Sunday, November 8, 2026

Lessons from Jeju : freediving and motherhood with Kimi Werner

Seven months pregnant and apprehensive of the effect motherhood would have on her career as a professional freediver, Kimi Werner took a trip to the island of Jeju in South Korea to meet her heroes, the haenyeo – a group of freediving and fishing women often regarded as Korea’s first working mother’s whose culture dates back centuries.
Expecting her first child, Kimi will explore how the haenyeo represent feminine strength and resilience as a self sufficient sisterhood of diving mothers and grandmothers.
As Kimi transitions from a solo underwater adventurist to a mother cultivating a family, she longs to learn from the haenyeo elders - many of which are well into their 70’s and continue to dive.
Join Kimi on her journey in Lessons from Jeju, where she gains a deeper understanding of what it means to pass on her own legacy and learns motherhood for a professional athlete isn’t a roadblock but instead a path forward.

Saturday, November 7, 2026

First time filmed in a decade : underwater volcano eruption

We went on an expedition to capture Kavachi, one of the world’s most active underwater volcanoes, erupting beneath the Pacific Ocean in the remote Solomon Islands.
Steam explosions, sulfur-rich plumes, and superheated seawater collide in one of the most extreme environments on Earth.

March 8, 2024
 
 
Kavachi is one of the most active submarine volcanoes in the Pacific.
This conical seamount, located in the Solomon Islands and named after a sea god of the Gatokae and Vangunu people, rises some 1,200 meters (3,900 feet) from the seafloor.
But its summit remains just 20 meters (65 feet) below sea level, which makes it easier for satellites to detect discolorations of the water due to volcanic activity than at deeper undersea volcanoes.
 
Localization with the GeoGarage platform

Kavachi has erupted at least 39 times since 1939, with the latest eruptive period beginning in 2021, according to the Smithsonian Institution’s Global Volcanism Program.
In 2024, the volcano continued to stir—and satellites continued to capture images of discolored plumes of water.

The image above, acquired on March 8 by the OLI (Operational Land Imager) on Landsat 8, shows a plume of discolored water near the undersea volcano.
The plume drifted north-northeast toward Nggatokae Island.
Vangunu Island, also pictured, lies about 24 kilometers (15 miles) north of Kavachi, and Papua New Guinea is about 800 kilometers (500 miles) to the west.

The MODIS (Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer) on NASA’s Terra and Aqua captured images of similar underwater plumes near Kavachi on several other occasions in recent weeks, including February 3, 15, and 23.

Previous research has shown such plumes of superheated, acidic water can contain particulate matter, volcanic rock fragments, and sulfur, as well as precipitates of silicon, iron, and aluminum oxides.
The color of plumes can offer clues about the composition of the particles within them.
Yellow and brown plumes tend to have a higher proportion of iron, while white plumes tend to have a higher proportion of silicon or aluminum.


Though Kavachi is challenging for scientists to access, a lull in activity allowed a team to explore it in 2015.
The researchers observed marine life within the crater, including orange and white bacterial mats, silky and hammerhead sharks, bluefin trevally, and snapper.

The authors of a report about the expedition noted that other active submarine volcanos—Vailulu’u Seamount in American Samoa and Kolumbo in Greece—are known to have highly acidic water and “kill zones” that contain carcasses of larger animals.
“It is likely that the high crater walls at these sites cause physical entrainment and concentration of vent fluids, while Kavachi’s crater is relatively shallow and subjected to high surface currents that allow rapid mixing to occur,” they wrote in the report.Kavachi formed in a tectonically active area just 30 kilometers (18 miles) northeast of a subduction zone.
The volcano produces lavas that range from basaltic, which is rich in magnesium and iron, to andesitic, which contains more silica.
It is known for having phreatomagmatic eruptions in which the interaction of magma and water eject steam, ash, volcanic rock fragments, and incandescent bombs out of the water and into the air.

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Friday, November 6, 2026

War at sea: the maritime crisis and the forgotten rights of seafarers – Analysis


From Eurasia Review by K.M. Seethi

Key Takeaways:
  • Escalating conflicts—from Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupting Black Sea grain shipments, to Houthi attacks forcing diversions around the Cape of Good Hope, to the post-28 February 2026 US-Israel-Iran confrontation—have turned major maritime routes including the Strait of Hormuz into conflict zones, trapping approximately 6,000 seafarers and causing deaths, vessel attacks, and prolonged strandings.
  • International maritime law (UNCLOS, Maritime Labour Convention, San Remo Manual) and naval operations such as Operation Prosperity Guardian provide limited protection, as enforcement is weak, crews face multinational accountability gaps, and militarisation of distress channels and waterways endangers civilian lives and the environment.
  • The crisis exposes a core contradiction in which global trade relies on roughly two million seafarers, many from developing countries, yet prioritises oil prices and strategic interests over their safety, evacuation rights, and human security, underscoring that freedom of navigation is incomplete without protecting those who sustain it.
The world’s oceans have become ever more dangerous for commercial shipping and the millions of seafarers who sustain international trade.
The war in Ukraine, the continuing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the military confrontation involving the United States, Israel and Iran have made some of the world’s busiest maritime routes into conflict zones.
Merchant vessels carrying oil, food, fertilisers and other essential commodities have come under missile and drone attacks.
Shipping companies have been forced to abandon traditional routes, while thousands of seafarers remain exposed to dangers over which they have little control.

The situation has deteriorated considerably since the United States and Israel launched attacks on Iran on 28 February 2026.
The subsequent confrontation has placed the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy corridors, at the centre of a growing maritime crisis.
The consequences sprawl beyond rising oil prices, disrupted supply chains and higher insurance costs.
They raise critical questions about the safety, dignity and rights of civilian seafarers caught in military conflicts.

From the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf

The maritime crisis acquired a new dimension following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
The Black Sea became a major theatre of military operations, threatening commercial vessels transporting grain, energy and other commodities.
The disruption of Ukrainian grain exports contributed to global food insecurity, particularly in countries dependent on imports from the region.

The Black Sea Grain Initiative, negotiated in July 2022 with the involvement of Türkiye and the United Nations, temporarily facilitated the movement of Ukrainian agricultural exports.
However, Russia’s withdrawal from the agreement in July 2023 renewed uncertainty over commercial navigation.
Missile attacks, naval mines and strikes on port infrastructure continued to threaten merchant vessels and their crews.

The war demonstrated how fast civilian shipping could become vulnerable when major powers resorted to military force.
Seafarers from countries having no direct involvement in the conflict found themselves exposed to attacks, prolonged confinement and uncertainty over evacuation.

The crisis subsequently spread to another vital maritime region.
Following the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023, Yemen’s Houthi movement began attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
The Houthis presented their operations as part of their campaign against Israel and its supporters.
However, attacks on merchant vessels placed civilian crews of different nationalities in danger.

The Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait form a crucial link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal.
Before the disruptions, the Suez route carried approximately 12–15 per cent of global maritime trade.
Houthi attacks involving anti-ship missiles, drones and other weapons forced major shipping companies to divert vessels around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope.
These diversions added thousands of nautical miles to voyages between Asia and Europe.
Depending on the route, shipping times increased by one to two weeks.
Additional fuel consumption, insurance premiums and operational expenses increased the cost of maritime transportation.

The effects were felt across the conflict zone and the countries dependent on imported food, energy and industrial materials faced additional costs.
The longer voyages also increased greenhouse gas emissions, undermining efforts to reduce the environmental impact of international shipping.
 
strait of Hormuz with the GeoGarage platform

The Strait of Hormuz: A Humanitarian Emergency


The confrontation involving Iran, Israel and the United States has created another serious crisis in the Strait of Hormuz.
The narrow waterway connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.
It is indispensable to the transportation of oil and liquefied natural gas from the Gulf.
According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), approximately 6,000 seafarers remained trapped aboard commercial vessels in the region in October 2026.
The organisation’s Secretary-General, Arsenio Dominguez, described the situation as critical and warned that safe navigation could no longer be guaranteed.
Reports published on 22–23 October indicated that the IMO had confirmed approximately 100 maritime incidents as of 9 October, while at least 24 seafarers had been killed since the conflict began on 28 February.
Another 24 commercial vessels were reportedly attacked within approximately two weeks.

These figures reveal the seriousness of the situation.
They also indicate the limitations of available information.
The actual human consequences may be greater because smaller commercial vessels, fishing boats and other maritime workers are not always adequately represented in international reporting.

The attacks on the Singapore-registered vessels GFS Pride and GFS Giselle on 13 and 14 October validated the dangers.
GFS Pride reportedly sank after being struck by a projectile, although its 21 crew members survived.
GFS Giselle suffered hull damage, and its 22 crew members were evacuated.
The immediate question concerns the fate of thousands of seafarers who remain stranded.
They are unable to leave their vessels safely, return home or determine when normal commercial operations will resume.
The IMO has advised shipping companies to avoid transiting the Strait until credible safety guarantees become available.
Yet this warning provides little immediate relief to those already trapped in the conflict zone.

Seafarers as Victims of Geopolitical Conflicts

International maritime trade depends on approximately two million seafarers.
A substantial proportion comes from developing countries, including India, the Philippines, Indonesia and other Asian nations.
Their labour sustains the movement of commodities that support industrial production and everyday consumption across the world.
However, seafarers remain among the most vulnerable workers during international conflicts.
They spend long periods away from their families, often under difficult working conditions.
When war breaks out, they face dangers that are unimaginable, going beyond the normal risks of maritime employment.

The current crisis has exposed them to missile attacks, drone strikes, naval mines, detention and prolonged confinement.
Many experience anxiety over their families, uncertainty about wages and difficulties accessing medical assistance.
Evacuation may become impossible when ports are closed or surrounding waters are militarised.

The multinational composition of commercial crews creates additional complications.
A vessel may be owned by a company in one country, registered in another, operated from a third and staffed by workers from several countries.
This complex arrangement makes accountability difficult when emergencies arise.
For Indian seafarers, the crisis has particular significance.
India is among the major suppliers of maritime labour to international shipping.
Indian nationals serving aboard foreign-flagged vessels may be exposed to conflicts in which India has no military involvement.
Their safety depends on shipping companies, flag states, coastal authorities and diplomatic intervention.
When these institutions fail to coordinate, the seafarer becomes the weakest party in an increasingly complicated international system.
The problem also concerns the right of workers to refuse dangerous assignments.
Maritime employment should never require civilian workers to accept the possibility of death merely because commercial contracts must be fulfilled.

Maritime Law and Its Limitations


International law contains several provisions intended to protect commercial navigation and civilian seafarers.
However, the present crisis has exposed serious weaknesses in their implementation.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes important principles governing navigation.
Article 87 recognises freedom of navigation on the high seas, while Article 38 provides for transit passage through straits used for international navigation.
These provisions are essential to the functioning of international maritime trade.
But they cannot, by themselves, prevent missile attacks, naval blockades or the seizure of commercial vessels.

International humanitarian law also requires parties to armed conflicts to distinguish between military objectives and civilian persons and objects.
Merchant vessels ordinarily enjoy civilian protection, although they may lose protection against attack under specific circumstances recognised by the law of armed conflict.
The 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea provides further guidance concerning naval warfare, blockades and the protection of merchant shipping.
However, it is not a binding international treaty, and its provisions depend substantially on compliance by states and other parties to conflicts.
The Maritime Labour Convention of 2006, adopted under the International Labour Organization, establishes standards concerning seafarers’ employment, health, safety, welfare and working conditions.

Nevertheless, the convention was not designed to resolve military confrontations between states.
Its effectiveness depends on implementation by flag states, port authorities and shipping companies.
In active war zones, these mechanisms are frequently inadequate.

The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation also addresses serious acts of violence against shipping.
Its application to particular incidents depends on the treaty’s jurisdictional provisions and exclusions, including those relating to armed conflict.
The major difficulty is therefore one of enforcement.
International maritime law recognises important rights and obligations, but there is no effective global mechanism capable of guaranteeing the physical safety of every merchant vessel during armed conflict.
The IMO can issue warnings, coordinate assistance and facilitate negotiations.
It cannot compel belligerent states or armed groups to cease attacks.
Similarly, international labour standards offer protections that become difficult to enforce when commercial shipping enters militarised waters.

Militarisation and the Failure of Maritime Security

The international response to maritime insecurity has relied heavily on naval deployments.
The United States and its allies established Operation Prosperity Guardian in December 2023 to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
European naval forces have also undertaken defensive operations, while the Indian Navy has maintained a substantial presence in the Arabian Sea and surrounding waters.
These deployments have helped protect some commercial vessels and respond to emergencies.
However, they have failed to eliminate the threat.

The continuing Houthi attacks demonstrate the limitations of military responses against armed groups operating from coastal territories.
Similarly, the confrontation in the Persian Gulf shows how commercial shipping can become vulnerable when naval operations themselves form part of a wider military conflict.
The reported dispute over the use of VHF Channel 16, the internationally recognised maritime distress and safety communication channel, illustrates another disturbing development.

Iran has accused American naval forces of using the channel to intimidate civilian crews.
The United States maintains that its communications were intended to enforce its naval blockade and provide warnings.
The Iranian allegations have not been independently substantiated.

Nevertheless, the controversy raises serious questions about the use of maritime safety systems during military operations.
Communication channels intended to protect lives at sea must remain reliable and accessible to all vessels.
The militarisation of international waterways also creates environmental dangers.
Attacks on oil tankers and vessels carrying hazardous materials can cause serious pollution.
The sinking of cargo ships threatens marine ecosystems, fisheries and coastal livelihoods.
Longer shipping routes further increase fuel consumption and emissions.
Thus, the consequences of maritime conflicts extend from commercial trade and labour rights to the environmental security of coastal communities.

The Forgotten Human Dimension

International discussions of maritime security frequently concentrate on oil prices, freight rates, insurance premiums and the strategic interests of major powers.
The human consequences receive much less attention.
The suffering of seafarers rarely attracts the international concern associated with other categories of civilian victims of war.
Their isolation at sea, the multinational character of their employment and the commercial interests surrounding shipping contribute to this neglect.

The present crisis calls for a different approach.
Protecting commercial navigation should begin with protecting the people who operate commercial vessels.
Governments, shipping companies and international organisations must ensure that seafarers receive timely information about security threats, effective evacuation assistance, medical support and access to their families.
Their right to refuse assignments in designated warlike or high-risk areas must be respected in accordance with applicable agreements.
Compensation and insurance arrangements should provide meaningful protection when workers suffer injury, detention or death.
There is also an urgent need for stronger international coordination to secure humanitarian evacuation corridors and prevent civilian crews from becoming instruments of military pressure.

Finally, the crisis reveals a major contradiction in the international maritime order.
Global commerce depends on the freedom of the seas, but the protection of those who sustain that commerce remains inadequate.
International law contains provisions intended to safeguard navigation and civilian lives, but political and military interests frequently override these obligations.

The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have exposed this contradiction with disturbing clarity.
The oceans cannot remain secure merely through the deployment of additional warships.
Their security depends equally on diplomacy, restraint, respect for international law and recognition of the rights of those who work at sea.

For the thousands of seafarers stranded in the Persian Gulf and other conflict zones, these are immediate questions of survival.
Their predicament should remind the international community that maritime security is ultimately about human security.
The freedom of navigation loses much of its meaning when those responsible for keeping the world’s trade moving are denied the basic freedom to return home safely.
 
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Thursday, November 5, 2026

Asking a vessel for its official position isn’t enough anymore: Windward acquires Azimut.ai

Windward has acquired maritime visual intelligence company Azimut.ai, adding camera-based vessel identification to its existing maritime intelligence platform.
The technology uses cameras positioned at ports and maritime chokepoints to identify and fingerprint vessels in real time, providing an additional means of tracking ships that have switched off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders or are otherwise attempting to evade detection.
 
From Substack by The Shipping Brief
 
How Windward’s acquisition of Azimut.ai signals a shift from vessel-reported data to independently verified maritime intelligence. 

For decades, the Automatic Identification System (AIS) has been one of the foundations of maritime intelligence.
It provides information about a vessel’s identity, position, course and speed, allowing shipping companies, authorities and analysts to monitor maritime traffic.

But AIS has a fundamental limitation: it relies on vessels transmitting information about themselves.

Ships can switch off their transponders, manipulate transmitted information or disappear from conventional tracking systems.
Some interruptions are deliberate; others result from technical failures, environmental conditions or interference.

In an increasingly complex maritime environment, knowing what a vessel reports is not necessarily the same as knowing what it is doing.

Windward’s acquisition of Azimut.ai, announced on 3 November 2026, addresses precisely this gap.
The maritime intelligence company is adding a visual sensing capability to its existing platform, introducing camera-based vessel identification alongside AIS, satellite imagery and radio-frequency intelligence.

The significance goes beyond adding another data source.
Windward is moving into the physical infrastructure that generates maritime intelligence, potentially giving it access to observations that do not depend on a vessel’s own transmissions.

It is a strategic move that raises a bigger question: is the future of maritime intelligence shifting from tracking vessels to independently verifying their identity and behaviour?


 
From vessel-reported data to independent observation

Azimut.ai brings optical sensing capabilities into Windward’s maritime intelligence platform.

The technology uses cameras positioned at strategic maritime locations, including ports, thoroughfares and chokepoints, to identify and fingerprint vessels in real time.

The distinction is important.

AIS provides information transmitted by the vessel.
Camera-based observation offers an independent way to establish that a vessel was physically present at a particular location and to support its identification.

Consider a vessel approaching a monitored port after a period during which its AIS signal was unavailable.
Its broadcast information may be incomplete or inconsistent.
A visual observation could provide another reference point against which its identity and movements can be assessed.

The two sources answer different questions.
AIS tells us what the vessel is transmitting.
Visual intelligence can provide evidence of what is physically observed.

When combined, they can help identify discrepancies that would be difficult to detect using a single source.

This is particularly relevant in areas where maritime traffic is concentrated, including major ports, straits and strategic passages.

It does not mean that cameras provide continuous visibility across the world’s oceans.
Their value depends on where sensors are deployed, the areas they cover and the conditions under which they operate.
But at critical points in the maritime network, independent visual confirmation can add an important layer of intelligence.


 
Windward is expanding beyond data integration

The acquisition is strategically interesting because it changes the nature of what Windward can offer.

The company has built its platform around combining multiple sources of maritime information, including AIS, satellite imagery, radio-frequency signals and other intelligence datasets.

Azimut.ai adds a different capability: physical sensors that can generate visual observations of vessels.

In its acquisition announcement, Windward describes this as a proprietary visual intelligence layer.
It plans to combine visual identifications with existing information on vessel ownership, sanctions, cargo, behaviour and risk.

The result is intended to turn an individual sighting into a broader, explainable assessment that government and commercial customers can act on.

This is where the commercial value lies.

A camera image on its own may establish that a vessel passed a particular location.
Its value increases when that observation can be connected to a vessel record, ownership structure, previous movements and other relevant intelligence.

The same principle applies to satellite and radio-frequency data.
Individual observations become more useful when they can be compared, cross-referenced and interpreted together.

For Windward, the acquisition potentially strengthens the relationship between data collection and intelligence analysis.

It also gives the company a more direct role in the physical sensing infrastructure behind its platform.

That is a meaningful distinction.
Many technology providers compete on their ability to process and interpret third-party data.
Owning or controlling additional sensing capabilities can create another source of differentiation, although it also introduces new operational responsibilities.
 
Screenshot of Winward's Maritime Visual Intelligence
 
Why this matters for maritime risk and sanctions

The ability to independently identify vessels has applications across several parts of the maritime ecosystem.
  • Sanctions compliance and investigations
Authorities, financial institutions and commodity traders need to assess whether vessels, owners and voyages are connected to restricted activity.
Independent observations can help investigate inconsistencies in vessel movements and identity.
  • Maritime security
Coast guards, naval forces and government agencies need to understand activity around strategic waterways and critical infrastructure.
Additional sensing capabilities can help build a more complete operational picture.
  • Ports and terminals
Port operators need reliable information about vessel arrivals and movements.
Visual identification can provide another means of verifying traffic at monitored locations.
  • Commercial risk management
Shipowners, insurers, banks and commodity companies all have exposure to maritime activity.
Better vessel verification can support more informed assessments of operational and counterparty risk.

The common requirement is not simply tracking a vessel.
It is establishing how much confidence can be placed in the information associated with it.

For organisations dealing with sanctions exposure, opaque ownership structures and suspicious maritime activity, that distinction can be commercially and operationally significant.

The technology is only as good as its coverage

There are, however, important limitations.

Camera-based vessel identification is not a replacement for satellite monitoring or AIS.
It is another layer of evidence, with its own strengths and constraints.

Coverage is geographically dependent.
Cameras need to be installed at locations where they can observe relevant maritime traffic.
A network covering several strategic ports or chokepoints does not provide continuous visibility across open oceans.

Performance also depends on environmental and operational conditions, including visibility, camera positioning, image quality, distance and vessel density.

There is another distinction worth making: detecting a vessel, identifying it correctly and interpreting its behaviour are three different tasks.

A camera may detect an object on the water.
A recognition system may match it to a particular vessel.
Further analysis is then required to establish whether its movements or associated information indicate suspicious activity.

These stages should not be confused.
Visual intelligence can strengthen an assessment, but it does not automatically prove intent or wrongdoing.

Windward has also emphasised privacy in its announcement.
The company says customers will not receive raw images or video footage.
The system is designed to support analytics relating to vessel activity, rather than the identification or verification of individuals.

That distinction will matter as the deployment of maritime camera networks expands.

The commercial model: from software to sensor infrastructure

One of the more interesting implications of this acquisition is that Windward is moving further into the infrastructure layer of maritime intelligence.

A software platform can scale through data partnerships, integrations and additional customers.
A physical sensor network has different requirements.

It needs suitable installation locations, access agreements, equipment, maintenance and reliable connectivity.
It also requires enough relevant traffic and observation quality to make each deployment commercially useful.

Windward has invited maritime stakeholders and other organisations to become site partners, indicating that partnerships will be part of its deployment strategy.

This creates an interesting business model question.

Will Windward build and operate a network of proprietary cameras at selected locations? Will it rely on partners to host and maintain installations? Or will it combine owned infrastructure with third-party deployments?

The answer will influence the cost of expansion, geographical coverage and the economics of the new capability.

Owning the sensing assets may provide greater control over data availability and consistency.
But it also means taking responsibility for the physical network.

The acquisition therefore brings an infrastructure dimension into a business that has largely been associated with data analytics and maritime AI.

A changing competitive landscape

Windward’s move also reflects a broader evolution in maritime intelligence.

The market is no longer limited to traditional vessel-tracking providers.
It increasingly includes satellite operators, radio-frequency detection companies, computer vision specialists, data platforms and AI-based analytics providers.

Each technology contributes a different type of evidence.
  • AIS provides vessel-reported identity and movement information.
  • Satellite imagery offers wide-area observation, although coverage and revisit frequency vary.
  • Radio-frequency intelligence can detect and analyse electronic emissions.
  • Visual intelligence provides camera-based vessel observations at locations where sensors are deployed.
These technologies are complementary rather than interchangeable.

The competitive advantage may increasingly belong to companies capable of bringing them together, resolving conflicting information and translating the results into operational decisions.

This is particularly important as AI becomes more deeply integrated into maritime intelligence workflows.
The quality of the underlying data will influence the quality of the analysis and the decisions that follow.

Windward’s acquisition suggests that the company sees proprietary data collection as an important part of its future positioning.

It is also a reminder that the maritime AI race will not be won by algorithms alone.
Access to differentiated data, physical infrastructure and strategically located sensors may become just as important.

What remains unanswered?

The acquisition announcement provides a clear indication of strategic direction, but several important details remain undisclosed.

First, Windward has not disclosed the financial terms of the transaction.
We therefore cannot assess the valuation of Azimut.ai or the scale of the investment required to develop the sensor network.

Second, the company has not provided detailed information about the existing network’s geographical coverage, number of installations or operational capacity.

Third, the integration roadmap remains unclear.
How quickly will visual identifications become available within Windward’s existing products? How will customers access the new intelligence, and how will it affect pricing?

Finally, the economics of deployment need to be demonstrated.
A proprietary camera network could create a valuable competitive advantage, but only if it can be expanded efficiently and deliver information that customers are willing to pay for.

These are the questions that will determine whether the acquisition becomes a meaningful commercial differentiator or remains a promising technological addition.


 
The next generation of maritime intelligence

Windward’s acquisition of Azimut.ai is more than an expansion into computer vision.

It signals a move towards a more comprehensive model of maritime intelligence, in which vessel-reported data is supplemented by independent observations from physical sensors.

The implications extend beyond Windward.
As maritime risks become more complex and the limitations of individual tracking systems become more apparent, the ability to combine multiple sources of evidence will become increasingly important.

For the industry, the question is no longer simply how many vessels a platform can track.

It is how reliably it can identify them, verify their movements, detect inconsistencies and explain what those observations mean.

Asking a vessel where it is has always been useful.
Being able to independently verify the answer could become much more valuable.

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Wednesday, November 4, 2026

Iran has ‘detailed plans’ to attack undersea cables, says report

(Credit: Sir Francis Canker Photography)

From PCMag by Will McCurdy

Analysts told Reuters that the attacks, if successful, could slow down internet services and disrupt financial transactions, e-commerce and cloud computing.

Iran reportedly has “detailed plans” to attack undersea cables in the Gulf, in the event of future attacks by Israel or the US.

Fiber-optic undersea cables carry the vast majority of the world’s internet bandwidth, and are increasingly under threat during modern conflicts.
Last year, attacks on undersea cables in Eastern Europe’s Baltic Sea, allegedly linked to Russia, disrupted connectivity in Sweden and Latvia, prompting calls from telecom firms for governments to step in.

One of the anonymous security officials who spoke to Reuters said Iran would also aim to prevent repairs after any attacks, to keep disruptions going as long as possible.

The reports come after official threats from Yadollah Javani, the deputy head of political affairs for Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), who said Iran may target seven major internet cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz if the country’s infrastructure was attacked.

Alan Mauldin, research director at telecommunications research firm TeleGeography, told Reuters he believes the attacks, if successful, could slow down internet services and disrupt financial transactions, e-commerce and cloud computing.
However, the full impact would depend on how operators rerouted traffic and the capacity available via alternative connections.

Meanwhile, Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, told Reuters that Iran “wants Gulf states and corporate executives to press President Donald Trump over the risks his policies pose to their investment plans.”

Other countries have been shoring up plans to protect their undersea infrastructure.
The UK government recently set out proposals to update its legislation to give it stronger tools to protect its critical undersea infrastructure.
These include tougher penalties on those who damage undersea cables, new requirements on the telecom industry to protect cables from sabotage, and powers for the government to intervene and direct telecom providers where national security is at risk.

The recent Iranian conflict has seen IT infrastructure become as much of a target as conventional military infrastructure.
Iranian strikes on data centers in Bahrain and the UAE in early 2026 are thought to have caused permanent data loss. Meanwhile, the country has also threatened Starlink facilities in the Middle East.
 
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