Illustration: TBS
From The Business Standard by Nasif Tanjim
Until global powers establish stronger, cooperative enforcement
mechanisms to protect maritime routes, the global economy will remain
deeply vulnerable to recurring disruptions, the costs of which are
ultimately borne by everyday consumers across the globe
The global economy is anchored to a remarkably fragile geometry of maritime trade routes increasingly vulnerable to geopolitical conflict.
Nearly 90% of global trade is transported by sea, representing 80% of international commerce by volume and more than 70% by value.
Squeezed through a handful of narrow natural straits and man-made canals, these maritime chokepoints serve as primary arteries for raw materials and finished goods.
However, when these channels become congested or closed due to wars, shipping accidents, or regional security threats, the global economy experiences immediate distress through soaring freight rates, delayed transits, and extreme market volatility.
In an era of escalating great-power rivalry and active warfare, these vital passages have increasingly been weaponised, exposing the severe limitations of international maritime law and forcing a fundamental reorganisation of global supply chain networks.
Battlefields on the water: The siege of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and Suez
The ongoing military escalations in the Middle East demonstrate the terrifying vulnerability of the world's most critical energy and transit corridors.
The Strait of Hormuz, wedged between Iran and Oman, connects the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea.
Measuring 39 kilometres at its narrowest point, this strait handles 20–21 million barrels of crude oil daily — representing roughly a quarter of all seaborne oil — and 20% of global liquefied natural gas exports.
Yet, this pivot was shattered when the United States-Israeli war on Iran erupted on 28 February, 2026, prompting Tehran to effectively close the strait to almost all tankers.
This blockade has triggered severe disruptions, particularly penalising Asian energy importers.
For developing countries like Bangladesh, the crisis is acutely felt as domestic industries depend on the Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb straits to ship vital energy and fertilizer supplies.
While Oman has proposed regional management and voluntary fees, Washington insists that unilateral closures violate transit passage rights guaranteed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Further south, the 32-kilometre-wide Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Suez Canal, carries 12% of global trade.
Recent Houthi missile strikes on Saudi-affiliated and Western vessels have turned this transit into an active combat zone, forcing over 70% of Suez Canal traffic to detour.
Bypassing the 193-kilometre Egyptian canal via South Africa's Cape of Good Hope adds up to 4,000 nautical miles and 10 to 14 days of travel.
This structural detour inflicts a heavy economic toll, costing global trade $10.7 billion annually in delays and $3.4 billion in elevated freight costs, delaying vital energy and fertiliser deliveries by up to a month.
The Malacca bottleneck: Overcrowding at the throat of asia
The Strait of Malacca, running 500 miles between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, connects the Indian Ocean with the Pacific and South China Sea.
As East Asia's primary maritime highway, it carries 60% of global maritime trade and handles over 94,000 ship crossings annually.
It handles 23 million barrels of oil daily, making it the world's busiest oil transit chokepoint, even exceeding Hormuz.
Nearing its capacity limits, the corridor is expected to exceed safe operational thresholds by the end of the decade.
To mitigate this bottleneck, Thailand has proposed an ambitious 100-kilometre landbridge railway/road bypass to offload cargo and completely avoid the Malacca Strait.
Continental gatekeepers: Bosporus, Danish Straits and Gibraltar
In Europe, continental gatekeepers wield immense strategic leverage.
The Turkish Straits – the Bosporus and Dardanelles — are the sole link between the Black Sea and Mediterranean.
Measuring only 700 metres wide at its narrowest point, the Bosporus sees 55,000 transits annually.
Turkey regulates military passage through these waters under the 1936 Montreux Convention, a power actively invoked following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
The Black Sea's vulnerability was underscored when blockaded ports severely disrupted global wheat and fertilizer supplies, driving food prices to historic highs.
Similarly, the narrow Danish Straits are the primary, highly contested gateway for Russian seaborne oil exports.
On Europe's western edge, the Strait of Gibraltar, ceded to Britain under the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, remains a contested 13-kilometre borderland with Spain.
The Polar Silk Road: Hopes and hazards of the new Arctic shipping route
As climate change accelerates polar ice melting, the Arctic Ocean is transitioning from an impenetrable frozen wilderness into a highly contested commercial and military corridor.
Between 2024 and 2025, the extent of Arctic sea ice during its winter peak phase fell by 5.8%, marking the largest recorded drop in history and offering longer windows of summer navigability.
This ecological transformation has allowed China and Russia to deepen their strategic partnership by actively commercialising the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia's Arctic coast.
Promoted by Chinese President Xi Jinping as the "Ice Silk Road", this polar corridor represents an appealing alternative to traditional southern routes.
Recently, the Chinese private shipping firm Sea Legend officially launched the first regularly scheduled seasonal container service connecting eastern China to Europe.
A test voyage demonstrated that a transit from Ningbo to the port of Felixstowe in eastern England takes just 20 days — slashing the 40 days required via the Suez Canal and avoiding the geopolitical disruptions plaguing the Middle East.
Logistically, the Arctic route is highly suitable for low-temperature, heat-sensitive and time-critical cargoes such as lithium-ion batteries and photovoltaic panels.
For Russia, the NSR is a vital economic lifeline to bypass Western sanctions.
Moscow has increasingly used the route to transport liquefied gas and crude oil from heavily sanctioned projects like Arctic LNG-2 and Yamal LNG directly to China.
Blacklisted Russian tankers frequently carry out ship-to-ship cargo transfers in secluded bays off the Kamchatka Peninsula to transport sanctioned gas directly to dedicated terminals in southern Chinese ports.
However, the Polar Silk Road is fraught with severe operational, environmental, and political hazards.
The route remains unpredictable and seasonal, as ice-free navigation is only possible during summer, and ships risk getting trapped in sudden ice formations, requiring expensive nuclear icebreaker escorts managed by Russia's state nuclear agency, Rosatom.
Furthermore, environmental organisations warn that increased shipping in the fragile Arctic ecosystem by older, poorly maintained vessels operating as part of Russia's shadow fleet significantly increases the risk of catastrophic oil spills and soot deposition, which accelerates localised melting.
Sovereignty and geopolitical control remain major friction points.
Permits to navigate the NSR are strictly controlled by Russia, meaning that transits are highly dependent on Moscow's political goodwill.
This expanding corridor has triggered deep military alarm among Western nations and Nato allies, who launched a specialised military mission named Arctic Sentry in February 2026 to curb Sino-Russian military projection.
Furthermore, the United States has signed a shipbuilding pact with Finland to rapidly expand its own icebreaker fleet to counter China's polar presence.
Private Chinese operators have had to establish new, small corporate entities to navigate the route to shield their larger parent companies from secondary Western sanctions associated with dealing with blacklisted Russian energy firms.
Ultimately, the Polar Silk Road remains a valuable strategic hedge for Beijing, rather than a year-round replacement for traditional shipping lanes.
The erosion of maritime law and the path to supply chain resilience
The systemic crises across the world's maritime corridors have exposed the fundamental limitations of international law in safeguarding global commerce.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was designed on the optimistic assumption that strategic straits would remain open to free transit even during times of heightened political tension.
However, the weak enforcement mechanisms of international law have proven entirely insufficient when confronted with the immediate security interests of regional and global powers.
As coastal nations and militant groups continue to weaponise these chokepoints as leverage in geopolitical disputes, global supply chains must adapt to a more volatile and fragmented reality.
For international businesses and importing nations, the path forward requires a transition from just-in-time supply chains to highly resilient logistics strategies.
This transition involves maintaining larger emergency inventories, partnering with multiple transportation providers, and actively diversifying shipping routes to hedge against localised disruptions.
Until global powers establish stronger, cooperative enforcement mechanisms to protect these maritime commons, the global economy will remain deeply vulnerable to recurring disruptions, the costs of which are ultimately borne by everyday consumers across the globe.
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Rockhopper penguin (Eudyptes chrysocome moseleyi) Gough Island, South Atlantic, Islands in the southern oceans
