Tuesday, October 6, 2026

U.S. shipwreck, laden with World War II munitions, is a time bomb near London

 
The final mast of the SS Richard Montgomery is removed on Sept. 30.
The shipwreck lies in the Thames estuary with 1,400 tons of explosives onboard. 
(Dan Kitwood/Getty Images)

From WashingtonPost by William Booth
 
A salvage crew has been working to stabilize the SS Richard Montgomery, which sank a few months after D-Day in 1944 with 1,500 tons of explosives in her holds.

SHEERNESS, England — In the mouth of the River Thames, just downstream from London, a team of elite marine salvors has been busy trying to stabilize one of the world’s most dangerous shipwrecks.

The SS Richard Montgomery, a U.S. military cargo ship, dragged anchor, broke her back on a sandbar, flooded and sank in late summer 1944, a few months after D-Day, with 1,500 tons of explosives still in the holds.
 
 Visualization with the GeoGarage platform (GB raster & ENC)
 
The Monty, as the locals call her, has been disintegrating, slowly but surely, on the shallow seafloor for the last 82 years.

Though a precise manifest is elusive, there are still thousands of World War II munitions inside the Montgomery’s broken hull, including 2,000-pound blockbusters, fragmentation bombs, white phosphorus smoke ordnance and crates of pressure fuzes.

Old bombs, even underwater, can still detonate under the right conditions and one thing certain about the Monty is that her conditions constantly change in the fast-moving tides and shifting sands of the estuary.
“It’s not just the explosives on the wreck that we’re worried about,” said Nolan Conway, who is leading the salvage operation from a high-tech Dutch barge that sits, ever so gently, alongside the wreck.

“It’s the stuff around the barge that we want to be careful about,” Conway said.
“Things could create a sympathetic detonation at the wreck.”

The wreck has stood for all these years as a kind of war memorial, its three masts visible above the waterline, and clearly marked on nautical charts.
You can see it from land.
Tour operators take day-trippers out to circle it.
Local communities remember the sacrifices — the bravery and the terror — of the earlier generations.

The wreck serves as a reminder, too, that the lethal detritus of war often lingers on, whether those ships and bombs are sunk off seaside towns on the English coast or in the Persian Gulf.

The Montgomery is a time capsule and a potential time bomb.
And, after much delay, the British government decided that it was time to do something to prevent a catastrophic collapse of the ship’s degrading steel hull.

On a recent afternoon, Conway, the project leader for Resolve Marine, a company based out of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, was aboard a launch vessel that shuttles crew out to the barge.

His team members are masters of disaster.
A recent assignment had them dealing with a fire in a torpedo room of a submarine operated by the Indian navy.
In 2024, they were hired to disentangle the container ship that struck the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore Harbor.
They routinely deal with groundings, capsizes, cargo losses, spills and fires.
The trip from the dock to the wreck takes just 20 minutes.

A first impression? How crowded the scene.
The wreck lies a couple miles from shore and just a few hundred meters from active shipping lanes.
Thousands of vessels pass by each year, including bulk freighters, container ships, tugboats, liquefied natural gas carriers and cruise ship bound for London, plus all many of fishing craft and pleasure boat.
The wreck is marked by buoys denoting an off-limits exclusion zone.
The masts were the remains of the derrick cranes that once were used to load and unload its lethal cargo.

The British government initiated the $12 million project to remove the three masts after experts concluded the steel structures might collapse onto the decomposing decks below — and that could be very bad.

Asked if the work on the Montgomery was dangerous, Conway explained how carefully they approached their task — the extensive surveys using radar, magnetometers and sonar to form a deep understanding of the wreck and seafloor around it, which is littered with UXO and PXO, terms of art for unexploded ordnance and potential unexploded ordnance.
Over the years, the wreck has collected additional dangers.
The seafloor around it is dotted with half-buried objects, possibly defensive mines and antiaircraft ordnance left by the British navy and unexploded offensive mines and bombs dropped by the Germans.

To put it very simply, the salvors really don’t want to bump into anything.

A shock wave could set off an explosion, which could be lethal to a diver, or could spark a larger conflagration.
Though some British government assessments remain classified, experts with the Royal Military College of Science estimated in 1970 that a “top event” — meaning essentially the worst case, in which the whole cargo goes kaboom! — could produce a blast of water and debris 3,000 meters high and set off a five-meter tsunami-style wave that could threaten local towns and industry, including nearby oil and gas facilities.

 For 82 years, the masts of the SS Richard Montgomery, a US Liberty ship that broke her back and sank off Sheerness in 1944 while loaded with munitions, stood above the Thames Estuary as the visible warning sign for roughly 1,400 tonnes of unexploded ordnance still sealed in her holds below.
The UK government formally announced plans to remove the masts in 2020, since their continued decay risked destabilizing the wreck and increasing the chance of the cargo shifting or detonating on its own.
Engineers finally began the careful, remotely monitored cutting operation in 2025, lifting sections away from the hull without disturbing the explosives underneath.
The recovered masts are now headed to Chatham's Historic Dockyard, where conservators will stabilize the corroded metal before putting them on public display, turning the most visible symbol of one of Britain's longest-running unexploded ordnance threats into a museum piece.
The wreck remains surrounded by an exclusion zone in the Thames Estuary [Getty Images]
 
The British government, in its reports, has calculated the risk of a top event as “remote.”
Remote, however, does not mean unfathomable, let alone completely safe.

In 1967, salvors attempted to stabilize munitions inside the wreck of another American-built ship, the SS Kielce, that was being used by the Polish navy, which had sunk soon after the war near the English port of Folkestone.

Using mines, the salvors somehow ignited the hold, sparking an explosion equaling a 4.5-magnitude earthquake.

“If the Montgomery were typical salvage job, we would simply rig to the mast, cut the mast using traditional techniques and pull it free — simple and done,” Conway said.
“But because of the sensitive nature of the wreck, we went with special tools.”

Those special tools include a barge that dropped three legs into the silty sand to position itself in place, just inches above the waterline and inches from the wreck.
Divers enter the water one at a time, careful not to step onto the fragile deck below.

“Visibility is measured in inches,” said Jeff Cornish, one of the divers.
“We work by feel.”
To cut the mast, the salvors deployed a diamond wire saw, “because it produces lower vibrations, with a lower potential for something to go wrong,” Conway said.

“We don’t do anything that would upset our mothers,” he added, meaning they plan to come home from work.
The Montgomery was a Liberty ship, designed for convoy duty in the North Atlantic.
She was built at the U.S. Navy’s direction by the St. John’s River Shipbuilding Company in Jacksonville, Florida, and took on her last load of high explosives at Hog Island, today the site of Philadelphia International Airport.

After surviving the ocean crossing and German U-boats, she was destined for an American air base in newly liberated Cherbourg, France.
The Montgomery arrived at what became her grave in late August 1944, two months after the Allied landing on the beaches of Normandy.
People in nearby towns — and those following a live stream online — watched as the masts were removed this week.
The cut masts, covered in rust and sea growth, now lie aboard the salvage barge.
They were in surprisingly robust shape.
But the structures around them were not.
Some of the steel could be knocked apart with a single bang by a hand scrapper.
“It’s paper thin,” Conway said.

David Alexander, an emeritus professor of emergency planning at University College London, has studied the wreck and its cargo.
“It is a rare case,” Alexander told The Washington Post.
In a research paper he wrote that the Montgomery “exemplified a very visible, alarming risk, but one which cannot be analyzed with any degree of sophistication and accuracy because there are simply not enough reliable, accurate data.”

“It’s impossible to say with any certainty what the explosion risk is,” he said, but that the risk is far from zero.
Alexander worried aloud that the wreck lies close to active shipping, that windsurfers have been recorded in the exclusion zone, that divers likely have sneaked out to the site and in years past, fishermen were photographed on the wreck at low tides.
Locals have reported seeing strange lights on the water above the wreck at night, likely phosphorous munitions that shook loose from their crates and ignited on the surface, he said.

In a debate in the House of Lords, and in the London newspapers, fears also have been raised that terrorists or saboteurs, using drones or simple explosives, could target the wreck.
But removing 1,500 tons of explosives might require emptying out local towns or building seawall defenses just in case.
So far, the British government appears satisfied that cutting down the masts — and watching and waiting — are enough.
The masts are now headed to a nearby museum and conservatory at the Historic Dockyard in Chatham, where the structures will be restored and displayed to the public, and the story of the Monty will continue.
“There’s a lot of interest in that ship,” said Paul Barnard, deputy CEO of Chatham Historic Dockyard Trust.
“A lot of history, and lore, and speculation, and to be honest, rumor, about what could happen next.”
 
Links :

Monday, October 5, 2026

Why AI has trouble predicting the intensity of hurricanes

A Pacific Ocean wave crashes into a seawall protecting beachside homes on Sept.
7 in Long Beach, California.
(Mario Tama/Getty Images)

From WashingtonPost by Chanh Kieu (associate professor of atmospheric science at Indiana University)

Artificial intelligence now produces excellent weather forecasts on a broad scale.
But several factors complicate its ability to predict how fast a hurricane will ramp up.
 
 Artificial intelligence has revolutionized weather forecasting in just a few years, with global AI weather models now able to produce forecasts that rival some of the world’s best physics-based prediction systems.

This remarkable progress has been driven by three factors: massive amounts of weather data, advances in AI models and unprecedented computational power.
While most of the current discussion on improving AI for weather focuses on the models or new hardware, the data is crucial.

At the global scale, AI has benefited from decades of climate and weather records covering the entire Earth.
These datasets contain millions of examples of how atmospheric conditions evolve with time, allowing AI models to learn patterns in a way that would have been impossible a decade ago.

But when you zoom in from the global scale to the regional scale, forecasts start to be much more challenging for AI.

That difference matters for forecasting hurricane intensity.

The world has seen many hurricanes rapidly intensify in recent years, strengthening from relatively weak storms into destructive monsters in a matter of hours.
Hurricane Polo did it off Mexico’s Pacific coast as it rapidly strengthened from a tropical storm on Sept.
21 to a powerful Category 5 hurricane in 24 hours.
Polo quickly became one of the strongest Pacific storms in decades, with winds reaching 180 mph.

When rapid intensification surprises forecasters — as Hurricane Michael did in 2018 when it grew into a destructive Category 5 hurricane right before hitting Tyndall Air Force Base and Mexico Beach, Florida, in 2018 — communities can be left with too little time to evacuate and prepare.

Why AI struggles with detail
 
Damage is shown in the Baja California Sur state of Mexico after Hurricane Polo, one of the strongest Pacific storms in decades.
(Eduardo Verdugo/AP)
 
Unlike global weather forecasts, hurricane intensity forecasts are often considered a regional forecasting problem.
Regional forecasts are often concerned with extreme events, such as heavy rainfall, squall lines, severe thunderstorms or hurricanes.

These extreme events often develop rapidly or move quickly over short periods of time.
Capturing such behavior in AI models requires data in much greater detail than current global datasets can typically provide.

When scientists train AI models to predict hurricane intensity, they usually rely on two sources of data.

The first is observations, which include measurements of rainfall, near-surface temperature, wind speed and other weather variables collected from weather stations, radars, buoys and satellites.
Such direct observations can be detailed, but they are often limited to near-coastal regions and unevenly distributed, while many of the most important stages of hurricane development occur over the open ocean where direct observations are sparse.

Modern satellites can help fill some of these gaps in the open ocean, but they can help estimate only part of the rainfall, surface winds or cloud-top temperatures due to limits in satellite coverage.
In particular, they cannot simultaneously scan a complete three-dimensional structure of every hurricane around the globe.
At present, even the best observational systems provide only a partial view of hurricanes at any point in time.

Scientists used satellite data to map aspects of Hurricane Matthew’s intensity as it gained strength on its way toward the Florida Panhandle in 2016.

The second source of training data comes from weather model simulations, which combine atmospheric conditions and knowledge of physics to provide the most complete three-dimensional picture of the atmosphere at high resolution.

However, this simulated data is not perfect either, because all computer models contain approximations and uncertainties arising from incomplete knowledge of the Earth’s atmosphere.
As such, there are always fine-scale processes that model simulations cannot capture.

So, we simply don’t have a good full, three-dimensional dataset to train an AI model for hurricane intensity prediction at present.

The other challenge: Chaos

A satellite view of Hurricane Erin tracking westward across the Atlantic in 2025. 
(Gallo Images/Gallo Images via Getty Images)

But data is not the only issue for AI hurricane prediction.

Suppose in the future scientists could measure the entirety of a storm, measured every second, for thousands of storms around the world.
That still might not allow AI to predict hurricane intensity perfectly.
The reason: chaos.
Tiny differences in the initial state of a hurricane can quickly grow over time.

My recent research with colleagues suggests that hurricanes may contain some element of chaos that can prevent AI models from accurately predicting hurricane intensity at long forecast times.

Once embedded in a favorable environment, a tropical storm can intensify toward a maximum possible strength.
Scientists call this upper limit the potential intensity.
It is determined primarily by the surrounding environment.
For example, warm ocean water can fuel a hurricane’s intensity, or wind shear can slow down a hurricane’s development.
If the ocean temperature rises, the potential intensity of a hurricane increases, too.

Any small disturbances will also cause the hurricane intensity to fluctuate.
The warmer the ocean surface, the more fluctuations.

Computer simulations show how forecasting a hurricane’s intensity becomes more uncertain the further out the forecast is.
Hurricane intensity is measured as the maximum wind at the height of 33 feet (10 meters).
The images show how much two hurricanes can differ in their physical appearance, even when they have the same Category 5 intensity.

Recent studies have proposed that these fluctuations are not purely random but occur within what is known as a chaotic attractor — a set of possible storm states within which the hurricane can evolve unpredictably.
Although the existence of such a chaotic intensity attractor has not yet been fully established, it presents a fundamental dilemma for training AI models to predict hurricane intensity.

On one hand, scientists want AI models to make the most accurate predictions possible.
Thus, during training the goal is to minimize the difference between the forecast and what actually happens until an AI model achieves the smallest possible error.

On the other hand, we also want the AI model to capture the hurricane’s intrinsic chaos.
But if an AI model can capture this chaos, then its error cannot be reduced indefinitely.
So, an AI model trained to minimize forecast error may learn the most likely evolution of a hurricane while smoothing out unpredictable fluctuations.
In this regard, these two goals compete with one another.

With data always containing some uncertainty, the rules an AI model learns are only approximated.
The accuracy of hurricane intensity forecast will therefore get worse after just a few days.

What will it take to make better forecasts?

The challenge for AI models to predict hurricane intensity is not just about obtaining more data, building better neural networks or deploying faster computers.
It is also about understanding hurricane behaviors and how chaos in intensity emerges.

Both dictate whether AI models can learn what is predictable and what is unpredictable.
That distinction not only puts a cap on our current hurricane intensity forecast accuracy but also determines the next generation of weather forecasting and evaluation systems, which should focus on a range of possible hurricane intensities and their probabilities instead of a single intensity number.

Sunday, October 4, 2026

What CEOs can learn from the deepest man on Earth


From ChiefExecutive by Dr. Lance Mortlock
 
Herbert Nitsch’s record-breaking dives weren’t feats of bravado—they were exercises in disciplined focus, pre-engineered risk and relentless refinement.
His approach offers leaders a powerful blueprint for leading under extreme pressure without burning out.

Long before Herbert Nitsch became known as “the deepest man on Earth,” he was simply a curious explorer of limits, of the mind, and of the quiet depths beneath the surface of human potential.
Today, with 33 world records and a legendary dive to 253 metres on a single breath, Nitsch stands alone in a category of performance that almost defies imagination.
But what’s most striking about him is not the record itself.
It’s the system behind how he thinks, prepares, adapts and leads himself through extreme environments.
Insights with profound relevance for leaders navigating the turbulence of today’s modern business.

In a world where executives face immense pressure from shifting markets, disruptive technologies, global tariff uncertainty, war, AI and increasing public scrutiny, few analogues are as apt or as vivid as watching a man descend into silence, darkness, crushing physical pressure and emotional stillness, and return not just unharmed, but triumphant.
Free diving, at Herbert’s level, is not simply a sport, but a study in applied psychology, decision design, risk governance, discipline and the mastery of focus.
And in conversation, he reveals these lessons with clarity that should capture the imagination of any senior leader striving to perform under pressure.

The making of a world‑class outlier

What stands out about Nitsch is that he achieved all of this while keeping a full-time job as an Austrian airline pilot.
“My competitors were living free diving,” he notes, “and I was doing free diving as a side gig.” That forced him very early in his career to create a radically efficient approach to training—one grounded not in doing more, but in doing better.
He didn’t have the luxury of endless hours underwater; he had to engineer performance through precision, intention and continuous refinement.

Herbert’s world was one built on constant adjustment.
Conditions changed.
Currents changed.
Temperatures changed.
His own physiology changed.
“Even if you think something is perfect,” he told me, “there is always room for improvement.”

This mindset of being adaptive, curious and unafraid to rethink even the things that work is a leadership principle hiding in plain sight.
In business, the external environment evolves constantly.
Policy and regulatory landscapes shift overnight.
Leaders who cling to past formulas because they once worked inevitably fall behind.
BlackBerry is one of the clearest examples of a company whose once‑unassailable competitive advantage eroded rapidly.
Organizations and leaders who, like Herbert, treat routines as living and evolving systems become more durable, more inventive and more resilient.

The discipline of focus in a distracted world

What happens inside Herbert’s mind in the final minute before a dive is perhaps the clearest window into his genius.
“It’s better to focus solely on what matters,” he says.
“Leave all the noise outside and live in the moment.” Even a flicker of excitement can be catastrophic because excitement consumes oxygen.
He must be calm, not metaphorically, but physiologically.

Yet this isn’t something he stumbled into.
It’s something he has trained for over decades.
Other freedivers nicknamed him “the robot” because of his ability to enter an ultra-focused tunnel state at will.
He describes it as a click, an internal switch that shuts out everything unrelated to the task.
“All of a sudden there is this focused tunnel vision and nothing else matters,” he says.

For executives, this is a profound lesson.
Modern leadership is full of noise, like emails, meetings, crises, shifting priorities, data streams and the constant hum of digital notifications.
In fact, a report by HPCwire claims that 80 percent of global workers suffer from information overload, and in the U.S., 76 percent of workers feel that this overload contributes to daily stress.
Furthermore, pressure amplifies the cost of distraction.
High-stakes presentations, negotiations, boardrooms and crisis moments demand the very mental state Herbert has mastered: clarity, presence and the ruthless elimination of irrelevance.

Focus is not a personality trait.
It is a practiced discipline.

Switching between the micro and the macro

Another vivid parallel exists in Herbert’s description of toggling between two modes: narrow focus during the dive and wide situational awareness immediately afterward.
When he resurfaces, cognitive capacity returns slowly as oxygen rebuilds.
Only then can he lift his head, scan the environment and make broader assessments.
 
 

As I describe in my book, Outside In, Inside Out leaders must do the same, and move fluidly between the details that matter and the systems that shape those details.
Strategy suffers when leaders stay too high for too long; execution suffers when they stay too deep in the weeds.
Herbert’s approach shows this duality must be intentional.
Leaders must practice moving between these modes with purpose.

Planning for risk before it arrives

Herbert’s philosophy on risk is one of the clearest leadership lessons he offers.
At extreme depths, cognitive function collapses.
Judgment narrows.
Decision-making becomes unreliable.
That means every critical choice must be predetermined.
“Don’t think when you have a problem but think before about what kind of problem you might have and how to deal with it,” he says.

He continues with even sharper clarity: “The deeper you go, the less judgmental brain power you have.
So, you need super simple plans—Plan A, Plan B and a clear rule for when to stop.” 
This is scenario planning in its purest, most unforgiving form.
In free diving, the cost of improvisation is physical harm or even death.
In business, the cost may be strategic misstep, reputational damage or financial loss.
The best leaders, like the best divers, design their decisions in advance.
They simplify questions before complexity hits.
They develop stop rules before emotion enters.
They reduce unnecessary branching.
They remove ambiguity.

When uncertainty spikes, clarity saves organizations.

Discomfort vs. limits

One of Herbert’s most interesting insights revolves around the difference between discomfort and true limits.
Physiologically, the urge to breathe is not the limit itself, but it’s an early warning mechanism.
The actual limit lies further.
But confusing the signal for the boundary is what stops most people.

Organizationally, the same pattern appears everywhere.
According to McKinsey & Company, 70 percent of organizational change initiatives fail, often due to resistance stemming from ingrained cultural norms and human behavior.
Leaders often mistake this friction for inability, retreating too early or pushing too hard.
Herbert’s philosophy encourages a more nuanced approach: know when discomfort is just discomfort.
But also know when a real limit is approaching, and respect that capacity threshold.

Purpose, motivation, and sustainable performance.

When asked why he continues to dive, Herbert’s answer is simple: curiosity.
“You’re amazed by what you have achieved, and curious to see what more you can still achieve,” he says.
It is not ego but exploration, and a drive to understand the boundary and what lies beyond it.

He also reflects candidly on longevity.
“Your health is the most important,” he says.
“You can’t buy a new body.” For leaders who burn themselves out in the name of performance, this is a sobering reminder.
Sustainability is not the opposite of ambition.
It is the foundation of it.

Depth reveals the truth

Herbert Nitsch’s achievements may exist in an extreme, uncommon domain, but the lessons behind them are universal.
He shows that mastery under pressure, whether underwater or in the boardroom, comes from clarity, focus, preparation, adaptability and respect for the environment you operate in.
In deep water, the pressure reveals the truth.
In business, volatility does the same.
Depth strips away illusion.

What remains is the quality of your thinking, the design of your decisions and the focused discipline you bring to moments that matter.

Herbert Nitsch has gone deeper than any human in history.
But his greatest offering may be the leadership philosophy he surfaced with.
 
Links :

Saturday, October 3, 2026

Cliffs of Moher, Doolin, Ireland


Friday, October 2, 2026

Why China opposes the Japan–Philippines maritime boundary process

Figure 1.
Map of the 350-Nautical-Mile Limit East of Taiwan
Source: Created by the author
 
From Eastisred by Yuxuan Jia 
 
Chinese maritime scholar builds legal case for China’s participation in maritime delimitation east of Taiwan. 

Earlier this month, China disclosed that it had conducted a seabed survey in waters east of Taiwan from August 10 to 31, while the China Coast Guard carried out what it described as its third “routine law-enforcement patrol” in the area since June.
The growing Chinese presence has been portrayed outside the country as part of Beijing’s effort to assert its sovereignty and jurisdictional claims; Beijing, for its part, has explicitly linked such activities to the maritime-boundary negotiations launched by Japan and the Philippines, insisting that China has an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the same waters and therefore cannot simply be excluded from the process.

That difference in framing is important.
Much of the outside discussion begins with the premise that Tokyo and Manila are conducting an essentially normal bilateral delimitation and then asks why China is objecting—and why Chinese survey vessels and coast-guard ships are appearing there.
The article below, by Zheng Zhihua, starts from the opposite end of the problem: if, as Beijing maintains, Taiwan’s eastern coast generates Chinese maritime entitlements that overlap with those claimed by Japan and the Philippines, can the proposed boundary really be treated as an exclusively bilateral one? Its central argument is that, because no negotiating map, controlling base points, coordinates or endpoints have been made public, Japan and the Philippines have yet to demonstrate that the area they intend to delimit is legally separable from the maritime claims China derives from Taiwan.

Zheng Zhihua’s article offers a detailed reconstruction of the logic behind Beijing’s position: China regards its diplomatic protests, surveys and maritime patrols not as the opening move in a new dispute, but as measures intended to prevent an undelimited area from gradually hardening into bilateral coordinates, enforcement zones and eventually security arrangements from which China has been excluded.
That is the argument worth understanding as activity east of Taiwan becomes an increasingly visible—and consequential—part of the region’s maritime politics.

The article was originally published by the South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI) on 2 September 2026.
The SCSPI is a research network directed by Hu Bo, research professor & director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Studies, Peking University.

SCSPI’s Editor’s Note:

This Article examines the legal and geopolitical implications of the 2026 decision by Japan and the Philippines to negotiate exclusive-economic-zone and continental-shelf boundaries in waters east of Taiwan.
It asks whether the contemplated area is legally separable from China’s claims, whether a bilateral line could prejudice third-party rights, what responses remain open to China, and which actor is altering the status quo.
Beginning from the principle that the land dominates the sea, the Article argues that coastal projections from Taiwan’s eastern coast, Japan’s Sakishima/Yaeyama Islands, and the Philippines’ Batanes Islands may substantially overlap.
The fact that Japanese and Philippine features lie less than 400 nautical miles apart establishes a possible bilateral overlap, but not an exclusively bilateral geography; continental-shelf entitlements may also extend beyond 200 nautical miles under Article 76 of UNCLOS.
Because Japan and the Philippines have disclosed neither a negotiating map nor controlling base points, coordinates, or endpoints, they have not demonstrated the separability of the proposed delimitation area.

Although a bilateral treaty cannot bind China without its consent, a fixed endpoint and the incorporation of coordinates into charts, licences, enforcement practices, or security arrangements could prejudice China’s legal and practical position.
International jurisprudence therefore supports geographic restraint, open endpoints, and effective non-prejudice safeguards.
China may preserve its claims through diplomatic representations, protests, and maritime presence according international and domestic law.
Finally, the parallel expansion of Japan–Philippines defense cooperation creates a risk of securitizing the boundary and may blur their one-China positions by implying who is entitled to represent Taiwan-facing coasts.

On May 28, 2026, Japan and the Philippines upgraded their bilateral relationship to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” in Tokyo.
The same Joint Statement also outlined the initiation of formal negotiations to delimit the boundary between their respective exclusive economic zones and continental shelves.
Concerning defense matters, the statement confirmed that the Reciprocal Access Agreement had entered into force and had already been utilized in exercises including Balikatan 41-26.
Moreover, the two countries signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement in January of the same year, launching discussions on an agreement for the protection of classified military information and promoting transfers of defense equipment such as destroyers, TC-90 aircraft, and coastal radar systems.
On May 31, the two defense ministers struck a deal to proceed with the transfer of decommissioned Abukuma-class destroyers and a TC-90 aircraft, while continuing consultations on personnel training, maintenance support, equipment management, and information cooperation.

The Japan–Philippines maritime delimitation process has thus unfolded in parallel with the development of the two countries’ defense mechanisms, joint operations, and maritime-capability cooperation.
On June 2, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China stated that, as the contemplated waters lie east of Taiwan Island where China has an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, China’s participation in the delimitation is indispensable; and that Japan and the Philippines, by commencing negotiations without China, had violated international law and infringed upon China’s maritime rights and interests.
On June 6, the Ministry of Transport of China organized forces of maritime administration, navigation support, and rescue to launch a special law-enforcement operation targeting maritime traffic in waters east of Taiwan Island.
The China Coast Guard subsequently announced regular law-enforcement patrols in the relevant waters.
On August 14, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. expected that the negotiations could be concluded by the end of the year, regarding no major obstacles and characterizing the contemplated agreement as essentially a “bilateral matter” between Japan and the Philippines.1

There arise five interrelated questions: Are Japan and the Philippines entitled to proceed unilaterally with the delimitation of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in waters east of Taiwan?
Is the contemplated Japan–Philippines delimitation separable from China’s claims?
Would such a delimitation encroach upon or appropriate China’s exclusive-economic-zone and continental-shelf entitlements east of Taiwan Island?
Is China entitled to make diplomatic representations and protests and to conduct maritime law-enforcement patrols in the relevant waters?
And which side, ultimately, is attempting to change the status quo there?

I. The Claims of China, Japan, and the Philippines in Waters East of Taiwan Substantially Overlap

In maritime delimitation, “the land dominates the sea” is a fundamental principle: maritime entitlements are derived from the geographical projection of coasts.
The relevant Japanese and Philippine land features are located less than 400 nautical miles apart.
That fact may indicate that their respective maximum 200-nautical-mile entitlements overlap, but it does not mean that projections from other relevant coasts are excluded from that area.

Publicly available geographical materials show that Taiwan’s eastern coast is a long and continuous main-island coast facing the Philippine Sea Basin.
Japan’s claimed entitlements would come principally from the Sakishima/Yaeyama island chain, while the Philippines relies on the Batanes Islands to its north and on its archipelagic baselines.
If the Japan–Philippines boundary were extended westward or southwestward and enclosed the tripoint, the resulting cut-off could affect not only the projection of an isolated offshore island, but also the maritime space generated by Taiwan’s continuous eastern coast together with Orchid Island(Lan Yu) and Green Island(Lü Dao).2

Figure 2.
Seafloor Topographic Map of the Waters East of Taiwan 
Source: Ocean Data Bank,

Another issue concerns what kind of effect should be given, in a concrete delimitation, to relatively small islands such as Yonaguni, Ishigaki, Iriomote, Batan, Itbayat, and Sabtang against Taiwan’s continuous coast.
Without such an assessment, no bilateral line segment drawn using those islands as basepoints can be proven to be equitable solely on the basis of geometric overlap.3 
In addition, islands like Orchid Island and Green Island may also modify the local geographical relationship.
If the same waters lie within the maximum potential entitlements of three sides, Japan and the Philippines must demonstrate that the contemplated segment does not necessitate a prior determination of the effect to be accorded to Taiwan’s relevant coasts.
Likewise, placing the contemplated boundary “beyond 200 nautical miles from Taiwan” does not fully resolve the question.4 For the exclusive economic zone, 200 nautical miles may serve as an initial screening criterion.
For the continental shelf, however, entitlements that meet the requirements of Article 76 of UNCLOS may extend beyond 200 nautical miles.
It must also be clarified whether the 200 nautical miles are measured from the low-water line of Taiwan’s main island, from the applicable baselines, or from offshore islands.
A cartographic arc drawn for convenience cannot replace a complete analysis of title, baselines, and relevant coasts.



Figure 3.
Geological Map of the Gagua Ridge and Adjacent Areas
Source: Qian, Shengping, et al.
“First identification of a Cathaysian continental fragment beneath the Gagua Ridge, Philippine Sea, and its tectonic implications.” Geology 49.11 (2021): 1332-1336.



Figure 4.
Map of the Overlapping 200-Nautical-Mile Zones East of Taiwan (Dark Purple Indicates the Overlap of the 200-Nautical-Mile Zones of China, Japan, and the Philippines)
Source: Created by the author

II. Japan and the Philippines Have Not Demonstrated That the Contemplated Delimitation Area Is Separable from China’s Claims


In waters potentially subject to projections from more than two coasts, separability marks the outer boundary of bilateral disposition.
Japan and the Philippines may only dispose of an area where their respective potential entitlements with legal basis overlap and is separable from third-party rights.
That area cannot be determined simply by drawing two complete 200-nautical-mile arcs and treating their intersection as legally homogeneous.
The relevant coasts, applicable baselines, the capacity of islands to generate maritime zones, and possible projections from third-party coasts all affect the outer limits of the two countries’ competence to effect a bilateral disposition.

President Marcos characterized the contemplated agreement as “essentially a matter between Japan and the Philippines.” 
As of the evidentiary cut-off date for this Article, however, materials made public by Japan and the Philippines disclosed none of the following: a map defining the negotiating area, the baselines to be used, controlling base points, proposed endpoints, or a mechanism safeguarding third-party rights.

The information disclosed to date therefore indicates that Japan and the Philippines have not publicly established the complete factual foundation necessary to demonstrate separability.
If they continued to exclude Beijing and proceeded to a final delimitation, they would not only breach international-law obligations of good faith, cooperation, and restraint, but could also infringe China’s maritime rights in waters east of Taiwan Island and potentially give rise to an internationally wrongful act.5
 
III. Prejudgments and Effects on Third-Party Positions and Interests

According to Reuters, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara stated that any maritime-boundary agreement reached by Japan and the Philippines would not be legally binding on third parties.
Meanwhile, Philippine public statements emphasized that the negotiations would proceed in accordance with international law; President Marcos later characterized the contemplated agreement as essentially a bilateral matter between Japan and the Philippines.

Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.
This rule addresses the issue of legal binding force: as a matter of law, a Japan–Philippines agreement cannot extinguish the rights of an absent party.
However, it does not mean that the agreement cannot produce practical externalities.
Maritime-boundary coordinates may be incorporated into official charts, fishing licences, resource blocks, coast-guard patrol instructions, and security-cooperation documents.
Even if a third party is not legally bound by the agreement, it may nevertheless incur diplomatic, enforcement, and litigation costs in resisting those practical effects.
International courts and tribunals employ approaches including open endpoints, formulas terminating a line before it reaches potential third-party interests, and non-prejudice safeguards precisely because formal non-opposability must be reinforced by self-restraint in both spatial scope and practical implementation.6 
Credible third-party protection must therefore operate on at least four levels: the treaty text must expressly preserve third-party rights; maps must leave potential tripartite areas undelimited; endpoints must remain open to future adjustment; and law-enforcement activity, resource licensing, and security cooperation must not treat an undelimited line as an exclusive boundary.

In international adjudication, where a court would have to determine, as a prerequisite, an absent country’s international responsibility or legal rights, and if that determination constitutes the very subject matter of the case, the Monetary Gold principle precludes the court from proceeding without that country’s consent.7 
Although the principle directly governs adjudicative proceedings, it offers a useful analogous screening criterion: a delimitation segment cannot become a purely bilateral matter merely through mutual consent between Japan and the Philippines.

IV. China Is Entitled to Make Diplomatic Representations and Protests and to Conduct Maritime Law-Enforcement Patrols in Relevant Waters

First, the stakeholder could ordinarily preserve its rights by making diplomatic representations and protests, requesting consultations, declining to recognize prejudicial coordinates, publicizing its positions, and collecting evidence.
Second, it appears to be unexceptionable insofar as the China Coast Guard and China’s maritime authorities act in accordance with domestic law, conduct patrol and verification operations, carry out fisheries protection and rescue services, and maintain normal navigation and operational order while serving to reserve rights, establish facts, and perform jurisdictional functions relating to the relevant waters and subject matters.

An American think tank contends that Beijing inspected hundreds of merchant vessels that showed no indication of engaging in resource development or causing damage to resources in the seabed or water column.
Such inspections infringed the rights of all countries using the area and interfered with commercial navigation.
It accordingly accuses Beijing of violating UNCLOS and seeking to exercise broad and unprecedented jurisdiction over the area.
Yet no evidence establishes that the patrol and verification activities conducted by Chinese maritime law-enforcement forces amounted to unlawful interception or disrupted normal commercial navigation.

V. Which Side Is Changing the Status Quo?

One view holds that China increased its survey vessels, maritime-administration activities, and the coast guard presence after Japan and the Philippines announced their delimitation negotiations, thereby seeking to change the status quo east of Taiwan through a quasi-routine maritime presence and jurisdictional assertions.
However, it must be emphasized that Japan and the Philippines characterized the undelimited waters east of Taiwan as a Japan–Philippines “bilateral matter” and advanced that process in parallel with defense cooperation without disclosing the scope of the contemplated delimitation area, demonstrating separability, or consulting China.
They were thus the first to alter the pre-existing legal and procedural status quo, and their conduct was clearly provocative.

The security setting reinforces, but does not replace, that inference.
Delimitation is advancing alongside arrangements for classified military information and transfers of maritime-defense assets, including destroyers scheduled for decommissioning.
A line whose third-party limits remain unresolved could later organize patrols, surveillance, access expectations, or contingency planning affecting the Taiwan question.
Parallel timing does not prove such a plan.
It does make the risk foreseeable, and international objection need not await the moment when a disputed line has already hardened into operational practice.

Perhaps, the more pertinent questions are as follows: Why have Japan and the Philippines chosen this moment to advance maritime delimitation and defense cooperation in parallel? Why have they not disclosed a negotiating area and baseline assumptions sufficient to demonstrate separability? And why the haste to set a political objective of completing the negotiations within the year? China’s protests, surveys, and patrols merely preserve its position and constitute reactive measures aimed at preventing Japan and the Philippines from transforming undelimited space into exclusive coordinates, licensing regimes, enforcement zones, or security boundaries.

VI. Unilateral Japan–Philippines Maritime Delimitation Is Highly Likely to Blur Their Respective Positions on the Taiwan Question

By pressing ahead with the negotiations without disclosing their scope or publicly communicating with Beijing, Japan and the Philippines risk further obscuring their respective positions on the Taiwan question.
The fundamental reason is that maritime delimitation cannot avoid the antecedent questions of who owns Taiwan’s coasts and who is entitled to represent them.
Nor can those questions be evaded merely by describing the process as a “bilateral matter.” Under the principle that “the land dominates the sea,” maritime entitlements derive from specific land-based coasts.
Using base points located on Taiwan’s eastern coast, Orchid Island, or Green Island necessarily raises the question of which country they are taken to represent.
Excluding those coasts altogether likewise entails a choice with implications for Taiwan policy.

In the 1972 China–Japan Joint Communique, Japan recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China and stated that it “fully understands and respects” China’s position on Taiwan.
Philippine Executive Order No.
313 of 1987
reaffirmed the relevant terms of the 1975 communique establishing diplomatic relations: the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China, there is but one China, and Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory.
Against this background, if Japan and the Philippines employ baselines promulgated by the Taiwan authorities without communicating with Beijing, their conduct may readily be understood as treating Taiwan as an independent coastal country capable of generating maritime entitlements.
If they exclude Taiwan’s coasts entirely, their conduct may be understood as taking the position that those coasts cannot generate maritime entitlements for China.
If they accept that those coasts belong to China but bypass Beijing, their conduct would sit uneasily with their recognition of Beijing as the sole legal Government of China.
By neither disclosing the contemplated scope nor indicating which conception of the relevant parties and their legal status underpins their approach, Japan and the Philippines leave their Taiwan policies open to multiple interpretations.

In conclusion, the formal opening by Japan and the Philippines of negotiations to delimit exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in waters east of Taiwan has implications beyond the allocation of resources between neighbouring States; it may also affect the spatial order of key waters along the “First Island Chain.” The Joint Statement invokes UNCLOS and relevant international jurisprudence while simultaneously placing maritime delimitation, defense-related information sharing, and equipment transfers within the same partnership framework.
This is sufficient to demonstrate a real risk that the contemplated boundary will be used for securitization purposes.

Analyses of the issue should therefore neither accord the Japan–Philippines initiative a “presumption of legality” nor subject China’s response to a “most adverse strategic interpretation.” Objectively speaking, the decision by Japan and the Philippines to open delimitation negotiations at this juncture is unmistakably provocative and strategically inflammatory.
That provocation should not be concealed by the rhetoric of “normal negotiations.” In the western Pacific, where maritime boundaries remain unsettled among multiple parties, any attempt to use legal characterization as a cover for political manipulation will undermine the region’s fragile maritime order.

Links :

1 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, As Tokyo and Manila Talk Boundaries, Beijing Breaks Them (Aug. 19, 2026), https://amti.csis.org/as-tokyo-and-manila-talk-boundaries-beijing-breaks-them/(link is external).
The article characterizes the Japan–Philippines negotiations as a conventional bilateral delimitation exercise and assesses negatively the legality and purpose of certain Chinese maritime activities.

2 Michael Sheng-ti Gau & Hsien-Wen Huang, An Analysis of the International Legal Issues Raised by the Japan–Philippines Maritime Delimitation Negotiations, China Review, July 2026, no.
343, pp. 20–23 (Chinese).

3 Taiwan proper and its 21 affiliated islands have an area of 35,887.1325 square kilometres, https://www.ey.gov.tw/state/4447F4A951A1EC45/094b1d53-de8d-4393-bde6-ab092969cce4(link is external); as of July 2026, Taiwan’s population was 23,235,002, https://eng.stat.gov.tw/Point.aspx?n=4208&sid=t.9&sms=11713(link is external).
Okinawa Prefecture, Department of Planning, Regional and Remote Islands Division, 2025 Materials Relating to Remote Islands, ch. 1, p. 2, https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/_res/projects/default_project/_page_/001/033/624/01_chapter1_r7.pdf(link is external) (the inhabited islands of Miyako and Yaeyama have a combined area of 806.68 square kilometres and a basic-resident-registry population of 107,244); Philippine Statistics Authority, Province of Batanes, https://psa.gov.ph/classification/psgc/citimuni/0200900000(link is external) (2024 population: 18,937); Department of Budget and Management, Philippines, FY 2014 Internal Revenue Allotment for LGUs: Region II, https://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/Issuances/IRA/IRA2014/PCM/RO2/RO2.pdf(link is external)(Batanes Province has an area of 219.01 square kilometres).
Using statistics drawn from different years and compiled under different methodologies solely for an order-of-magnitude comparison, the land area of Taiwan proper and its affiliated islands is approximately 44 times that of the inhabited Miyako and Yaeyama islands combined and 164 times that of Batanes Province; Taiwan’s population is approximately 217 times that of the former and 1,227 times that of the latter.
Land area and population do not automatically determine maritime entitlements or delimitation ratios; the comparison merely demonstrates that the potentially affected coastal frontage cannot be disregarded.

4 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p.348, at pp.372–73, ¶¶ 86–90 (May 4), https://www.icj-cij.org/case/124/intervention;(link is external) Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl./Myan.), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 4, ¶¶ 462, 505, dispositif para. 6 (Mar.
14), https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-16/(link is external).

5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts.
74(1), 74(3), 83(1), 83(3), 300, Dec.10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf(link is external); North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. Ger./Den.; Fed. Rep. Ger./Neth.), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, at p. 47, ¶ 85 (Feb.
20), https://www.icj-cij.org/case/52(link is external); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Guyana and Suriname, Award, 30 R.I.A.A. 1, ¶¶ 459–70 (Sept. 17, 2007), https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXX/1-144.pdf(link is external).
These rules support scrutiny of the duty to negotiate in good faith and of conduct that might jeopardize or hamper a final agreement.
 
6 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 348, at pp.
372–73, ¶¶ 86–90 (May 4), https://www.icj-cij.org/case/124/intervention;(link is external) Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl./Myan.), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p.
4, ¶¶ 462, 505, dispositif para. 6 (Mar. 14), https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-16/(link is external)
 
7 Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 19, at p. 32 (June 15), https://www.icj-cij.org/case/19(link is external); cf. Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Eq. Guinea Intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 303, at pp. 421–22, ¶¶ 237–38 (Oct. 10), https://www.icj-cij.org/case/94(link is external) (the Court may address the boundary between the parties but may not determine the boundary between a party and a third State).