Saturday, November 7, 2026

First time filmed in a decade : underwater volcano eruption

We went on an expedition to capture Kavachi, one of the world’s most active underwater volcanoes, erupting beneath the Pacific Ocean in the remote Solomon Islands.
Steam explosions, sulfur-rich plumes, and superheated seawater collide in one of the most extreme environments on Earth.

March 8, 2024
 
 
Kavachi is one of the most active submarine volcanoes in the Pacific.
This conical seamount, located in the Solomon Islands and named after a sea god of the Gatokae and Vangunu people, rises some 1,200 meters (3,900 feet) from the seafloor.
But its summit remains just 20 meters (65 feet) below sea level, which makes it easier for satellites to detect discolorations of the water due to volcanic activity than at deeper undersea volcanoes.
 
Localization with the GeoGarage platform

Kavachi has erupted at least 39 times since 1939, with the latest eruptive period beginning in 2021, according to the Smithsonian Institution’s Global Volcanism Program.
In 2024, the volcano continued to stir—and satellites continued to capture images of discolored plumes of water.

The image above, acquired on March 8 by the OLI (Operational Land Imager) on Landsat 8, shows a plume of discolored water near the undersea volcano.
The plume drifted north-northeast toward Nggatokae Island.
Vangunu Island, also pictured, lies about 24 kilometers (15 miles) north of Kavachi, and Papua New Guinea is about 800 kilometers (500 miles) to the west.

The MODIS (Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer) on NASA’s Terra and Aqua captured images of similar underwater plumes near Kavachi on several other occasions in recent weeks, including February 3, 15, and 23.

Previous research has shown such plumes of superheated, acidic water can contain particulate matter, volcanic rock fragments, and sulfur, as well as precipitates of silicon, iron, and aluminum oxides.
The color of plumes can offer clues about the composition of the particles within them.
Yellow and brown plumes tend to have a higher proportion of iron, while white plumes tend to have a higher proportion of silicon or aluminum.


Though Kavachi is challenging for scientists to access, a lull in activity allowed a team to explore it in 2015.
The researchers observed marine life within the crater, including orange and white bacterial mats, silky and hammerhead sharks, bluefin trevally, and snapper.

The authors of a report about the expedition noted that other active submarine volcanos—Vailulu’u Seamount in American Samoa and Kolumbo in Greece—are known to have highly acidic water and “kill zones” that contain carcasses of larger animals.
“It is likely that the high crater walls at these sites cause physical entrainment and concentration of vent fluids, while Kavachi’s crater is relatively shallow and subjected to high surface currents that allow rapid mixing to occur,” they wrote in the report.Kavachi formed in a tectonically active area just 30 kilometers (18 miles) northeast of a subduction zone.
The volcano produces lavas that range from basaltic, which is rich in magnesium and iron, to andesitic, which contains more silica.
It is known for having phreatomagmatic eruptions in which the interaction of magma and water eject steam, ash, volcanic rock fragments, and incandescent bombs out of the water and into the air.

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Friday, November 6, 2026

War at sea: the maritime crisis and the forgotten rights of seafarers – Analysis


From Eurasia Review by K.M. Seethi

Key Takeaways:
  • Escalating conflicts—from Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupting Black Sea grain shipments, to Houthi attacks forcing diversions around the Cape of Good Hope, to the post-28 February 2026 US-Israel-Iran confrontation—have turned major maritime routes including the Strait of Hormuz into conflict zones, trapping approximately 6,000 seafarers and causing deaths, vessel attacks, and prolonged strandings.
  • International maritime law (UNCLOS, Maritime Labour Convention, San Remo Manual) and naval operations such as Operation Prosperity Guardian provide limited protection, as enforcement is weak, crews face multinational accountability gaps, and militarisation of distress channels and waterways endangers civilian lives and the environment.
  • The crisis exposes a core contradiction in which global trade relies on roughly two million seafarers, many from developing countries, yet prioritises oil prices and strategic interests over their safety, evacuation rights, and human security, underscoring that freedom of navigation is incomplete without protecting those who sustain it.
The world’s oceans have become ever more dangerous for commercial shipping and the millions of seafarers who sustain international trade.
The war in Ukraine, the continuing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the military confrontation involving the United States, Israel and Iran have made some of the world’s busiest maritime routes into conflict zones.
Merchant vessels carrying oil, food, fertilisers and other essential commodities have come under missile and drone attacks.
Shipping companies have been forced to abandon traditional routes, while thousands of seafarers remain exposed to dangers over which they have little control.

The situation has deteriorated considerably since the United States and Israel launched attacks on Iran on 28 February 2026.
The subsequent confrontation has placed the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy corridors, at the centre of a growing maritime crisis.
The consequences sprawl beyond rising oil prices, disrupted supply chains and higher insurance costs.
They raise critical questions about the safety, dignity and rights of civilian seafarers caught in military conflicts.

From the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf

The maritime crisis acquired a new dimension following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
The Black Sea became a major theatre of military operations, threatening commercial vessels transporting grain, energy and other commodities.
The disruption of Ukrainian grain exports contributed to global food insecurity, particularly in countries dependent on imports from the region.

The Black Sea Grain Initiative, negotiated in July 2022 with the involvement of Türkiye and the United Nations, temporarily facilitated the movement of Ukrainian agricultural exports.
However, Russia’s withdrawal from the agreement in July 2023 renewed uncertainty over commercial navigation.
Missile attacks, naval mines and strikes on port infrastructure continued to threaten merchant vessels and their crews.

The war demonstrated how fast civilian shipping could become vulnerable when major powers resorted to military force.
Seafarers from countries having no direct involvement in the conflict found themselves exposed to attacks, prolonged confinement and uncertainty over evacuation.

The crisis subsequently spread to another vital maritime region.
Following the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023, Yemen’s Houthi movement began attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
The Houthis presented their operations as part of their campaign against Israel and its supporters.
However, attacks on merchant vessels placed civilian crews of different nationalities in danger.

The Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait form a crucial link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal.
Before the disruptions, the Suez route carried approximately 12–15 per cent of global maritime trade.
Houthi attacks involving anti-ship missiles, drones and other weapons forced major shipping companies to divert vessels around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope.
These diversions added thousands of nautical miles to voyages between Asia and Europe.
Depending on the route, shipping times increased by one to two weeks.
Additional fuel consumption, insurance premiums and operational expenses increased the cost of maritime transportation.

The effects were felt across the conflict zone and the countries dependent on imported food, energy and industrial materials faced additional costs.
The longer voyages also increased greenhouse gas emissions, undermining efforts to reduce the environmental impact of international shipping.
 
strait of Hormuz with the GeoGarage platform

The Strait of Hormuz: A Humanitarian Emergency


The confrontation involving Iran, Israel and the United States has created another serious crisis in the Strait of Hormuz.
The narrow waterway connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.
It is indispensable to the transportation of oil and liquefied natural gas from the Gulf.
According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), approximately 6,000 seafarers remained trapped aboard commercial vessels in the region in October 2026.
The organisation’s Secretary-General, Arsenio Dominguez, described the situation as critical and warned that safe navigation could no longer be guaranteed.
Reports published on 22–23 October indicated that the IMO had confirmed approximately 100 maritime incidents as of 9 October, while at least 24 seafarers had been killed since the conflict began on 28 February.
Another 24 commercial vessels were reportedly attacked within approximately two weeks.

These figures reveal the seriousness of the situation.
They also indicate the limitations of available information.
The actual human consequences may be greater because smaller commercial vessels, fishing boats and other maritime workers are not always adequately represented in international reporting.

The attacks on the Singapore-registered vessels GFS Pride and GFS Giselle on 13 and 14 October validated the dangers.
GFS Pride reportedly sank after being struck by a projectile, although its 21 crew members survived.
GFS Giselle suffered hull damage, and its 22 crew members were evacuated.
The immediate question concerns the fate of thousands of seafarers who remain stranded.
They are unable to leave their vessels safely, return home or determine when normal commercial operations will resume.
The IMO has advised shipping companies to avoid transiting the Strait until credible safety guarantees become available.
Yet this warning provides little immediate relief to those already trapped in the conflict zone.

Seafarers as Victims of Geopolitical Conflicts

International maritime trade depends on approximately two million seafarers.
A substantial proportion comes from developing countries, including India, the Philippines, Indonesia and other Asian nations.
Their labour sustains the movement of commodities that support industrial production and everyday consumption across the world.
However, seafarers remain among the most vulnerable workers during international conflicts.
They spend long periods away from their families, often under difficult working conditions.
When war breaks out, they face dangers that are unimaginable, going beyond the normal risks of maritime employment.

The current crisis has exposed them to missile attacks, drone strikes, naval mines, detention and prolonged confinement.
Many experience anxiety over their families, uncertainty about wages and difficulties accessing medical assistance.
Evacuation may become impossible when ports are closed or surrounding waters are militarised.

The multinational composition of commercial crews creates additional complications.
A vessel may be owned by a company in one country, registered in another, operated from a third and staffed by workers from several countries.
This complex arrangement makes accountability difficult when emergencies arise.
For Indian seafarers, the crisis has particular significance.
India is among the major suppliers of maritime labour to international shipping.
Indian nationals serving aboard foreign-flagged vessels may be exposed to conflicts in which India has no military involvement.
Their safety depends on shipping companies, flag states, coastal authorities and diplomatic intervention.
When these institutions fail to coordinate, the seafarer becomes the weakest party in an increasingly complicated international system.
The problem also concerns the right of workers to refuse dangerous assignments.
Maritime employment should never require civilian workers to accept the possibility of death merely because commercial contracts must be fulfilled.

Maritime Law and Its Limitations


International law contains several provisions intended to protect commercial navigation and civilian seafarers.
However, the present crisis has exposed serious weaknesses in their implementation.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes important principles governing navigation.
Article 87 recognises freedom of navigation on the high seas, while Article 38 provides for transit passage through straits used for international navigation.
These provisions are essential to the functioning of international maritime trade.
But they cannot, by themselves, prevent missile attacks, naval blockades or the seizure of commercial vessels.

International humanitarian law also requires parties to armed conflicts to distinguish between military objectives and civilian persons and objects.
Merchant vessels ordinarily enjoy civilian protection, although they may lose protection against attack under specific circumstances recognised by the law of armed conflict.
The 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea provides further guidance concerning naval warfare, blockades and the protection of merchant shipping.
However, it is not a binding international treaty, and its provisions depend substantially on compliance by states and other parties to conflicts.
The Maritime Labour Convention of 2006, adopted under the International Labour Organization, establishes standards concerning seafarers’ employment, health, safety, welfare and working conditions.

Nevertheless, the convention was not designed to resolve military confrontations between states.
Its effectiveness depends on implementation by flag states, port authorities and shipping companies.
In active war zones, these mechanisms are frequently inadequate.

The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation also addresses serious acts of violence against shipping.
Its application to particular incidents depends on the treaty’s jurisdictional provisions and exclusions, including those relating to armed conflict.
The major difficulty is therefore one of enforcement.
International maritime law recognises important rights and obligations, but there is no effective global mechanism capable of guaranteeing the physical safety of every merchant vessel during armed conflict.
The IMO can issue warnings, coordinate assistance and facilitate negotiations.
It cannot compel belligerent states or armed groups to cease attacks.
Similarly, international labour standards offer protections that become difficult to enforce when commercial shipping enters militarised waters.

Militarisation and the Failure of Maritime Security

The international response to maritime insecurity has relied heavily on naval deployments.
The United States and its allies established Operation Prosperity Guardian in December 2023 to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
European naval forces have also undertaken defensive operations, while the Indian Navy has maintained a substantial presence in the Arabian Sea and surrounding waters.
These deployments have helped protect some commercial vessels and respond to emergencies.
However, they have failed to eliminate the threat.

The continuing Houthi attacks demonstrate the limitations of military responses against armed groups operating from coastal territories.
Similarly, the confrontation in the Persian Gulf shows how commercial shipping can become vulnerable when naval operations themselves form part of a wider military conflict.
The reported dispute over the use of VHF Channel 16, the internationally recognised maritime distress and safety communication channel, illustrates another disturbing development.

Iran has accused American naval forces of using the channel to intimidate civilian crews.
The United States maintains that its communications were intended to enforce its naval blockade and provide warnings.
The Iranian allegations have not been independently substantiated.

Nevertheless, the controversy raises serious questions about the use of maritime safety systems during military operations.
Communication channels intended to protect lives at sea must remain reliable and accessible to all vessels.
The militarisation of international waterways also creates environmental dangers.
Attacks on oil tankers and vessels carrying hazardous materials can cause serious pollution.
The sinking of cargo ships threatens marine ecosystems, fisheries and coastal livelihoods.
Longer shipping routes further increase fuel consumption and emissions.
Thus, the consequences of maritime conflicts extend from commercial trade and labour rights to the environmental security of coastal communities.

The Forgotten Human Dimension

International discussions of maritime security frequently concentrate on oil prices, freight rates, insurance premiums and the strategic interests of major powers.
The human consequences receive much less attention.
The suffering of seafarers rarely attracts the international concern associated with other categories of civilian victims of war.
Their isolation at sea, the multinational character of their employment and the commercial interests surrounding shipping contribute to this neglect.

The present crisis calls for a different approach.
Protecting commercial navigation should begin with protecting the people who operate commercial vessels.
Governments, shipping companies and international organisations must ensure that seafarers receive timely information about security threats, effective evacuation assistance, medical support and access to their families.
Their right to refuse assignments in designated warlike or high-risk areas must be respected in accordance with applicable agreements.
Compensation and insurance arrangements should provide meaningful protection when workers suffer injury, detention or death.
There is also an urgent need for stronger international coordination to secure humanitarian evacuation corridors and prevent civilian crews from becoming instruments of military pressure.

Finally, the crisis reveals a major contradiction in the international maritime order.
Global commerce depends on the freedom of the seas, but the protection of those who sustain that commerce remains inadequate.
International law contains provisions intended to safeguard navigation and civilian lives, but political and military interests frequently override these obligations.

The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have exposed this contradiction with disturbing clarity.
The oceans cannot remain secure merely through the deployment of additional warships.
Their security depends equally on diplomacy, restraint, respect for international law and recognition of the rights of those who work at sea.

For the thousands of seafarers stranded in the Persian Gulf and other conflict zones, these are immediate questions of survival.
Their predicament should remind the international community that maritime security is ultimately about human security.
The freedom of navigation loses much of its meaning when those responsible for keeping the world’s trade moving are denied the basic freedom to return home safely.
 
Links :

Thursday, November 5, 2026

Asking a vessel for its official position isn’t enough anymore: Windward acquires Azimut.ai

Windward has acquired maritime visual intelligence company Azimut.ai, adding camera-based vessel identification to its existing maritime intelligence platform.
The technology uses cameras positioned at ports and maritime chokepoints to identify and fingerprint vessels in real time, providing an additional means of tracking ships that have switched off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders or are otherwise attempting to evade detection.
 
From Substack by The Shipping Brief
 
How Windward’s acquisition of Azimut.ai signals a shift from vessel-reported data to independently verified maritime intelligence. 

For decades, the Automatic Identification System (AIS) has been one of the foundations of maritime intelligence.
It provides information about a vessel’s identity, position, course and speed, allowing shipping companies, authorities and analysts to monitor maritime traffic.

But AIS has a fundamental limitation: it relies on vessels transmitting information about themselves.

Ships can switch off their transponders, manipulate transmitted information or disappear from conventional tracking systems.
Some interruptions are deliberate; others result from technical failures, environmental conditions or interference.

In an increasingly complex maritime environment, knowing what a vessel reports is not necessarily the same as knowing what it is doing.

Windward’s acquisition of Azimut.ai, announced on 3 November 2026, addresses precisely this gap.
The maritime intelligence company is adding a visual sensing capability to its existing platform, introducing camera-based vessel identification alongside AIS, satellite imagery and radio-frequency intelligence.

The significance goes beyond adding another data source.
Windward is moving into the physical infrastructure that generates maritime intelligence, potentially giving it access to observations that do not depend on a vessel’s own transmissions.

It is a strategic move that raises a bigger question: is the future of maritime intelligence shifting from tracking vessels to independently verifying their identity and behaviour?


 
From vessel-reported data to independent observation

Azimut.ai brings optical sensing capabilities into Windward’s maritime intelligence platform.

The technology uses cameras positioned at strategic maritime locations, including ports, thoroughfares and chokepoints, to identify and fingerprint vessels in real time.

The distinction is important.

AIS provides information transmitted by the vessel.
Camera-based observation offers an independent way to establish that a vessel was physically present at a particular location and to support its identification.

Consider a vessel approaching a monitored port after a period during which its AIS signal was unavailable.
Its broadcast information may be incomplete or inconsistent.
A visual observation could provide another reference point against which its identity and movements can be assessed.

The two sources answer different questions.
AIS tells us what the vessel is transmitting.
Visual intelligence can provide evidence of what is physically observed.

When combined, they can help identify discrepancies that would be difficult to detect using a single source.

This is particularly relevant in areas where maritime traffic is concentrated, including major ports, straits and strategic passages.

It does not mean that cameras provide continuous visibility across the world’s oceans.
Their value depends on where sensors are deployed, the areas they cover and the conditions under which they operate.
But at critical points in the maritime network, independent visual confirmation can add an important layer of intelligence.


 
Windward is expanding beyond data integration

The acquisition is strategically interesting because it changes the nature of what Windward can offer.

The company has built its platform around combining multiple sources of maritime information, including AIS, satellite imagery, radio-frequency signals and other intelligence datasets.

Azimut.ai adds a different capability: physical sensors that can generate visual observations of vessels.

In its acquisition announcement, Windward describes this as a proprietary visual intelligence layer.
It plans to combine visual identifications with existing information on vessel ownership, sanctions, cargo, behaviour and risk.

The result is intended to turn an individual sighting into a broader, explainable assessment that government and commercial customers can act on.

This is where the commercial value lies.

A camera image on its own may establish that a vessel passed a particular location.
Its value increases when that observation can be connected to a vessel record, ownership structure, previous movements and other relevant intelligence.

The same principle applies to satellite and radio-frequency data.
Individual observations become more useful when they can be compared, cross-referenced and interpreted together.

For Windward, the acquisition potentially strengthens the relationship between data collection and intelligence analysis.

It also gives the company a more direct role in the physical sensing infrastructure behind its platform.

That is a meaningful distinction.
Many technology providers compete on their ability to process and interpret third-party data.
Owning or controlling additional sensing capabilities can create another source of differentiation, although it also introduces new operational responsibilities.
 
Screenshot of Winward's Maritime Visual Intelligence
 
Why this matters for maritime risk and sanctions

The ability to independently identify vessels has applications across several parts of the maritime ecosystem.
  • Sanctions compliance and investigations
Authorities, financial institutions and commodity traders need to assess whether vessels, owners and voyages are connected to restricted activity.
Independent observations can help investigate inconsistencies in vessel movements and identity.
  • Maritime security
Coast guards, naval forces and government agencies need to understand activity around strategic waterways and critical infrastructure.
Additional sensing capabilities can help build a more complete operational picture.
  • Ports and terminals
Port operators need reliable information about vessel arrivals and movements.
Visual identification can provide another means of verifying traffic at monitored locations.
  • Commercial risk management
Shipowners, insurers, banks and commodity companies all have exposure to maritime activity.
Better vessel verification can support more informed assessments of operational and counterparty risk.

The common requirement is not simply tracking a vessel.
It is establishing how much confidence can be placed in the information associated with it.

For organisations dealing with sanctions exposure, opaque ownership structures and suspicious maritime activity, that distinction can be commercially and operationally significant.

The technology is only as good as its coverage

There are, however, important limitations.

Camera-based vessel identification is not a replacement for satellite monitoring or AIS.
It is another layer of evidence, with its own strengths and constraints.

Coverage is geographically dependent.
Cameras need to be installed at locations where they can observe relevant maritime traffic.
A network covering several strategic ports or chokepoints does not provide continuous visibility across open oceans.

Performance also depends on environmental and operational conditions, including visibility, camera positioning, image quality, distance and vessel density.

There is another distinction worth making: detecting a vessel, identifying it correctly and interpreting its behaviour are three different tasks.

A camera may detect an object on the water.
A recognition system may match it to a particular vessel.
Further analysis is then required to establish whether its movements or associated information indicate suspicious activity.

These stages should not be confused.
Visual intelligence can strengthen an assessment, but it does not automatically prove intent or wrongdoing.

Windward has also emphasised privacy in its announcement.
The company says customers will not receive raw images or video footage.
The system is designed to support analytics relating to vessel activity, rather than the identification or verification of individuals.

That distinction will matter as the deployment of maritime camera networks expands.

The commercial model: from software to sensor infrastructure

One of the more interesting implications of this acquisition is that Windward is moving further into the infrastructure layer of maritime intelligence.

A software platform can scale through data partnerships, integrations and additional customers.
A physical sensor network has different requirements.

It needs suitable installation locations, access agreements, equipment, maintenance and reliable connectivity.
It also requires enough relevant traffic and observation quality to make each deployment commercially useful.

Windward has invited maritime stakeholders and other organisations to become site partners, indicating that partnerships will be part of its deployment strategy.

This creates an interesting business model question.

Will Windward build and operate a network of proprietary cameras at selected locations? Will it rely on partners to host and maintain installations? Or will it combine owned infrastructure with third-party deployments?

The answer will influence the cost of expansion, geographical coverage and the economics of the new capability.

Owning the sensing assets may provide greater control over data availability and consistency.
But it also means taking responsibility for the physical network.

The acquisition therefore brings an infrastructure dimension into a business that has largely been associated with data analytics and maritime AI.

A changing competitive landscape

Windward’s move also reflects a broader evolution in maritime intelligence.

The market is no longer limited to traditional vessel-tracking providers.
It increasingly includes satellite operators, radio-frequency detection companies, computer vision specialists, data platforms and AI-based analytics providers.

Each technology contributes a different type of evidence.
  • AIS provides vessel-reported identity and movement information.
  • Satellite imagery offers wide-area observation, although coverage and revisit frequency vary.
  • Radio-frequency intelligence can detect and analyse electronic emissions.
  • Visual intelligence provides camera-based vessel observations at locations where sensors are deployed.
These technologies are complementary rather than interchangeable.

The competitive advantage may increasingly belong to companies capable of bringing them together, resolving conflicting information and translating the results into operational decisions.

This is particularly important as AI becomes more deeply integrated into maritime intelligence workflows.
The quality of the underlying data will influence the quality of the analysis and the decisions that follow.

Windward’s acquisition suggests that the company sees proprietary data collection as an important part of its future positioning.

It is also a reminder that the maritime AI race will not be won by algorithms alone.
Access to differentiated data, physical infrastructure and strategically located sensors may become just as important.

What remains unanswered?

The acquisition announcement provides a clear indication of strategic direction, but several important details remain undisclosed.

First, Windward has not disclosed the financial terms of the transaction.
We therefore cannot assess the valuation of Azimut.ai or the scale of the investment required to develop the sensor network.

Second, the company has not provided detailed information about the existing network’s geographical coverage, number of installations or operational capacity.

Third, the integration roadmap remains unclear.
How quickly will visual identifications become available within Windward’s existing products? How will customers access the new intelligence, and how will it affect pricing?

Finally, the economics of deployment need to be demonstrated.
A proprietary camera network could create a valuable competitive advantage, but only if it can be expanded efficiently and deliver information that customers are willing to pay for.

These are the questions that will determine whether the acquisition becomes a meaningful commercial differentiator or remains a promising technological addition.


 
The next generation of maritime intelligence

Windward’s acquisition of Azimut.ai is more than an expansion into computer vision.

It signals a move towards a more comprehensive model of maritime intelligence, in which vessel-reported data is supplemented by independent observations from physical sensors.

The implications extend beyond Windward.
As maritime risks become more complex and the limitations of individual tracking systems become more apparent, the ability to combine multiple sources of evidence will become increasingly important.

For the industry, the question is no longer simply how many vessels a platform can track.

It is how reliably it can identify them, verify their movements, detect inconsistencies and explain what those observations mean.

Asking a vessel where it is has always been useful.
Being able to independently verify the answer could become much more valuable.

Links :

Wednesday, November 4, 2026

Iran has ‘detailed plans’ to attack undersea cables, says report

(Credit: Sir Francis Canker Photography)

From PCMag by Will McCurdy

Analysts told Reuters that the attacks, if successful, could slow down internet services and disrupt financial transactions, e-commerce and cloud computing.

Iran reportedly has “detailed plans” to attack undersea cables in the Gulf, in the event of future attacks by Israel or the US.

Fiber-optic undersea cables carry the vast majority of the world’s internet bandwidth, and are increasingly under threat during modern conflicts.
Last year, attacks on undersea cables in Eastern Europe’s Baltic Sea, allegedly linked to Russia, disrupted connectivity in Sweden and Latvia, prompting calls from telecom firms for governments to step in.

One of the anonymous security officials who spoke to Reuters said Iran would also aim to prevent repairs after any attacks, to keep disruptions going as long as possible.

The reports come after official threats from Yadollah Javani, the deputy head of political affairs for Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), who said Iran may target seven major internet cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz if the country’s infrastructure was attacked.

Alan Mauldin, research director at telecommunications research firm TeleGeography, told Reuters he believes the attacks, if successful, could slow down internet services and disrupt financial transactions, e-commerce and cloud computing.
However, the full impact would depend on how operators rerouted traffic and the capacity available via alternative connections.

Meanwhile, Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, told Reuters that Iran “wants Gulf states and corporate executives to press President Donald Trump over the risks his policies pose to their investment plans.”

Other countries have been shoring up plans to protect their undersea infrastructure.
The UK government recently set out proposals to update its legislation to give it stronger tools to protect its critical undersea infrastructure.
These include tougher penalties on those who damage undersea cables, new requirements on the telecom industry to protect cables from sabotage, and powers for the government to intervene and direct telecom providers where national security is at risk.

The recent Iranian conflict has seen IT infrastructure become as much of a target as conventional military infrastructure.
Iranian strikes on data centers in Bahrain and the UAE in early 2026 are thought to have caused permanent data loss. Meanwhile, the country has also threatened Starlink facilities in the Middle East.
 
Links :

Tuesday, November 3, 2026

Route du Rhum vessel tracking in NavimetriX application

 The 2026 Route du Rhum competitors tracked on GeoGarage nautical charts
 
Links :

Netherland layer update in the GeoGarage platform

 1 new nautical chart & 71 charts updated

Bottom trawlers do huge amounts of damage to life on undersea mountains

Seamounts are vital oases in the open sea. 
NOAA, CC BY-NC-ND

From The Conversation by Elin Angharad Thomas

Tens of thousands of underwater mountains dot the ocean floor around the world.
A few break the surface, such as the Hawaiian island chain.
The rest are seamounts, peaks and pinnacles rising from the deep seafloor.
Some lie just a few meters below the surface, while others rest deeper.

For many creatures, a seamount is an oasis in the vast open ocean.
Deep-ocean currents flow up their slopes, bringing cold, nutrient-rich water towards the surface.
These undersea mountains are often home to colourful cold-water coral reefs and gardens of ancient sponges.
Fish, turtles, sharks and whales use seamounts as breeding, feeding and migration sites.

But these biodiversity hotspots are at real risk.
Their abundance of life has made them a magnet for the most destructive type of fishing – trawling.
For decades, trawlers have targeted seamounts, towing heavy nets with weighted rollers across them.

This week, there’s a chance this highly destructive practice could be phased out across seamounts found in international waters, where no nation has exclusive rights.

What’s the problem with bottom trawling?

The goal of bottom trawling is to scoop up commercially valuable species, such as orange roughy and toothfish.
But each catch comes at a direct cost to everything else living on the seamount.

Trawlers drag enormous fishing nets for kilometers across the slopes and summits of seamounts.
These nets can be 80 to 200 meters wide and are held open by heavy metal doors weighing up to five tonnes.

Slow-growing deep-sea corals and sponges can live for centuries or even millennia.
These species act like shrubs and trees on land, providing shelter, feeding grounds and nurseries.
When they are destroyed, their vital ecological roles are lost.

More concerningly, scientists have found no evidence that any seamount has fully recovered after trawling stops – even 40 years later.

David Attenborough’s recent documentary, Ocean, gave a rare view of the damage trawling can do.

Where is seamount trawling still occurring?

It’s been 20 years since the United Nations first called for the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems such as seamounts.
But almost all seamounts in international waters remain exposed to what the UN has called the “greatest current threat to seamount ecosystems” – bottom trawling.

This week, nations are negotiating the UN’s Sustainable Fisheries Resolution.
On the table is a proposal to phase out bottom trawling on seamounts in international waters by the end of 2027.
The proposal is significant.
It’s the first concrete measure – with a deadline – offering a pathway to protection.

Protecting seamounts is not only possible, but already progressing.
Bottom trawling is no longer allowed on seamounts of fishable depths in the Northwest Atlantic.
Seamounts have also been closed to trawling in other parts of the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

But these represent a small fraction – just 1.5% of known seamounts are currently protected.
In the South Pacific, seamounts and underwater ridges such as the Lord Howe Rise, lying off the east coast of Australia, are still trawled.

Momentum has been building

Momentum has been building since nations signed the 2022 Global Biodiversity Framework, which set a goal of protecting 30% of the oceans by 2030.

Over the last two years, conservation authorities such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature have pushed for seamount protection.
The UN Convention on Migratory Species responded by adopting a new resolution on seamount conservation.
The High Seas Treaty (formally known as the BBNJ Agreement) also came into effect this year, ushering in better protection for marine life in international waters.

Scientific evidence has continued to accumulate.
Over 400 scientists have signed the Seamounts Proclamation, urging governments to act on the science by ending bottom trawling on seamounts in international waters.

For major ocean nations such as Australia, these negotiations represent a rare chance to progress a phase-out.
Australia has long taken a strong stance on bottom trawling in international waters, and has played an instrumental role in fisheries management in the South Pacific.

The question is whether this momentum and scientific evidence will translate into a firm agreement to phase out this destructive practice – and begin protecting these oceanic oases.
 
Links :

Monday, November 2, 2026

R-Mode: the radio beacon we thought was obsolete could once again become GPS’s backup



From Pulse by James Crawford

What I learned watching DGPS stations go dark

I started navigating during the GPS boom, when radio direction finding was already part of the recent past.
For decades, mariners had tuned into coastal radio beacons to take bearings on reference points and establish their position, but in the mid-1990s the Chilean Navy began dismantling those stations because of their high maintenance cost and low accuracy compared with satellite constellations.

For my generation, the satellite was simply how you navigated.

Radio Navigation Development Plan for Participating Commonwealth of Independent States
for 2019 to 2024
 
Years later, during the 11 years I represented the State of Chile on the IALA Council, I watched history repeat itself with DGPS stations.
One after another, those medium-frequency antennas next to lighthouses and headlands stopped transmitting, and we experienced it with a mix of logic and nostalgia.
The logic was clear, because the service was born to correct an intentionally degraded GPS, and that problem no longer existed.
The nostalgia was real, because those stations had been a quiet part of the aids to navigation system for decades.

The decisions made sense for their time.
The United States switched off its last stations in June 2020, and the UK, Ireland and Canada followed in 2022.
The reasoning was sound, since undegraded GPS, supported by satellite-based augmentation, met navigational accuracy needs.

Yet today’s problem is no longer GNSS accuracy, but its availability and integrity.
In June 2025, IMO circulated a communication from several governments warning of increasing GNSS disturbances in European waters, particularly in the Baltic, and that same month the Swedish Maritime Administration issued a notice to mariners on recurring interference across the region.
A very weak signal, transmitted from roughly 20,000 km above us, remains the position and time reference for ships, pilots, VTS and port systems.
That is the paradox, because the terrestrial infrastructure we watched being dismantled as unnecessary is precisely what could now give us resilience.

The key idea is called R-Mode (Ranging Mode).
Instead of building a new system, it reuses the same medium-frequency beacon, synchronises it precisely and adds two continuous-wave carriers on either side of its signal.
The shipborne receiver measures the phase of each station, estimates its range and, with three or more stations, computes a position without satellites.
For an AtoN manager, what matters is that existing DGNSS receivers keep getting their corrections as before, and that medium-frequency propagation allows wide coastal coverage with few stations.
 

The concrete example is the Baltic.
Germany, Sweden and Poland modified existing beacons to build a testbed, and in 2021 medium-frequency R-Mode delivered positioning at sea for the first time, with horizontal accuracy better than 12 metres (95%) in the central area between three transmitters.
For reference, IALA Recommendation R-129 calls for 100 metres in coastal navigation and 10 metres in port approaches.
Moreover, this is no longer just research, as IALA published Guideline G1187 in December 2024, standardising the signal and navigation message, and in June 2026 IMO’s NCSR 13 finalised draft performance standards for shipborne R-Mode receivers, which go to MSC 112 this December.

That said, it would be a mistake to present R-Mode as a cost-free solution.
At night, sky-wave propagation degrades performance and, in the Baltic trials, forced stations to be excluded from the position solution.
Transmitters themselves can show phase instabilities that require monitoring and corrections, and many States, Chile among them, have already dismantled their radio beacon infrastructure, so reinstalling or upgrading stations carries a real cost.
On top of that, receiver standards are still awaiting approval and the system is conceived as a voluntary backup.

There is also a factor the Baltic does not face and that is decisive in our reality: geometry.
Mariners who used radio direction finding knew it well, because a good fix depended on crossing lines from radio beacons at favourable angles, and the same principle governs R-Mode today.
The system computes position from ranges to several stations, and its accuracy improves when those stations surround the ship.
In an enclosed sea like the Baltic this happens naturally, but along a long, narrow coastline such as Chile’s the stations would be almost aligned, which would weaken the solution precisely in the direction perpendicular to the coast.
This is why no technology should be assessed in isolation.
South Korea, for example, already operates three eLoran stations covering the Yellow Sea as a terrestrial backup, and VHF R-Mode over VDES shore stations emerges as another possible complement.

For the same reason, the relevant question for Chile is not whether to adopt R-Mode, but who assesses whether it makes sense, where, and with which complements.
Answering it requires analysing coverage, geometry, risk, integration with other services and operational continuity, a task for certified professionals in marine Aids to Navigation and telecommunications, able to, among others, apply IALA standards to the reality of each coastline and each port.
Looking back, the lesson I take from that period is that when we assess decommissioning a station, we tend to judge it by the function it was built for, but the site, the mast, the frequency and the timing hold value that can resurface through another service.
 
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Sunday, November 1, 2026

Banque Populaire XI : a trimaran taking flight at 50 knots


Aboard the Maxi Banque Populaire XI. At the helm, Armel Le Cléac’h steers his giant trimaran through the waves at 50 knots—about 90 km/h. 
Spectacular footage offering a glimpse into Ultim-class sailing in the context of the 2026 Route du Rhum.
The bow lifts, spray sweeps across the deck, and the boat accelerates.
Carried by its foils, the Maxi Banque Populaire XI lifts its hulls out of the water and appears to glide over the waves.
But behind this impression of lightness, every movement reflects the considerable forces the trimaran is subjected to.
At this speed, the landscape flies by, and the impacts serve as a reminder that flight is a delicate balance that must be maintained.
The boat rises, drops, and regains its trim.
These moments offer a tangible sense of what a 50-knot top speed means on an offshore racing yacht: noise, spray, and constant vigilance.
Armel Le Cléac’h at the helm, heading for the Route du Rhum
At the helm, Armel Le Cléac’h responds to the boat’s movements.
His gaze shifts from the sea to the sails, while his actions seek to maintain course and stability. For the skipper, harnessing the power of Banque Populaire XI also means preserving the vessel.
With an eye toward the 2026 Route du Rhum, these images bring home the full scale of the Ultim challenge: crossing the Atlantic solo, from Saint-Malo to Guadeloupe, at the helm of multihulls capable of such high speeds.


Saturday, October 31, 2026

Gitana 18, the new Maxi Ultim


Tomorrow, on November 1st, the Maxi Edmond de Rothschild will set sail in the legendary Route du Rhum, its first major race and transatlantic crossing (Gitana team)

Friday, October 30, 2026

Croatia layer update in the GeoGarage platform

 
3 new charts added & 107 updated

Portugal layer update in the GeoGarage platform

1 new nautical chart added & 45 updated
 

Closing the sea: lessons from ancient Mediterranean blockades

Naval battle at the harbor of Syracuse, illustration circa 1890 (artist unknown / public domain)

From CIMSEC by Dr. Stephen DeCasien

Nearly a century ago, Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, U.S.N., wrote in the foreword to Arthur M.
Shepard’s seminal work, Sea Power in Ancient History, that “Readers of this work cannot but be impressed by the similarity between the problems of sea power in ancient times and problems of sea power which are engaging the attention of maritime nations today.”
Practitioners of naval power have long looked to the past for warnings, lessons, and insights that might inform the challenges of the present and future.
This post follows in that tradition by considering what antiquity might offer for understanding one of the most enduring applications of naval power, the blockade.

The British naval theorist Julian Corbett distinguished between commercial blockade, intended to restrict an enemy’s maritime trade, and naval blockade, directed against an enemy’s fleet.
The latter could itself serve different purposes, either keeping an enemy fleet confined to port or watching it closely while encouraging it to put to sea, where it could be brought to battle.
Although Corbett developed these categories from the experience of more recent naval warfare, their basic purposes would have been readily recognizable in antiquity.
Ancient fleets likewise sought to restrict maritime commerce and supplies, contain hostile naval forces, or compel an adversary’s fleet to come out and fight.

The relevance of these forms of blockade is hardly confined to the past.
At the time of writing, the United States is enforcing a blockade against Iran, restricting maritime traffic to and from Iranian ports as part of the ongoing conflict.
At the same time, across the Indo-Pacific, the possibility of a Chinese blockade of Taiwan remains a central concern in discussions of a potential cross-Strait conflict.
Chinese military planning considers blockade operations as one means of isolating and coercing Taiwan, alongside the considerably more demanding possibility of an amphibious invasion.
Despite enormous differences in political circumstances, technologies, and scale, these situations underscore a common problem.
Establishing control of the sea is one thing, but maintaining that control long enough to achieve a political or military objective is another.

There are, of course, many examples of naval blockade in the ancient Mediterranean, but four cases highlight particularly well the different challenges such operations presented: Samos in 440–439 BCE, Syracuse in 413 BCE, Rhodes in 305–304 BCE, and Roman operations around Lilybaeum and Drepana in 250–249 BCE.
Each exposes a different problem associated with blockade, including maintaining forces on station, preserving or contesting command of the sea, restricting or sustaining access to supplies, and protecting the forces involved.

Samos, 440–439 BCE: The Challenge of Maintaining a Blockade

The Athenian campaign against Samos in 440–439 BCE provides a clear example of both the effectiveness and fragility of naval blockade.
After an earlier Athenian intervention on the island, a group of Samian exiles returned, overthrew the Athenian-backed government, and revolted.
Athens responded by sending sixty ships under the command of Pericles and other generals.
After defeating a Samian fleet of seventy vessels near Tragia and receiving additional ships from Athens, Chios, and Lesbos, the Athenians landed troops and surrounded Samos with three walls while simultaneously blockading the city “from the sea at the same time” (?κ θαλ?σσης ?μα).

The blockade quickly revealed a problem that remains fundamental to such operations, as forces maintaining a blockade may also be required to respond to threats elsewhere.
Reports reached Pericles that a Phoenician fleet was approaching to assist the Samians.
He therefore took sixty ships from the force stationed around Samos and sailed toward Caunus and Caria to meet the anticipated threat.
His departure weakened the blockade at precisely the moment the defenders needed.

The Samians exploited the opportunity.
They attacked the inadequately protected Athenian naval station, destroyed the guard ships, and defeated the vessels sent against them.
For fourteen days they “controlled the sea in their area” (τ?ς θαλ?σσης τ?ς καθ? ?αυτο?ς ?κρ?τησαν) and, as Thucydides puts it, “brought in and carried out whatever they wished” (?σεκομ?σαντο κα? ?ξεκομ?σαντο ? ?βο?λοντο).
When Pericles returned, however, the Athenians reestablished the blockade by land and sea.
Further reinforcements arrived from Athens, Chios, and Lesbos, and after a nine-month siege the Samians surrendered, demolished their walls, surrendered their fleet and hostages, and agreed to repay the costs of the war.

For fourteen days, the diversion of part of the Athenian fleet was enough to reopen Samian access to the sea, demonstrating the importance of persistence in maintaining a blockade.
For those under blockade, even a temporary weakening of the forces on station could provide an opportunity to restore maritime access.

Syracuse, 413 BCE: The Reversal of a Blockade

When the Athenians arrived at Syracuse in 415 BCE, seeking to conquer the city and extend their power into Sicily, their overwhelming superiority at sea was one of the expedition’s greatest advantages.
Over the course of the campaign, however, they gradually lost that advantage and ultimately found themselves trapped in the Great Harbor.
By 414 BCE, the campaign had developed into an effort to isolate Syracuse by land and sea.
The Athenians occupied Plemmyrium at the entrance to the Great Harbor, using it to protect their ships and store equipment, while their army attempted to complete a wall of circumvallation around the city.
Thucydides emphasizes how far the Athenian works had progressed by the time Spartan support for Syracuse arrived under the command of Gylippus.
Much of the wall toward the Great Harbor was already complete, while materials had been prepared to extend the line toward the opposite coast.

Gylippus’ intervention changed the strategic situation.
Syracusan counter-walls prevented completion of the Athenian circumvallation, while the capture of Plemmyrium deprived the expedition of its principal position at the mouth of the Great Harbor and cost it substantial stores and naval equipment.
The Syracusans also refused to remain blockaded within the Great Harbor, continuing to contest Athenian control of its waters.
In 413 BCE, they modified their triremes for its confined waters, strengthening and shortening their prows for direct, head-on, prow-to-prow attacks (?ντιπρ?ροις), rather than the maneuvering attacks (?κ περ?πλου) for which the more lightly constructed Athenian prows were designed.

After defeating the Athenians at sea, the Syracusans closed the mouth of the Great Harbor with merchant vessels, warships, and other crafts moored across the entrance.
The fleet that had arrived with overwhelming maritime superiority now had to fight its way out of the harbor it had once helped control.
In the final naval battle, the Athenians attempted to break the Syracusan blockade, attacking the barrier across the harbor entrance, but the Syracusan and allied fleet prevented their escape.
The surviving Athenians abandoned their ships and attempted to retreat overland, ending in the destruction of the expedition.

Syracuse demonstrates that a blockade depends on continued control of the surrounding maritime space.
As Athenian control weakened through setbacks ashore, the loss of key positions, Syracusan tactical adaptation, and defeat at sea, the Athenians went from attempting to cut off Syracuse to being trapped themselves.
For a force under blockade, contesting control rather than simply accepting isolation can fundamentally alter the strategic situation.

Rhodes, 305–304 BCE: The Limits of a Blockade

Few commanders in antiquity possessed a reputation for naval siege warfare comparable to Demetrius Poliorcetes, yet his enormous effort against Rhodes in 305–304 BCE failed to isolate the city completely.
Maritime commerce was fundamental to Rhodian wealth and strategic power.
Diodorus Siculus describes Rhodes as possessing considerable naval strength (?σχ?ουσα ναυτικα?ς δυν?μεσι) and notes its particularly close economic relationship with Ptolemy I of Egypt.
When Antigonus and Demetrius attempted to force Rhodes away from its relationship with Ptolemy, separating the city from outside support became a central part of the campaign.

Demetrius arrived with a formidable fleet.
He attacked the Rhodian harbor defenses from the sea, deployed ship-mounted artillery and siege machinery, and later shifted much of his effort ashore.
Yet his fleet could not make the waters around Rhodes impermeable.
Rhodian warships continued to operate, and outside powers repeatedly sent assistance.
Ptolemy, Cassander, and Lysimachus supplied the city, with Diodorus describing major shipments of grain and other provisions.
Their importance was reflected in the honors Rhodes later granted its benefactors.

Every successful entry weakened the coercive purpose of Demetrius’ effort to isolate the city.
So long as Rhodes retained sufficient maritime access to receive supplies and outside assistance, time did not necessarily favor the attacker.
After roughly a year of fighting, Demetrius accepted a settlement.
Rhodes preserved its autonomy and its relationship with Ptolemy, while agreeing to support Antigonus except in conflicts against Ptolemy.

Rhodes illustrates the difficulty of maintaining a fully effective blockade.
A blockade does not need to stop all traffic to exert pressure, nor does every successful passage render it ineffective.
Its effectiveness ultimately depends on whether enough traffic is restricted to achieve its strategic purpose, while even limited access may be sufficient for the defender to sustain resistance.

Lilybaeum and Drepana, 250–249 BCE: The Costs of Maintaining a Blockade

By 250 BCE, during the First Punic War, Roman successes in Sicily had narrowed the Carthaginian position to a handful of strongholds in the west, but the effort to blockade Lilybaeum exposed the Roman fleet to risks that would ultimately threaten the operation itself.
Polybius notes that the Romans believed its capture would open the way for attacks against North Africa, while Carthage resolved to hold it at virtually any cost.
The Romans therefore invested Lilybaeum by land and sea.

The harbor proved exceptionally difficult to blockade effectively.
Carthage exploited local knowledge, favorable winds, and skilled seamanship to penetrate the Roman blockade.
A force under Hannibal, son of Hamilcar, carried approximately 10,000 troops and supplies into Lilybaeum despite the Roman presence.
Hannibal “the Rhodian” later repeatedly sailed between Carthaginian territory and Lilybaeum, running the Roman blockade until the Romans captured a sufficiently fast Carthaginian vessel to intercept him.
These episodes demonstrated the difficulty of transforming naval superiority into complete control of a contested area.

The blockade also imposed costs on the Romans.
Combat, siege operations, and disease depleted the fleet’s manpower, requiring 10,000 replacement sailors.
In 249 BCE, the Roman consul Publius Claudius Pulcher used the reconstituted fleet to strike the nearby Carthaginian naval base at Drepana, apparently hoping to surprise the Carthaginian commander Adherbal and eliminate the threat to Roman blockade operations around Lilybaeum.
Instead, Adherbal brought his ships into open water.
The Romans, caught close to the coast with less maneuverable ships and inexperienced replacement crews, suffered a devastating defeat.
Polybius reports that ninety-three Roman vessels were captured while Claudius escaped with about thirty.
Carthaginian forces subsequently returned to the vicinity of Lilybaeum and attacked Roman ships there.

Lilybaeum and Drepana reveal the sustained costs of blockade.
Maintaining pressure exposes the forces involved to attrition, crew exhaustion, enemy action, and competing operational demands.
As these pressures accumulate, they can create opportunities for the opposing force to challenge the blockade and reshape the balance at sea.

Ancient Blockades and the Problem of Sea Power

Ancient and modern blockades operate with radically different technologies.
Samos, Syracuse, Rhodes, and Lilybaeum offer no tactical prescriptions for fleets operating with submarines, aircraft, missiles, satellites, or unmanned systems.
Their relevance lies instead in the strategic problems they expose.

Taken together, the four cases suggest that blockade should be understood as a continuing contest rather than a condition established simply by achieving maritime superiority.
Samos demonstrates the demands of persistence, as even the temporary removal of part of the blockading force created an opportunity to reopen access to the sea.
Syracuse shows how control can be reversed, as the Athenians went from attempting to isolate the city to being trapped within the Great Harbor themselves.
Rhodes demonstrates that a blockade need not be broken completely to fail; sufficient access may allow a defender to continue resisting.
Lilybaeum and Drepana show how the accumulating costs and vulnerabilities of maintaining a blockade can create opportunities for it to be challenged.

These cases raise several enduring strategic questions about blockades.
How difficult is a blockade to impose, sustain, resist, or break?
How much force does it require, and for how long?
How complete must it be to achieve its political or military objectives?
How much traffic can continue to pass through before its effectiveness is undermined?
What outside powers might intervene or provide support?
And what forces, bases, or geographic features might strengthen, weaken, or threaten a blockade?

The central question is therefore not simply whether a blockade can be imposed, but whether it can be maintained long enough to achieve its purpose in the face of resistance, changing circumstances, and the costs of sustaining it.

That broader lesson returns us to Moffett’s observation nearly a century ago.
The instruments of sea power have changed beyond anything an ancient commander could have imagined.
The underlying strategic problem has not changed.
Control of the sea is only valuable insofar as it can be translated into lasting political or military results.

Thursday, October 29, 2026

How AI is transforming hurricane forecasts


A satellite image provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) shows Hurricane Isaias approaching the Gulf Coast of Alabama and Florida on Friday, Oct. 9 2026.NOAA/NOAA

From NPR by Jessica Meszaros
 
Hurricane forecasters are increasingly using artificial intelligence to make predictions — and they say the technology is rapidly transforming the field.

When the first hurricane of the Atlantic season formed this month, an AI model beat out traditional models at predicting where it would go.

In early October, Hurricane Isaias made landfall near Destin, Fla., as a Category 2 storm.
Conventional forecasting models initially predicted it would head further west, toward southeastern Louisiana.

But Google DeepMind's artificial intelligence model called it right out of the gate: the hurricane was going to hit the western Florida Panhandle.
"Google DeepMind, in particular, has really proven itself the last few years as the gold standard model," says Michael Lowry, a longtime meteorologist and hurricane expert in Miami, who has previously advised both the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the National Hurricane Center (NHC).
"That model has been, by far and away, the best performing computer model that we've ever seen. Period."

A different kind of model

The National Hurricane Center first started incorporating the Google DeepMind model into its official forecasts last year.

By the end of the 2025 Atlantic hurricane season, it was already one of the best at predicting a storm's path and strength, says Brian McNoldy, a hurricane researcher for the University of Miami.

Usually, new models take years to refine after first being introduced.
"It's something we're not used to – to have a model, the new kid on the block, very quickly becoming the best model out there," McNoldy says. 
"This pretty much came out of the gate in first place, and that's a pretty impressive feat."

Traditional physics-based hurricane models use real-time atmospheric data, like temperature, humidity, pressure and wind shear, as measured by satellites and aircraft.
Then they use complicated equations to predict what path a storm might travel and how strong it could get.

An AI model operates very differently: it relies more on history.
It identifies patterns by analyzing thousands of past storms along with atmospheric data.

"The AI models don't really know anything about the atmosphere other than the current picture," Lowry says.
"Beyond that, it's not leaning on the governing equations of the atmosphere, the physics, to make predictions."

Most of the people designing and developing these models aren't even meteorologists, Lowry notes: "They're software engineers, and they're developing neural networks."

A "neural network" is a set of computer algorithms modeled on the human brain and trained to find patterns in massive amounts of data.
As a result, the models can seem like a "black box," Lowry says: "We don't know why they might get a forecast right. We also don't know why they might get a forecast wrong."

It can be unsettling for meteorologists to depend on a system they don't totally understand – especially during storms when millions of people might be relying on their forecasts.
"It makes us a little uncomfortable, because we like to know why you're getting the right answer," McNoldy says. 
"And I feel like we don't – or at least I don't know why."

Not all AI models have performed well, though.
There are lots of unproven weather forecasting AI models out there, Lowry says.

The two that have so far proven to be the most accurate, despite some pitfalls, are the models developed by Google DeepMind and by the U.K.-based European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF).



People retrieve belongings from a collapsed boat house in the aftermath of Hurricane Isaias in Destin, Fla., Saturday, Oct. 10, 2026. An AI model from Google Deepmind beat out traditional physics-based models at predicting the path of the storm, though it didn't do as well in forecasting the storm's strength.
Gerald Herbert/AP

Relying on a "blend" of models

Forecasters at the National Hurricane Center use several proven models – both AI and traditional – when putting together their official forecasts.

"Every storm has different forecast challenges," says NHC Director Michael Brennan.
"That's why we take that consensus approach and use that blend of the best models."

And it's still humans who have to interpret the results of those models before deciding what to tell the public.

The NHC provides updates every six hours during active hurricanes.
The models by themselves can sometimes show drastic changes from one update to the next. Forecasters have to translate those shifting predictions into clear guidance that people can act on.

"That's one thing that the human forecaster provides a lot of, is continuity," Brennan says.
"We're using our expertise and our understanding to translate that hurricane forecast into the hazard space, and that's what people really need to pay attention to."

Scientists expect rapid advances

The Google DeepMind model still needs some work, Brennan says.
While it topped other models in tracking the path of Isaias, it didn't do as well as the NHC's blended forecast in determining the intensity, or strength, of the storm.

Brennan's team gives regular feedback to Google DeepMind to help improve the model.
Google didn't respond to questions from NPR for this story.

The "future of forecasting has always been changing," Brennan says. 
"It's never just one thing that's driving those improvements."

It wasn't that long ago when forecasters couldn't predict how strong a storm would be even within a couple of days, he notes.
That changed, because of advances in prediction models and better data collected by satellites and planes.
"Errors are about half of what they were, say, at the time of [Hurricane] Katrina, in terms of intensity forecasting," Brennan says.

The exciting thing about AI, says meteorologist Michael Lowry, is how quickly it's improving.
AI updates take only months or even weeks, unlike traditional models, which are updated annually at best.
"They are making advancements in skill and hurricane predictions over the course of a year that would have taken us 10 years, a decade or more, to make," Lowry says.

But even with AI coming in fast and strong, Lowry says he's not worried about artificial intelligence replacing people.
"For me, I don't feel some sort of existential crisis with AI," Lowry says. 
"If anything, I think it is a boon for our business."

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