Goblin shark caught on camera for the first time ever

Scientists have captured the first-ever footage of a goblin shark swimming deep beneath the ocean's surface, providing an unprecedented look at one of Earth's most mysterious predators.

Goblin sharks are rarely seen alive, making this discovery a major breakthrough for marine researchers.

Their unusual appearance and extendable jaws have fascinated scientists for decades, and this footage reveals how these ancient sharks move through the darkness of the deep sea.

One of the ocean's most mysterious sharks caught on camera in world-first: 

One of the ocean's most elusive creatures, described by scientists as "the ugliest shark on the planet", has been filmed alive in its deep-sea habitat for the first time.
The footage captures goblin sharks swimming at depths previously unknown for the species, extending the species’ known range into the Central Pacific, and revealing just how little scientists still know about the deep sea.

The first underwater jet pack designed for hands-free propulsion

With Kikfin, you steer by tilting your head and control speed with a wireless glove remote.

The new geography of subsea cables

photograph: reuters

From The Economist

The AI boom and geopolitics are rewiring Asia’s oceans
New cables between data centres are avoiding China and chokepoints

“The seabed is a battlefield,” Australia’s defence minister told a room full of admirals and generals in Singapore at the end of May.
Richard Marles, citing several subsea cables that have been cut in the Baltic Sea and around Taiwan in recent years, joined 16 of his counterparts in announcing plans to protect the submarine tendrils of the digital world: the nearly 700 communications cables which mostly lie exposed on the floor of the world’s oceans.

Governments and armed forces in Asia have only recently awoken to the importance of subsea cables.
Some of their fears of subterfuge may be overblown; to date, no conclusive evidence has been shared to suggest that the cuts highlighted by Mr Marles are sabotage.
But they are right about the vulnerability of these arteries of commerce.
And the private firms which build and operate almost all of the world’s subsea cables are not waiting for governments to better secure them.
They are increasingly taking steps on their own to avoid Asia’s most contested waters.

Asia and Australia are now connected to Europe by fibre-optic cables which tend to hug the coastlines of the Asian continent before heading up the Red Sea.
But a combination of the ai boom and geopolitics is rerouting cable traffic across the Indian and Pacific oceans.
This new geography avoids chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca and contested waters like the South China Sea.
Much of it avoids South-East Asia entirely, running from the Middle East and India to Australia and then onward through the Pacific Islands to America.

 

The first cable to run the new route was laid in 2022 between Oman and Australia, with spurs to the Anglo-American military base at Diego Garcia and the Cocos Islands, a tiny Australian territory in the Indian Ocean.
Then, last year, Google announced that Christmas Island, another Australian territory in the Indian Ocean, would become a hub for a new cable network between Australia and the Middle East.
Fibre will run from Oman via the Maldives to Christmas Island, and then onward to Australia.
Meta’s $10bn Project Waterworth, a global cable network still in development, looks set to follow a similar course in the Indian Ocean.

The first shift remapping cable routes is a change in who pays for them.
Subsea cables are expensive.
To defray the cost, for most of the last few decades big national telecoms firms would form consortia to build them.
Back in 1999, one of the first big fibre-optic cables between Europe and Asia to come online, known as sea-me-we 3, cost $1.3bn and had 92 consortium partners.
Financing and planning a cable among so many firms tended to increase costs and delay laying it.
Once it was funded, the number of partners involved pulled the route close to the Asian continent where the bulk of the customers were located.

But the ai boom is scrambling the economics of the subsea cable business and changing its geography.
Over the past ten years, internet giants have begun to finance and build cables single-handedly.
That has simplified the fundraising and planning process, and cut the lead-time for new cable projects.
Google invested in its first cable in 2008.
It has since funded at least 34 more, 18 of which it owns without partners.
Increasingly, firms like Meta, Google and Microsoft are building cables not to connect population centres but to connect their data centres.

And build them they are.
By one estimate, the next four years will see an average of $4bn a year in new cable investment, the bulk of it by so-called hyperscalers seeking to win the ai race.
While satellite internet service from firms such as Starlink is getting cheaper, it is still orders of magnitude more expensive to beam each gigabyte of data into space than it is to push light down a cable, and is likely to be so for many years yet.
As a result, subsea cables still carry 99% of the world’s intercontinental internet traffic.

As the subsea cable market consolidates vertically, it is expanding geographically.
Unshackled from the need to remain close to population centres, ships are laying subsea cables across the open ocean more than ever before.
The new routes have been drawn up to avoid seabed governed either by China or by governments that might seek to extract payment for laying or repairing a cable across a chokepoint, such as the Indonesian straits.

Geopolitical risk has become particularly acute in the South China Sea, where China has yet to effect full control on the surface but exercises de facto sovereignty over the seabed.
Under international law, states are not supposed to interfere with repairs to cables outside their territorial sea.
But repairs to any cables within China’s “nine-dash” line, which stretches over a thousand kilometres from China’s coasts (and which it claims as the extent of its waters) require approval from officials in Beijing.

Cables transiting through chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca run similar risks, says Samuel Bashfield, who studies subsea cables at La Trobe University in Australia.
Constantly shifting rules set by littoral countries like Malaysia and Indonesia are designed to extract value from cable operations through measures like requiring the use of local ships.
These can be expensive annoyances.
But recent musings by Indonesia’s cash-strapped president and finance minister about how the country could make money from its position astride some of the world’s great sea-lanes suggest that more aggressive measures could be coming.

To avoid these risky shoals, more and more internet traffic is simply going around them.
Google and Meta’s new networks run instead from the Middle East through Australia and onwards to Japan and South Korea or America.
In the Pacific, cables increasingly use Guam as a hub to connect American allies in Asia.
These new routes are part of an increasingly bifurcated internet infrastructure beneath the waves: no new cables between America and China have been approved since Barack Obama was in office.

More than a boundary: why Japan-Philippines maritime talks matter for China

A television screen shows a news report on patrol and law‑enforcement operations around Taiwan conducted by the China Coast Guard, at a restaurant in Beijing in late December. | REUTERS

From JapanTimes by Gabriel Dominguez

At first glance, Japan and the Philippines’ decision to begin negotiations on a maritime boundary appears to be a routine exercise in international law.

But China’s unusually forceful response signals that the talks are about far more than drawing a line at sea.

Beijing argues the talks infringe on maritime rights it claims through Taiwan and sees discussions as part of a broader effort by two key U.S. allies to deepen strategic coordination in waters central to China’s security interests.

When Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. used a late-May summit in Tokyo to launch the bilateral delimitation talks, China reacted swiftly.

China not only declared the negotiations “illegal, null and void” and lodged diplomatic protests, but also backed its rhetoric with action, deploying coast guard vessels for what it described as “law-enforcement patrols” east of Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its own territory.

By extending its operations south of Yonaguni Island into waters Tokyo considers part of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), Beijing underscored its determination to contest the talks both diplomatically and at sea.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), such negotiations are routine whenever states have overlapping EEZs and continental shelves.

 

EEZ with the GeoGarage platform

More than routine talks

So why has Beijing reacted so strongly?

The answer lies in the unique geography of the waters east of Taiwan, where international law, the self-ruled island’s contested status and intensifying strategic competition converge.

What would otherwise be a routine delimitation has become a contest over how one of the Indo-Pacific’s most sensitive maritime corridors should be governed.

A China Coast Guard vessel sails near a Japan Coast Guard vessel around the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands last September. | HITOSHI NAKAMA / VIA REUTERS

Japan and the Philippines do not share a land border, but their EEZs and continental shelves overlap because Japan’s southwestern islands and the Philippines’ northernmost islands lie less than 400 nautical miles (740 kilometers) apart.

Taiwan, meanwhile, sits almost directly between Japan and the Philippines.

Any eventual boundary would almost certainly pass through waters where maritime entitlements generated by the island overlap with those claimed by Tokyo and Manila.

Because Beijing considers those entitlements as belonging to China, the negotiations inevitably intersect with the Taiwan issue, transforming an otherwise routine legal exercise into one with significant strategic and political implications.

Why Beijing is so alarmed

China argues that Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory and that the maritime rights generated by the democratic island therefore fall under Beijing’s jurisdiction.

From that perspective, any boundary negotiated in these waters cannot legitimately proceed without China’s participation.

Japan and the Philippines reject that premise. While both acknowledge Beijing’s “One China” position, neither recognizes Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.

By negotiating under UNCLOS, they are treating the issue as a bilateral maritime delimitation rather than one requiring China’s participation.

That framework does not require every potentially interested party to participate in the same negotiation, and such agreements routinely state that they are without prejudice to third-party rights.

If concluded, a boundary deal would reinforce a framework for managing overlapping maritime claims while leaving third-party rights formally unresolved.

The talks are designed to “cement Japan-Philippine maritime cooperation” by clarifying the boundary and facilitating closer political, military and economic ties, said James Kraska, an expert on international maritime law at the U.S. Naval War College.

Why now?

Japan and the Philippines have claimed overlapping maritime zones for decades, yet neither prioritized boundary talks until recently.

What has changed is the regional security environment.

A China Coast Guard ship is seen on the horizon through a telescopic view from Philippine-occupied Thitu Island in the disputed South China Sea in February. | REUTERS

China’s sustained maritime pressure — including expansive South China Sea claims, growing coast guard operations around disputed features and repeated incursions into waters surrounding the Japanese-controlled but Chinese-claimed Senkaku Islands — has led Tokyo and Manila to deepen defense ties at an accelerated pace.

Once centered on development assistance, the Japan-Philippine relationship has evolved into a comprehensive security partnership encompassing a visiting-forces agreement, defense equipment exports, closer military and coast guard cooperation and negotiations toward an expanded intelligence-sharing pact.

In that context, maritime delimitation has become another pillar of the rapidly expanding security partnership rather than merely a legal exercise. Clarifying the maritime boundary between the quasi-allies, Kraska said, removes lingering uncertainty and facilitates closer cooperation across political, military and economic domains.

‘First island chain’ legal geography

A maritime boundary agreement would establish a clearer legal framework in the strategically important waters linking the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

Far from simply drawing a line at sea, such a deal would contribute to the gradual alignment of the region’s legal geography with its evolving security architecture along the “first island chain” — the string of islands stretching from Japan toward Borneo.

By clarifying jurisdiction over fisheries, law enforcement and coast guard operations, a final agreement could complement allied coordination and maritime domain awareness in one of the Indo-Pacific’s most sensitive maritime corridors.

The strategic importance of these waters has grown as the Chinese Navy pushes farther into the western Pacific. Unlike the shallow and congested Taiwan Strait, the deeper waters of the Philippine Sea provide the Chinese Navy with a key route into the wider Pacific.

Defense analysts have long regarded this maritime space as critical to Beijing’s naval operations beyond the first island chain, which is also why strengthening coordination across the same corridor has become an increasingly important objective for Tokyo, Washington and Manila.

From diplomacy to ‘gray-zone’ competition

China’s response suggests it intends to contest not only the eventual outcome of the negotiations but also the premise that Japan and the Philippines can negotiate over those waters without Beijing.

The recent coast guard deployment suggests Beijing is increasingly willing to extend its “gray-zone” activities east of Taiwan, reinforcing its claims through regular deployments while contesting actions it believes undermine them.

A Taiwan Coast Guard ship patrols near Dadan Island, with China's Xiamen city visible in the background, last October. | REUTERS

Kraska suggests that China’s opposition ultimately reflects a broader objective: resisting developments that bring Japan and the Philippines closer together strategically. Viewed in that light, Beijing’s reaction is directed not only at the legal implications of a maritime boundary but also at what a deal would represent for the evolving regional balance.

Taiwan’s delicate balancing act

The negotiations also present a dilemma for Taiwan.

Taipei has generally welcomed closer security cooperation among Japan, the Philippines and other like-minded partners in response to growing Chinese military pressure.

At the same time, the island maintains its own longstanding maritime claims in the waters east of Taiwan. Openly endorsing a Japan-Philippines boundary could be interpreted as weakening those claims, while objecting to the negotiations would risk undermining cooperation with two of its most important partners.

Instead, Taiwan has adopted a dual-track approach. While rejecting Beijing’s claims and supporting closer cooperation with regional partners, its Foreign Ministry has also sought assurances through its representative offices in Tokyo and Manila that any eventual agreement would not prejudice Taiwan’s maritime rights or existing fisheries arrangements.

A parallel transformation

Much attention has focused on the military dimension of allied cooperation along the first island chain — from missile deployments and expanded access agreements to integrated operational planning and sophisticated joint exercises.

Less noticed is the parallel construction of a legal and institutional architecture driven by coast guard cooperation, reciprocal access agreements, intelligence sharing and maritime boundary negotiations.

While these initiatives do not resolve competing maritime claims or the complex legal questions surrounding Taiwan, they demonstrate how institutional cooperation has become a critical feature of the region’s security landscape.

The unfolding negotiations reveal that competition along the first island chain is no longer just about missile deployments and military exercises; it is increasingly a contest over the legal and institutional order governing these strategically important waters.

For years, Beijing has relied on sustained coast guard deployments and other gray-zone activities to reinforce its maritime claims. Japan and the Philippines, by contrast, are seeking to clarify jurisdiction and deepen bilateral cooperation through maritime delimitation and other institutional mechanisms.

As the negotiations progress, the waters east of Taiwan are becoming a testing ground for two competing approaches to managing the regional maritime order: one grounded primarily in sustained operational presence, the other in legal and institutional coordination.

 

Links :

• Bloomberg : Japan protest's China's Maritime claims after bomber flights
• SCMP : Chinese vessels shadow US-Philippine naval drills in South China Sea near disputed shoal
• Reuters : China patrols waters east of Taiwan in response to Japan, Philippine maritime border talks 

Map shows US cities that could go underwater if sea levels rise 3 meters

In a total meltdown scenario, global sea levels would rise by a maximum of around 66 meters/217 feet. Anything shown beyond this level in this video is a theoretical simulation to explore the extreme limits of our geography.

From Newsweek by Jasmine Laws

Scientists are warning that the collapse of Antarctica’s massive “doomsday glacier” could eventually redraw large parts of America’s coastline, threatening major cities from Florida to California with severe flooding and rising seas.

Researchers say the Thwaites Glacier in West Antarctica is becoming increasingly unstable, raising fears that its eventual collapse could contribute to dramatic long-term sea level rise.

While the glacier itself could add around 65 centimeters (roughly 2 feet) to global sea levels, some scientists worry it could destabilize much larger sections of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet—potentially contributing to sea level rise approaching 3 meters (nearly 10 feet) over time.

Such a rise would dramatically alter large stretches of the U.S. coastline, threatening homes, infrastructure, airports and major cities across several states.

Glacier On The ‘Cusp of Collapse’

The Thwaites Glacier in Antarctica is seen in this undated NASA image. Right now, Antarctica and Greenland ice sheets both contribute under or near 1 millimeter to sea-level rise every year; they each contain enough stored ice to drive up ocean levels by 20 and 200 feet, respectively.

David Holland, a professor of mathematics and atmosphere/ocean science at New York University, told Newsweek that the glacier is on the “cusp of collapse,” and that he was “concerned” about it.

“It is held back on its sides by the buttressing provided by the ice shelf in front of it, which is now about to collapse,” he explained.

The glacier is also held back by “a hump in the seafloor at its current grounding line,” he added, which he said “may be next to go, given the high rate of melt occurring there.”

The result of the glacier’s collapse would be vast. Holland said that “certainly, low-lying cities and states in the U.S. would experience floods,” while many other cities and countries would “undergo stress” as well.

Safe embed will be rendered here
Thwaites Glacier—Major Changes Between 2001 and 2019
Service URL: https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/29052478/embed

 
Which American Cities Could Be Flooded?

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) projection maps show that a 3-meter rise in sea levels would inundate major parts of the U.S. coastline, with some of the country’s most populated urban areas facing chronic flooding or partial submersion.
Eastern Seaboard and Gulf Coast

Florida would be among the hardest-hit states. Large parts of the coastline could disappear beneath rising seas, while cities including Jacksonville, Fort Lauderdale, Tampa, St. Petersburg and Panama City would face severe flooding risks.

Large stretches of low-lying coastal communities across the state could also become uninhabitable.

Large sections of the Gulf Coast would also be exposed.

Cities and communities along the Texas coastline near Galveston Bay, Freeport and Surfside Beach could see extensive inundation, while low-lying parts of Louisiana, including areas around New Orleans, would remain especially vulnerable.

Other coastal cities at risk include Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; Norfolk and Virginia Beach, Virginia; Wilmington, North Carolina; Baltimore, Maryland; and parts of New Jersey, Delaware and Mississippi.

New York City would face widespread flooding risks across parts of Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island and Lower Manhattan.

Critical infrastructure, including Newark Liberty International Airport and nearby transport links, could also be affected. MetLife Stadium in New Jersey—one of the venues for the 2026 FIFA World Cup—lies within an area vulnerable to flooding under NOAA’s projections.
West Coast

A screenshot of an NOAA map showing which U.S. cities would be underwater if there was a 10-foot sea level rise.

In California, areas around the San Francisco Bay, Oakland, San Mateo and parts of Southern California near San Diego and Oxnard would also face major impacts.

Notable parts of the landscape and wildlife reserves could also be affected, including Big Lagoon, the Brush Creek/Lagoon Lake Wetlands and Coastal Dunes Natural Preserve, the Ventura County Game Reserve as well as vast amounts of the California Coastal National Monument.

Why Scientists Are Worried by the Thwaites Glacier

Thwaites is the widest glacier on the planet, stretching around 120 kilometers (75 miles), and its basin measures around 192,000 kilometers squared, meaning it is larger than the state of Florida.

Over the years, Thwaites—located in West Antarctica—has been losing ice at an increasing pace, and since 2000 the glacier has experienced a net loss of more than 1 trillion tons of ice.

The tongue of the glacier—which is the extension that floats out over water—has continued to fracture and separate from the ice shelf in recent years, as images from NASA show.

The floating ice is now melting, given that the seawater is a few degrees above freezing as warmer water temperatures have recently been recorded in the region.

 

Links :

• CNN : Rising seas will swallow New Orleans. Relocation planning must start now, scientists say