ton autonomous patrol vessel based on Damen’s Stan Patrol 6009, Google Ventures-backed, with a 10,000 nautical mile design range and 150 tons of payload including missile launchers. Production starts at Conrad Shipyard in Louisiana next month, first delivery later this year. No owned shipyard. CEO Rylan Hamilton’s framing at WEST 2026 was candid: the Navy needs to see these vessels “in the water operating every single day with the fleet” before it can figure out how many it actually wants. That is a reasonable description of where things stand. Bryan Clark at the Hudson Institute is blunt about the consolidation math. The Navy, he argues, will sustain enough orders to keep two medium and large USV companies in business, not twelve. Every company in the field believes it will be one of the two. That belief is not universally well-founded.
For his part, Caudle’s explanation for the Navy’s measured pace is worth taking seriously. The service isn’t indecisive — it’s building C2 structures, training pipelines, and sustainment models that procurement can actually scale on top of. UUV squadrons, USV flotillas, the organisational scaffolding going up in parallel with the contracts. Without it, Hamilton’s concern materialises: platforms arrive and sit idle because no one has worked out how to operate them. The bubble and the institutional constraint are related problems, not separate ones. UNITED KINGDOM: The Most Honest Assessment in the Field
In October 2025, five 7.2-metre Rattler USVs operated off Scotland for 72 continuous hours, remotely controlled from HMS Patrick Blackett moored in Portsmouth, 500 miles away. They escorted HMS Tyne and HMS Stirling Castle. From concept to operational deployment: somewhere between two and four months, depending on which source you believe. The procurement itself was concluded in weeks.
SYOS, the UK-New Zealand company behind the Rattlers (manufacturing in Fareham, Hampshire), is producing 50 USVs per month. Many going to Ukraine.
First Sea Lord General Sir Gwyn Jenkins set the ambition at DSEI in September:
“It is my aim to have the first of our uncrewed escort ships sailing alongside our RN warships within the next two years.”
The Strategic Defence Review codified it: 'uncrewed wherever possible; crewed only where necessary.'
Atlantic Bastion, announced in December, is the vision at scale. Phase 1 (Atlantic Net) builds out AI-powered acoustic detection, connecting ships, submarines, aircraft and unmanned vessels through a digital targeting web. Phase 2 adds the Type 92 'sloop' ASW USV and Type 93 XLUUV. Helsing's SG-1 Fathom glider with Lura acoustic software is the core sensor technology. Private investment is matching government funding at a 4:1 ratio, totalling around £0.5 billion in R&D.
But the UK is also the only navy publicly wrestling with what this actually means institutionally. RAN officer Matthew Bell's January 2026 Navy Lookout analysis is worth reading carefully. The accountability gaps are real: 'Who goes to court martial when a robot fails?'
'Command by direction' versus decentralized autonomy. Erosion of sea sense for remote operators. Damage control that simply does not exist when there's no crew. His phrase 'the Old Navy resists the New Navy with fierce institutional inertia' is a diagnosis, not a criticism. Every navy faces this. The UK is the only one discussing it openly.
AUSTRALIA: The Sovereignty Trap
Australia has committed to six LOSVs through the Henderson Defence Precinct, each with 32-cell Mk41 VLS and Aegis Baseline 9 combat system. The A$25 billion precinct investment is real. Entry into service: mid-2030s.
The Surface Fleet Review recommended acquiring LOSVs as a 'fast follower' of the US program. The problem: the US program that Australia is following has since been restructured entirely. Australian documentation still references LUSV. The US Navy has moved on to MASC. The design constraints are shifting. The timeline is long. And RADM William Daly, who leads US unmanned surface programs, has expressed skepticism about widespread LUSV deployment at scale.
That is a sovereign dependency problem dressed up as procurement strategy.
The smarter Australian capability story isn't the LOSVs.
It's Ocius.
Four Bluebottle USVs have accumulated 23,000 nautical miles of unescorted maritime surveillance patrols off Western Australia for Maritime Border Command.
A single 165-day unescorted deployment is now on the record. In a 30-day trial, they identified 19 boats violating protected marine areas.
Ocius has a forward operating base in Darwin. CEO Robert Dane's framing: 'Bluebottles were designed from day one to be anti-submarine warfare USVs.'
The Saildrone-Thales BlueSentry integration matters too.
Twenty-six continuous days off California, 96% uptime, autonomously detecting and classifying underwater threats. ONR-funded. Explicitly positioned under AUKUS Pillar 2.
Australian Ambassador Kevin Rudd attended the christening of the first production ThayerMahan Outpost vessel in April 2025.
Australia is hedging through domestic autonomy software development: Austal's AROS platform controller, Greenroom Robotics' GAMA (with ITAR exemption under AUKUS), the Leidos Sea Archer. The hedge is smart.
It just shouldn't be the plan B.
JAPAN: Serious, Methodical, Outpaced by Events
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries unveiled its combat USV at DSEI Japan in May 2025.
Forty to fifty metres, around 300 tons, containerised armament, AI target classification, CoasTitan C2 system. Sea trials target: end of 2027.
R&D budget: approximately $160 million.
The development is real.
The timeline is measured.
The strategic driver is straightforward.
China fields roughly 88-plus modern destroyers and frigates. Japan operates around 49-50 surface combatants.
The numerical gap is structural and widening. Japan's SHIELD program (FY2027 establishment, ¥100.1 billion in the FY2026 budget) targets an 'asymmetrical defense architecture' of UAVs, USVs and UUVs.
The concept of operations is sound.
The timeline for delivery is not.
The Mogami-class as a USV mothership platform is the operational bright spot.
On June 15, the lead ship conducted its first mine disposal drill using a USV, off Iwo-To Island.
The class has a built-in rear ramp for deploying and recovering unmanned vehicles.
The 12th and final Mogami was launched in December. Australia selected the upgraded Mogami class for its General Purpose Frigate program in August. The integration capability is in the water.
What's not yet clear: interoperability with US systems.
Japan's sovereign development path gives it capability.
Whether that capability speaks the same language as MASC and AUKUS platforms is an open question.
CHINA: The Wrong Benchmark
The JARI-USV-A is 58 metres, somewhere between 300 and 500 tons depending on which source you trust (NAVDEX model, Janes, and H.I. Sutton all give different figures), 40-plus knots, 4,000 nautical mile range, and carries a VLS with 4 to 12 cells, torpedo tubes, AESA radar, a helipad for VTOL UAVs, and provision for AUVs.
It appeared at Guangzhou Shipyard International in late October 2024, sailed to Zhuhai on November 8, and was displayed at Airshow China 2024.
It is the largest and most heavily armed USV afloat globally.
It is also one hull, and the PLAN has not adopted it. EDR Magazine assessed in February 2025: 'There is currently no information on whether the PLA Navy has adopted the only JARI-USV-A that has undergone testing.'
H.I. Sutton: 'It is unclear whether any of these projects enjoys real Chinese Navy support.'
The War Zone flagged the same uncertainty.
Calling it a benchmark for Western programs overstates what one unconfirmed demonstrator represents.
The actual threat is not the vessel.
It's the infrastructure behind it.
China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) operates the shipyard capacity to go from demonstrator to series production in a timeline no Western navy can match.
The yards currently outbuilding every Western navy combined are the same yards that could pivot to USV volume production.
ASPI's December 2025 update found China leading in 66 of 74 critical technology areas, up from 57 of 64. Radar, drones, and swarming robotics are among the 24 technologies at 'high risk' of Chinese monopoly.
That latent capacity is the benchmark. Not the single hull in Zhuhai.
UKRAINE AND NORWAY: The Data Nobody Is Using
Ukraine's 385th USV Brigade, the world's first dedicated military USV unit, established in August 2023, has destroyed more than 15 Russian warships and inflicted over $500 million in damages.
The Magura V5 sank a missile corvette, a landing ship, and a patrol vessel in the space of five weeks in early 2024.
On December 31, a Magura V5 with an R-73 missile shot down a Russian Mi-8 helicopter: the first USV-to-aircraft kill. Then came the Su-30SM jets in May.
In December 2025, a 'Sub Sea Baby' UUV attacked an Improved Kilo-class submarine at Novorossiysk. UK MoD assessed 'highly likely significant damage.'
That is the assessed first successful UUV strike on a submarine in combat.
RUSI's summary: 'The success of Ukraine's uncrewed surface vessels is indisputable. The Russian Navy is now on the defensive.'
Norway's contribution is less dramatic and more strategically durable. The Maritime Capability Coalition, co-led with the UK, allocated NOK 6.7 billion (around 580 million euros) for 2025. Kongsberg signed MoUs in June to equip Ukrainian-built USVs with PROTECTOR remote weapon stations, opened a permanent Kyiv office, and announced Seawolf USV production in Poland (PLN 250 million investment).
The Seawolf is a 7.7-metre drone boat carrying four AIM-9 missiles plus an M2 machine gun.
Twenty-four NATO nations gained operational insights at REPMUS 2025, where Ukrainian forces served as the adversarial red team.
NATO's JATEC is capturing lessons learned.
The data pipeline exists.
Whether Western procurement processes absorb it at anything like the speed it's being generated is a different question.
The OTI Take
The country-by-country picture resolves into a single, uncomfortable observation: the organisations producing the most operationally valuable data are moving at startup speed, and the organisations with the most procurement budget are moving at institutional speed.
Ukraine iterates in weeks.
MASC will take years.
The Bluebottle has 23,000 nautical miles of live operational data.
Australia's LOSVs are a decade out.
Two developments worth watching closely in the next six months.
First, the MASC prototype down-select: which companies survive the 720-continuous-hour propulsion and electrical demonstration requirement mandated under NDAA Section 122.
That threshold will eliminate contenders, and the field is not well telegraphed yet.
Second, the AUKUS interoperability question for Australian and Japanese autonomous platforms.
The gap between domestic development and trilateral standards is where procurement risk concentrates.
One number to close on: the DoD-wide autonomy budget for FY2026 is $13.4 billion.
That is the financial commitment.
Whether the acquisition models match it in speed is the story of the next two years.
Clark’s consolidation thesis sharpens the question: the Navy will sustain enough volume to keep two players in the medium and large USV space viable.
The rest are competing for a bubble that will eventually deflate.
What separates the survivors from the casualties isn’t just technology — it’s which companies can bridge the gap between procurement signal and actual volume orders. MASC is the signal. The orders are years away.
That gap is where the field thins out.
Next Week
We deep dive into Marine Materials Readiness and ask: Which ocean-derived materials are actually deployment-ready in 2026? who is producing them at scale?
and Why is China's seawater-to-plastic industrial chain getting less scrutiny than it deserves?
If you are tracking the intersection of defense procurement and sustainability mandates, this is the one to read.
The flags of the two Pacific nations are reportedly being used to disguise the movements of the "shadow fleet" illegally transporting Iranian oil to China.
The governments of Tonga and the Cook Islands have condemned misuse of their flags amid reports that at least 29 ships were flying their colors in a bid to dodge international sanctions.
The majority of the vessels are crude oil carriers that appear to be operating between Iran and China, with the vessels loading Iranian crude in the Persian Gulf before conducting ship-to-ship transfers and other movements designed to hide the true origin of the oil before unloading it in China, said Mark Douglas, maritime domain analyst with Starboard Maritime Intelligence in New Zealand.
The flags of Cook Islands (pictured) are often used by ships trying to avoid identification
Image: MLWilliams/Depositphotos/IMAGO
"These tankers normally take on false flags in order to continue trading after being removed from other flags, normally due to sanctions violations," Douglas told DW.
Crews interfering with Automatic Identification System
Under modern maritime law, ships are assigned numbers used by the Automatic Identification System (AIS), which allows authorities to trace them and reduces the possibility of collision.
"Of the 29 tankers identified as falsely using the Tongan or Cook Island flag, 21 are sanctioned and another two are transmitting invalid AIS numbers, which makes checking their sanction status more difficult," according to the analyst.
Tonga islands in the GeoGarage platform (SHOM nautical raster chart)
In addition to using false numbers, ship crews are able to simply turn the identification system off and effectively become invisible, despite the obvious risks.
North Korea is known for using this tactic for some years to evade UN sanctions.
On January 20, US forces boarded a seventh oil tanker in the Caribbean, the Liberian-flagged Motor Vessel Sagitta.
On Thursday, French authorities confirmed that they had detained the Russian oil tanker Grinch, which had departed from the Russian port of Murmansk in early January, flying the flag of the Comoros.
Tonga and the Cook Islands have also responded to the illegal use of their symbols by alerting the International Maritime Organization and publicly announcing that these vessels are not legitimately flagged.
The government of the Cook Islands was initially alerted by reports of the tanker Bertha flying its flag off Venezuela in early January, although that later proved to be inaccurate.
The government, nevertheless, has set up a Vessel Verification Portal in an attempt to "enhance transparency, efficiency and access to vessel information."
Tongan authorities issued a statement saying, "Any foreign vessel currently transmitting under the Tongan flag is doing so fraudulently and without authorization from the Kingdom of Tonga."
It added that the country closed its international registry of ships in 2002 and that it no longer registers foreign vessels on international voyages, Radio New Zealand reported. 'Shadow fleet' ships avoid ports
As well as physically flying another nation's flag, "shadow fleet" ships alter the first three figures of a vessel's Maritime mobile Service Identity number, which show its national registration, effectively changing its nationality.
"This type of behavior should be detected during port inspections, which are there to find this type of fraud as well as anything to do with the vessel or crew that does not meet local or international regulations," Douglas said.
"However, these tankers normally either avoid going into port or they go into ports where the operators know the vessel's paperwork will not be closely inspected," he said.
Countdown to 'big disaster' involving illegal ships
In addition to the US, France and the UK are also becoming more proactive in seizing "shadow fleet" vessels.
However, Douglas notes that such seizures are less likely to occur in the Pacific as it would require policy changes.
The analyst also declined to speculate on which countries might be willing to intervene.
Stephen Nagy, a professor of international relations at Tokyo’s International Christian University, says the governments of the two Pacific states have limited resources to deal with the problem beyond angry statements and are also "a long way away from where these ships have been operating."
"Perhaps their best course of action would be to cooperate with allied countries and to use their coast guard capabilities to do the heavy lifting," Nagy said.
He suggested the US, France and the UK may be willing to intercede in the Atlantic, with France and Spain also possibly willing to step up in the Mediterranean.
In Late 2024, Finland seized oil tanker Eagle S, flying a Cook Islands flag and believed to be a part of the Russian 'shadow fleet,' on suspicion of disrupting electrical links between Finland and EstoniaImage: Vesa Moilanen/Lehtikuva/SIPA/picture alliance
A matter of scale
The Pacific, the world's biggest ocean, is likely to be more of a challenge due to its size.
Even so, Tonga and the Cook Islands could call appeal to the governments of Canada, New Zealand and Australia for support, Nagy said.
He warned that failure to intervene with the "shadow fleet" ships, which are carrying vast amounts of fuel or other hazardous substances, could lead to a disaster, especially with the vessels' seaworthiness in question.
At the same time, Nagy said "responsible partners" in the region have to deal with many pressures draining their resources, while the operators of "shadow fleet" vessels are becoming more adept at disappearing at sea and have plenty of paying clients.
FB Imray, Laurie Norie & Wilson GmbH has been recognized by the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) as a Private Chart Producer. This means that Imray charts continue to meet UK legal requirements for navigation, providing small commercial and recreational vessel operators with accurate, detailed, and compliant charts. The charts combine official UK Hydrographic Office data with enhanced small-craft details, including marina layouts and local pilotage notes – a combination valued by yachts, small craft, and sailing enthusiasts.
Carl Rauch, CEO of FB Imray: "This recognition confirms that our charts meet the standards for safe navigation and regulatory compliance. Sailors and commercial operators can continue to rely on Imray charts for clarity, detail, and peace of mind at sea." We’ve also achieved ISO 9001 certification, reinforcing our commitment to quality and reliability.
