Links :
Saturday, June 14, 2025
Image of the week : biggest wave ever ridden at Jaws
Friday, June 13, 2025
VDES authentication: safeguarding maritime E-navigation’s future
In the ever-evolving world of maritime communications, a new system is making waves, and it’s not just about sending messages faster.
The very-high-frequency data exchange system, or VDES, is set to revolutionize how ships communicate, paving the way for advanced e-navigation applications.
But with great power comes great responsibility, and that’s where data authentication comes into play.
Gareth Wimpenny, lead author of a recent study published in ‘Navigation’ (translated from German), has been delving into the nitty-gritty of VDES authentication, and his findings could have significant implications for the maritime industry.
So, what’s the big deal about data authentication? Well, imagine you’re at the helm of a massive vessel, relying on digital data to navigate treacherous waters.
You need to be darn sure that the data you’re receiving is legit and hasn’t been tampered with.
That’s where VDES comes in, but it’s not without its challenges.
As Wimpenny puts it, “A key problem in e-navigation is that of data authentication: determining that the data originate from a trusted party and have not undergone changes after transmission.”
Wimpenny’s research, affiliated with an unknown institution, tackles this problem head-on, considering the unique constraints of the maritime environment.
He proposes a two-tiered solution that’s as clever as it is practical.
In low-traffic areas where wireless capacity is ample, the default approach would be digital signatures.
But here’s where it gets interesting: for areas under the control of a shore station with low wireless capacity, Wimpenny suggests using the TESLA protocol.
TESLA, or timed efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication, is a low-overhead authentication scheme that’s particularly attractive for future-proof quantum-safe cryptography.
In other words, it’s a nifty way to authenticate data even when bandwidth is tight.
So, what does this mean for the maritime industry?
For starters, it could lead to more secure and efficient communications at sea.
But the opportunities don’t stop there.
As VDES becomes more prevalent, we could see a boom in e-navigation applications, from automated collision avoidance to real-time weather updates.
And with quantum-safe cryptography on the horizon, the maritime industry could be at the forefront of secure communications.
But it’s not just about the tech.
As Wimpenny’s research shows, understanding the unique challenges and constraints of the maritime environment is crucial.
By working closely with maritime professionals and stakeholders, researchers can develop solutions that are not only innovative but also practical and effective.
As the maritime industry continues to embrace digital technologies, the need for robust and secure communications will only grow.
With researchers like Wimpenny leading the charge, the future of maritime communications looks bright.
So, let’s raise a glass to the seafarers, the researchers, and the innovators making waves in the world of maritime communications.
Here’s to smooth sailing and secure communications!
But the opportunities don’t stop there.
As VDES becomes more prevalent, we could see a boom in e-navigation applications, from automated collision avoidance to real-time weather updates.
And with quantum-safe cryptography on the horizon, the maritime industry could be at the forefront of secure communications.
But it’s not just about the tech.
As Wimpenny’s research shows, understanding the unique challenges and constraints of the maritime environment is crucial.
By working closely with maritime professionals and stakeholders, researchers can develop solutions that are not only innovative but also practical and effective.
As the maritime industry continues to embrace digital technologies, the need for robust and secure communications will only grow.
With researchers like Wimpenny leading the charge, the future of maritime communications looks bright.
So, let’s raise a glass to the seafarers, the researchers, and the innovators making waves in the world of maritime communications.
Here’s to smooth sailing and secure communications!
Links :
Thursday, June 12, 2025
Shipping lines go cool on Arctic Ocean route
Venta Maersk was the first container ship to take the Northern Sea Route back in 2018
© Olga Maltseva/AFP via Getty Images
From FT by Robert Wright
Melting ice could make shorter transits between Asia and Europe a reality but there are economic and geopolitical risks
When the Venta Maersk, a ship owned by Denmark’s AP Møller-Maersk, set sail in 2018 from Vladivostok in the far east of Russia towards St Petersburg in the west, the voyage was reported as a harbinger of things to come.
It was the first container ship to head for Europe from Asia via the Northern Sea Route, through the Arctic Ocean, instead of the Suez Canal.
It was speculated that, as Arctic temperatures rose and sea ice cover fell, the time and cost savings would make such trips routine.
Yet, seven years on, the Venta Maersk remains the only ship from a large international container line to have used the route.
In 2024, ships taking the journey handled only 3mn tonnes of cargo transiting between points outside the Arctic, according to Rosatom, the Russian state company that organises the transits.
The figures are dwarfed by the 1.57bn tonnes of cargo and 26,434 trips through the Suez Canal in 2023, the last year before attacks by Yemen’s Houthis prompted rerouting of voyages.
When the Venta Maersk, a ship owned by Denmark’s AP Møller-Maersk, set sail in 2018 from Vladivostok in the far east of Russia towards St Petersburg in the west, the voyage was reported as a harbinger of things to come.
It was the first container ship to head for Europe from Asia via the Northern Sea Route, through the Arctic Ocean, instead of the Suez Canal.
It was speculated that, as Arctic temperatures rose and sea ice cover fell, the time and cost savings would make such trips routine.
Yet, seven years on, the Venta Maersk remains the only ship from a large international container line to have used the route.
In 2024, ships taking the journey handled only 3mn tonnes of cargo transiting between points outside the Arctic, according to Rosatom, the Russian state company that organises the transits.
The figures are dwarfed by the 1.57bn tonnes of cargo and 26,434 trips through the Suez Canal in 2023, the last year before attacks by Yemen’s Houthis prompted rerouting of voyages.
Most Arctic shipping goes through the Northwest and Northeast Passages.
Other routes are not yet suitable for commercial shipping, although they will likely become navigable in the decade ahead.
© GIS
The reluctance of most shipping lines to operate in the Arctic has cast doubt over predictions that warming in the sea there would reshape shipping patterns.
Daniel Richards, a director at London-based consultancy Maritime Strategies International, points to the risks of using the northern route.
He says container shipping lines tend to be risk-averse, and their customers are similarly reluctant to have their goods enter an ecologically and geopolitically sensitive region.
“That doesn’t feel likely to change in the near term,” he says.
He says container shipping lines tend to be risk-averse, and their customers are similarly reluctant to have their goods enter an ecologically and geopolitically sensitive region.
“That doesn’t feel likely to change in the near term,” he says.
However, Terje Jørgensen, director of the port of Kirkenes, near Norway’s border with Russia, is convinced the region can become an important trading route.
He told the BBC in May about his vision to turn the lightly used port into a “Singapore of the North”, transferring containers between ships: “What we’re trying to build here in Kirkenes is a trans-shipment port where three continents meet: North America, Europe and Asia.”
He told the BBC in May about his vision to turn the lightly used port into a “Singapore of the North”, transferring containers between ships: “What we’re trying to build here in Kirkenes is a trans-shipment port where three continents meet: North America, Europe and Asia.”
Terje Jørgensen, director of the port of Kirkenes, near Norway’s border with Russia
© Naina Helén Jåma/Bloomberg
‘What we’re trying to build here in Kirkenes is a trans-shipment port where three continents meet: North America, Europe and Asia’ © Naina Helén Jåma/Bloomberg
‘What we’re trying to build here in Kirkenes is a trans-shipment port where three continents meet: North America, Europe and Asia’ © Naina Helén Jåma/Bloomberg Shipping lines’ willingness to use the Northern Sea Route is likely to be determined by geography, economics and geopolitics.
Geography is the main point in favour, as the corridor is a far shorter means of reaching parts of Europe from Asia than alternatives.
From the Japanese port of Yokohama to the Russian Arctic port of Murmansk is a journey of 12,840 nautical miles via the conventional Suez Canal route and 5,770 nautical miles via the Northern Sea Route.
The passage has also become more navigable because of climate change.
Parts of the Arctic are frequently free of sea ice in summer, although many shipping lines prefer to use “ice-class” vessels with extra-strong hulls.
Many rely on Russian icebreakers, provided by Rosatom, to clear the way.
Richards notes that the period with the lowest sea-ice coverage — northern hemisphere summer — is when the heaviest flows of goods come from Asia to Europe and North America, ahead of Christmas.
“It might be that someone would run a few sailings per year to coincide with the peak season in the summer, offering slightly faster transit times,” he says.
Geography is the main point in favour, as the corridor is a far shorter means of reaching parts of Europe from Asia than alternatives.
From the Japanese port of Yokohama to the Russian Arctic port of Murmansk is a journey of 12,840 nautical miles via the conventional Suez Canal route and 5,770 nautical miles via the Northern Sea Route.
The passage has also become more navigable because of climate change.
Parts of the Arctic are frequently free of sea ice in summer, although many shipping lines prefer to use “ice-class” vessels with extra-strong hulls.
Many rely on Russian icebreakers, provided by Rosatom, to clear the way.
Richards notes that the period with the lowest sea-ice coverage — northern hemisphere summer — is when the heaviest flows of goods come from Asia to Europe and North America, ahead of Christmas.
“It might be that someone would run a few sailings per year to coincide with the peak season in the summer, offering slightly faster transit times,” he says.
© FT • Sources: NSIDC; FT research
Some container ships are taking the Northern Sea Route in relatively small numbers, says Richards, but they are mostly run by specialist operators with links to Russia and China.
Two small container lines — NewNew Shipping, based in Dalian, China, and Hong Kong-based Safetrans Line, for example, offer services via the route.
Two small container lines — NewNew Shipping, based in Dalian, China, and Hong Kong-based Safetrans Line, for example, offer services via the route.
For most shipping companies, however, the economic and geopolitical risks of operating via the Arctic outweigh any opportunity.
Basil Karatzas, a New York-based ship finance specialist, says the route is “fairly isolated; it’s not year-round”.
Basil Karatzas, a New York-based ship finance specialist, says the route is “fairly isolated; it’s not year-round”.
Richards says that for container ships, which follow set schedules, unpredictable weather presents “technical challenges”.
It is seldom clear which parts will be ice-free and when — or if an icebreaker is required.
And there are environmental concerns; since 2019, several big shipping lines have signed the Arctic Corporate Shipping Pledge, promising not to use Arctic routes to avoid polluting the area.
It is seldom clear which parts will be ice-free and when — or if an icebreaker is required.
And there are environmental concerns; since 2019, several big shipping lines have signed the Arctic Corporate Shipping Pledge, promising not to use Arctic routes to avoid polluting the area.
The route also bypasses hubs where ships drop off or pick up cargo between ports.
Maersk, for example, uses hubs in Tanjung Pelepas, near Singapore; Salalah, in Oman; and on the Spanish and Moroccan sides of the Gibraltar strait to serve Asia, the Gulf and Africa.
Maersk, for example, uses hubs in Tanjung Pelepas, near Singapore; Salalah, in Oman; and on the Spanish and Moroccan sides of the Gibraltar strait to serve Asia, the Gulf and Africa.
A person familiar with Maersk’s thinking suggests its reliance on the hubs is a reason why it has not returned to the Arctic, adding that, because of sanctions, Maersk no longer does business in Russia.
The route runs almost entirely through Russian waters and using it may require support from Rosatom’s icebreakers.
The route runs almost entirely through Russian waters and using it may require support from Rosatom’s icebreakers.
Karatzas suspects most lines will hold off from using the route for now: “Unless there’s a compelling reason, I think for the time being people will stay away.”
Links :
- GISreportonline : Russia clears the path for China in the Arctic
Wednesday, June 11, 2025
Geography matters, time collides: mapping China’s maritime strategic space under Xi
Andrew S.Erickson, Geography Matters, Time Collides: Mapping China’s Maritime Strategic Space under Xi (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 1 August 2024).
Banner illustration by Nate Christenson ©The National Bureau of Asian Research.
Andrew Erickson considers the “mental map” of China’s leaders—how
they regard the physical nature of strategic space—in the context of the
maritime expansion being pursued by Xi Jinping and the Chinese
Communist Party.
He uses maps as visual references for
understanding China’s evolving maritime geography and the constraints on
its power in the maritime domain.
This essay is from the Mapping China’s Strategic Space
project, which seeks to better understand what constitutes the
“strategic space” beyond China’s national borders that Chinese leaders
consider vital to their pursuit of national political, economic, and
security objectives and to the achievement of China’s rise.
Honored to contribute to Nadège Rolland’s insightful National Bureau of Asian Research Strategic Space series!
Grateful to Andrew Rhodes for permission to use three of his world-class maps! Click here to see his other cartographic creations, as well as his publications.I’ve made a curated compilation of some of his greatest hits here.
What are China’s military maritime priorities?
Easy to say historically and nearby, harder looking forward in time and distance…
Overall, available PRC writings suggest tentative prioritization: (1) Near Seas and First Island Chain, (2) out to Second Island Chain, (3) Western Pacific out to Third Island Chain bisecting Hawaii and northern Indian Ocean, (4) Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea and Arctic Ocean, and (5) beyond.Few sources explicitly delineate such layers—but few, if any, disagree.I include a (translated) table by Peking University Professor Hu Bo, which offers ideas in this regard.
Delighted to work with Louis Martin-Vézian of CIGeography on a new “PRC Prioritized Maritime Spaces Map”! Projects China’s oceanic priorities strategic zones.
Offers best official depiction available of key Maritime Silk Road sea lanes in Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Plots PLA Navy’s current bases as well as potential future first- and second-priority ports that might offer special access/support.
Overall, available PRC writings suggest tentative prioritization: (1) Near Seas and First Island Chain, (2) out to Second Island Chain, (3) Western Pacific out to Third Island Chain bisecting Hawaii and northern Indian Ocean, (4) Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea and Arctic Ocean, and (5) beyond.Few sources explicitly delineate such layers—but few, if any, disagree.I include a (translated) table by Peking University Professor Hu Bo, which offers ideas in this regard.
Delighted to work with Louis Martin-Vézian of CIGeography on a new “PRC Prioritized Maritime Spaces Map”! Projects China’s oceanic priorities strategic zones.
Offers best official depiction available of key Maritime Silk Road sea lanes in Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Plots PLA Navy’s current bases as well as potential future first- and second-priority ports that might offer special access/support.
With an increasingly powerful People’s Republic of China (PRC) under paramount leader Xi Jinping engaging in meteoric military-maritime buildup and pressing disputed sovereignty claims with increasing assertiveness, it is more important than ever to consider Beijing’s “mental map”: how its leaders regard the physical nature of strategic space.
As Andrew Rhodes argues cogently, “Being able to ‘think in space’ is a crucial tool for decision-makers, but one that is often deemphasized.”1
This applies to understanding both how PRC leaders envision China’s strategic space and how it is evolving in practice.
Beijing pursues a disciplined hierarchy of national security priorities in a pattern that Peter Dutton terms “concentrism”: “The strongest power is reserved for managing and securing its periphery, the next ring is a zone of disruption of potential attacking powers, and the third is to venture beyond the first two largely at the sufferance of stronger regional powers.”
Beijing pursues a disciplined hierarchy of national security priorities in a pattern that Peter Dutton terms “concentrism”: “The strongest power is reserved for managing and securing its periphery, the next ring is a zone of disruption of potential attacking powers, and the third is to venture beyond the first two largely at the sufferance of stronger regional powers.”
He refers to these three spheres, respectively, as “zones of control, influence, and reach.”2
The resulting “ripples of capability” in China’s military forces, extending in progressively descending circles of intensity outward from PRC shores, remain best viewed overall “through the lens of distance.”3
Per the mental map of Xi and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) the PRC has achieved relatively smooth expansion of influence overland through Central Asia to Europe and the Middle East.
Per the mental map of Xi and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) the PRC has achieved relatively smooth expansion of influence overland through Central Asia to Europe and the Middle East.
It is still working on a more contested project of maritime expansion but has made considerable progress there as well.Beijing’s ambitions also extend to frontier domains.
Regarding the projection of sea power, China faces difficult opponents and geography.
It is nevertheless becoming an increasingly formidable opponent to neighbors over sovereignty disputes, none more so than Taiwan.
The map below by Rhodes offers perspectives on Beijing’s geostrategic location.… … …
Map 1: China’s Geographic Position
History and Geography
The PRC’s consistent, incremental security priorities draw on historical and spatial fundamentals.4
The CCP has followed the precedent of dynastic China in expanding along relatively predictable geophysical lines, but it has done so with unprecedented focus and determination, which has thus far yielded steady, substantive progress.
Party-army capture of the Chinese state in 1949 set the stage for achieving the next layer of security: party-state administration of core historic heartland.
Next came control of ethno-religious minority borderlands, with Tibet being invaded in 1950 and subjugated the following year.
China then spent much of the Cold War defending the integrity of its self-defined land borders.
In 1962, it defeated India in a border conflict.
In 1969, PRC forces preemptively attacked Soviet counterparts on the Ussuri River’s contested Zhenbao Island to deter broader incursions by thousands of Soviet troops deployed along China’s disputed northern border.
In 1979, China waged a bloody border war to punish Vietnam for invading Cambodia and deposing the Khmer Rouge.
This conflict was followed by years of episodic skirmishes.
Meanwhile, China’s seaboard faced important flashpoints unresolved by civil war.
Meanwhile, China’s seaboard faced important flashpoints unresolved by civil war.
In 1950, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) captured Hainan Island and subsequently secured the mainland coastline and airspace by limiting and ultimately halting Kuomintang coastal raids, harassment, and subsequently U.S.-sponsored U-2 overflights.5
However, it failed to wrest the heavily fortified offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu from Kuomintang control, shelling them intermittently instead.
However, it failed to wrest the heavily fortified offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu from Kuomintang control, shelling them intermittently instead.
Following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Mao Zedong indefinitely postponed an invasion of Taiwan slated for 1950–51.
Taiwan Strait crises erupted in 1954–55, 1958, and 1995–96.
Today, a Taiwan contingency is the PLA’s lead planning scenario.
China’s military strategies of 1993, 2004, and 2014 focus geographically on Taiwan and its surroundings and emphasize achieving the sophistication necessary to prevail in a contingency potentially involving the U.S. military.
History and geography still matter today.
History and geography still matter today.
Although China has now settled its land border disputes with all neighbors save India and Bhutan, its achievements in the maritime domain are mixed.
Leaders under Xi Jinping regard extensive outstanding claims in the “near seas”—the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas—as historical injustices that must ultimately be rectified, thereby demonstrating the CCP’s unique ability to reclaim China’s rightful place.
Beijing has the world’s most numerous, extensive disputed island/feature claims, with the largest number of counterparties.
Foremost among these unresolved sovereignty issues is whether Xi can achieve his goal of bringing Taiwan under CCP control within his time in power.
This is a question of tremendous import for the world, the region, and the PRC’s future strategic space.
This is a question of tremendous import for the world, the region, and the PRC’s future strategic space.
It also highlights the direction of Beijing’s thinking.
PRC defense white papers and the “main strategic direction” of the PLA’s doctrine codify a focus on the southeast maritime direction.
Standard wall maps in the PRC understandably center on China, with key geopolitical rivalry extending across the Pacific and various economic interests and ties snaking westward across Eurasia.
The map below by Rhodes captures the world as it looks from Beijing out to the disputed southeastern seaboard and beyond.
Map 2: China Looks East
Even China’s third sea force (after its navy and coast guard), the Maritime Militia, is an integral part of the country’s armed forces with critical peacetime and wartime roles, including in a potential cross-strait amphibious invasion.
All three sea forces are the world’s largest by number of ships.
This seaward surge reflects the confluence of strategic fundaments, the enduring shaping power of geography, and geohistorical implications.
Powered by the world’s second-largest economy and defense budget, China has gone to sea with scale, sophistication, and sea power components that no continental country previously sustained in modernity.
They are supplied by the world’s largest shipyard infrastructure, yielding the fastest expansion of production capacity and largest military buildup since World War II.
On the civilian side of China’s sprawling waterfront, sea power is supplemented by the world’s largest fishing fleet by number of vessels and fishers, commercial fleet by shipping capacity, merchant marine, and marine economy overall.
On the civilian side of China’s sprawling waterfront, sea power is supplemented by the world’s largest fishing fleet by number of vessels and fishers, commercial fleet by shipping capacity, merchant marine, and marine economy overall.
China also boasts a large nationally flagged tanker fleet and globe-girdling port infrastructure.
Xi, living out previous generations’ dreams to truly develop the “blue economy,”6 is personally guiding China’s transformation into a comprehensive “great maritime power.”7
Awe-inspiring high-seas capabilities should dispel any remaining illusions that China is a hidebound continental power paying lip service to maritime affairs.
China’s Evolving Maritime Geography
For all this progress, comparing and contrasting PRC military strategies and capabilities as they apply to the “near seas” versus the “far seas,” the airspace above, and the related and supporting capabilities in other domains reveals persistent gradients.
PRC naval strategy and attendant changes in warfare area capabilities have evolved over successive eras, with greater responsibilities in each new phase adding a new layer to the previous core.8
While the innermost core of “near seas active defense,” established in 1985, retains priority, Xi Jinping added a “far seas protection” strategy in 2015.
Moreover, since around 2019 the PLA Navy has pursued an emerging combination of “near seas defense, far seas protection, [global] oceanic presence, and expansion into the two poles.”9
Already China and its military have achieved a status and confidence unseen in nearly two centuries and unprecedented in sophistication and geographic scope—going, literally and figuratively, where elements of Chinese state power never went before.
Already China and its military have achieved a status and confidence unseen in nearly two centuries and unprecedented in sophistication and geographic scope—going, literally and figuratively, where elements of Chinese state power never went before.
This enables production and projection of military power in unprecedented ways.
The extent to which China can deliver force sustainably over increasing distances to further its burgeoning interests is one of the key questions of 21st-century geopolitics—with major consequences for Beijing’s role and footprint in the world and for U.S. and allied interests.
Here, as in so many areas, much depends on topic and framing.
Here, as in so many areas, much depends on topic and framing.
As a consequential leader taking China in a more determined and dangerous (for neighbors, the United States, and other potential opponents) direction with regard to military issues than his post-Mao predecessors did, or a baseline alternative paramount leader likely would, Xi himself matters significantly.
China’s first navalist leader, having in 2018 called for a “world-class navy,”10 he is a personalist strongman pursuing a personality cult and historical legacy in the same league as that which Mao attained before the Cultural Revolution.
All these factors drive China harder and faster in military maritime development than they would have without Xi.11
Geographic constraints still matter, but somewhat less, and differently.
They are not static and unchallenged: how they manifest, and to what extent, evolves constantly.
One significant source of change is geoengineering.
Long ago, constructing the Great Wall and Grand Canal fundamentally reshaped Chinese strategic space, with maritime implications.12
Under Xi, China in 2014 began engineering an extraordinary externalization of its coastal defense posture through extreme augmentation and fortification of features it occupies in the South China Sea.
Similarly impactful is the country’s growing presence in a vast network of PRC-developed and -funded ports, including some offering naval access.
China’s establishment of its first overseas military facility in Djibouti has been followed quietly in Ream, Cambodia, with a portfolio of other locations under consideration.
Since the Cold War, the Pacific Islands have evolved for China as barriers, springboards, benchmarks, and now vectors of influence and disruption of U.S. power projection.
Since the Cold War, the Pacific Islands have evolved for China as barriers, springboards, benchmarks, and now vectors of influence and disruption of U.S. power projection.
Acute Pacific land scarcity makes these “chains” of islands encircling the Eurasian landmass strategically pivotal for great powers contending for mastery over the region.
While imperial Japan and Germany had strategic conceptions in this regard, it was Douglas MacArthur who formally linked the “chain of islands” to U.S. constraint of Communist hostility.13
A decade ago, Du Wenlong, a senior researcher at the PLA Academy of Military Science, declared the PRC’s success in escaping such strategic confinement: “The Chinese navy has the capability to cut the first island chain into several pieces.
Now the chain is fragmented.”14
In 1921, Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel “Pete” Ellis observed that the area east of what PRC strategists subsequently termed the second island chain, traversing Guam and the Marshall, Caroline, and Palau Islands, formed “a ‘cloud’ of islands stretching east and west.”15
In 1921, Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel “Pete” Ellis observed that the area east of what PRC strategists subsequently termed the second island chain, traversing Guam and the Marshall, Caroline, and Palau Islands, formed “a ‘cloud’ of islands stretching east and west.”15
Just as PRC strategists discovered and repurposed island chains as China became able to project power out to, and then through, them, PRC strategists may well embrace an even broader “second island cloud” concept as PRC activities vis-à-vis Pacific Island countries increase and diversify.
Rhodes’s map below offers a decided improvement over the truncated island chain maps in the Pentagon’s annual reports on China’s military power and a fitting supplement to the PLA Navy’s more extensive tracing of these strategic features.16
Map 3: The “Second Island Cloud”
Beyond the island chains, the PRC’s geographic weightings defy enduring precision.
A leading 2013 publication contains a section on the need to “expand [China’s] strategic space.”17
A subsection advocates a subsequent layer of PLA Navy emphases: “expanding to the two oceans” (the Pacific and Indian) as well as adjoining littoral regions, a preponderance of global water space akin to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s vast jurisdiction.18
It also mentions the Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Arctic Ocean.19
This Indo-Pacific construct subsequently faded from official documents but endures in some serious sources.
“The Pacific Ocean issue is the key to whether China’s maritime territorial rights and interests can be secured,” a 2020 article advocating a “two ocean strategy” maintains, “while the Indian Ocean is more about being the transportation artery for the development of China’s economy and production.”20
Hu Bo, a scholar at Peking University, articulates a “hierarchy of national interests” far more systematically than the PRC’s intentionally vague official statements.
Hu Bo, a scholar at Peking University, articulates a “hierarchy of national interests” far more systematically than the PRC’s intentionally vague official statements.
As his matrix presented in the table below illustrates, however, overlapping priorities resist clear-cut geographic demarcation.
Overall, available PRC writings suggest a tentative prioritization of maritime spheres:
(1) near seas and first island chain,
(2) waters out to the second island chain,
(3) the western Pacific out to a third island chain bisecting Hawaii and the northern Indian Ocean,
(4) the Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Arctic Ocean, and
(5) beyond.
Few sources explicitly delineate such layers, but few, if any, disagree.21
Additionally, Beijing may advance dramatically in “new strategic frontiers,” where it enjoys particular room for maneuver as rival powers struggle to invest the requisite resources to compete in less-established areas featuring extreme conditions.
Additionally, Beijing may advance dramatically in “new strategic frontiers,” where it enjoys particular room for maneuver as rival powers struggle to invest the requisite resources to compete in less-established areas featuring extreme conditions.
China is already attempting to achieve a more comprehensive, active presence globally, including in geophysically extreme zones of particular importance, such as sea depths and the seabed, outer space, and the Arctic and Antarctic.
Major General Xiao Tianliang emphasizes that “the view of time and space in war has undergone profound changes…the battlespace is expanding rapidly….
Space and cyberspace have become new commanding heights of military competition.”22
The map below projects Beijing’s maritime priorities geographically.
It illustrates the aforementioned maritime strategic zones and offers the best official depiction available of key Maritime Silk Road sea lanes in Xi’s BRI.23
It also plots the PLA Navy’s current bases as well as potential future first-priority and second-priority ports that might conceivably offer special access and support.24
Map 4: China’s Evolving Maritime Priorities
Constraints on China’s Power in the Maritime Domain
China is developing capabilities to project power globally and throughout emerging domains.
China is developing capabilities to project power globally and throughout emerging domains.
It does so multifariously, including through enhanced overseas presence and activities in order to secure citizens, assets, and access to material resources while attempting to circumvent or neutralize chokepoints.
Beijing may well make considerably greater strides worldwide and muster forces with robust global influence and reach.
Indeed, Xi’s call for a “world-class navy” by 2049 demands no less.
However, China’s geography and political system impose an unusually severe power-distance (“loss of strength”) gradient.
However, China’s geography and political system impose an unusually severe power-distance (“loss of strength”) gradient.
Radiation out into contested spaces and domains increases reliance on vulnerable land facilities, other fixed support points, and concentrated platforms such as carriers.
China’s homeland supports a dense network of potent counter-intervention capabilities, but the intensity with which it is incentivized and able to project military power attenuates markedly with distance from shore.
Beijing has progressively less reason to project power maximally at longer ranges, particularly under potentially contested conditions.
In the maritime domain, in particular, chokepoints and barriers—many with proximate U.S., allied, and partner military facilities and presence—are another hindrance to China projecting peak power even farther from its shores.
In the maritime domain, in particular, chokepoints and barriers—many with proximate U.S., allied, and partner military facilities and presence—are another hindrance to China projecting peak power even farther from its shores.
Analysts at the PLA Naval Research Institute acknowledge that, “according to the law of diminishing marginal utility, the strategic power that Chinese sea power can exert in the Indian Ocean is extremely limited.”
Moreover, “the sea routes by which China can enter the Indian Ocean are extremely narrow: China must choose from a very small number of straits such as the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Sunda, which are very easily blockaded and controlled.”25
It is not just a matter of distance or power gradients; geography still matters greatly.
Projecting power outward in some directions, or through some straits and potential chokepoints, may be much harder than in others.26
Closer to home, rising domestic expectations and Beijing’s need for popular legitimacy amid economic volatility, an economic slowdown, or other setbacks may motivate both geostrategic retrenchment and increased reliance on nationalism.
Closer to home, rising domestic expectations and Beijing’s need for popular legitimacy amid economic volatility, an economic slowdown, or other setbacks may motivate both geostrategic retrenchment and increased reliance on nationalism.
Along virtually any strategic trajectory that China might follow, cross-strait security seems far from guaranteed.
This much is clear: at a time when China under Xi Jinping is unprecedently powerful in the maritime domain, Taiwan is increasingly targeted and vulnerable.
Links :
- Africa Center : Mapping China’s Strategic Port Development in Africa
- The Economist : The scary new map of the South China Sea
- GeoGarage blog : China's Belt and Road Initiative: A revival of the historical ... / The silent struggle: countering China's Gray Zone operations in ... / China's maritime strategy: To own the oceans by adverse ... / Taking over from the inside : China's growing reach into ... / China suddenly building fleet of special barges suitable for ... / Loran leap: China's boost to maritime navigation accuracy / China's high-tech ship helps military prepare for war / The South China Sea comes to a boil / How China rules the waves / China's hidden Navy / China quietly annexes Northeast corner of Gulf of Tonkin / China's new deep-sea weapon: How dangerous is its ... / Keeping tabs on China's murky maritime manoeuvres / What is Beijing's 9-dash line in the South China Sea and ... / South China Sea's subsea features get new Chinese names / Assessing China's claims in South China Sea and East ... / South China Sea: a visual guide to the key shoals, reefs ... / China's latest delineation of territorial sea baseline in ... / New Google Earth photos capture China's nuclear ... / China mapping seafloor around US allies to send nuclear ... / China's fishing fleet, the world's largest, drives Beijing's ... / China is leading the world in naval sensing and navigation ... / South China Sea issue: Historical European maps show ... / The South China Sea reveals China's grand strategy / China's claims on the South China Sea are a warning to ... / Understanding the South China Sea : a very brief overview ... / Map shows where Chinese ships spotted off U.S. Coast / Rivalry between America and China has spread to the ... / For new robotic ships, Pentagon ignores China's ... / Aboard the giant sand-sucking ships that China uses to ... / U.S. Dismisses China's Claims in South China Sea in State ... / China to up its deep-sea mining efforts / China's lawful position on the South China Sea / Why China's challenges to Australian ships in the South ... / Geographer: China's claim to South China Sea not rooted ... / What China has been building in the South China Sea / Confrontations in South China Sea surge, raising fears a ... / A maritime revolution is coming, and no one's in the ... / What is really ours in the disputed SCS? / China is planning a massive sea lab 10000 feet underwater / Chinese customs seize thousands of maps over missing ... / New map boosts China's maritime claims / Old maps of China shed light on modern border disputes ... / China's 'Historic Rights' in the South China Sea / Chinese Navy ships came within 12 Nautical Miles of U.S. ... / China's line in the sea / Collector's 400 years of China maps and nautical charts ...
Tuesday, June 10, 2025
The plastic legacy at the bottom of the planet
From Pulse by British Antarctic Survey
At the bottom of the world, where few humans have ever set foot, an unwelcome visitor has arrived.
Antarctica – the vast, frozen wilderness of ice and snow – is no longer untouched by humanity’s most persistent pollutant: plastic.
The continent we often imagine as Earth’s last unspoiled frontier now bears the invisible fingerprints of our throwaway culture.
Researchers have documented microscopic fragments of plastics, not just in Antarctica’s snow and surrounding waters, but deep in the Southern Ocean and within the bodies of the marine life that calls these frigid waters home.
"Part of the challenge is that plastic is not just one type of pollutant," explains Emily Rowlands, a marine ecologist at British Antarctic Survey.
"It's a whole suite of different polymers that have different impacts on animals when they're ingested, and they can all interact differently in the environment."
Emily should know.
Her research delves into the impacts of plastic pollution, particularly how it interacts with other climate stressors and affects the ocean's ability to sequester carbon in the deep sea – a critical process in our planet's climate regulation.
As she and her colleagues continue measuring humanity's plastic footprint in this remote sanctuary, a question emerges: can understanding where plastic is help us reduce its devastating effects before it's too late?
Researchers have documented microscopic fragments of plastics, not just in Antarctica’s snow and surrounding waters, but deep in the Southern Ocean and within the bodies of the marine life that calls these frigid waters home.
"Part of the challenge is that plastic is not just one type of pollutant," explains Emily Rowlands, a marine ecologist at British Antarctic Survey.
"It's a whole suite of different polymers that have different impacts on animals when they're ingested, and they can all interact differently in the environment."
Emily should know.
Her research delves into the impacts of plastic pollution, particularly how it interacts with other climate stressors and affects the ocean's ability to sequester carbon in the deep sea – a critical process in our planet's climate regulation.
As she and her colleagues continue measuring humanity's plastic footprint in this remote sanctuary, a question emerges: can understanding where plastic is help us reduce its devastating effects before it's too late?
Dr Emily Rowlands out on sea ice near the RRS Sir David Attenborough for sampling work.
An invisible invasion
Picture a grain of sand.
Now imagine something 2,000 times smaller – invisible to the naked eye.
That's a nanoplastic particle, the smallest form of plastic pollution.
Its slightly larger cousin, microplastic (less than 5mm in diameter), can result from larger plastic items breaking down or be intentionally produced, like the microbeads once common in cosmetic products.
While previous studies had found microplastics in the Southern Ocean – typically at lower concentrations than other seas – a discovery in early 2025 shocked even expert research teams.
As part of the CUPIDO project led by Dr Clara Manno, Emily and other BAS scientists reported finding microplastics in snow near some of Antarctica's most remote field camps: Union Glacier, Schanz Glacier and even at the South Pole itself.
Their methodology was painstaking.
Snow samples were carefully collected, melted and filtered through fine paper.
The particles captured were then analysed using high-resolution infrared techniques capable of identifying plastics as small as a red blood cell (11 micrometres).
What they found was troubling: three common plastic types – polyamide used in textiles, polyethylene terephthalate found in bottles and packaging, polyethylene known for durability – along with synthetic rubber.
All were present at much higher levels than anticipated, the highest concentrations that these plastics had been documented in such remote locations.
Interestingly, at a control site distant from research facilities, polyamide was absent, suggesting some contamination comes from researchers themselves – perhaps from clothing fibres, ropes or marker flags.
"More needs to be done to understand the sources of plastic pollution on this beautiful continent," Emily says.
"Finding a human plastic legacy in the snow in the most remote region of our planet underlines the need for nations to collaborate to enforce global plastic mitigation strategies."
From krill to whales: plastic in the food chain
Most people remember the haunting images from BBC's Blue Planet II – a turtle trapped in plastic, a stillborn whale – that catapulted plastic pollution into public consciousness in 2018.
Since then, research publications on ocean plastic debris have increased more than fivefold according to UNESCO.
But the plastic problem extends far beyond these iconic species to the microscopic foundation of Antarctica's marine ecosystem.
In 2023, BAS scientists discovered microplastics in the two most abundant Antarctic zooplankton: krill and salps.
These tiny creatures – krill (which resemble tiny shrimps) and salps (transparent, barrel-shaped invertebrates) – mistake microplastics for food while grazing on phytoplankton of similar size.
This sends ripples through the entire Antarctic food web.
Krill are the primary food source for whales, penguins and seals, while salps are consumed by certain fish and marine birds.
As plastic enters these organisms at the bottom of a short food chain, it likely transfers up the food chain to the region's iconic wildlife.
Laura Wilkie Johnston, a marine biologist and PhD student who led the study, recalls the moment her team confirmed their suspicions after after examining the digestive tracts of krill and salps collected off the coasts of South Georgia and Coronation Island.
Euphausia superba, better known as krill (Credit: Pete Bucktrout | British Antarctic Survey)"Our discovery raises significant ecological concerns," she says.
"These species play an integral role in the Southern Ocean ecosystem and we don't understand the impact microplastics have on them or the overall environment.
"We long believed that because of their remoteness, the Poles were less at risk from plastic pollution compared with elsewhere on our planet, so it is really quite shocking to have found evidence of it in such abundant life in Antarctic waters."
The climate connection
The story of plastic in Antarctica isn't limited to its effect on wildlife.
There's an unexpected climate twist that few outside scientific circles have considered.
Krill might be tiny individually, but collectively they equal approximately the same biomass as humans on Earth.
These little creatures serve as mighty carbon processors.
When they eat, digest and excrete phytoplankton in massive quantities, they help lock away atmospheric CO₂ in the Southern Ocean's depths.
This natural carbon sequestration service is now under threat.
The CUPIDO project team discovered that nanoplastics may alter the density of krill “faecal pellets”, reducing their ability to carry carbon to the ocean floor.
In effect, plastic isn't just harming the animals – it's compromising one of nature's mechanisms for fighting climate change.
In laboratory conditions, the BAS plastic team has observed how different ocean stressors compound each other.
When comparing krill embryo development under different scenarios: clean water, water with plastic pollution, water with increased acidity, and water with both pollutants.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, those exposed to both stressors fared worst.
The embryos in clean water, predictably, showed the healthiest development.
Mapping the invisible threat
In a region already facing rapid climate change, understanding how plastic pollution interacts with other environmental stressors has become a matter of urgency.
Aidan Hunter, an ecological modeller at BAS, has pioneered a new approach to this complex problem.
As part of the CUPIDO project, he's created the first comprehensive map of microplastic threats in the Southern Ocean, identifying ecological hotspots where monitoring and mitigation efforts should be concentrated.
His innovative modelling technique overlays multiple datasets – krill distribution, phytoplankton presence, sea surface temperature and pH, shipping routes, research station activities, and existing microplastic measurements – to reveal where krill and plankton are most likely to encounter local plastic emissions, and where these emissions might worsen other environmental changes.
"We wanted to provide information to policymakers and environmental managers so they can prioritise and formalise efforts to monitor and mitigate plastic pollution," Aidan explains.
"The remoteness of this region makes monitoring a challenge, so by identifying where plastics are most likely to interact with the animals at the bottom of the food chain, we can maximise the value of sampling and research."
This ground-breaking mapping effort, accompanied by an interactive online application, allows researchers to continue tracking impacts as microplastic pollution intensifies alongside other environmental stressors.
A not-so-pristine paradise
With no proven techniques for removing plastics from the environment at scale, and global plastic production continuing to rise, Antarctica's plastic problem presents a sobering reality check about humanity's reach.
The scientists who spend their careers studying this remote continent find themselves in the bittersweet position of documenting its contamination, while working to understand and perhaps mitigate the damage.
Their research offers our best hope for protecting what remains of this once-pristine wilderness.
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