The subsea paradox: gray-zone threats, the "Subway Map" illusion, and the case for open subsea

 

From SubmarineNetworks by Winston Qiu

Cartography True digital openness requires physical visibility: Open Cables must no longer remain hidden beneath the waves

Submarine fiber-optic cables carry over 99% of intercontinental digital traffic, serving as the physical circulatory system of the global economy.
Yet, a fundamental contradiction lies at the heart of modern telecommunications: while the industry champions "Open Cable" architectures—characterized by open optical spectrum, disaggregated hardware, and carrier-neutral access—the physical geographic routes of these multi-billion-dollar assets remain veiled in obscurity, proprietary silos, or abstract cartography.

This transparency deficit creates a dangerous asymmetry.
Hostile state actors leveraging dual-use maritime survey vessels are actively conducting underwater reconnaissance on critical corridors like the Pacific Light Cable Network (PLCN).
Meanwhile, commercial ships, coastal states, and maritime security forces lack a single, standardized, open-access spatial map showing where these cables lie on the seabed.

To defend the world's digital backbone, the global community must align physical infrastructure policy with digital open-access principles: if a cable is open at the fiber level, its non-confidential physical route must be open on the global map.

An OPEN CABLE should never be a Hidden secret beneath the sea.

 

I. Tactical Flashpoint: Gray-Zone Reconnaissance over the PLCN

According to Maritime AI company Windward, a recent encounter in which a Chinese-flagged research vessel was filmed loitering directly over the Pacific Light Cable Network (PLCN)in the Philippine Sea illustrates the evolving "gray-zone" threat to seabed infrastructure.
Windward said the same ship had "operated repeatedly" in the Paracel Islands (西沙群岛), the Spratly Islands (南沙群岛), the Bay of Bengal and waters off Sri Lanka.
A subsequent report by the American magazine Newsweek brought widespread public attention to the incident, triggering follow-up coverage across major media outlets

Strategic Context of the PLCN

• High-Value Target: PLCN is an ~8,000-mile trans-Pacific fiber system linking Taiwan, the Philippines, and the United States, carrying vital financial, semiconductor supply chain, and government data.
• Geopolitical Backstory: Originally planned with a landing spur in Hong Kong, U.S. national security regulators blocked the Hong Kong segment in 2020 over data interception concerns.
• Operational since 2022 by removing the Hong Kong landing and fiber connection and routing directly into Taiwan and the Philippines, PLCN stands as a symbol of the Pacific digital geopolitical divide.

Operational Mechanics of the Encounter

• Dual-Use Hydrographic Reconnaissance: Nominally civilian research vessels equipped with multi-beam echo sounders, side-scan sonars, and sub-bottom profilers can map seabed contours, cable burial depths, and local bathymetry with high precision.
• Seabed Battlespace Preparation: Loitering at slow speeds over known cable paths allows operators to log precise coordinates for future cable-tapping, signal monitoring, or targeted severance during a crisis.
• Gray-Zone Probing: This activity forces coastal states like Taiwan and the Philippines to expend maritime assets monitoring, escorting, and warning off vessels, testing national rules of engagement without crossing the threshold of kinetic conflict.

Legal Analysis: Navigating UNCLOS, EEZ Jurisdictions, and the Debate Over Loitering vs. Transit

The legal classification of a foreign vessel operating near critical subsea infrastructure—or transiting strategic maritime chokepoints—lies at the intersection of conflicting interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Determining whether an operational activity is legal or illegal depends heavily on the maritime zone, the nature of the operations, and whether a state is acting as a coastal state protecting its sovereign rights or a flag state exercising navigational freedoms.

The Competing Perspectives: Western Coastal Claims vs. Chinese Counter-Arguments

The Core Legal Friction: Continuous Transit vs. Stationary Loitering

At the center of this geopolitical debate is a fundamental disagreement over vessel conduct and speed within EEZs:

• The Speed and Purpose Argument: Coastal states argue that when a vessel reduces speed, alters course erratically, or holds a stationary position directly over a known subsea cable corridor, it loses the protection of "expeditious transit" and enters the realm of unauthorized survey or gray-zone interference.
• The Hydrographic & Military Survey Loophole: Flag states often exploit UNCLOS ambiguities, as the convention does not explicitly define the boundary between Marine Scientific Research (which requires coastal state consent in an EEZ) and military hydrographic surveying or intelligence gathering (which flag states claim is an unrestricted high-seas freedom).

Conclusion: Whether an encounter is viewed as a lawful exercise of high-seas navigation or an illegal infringement on coastal state jurisdiction depends on which legal doctrine a government applies.
While coastal nations view loitering over subsea fiber as an illegal, unauthorized survey targeting critical infrastructure, researching states defend such operations by citing navigational freedoms and pointing to similar military operations conducted by Western allies across regional EEZs.

II. The Multi-Layered Defense: How to Protect Seabed Arteries

Defending subsea fiber against physical sabotage or intelligence probing requires a integrated defense matrix combining commercial sensing technology with state sovereign enforcement.

1. What Cable Owners & Consortiums Must Do

a) Deploy Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS): Optoelectronic interrogators turn active or dark fiber within the cable into continuous, long-range acoustic sensors. DAS can detect nearby vessel engine signatures, dropped anchors, bottom trawling, or underwater submersibles in real time.

b) Geofenced AIS Integration: Automated systems merge vessel Automatic Identification System (AIS) data with network operations centers (NOCs), triggering immediate security alerts when a vessel slows down or loiters inside a cable corridor.

c) Physical Hardening & Mesh Redundancy: Deep-burying cables 2–3 meters into the seabed where feasible and routing bandwidth across redundant, geographically diverse paths so that a single severed trunk does not cut off national connectivity.

2. What Coastal States Must Do

a) Establish Statutory Cable Protection Zones (CPZs): Enact laws declaring CPZs around critical cable routes, making bottom-trawling, commercial dredging, dropping anchor, or unauthorized loitering explicitly illegal

b) Strategic Transparency ("Naming and Shaming"): Publicly release Coast Guard video, AIS tracking logs, and spatial data when foreign research or commercial ships loiter over cables. Exposing gray-zone operations imposes diplomatic and political costs on foreign aggressors.

c) Public-Private Intel Fusion Centers: Establish direct data pipelines between private Cable Landing Stations (CLS) and naval/coast guard command centers to allow rapid dispatch of patrol ships or aerial drones when an anomaly is detected.

3. Operational Case Study: How Taiwan and the Philippines Responded to the PLCN Incident

The recent loitering of a Chinese-flagged research vessel directly over the Pacific Light Cable Network (PLCN) provided a live operational test of how regional coastal states respond to subsea gray-zone threats.

The vessel's tracked path traversed three distinct maritime legal zones: Taiwan's EEZ, the Philippines' EEZ, and the High Seas.
Both Taiwan and the Philippines deployed a combination of active maritime enforcement, strategic transparency, and regulatory domain awareness to counter the activity.

Key Takeaway: The joint response highlights that while regional coast guards lack the legal authority to seize foreign ships in international waters or EEZs without evidence of physical damage, real-time physical interception combined with public media exposure remains the most effective immediate countermeasure against subsea gray-zone probing.

III. The Cartographic Illusion: Schematic "Subway Maps" vs. Spatial Reality

A major vulnerability in subsea infrastructure security stems from a widespread public and policy misconception: the belief that accessible global maps of subsea cables already exist.

The "Subway Map" Fallacy

Platforms like TeleGeography's Submarine Cable Map and Infrapedia are widely used, highly valuable commercial tools.
However, they are not geographical maps.
They are stylized, schematic diagrams—functionally identical to a metro system map.

• They display logical connectivity (Point A connects to Point B).
• They do not reflect true geographic coordinates, bathymetric alignments, or actual physical trajectories across territorial seas, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), or the High Seas.

The Missing Public Spatial Layer

To navigate, anchor, or protect infrastructure safely, mariners and security forces require Route Position Lists (RPLs)—centimeter-accurate geographic datasets.
Today, actual RPL spatial data is fragmented into three locked domains:

• Proprietary Commercial Vaults: Held privately by cable owners, survey firms, and installers who treat detailed bathymetric paths as trade secrets.
• Paid Electronic Navigational Charts (ENCs): Encoded into official marine navigation databases (managed by national hydrographic offices like UKHO or NOAA) accessible primarily through expensive shipboard ECDIS equipment.
• Siloed Regulatory Filings: Buried inside static PDF attachments in environmental or regulatory applications (e.g., U.S. FCC filings).

IV. The ICPC Vision vs. Spatial Silos

The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) and the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) have long advocated for integrating subsea cables into standard nautical charting (under IHO Resolution 4/1967).
The goal was straightforward: mariners cannot avoid hazards they cannot see.

While the ICPC framework successfully pushed for cable lines on official nautical charts, this data remains locked inside closed maritime navigational software.
There is no open-access, global, GIS-compatible spatial layer showing the world's physical digital arteries.

“The ICPC recommends that governments and industry continue to identify submarine cables on nautical charts in a timely and accurate manner in order to ensure maritime safety and protection of global critical infrastructure.”International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) 

V. The "Open Cable" Paradox & Call to Action

Over the past decade, the telecommunications industry underwent a revolution driven by the Open Cable architecture model.
Hyperscalers and consortia dismantled proprietary vendor lock-in, embracing open optical spectrum, carrier-neutral landing stations, and interoperable wet-plant interfaces.

Yet, this openness stops at the shoreline.
The physical paths of these cables remain hidden behind commercial secrecy, regulatory silos, or abstract web vector graphics.

 

Why Hiding Physical Routes No Longer Works

The legacy justification for keeping cable paths secret was security through obscurity.
However, this logic has collapsed:

• Hostile state actors already possess the technology to find them. Advanced sonar, satellite RF tracking, and oceanographic research ships easily map cables regardless of whether the RPL is public.
• Commercial ships break them by accident. Fishermen and merchant captains drag anchors and nets through cables precisely because accurate, real-time spatial representations are not integrated into basic, accessible charting tools.
• Security forces are blind. Coast Guards and allied navies attempting to monitor gray-zone loitering lack an integrated, open GIS overlay combining live AIS vessel tracks with physical cable lines.

Conclusion: A Global Call for Open Seabed Mapping

You cannot build a resilient, open digital global society on hidden physical roads.
The world maps its physical roads, highways, and bridge infrastructure openly to ensure public safety, urban planning, and defense.
Subsea fiber-optic cables—the highways of global civilization—require the same spatial transparency.

A landmark step in international coordination was the creation of the International Advisory Body for Submarine Cable Resilience (ITU IAB), established by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in partnership with the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC).
Bringing together governments, regulatory authorities, telecom operators, and maritime experts, the ITU IAB operates through specialized Working Groups targeting deployment, repair logistics, risk mitigation, and route diversity.
However, standardized, open seabed cartography remains the critical missing link in global infrastructure security.

Strategic Roadmap: Integrating Open Mapping into the ITU IAB Action Plan

1. Adopt Open Seabed Mapping as an ITU IAB Core Action Item: The ITU IAB should formally incorporate open subsea cartography into its global resilience agenda—specifically within Working Group 2 (Risk Identification, Monitoring and Mitigation). By establishing a UN-backed open GIS framework, the ITU IAB can lead the shift from closed navigational silos to transparent global spatial awareness.
2. Fulfill the ICPC Vision via a UN-Backed Open Global Cable Registry: The ITU, International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), and ICPC should collaborate under the ITU IAB banner to build a standardized, open-access global GIS layer for all commercial subsea cables across Territorial Seas, EEZs, and the High Seas.
3. Declassify Non-Sensitive Geographic RPLs: National regulatory bodies (such as the U.S. FCC, European BEREC, and regional telecom authorities) should mandate that non-confidential physical Route Position Lists (RPLs) be published in standard, open GIS formats (GeoJSON/KML) as a condition for granting subsea landing licenses.
4. Unify Open Spectrum with Open Geography: The telecommunications industry must broaden its definition of "Open Cable." True digital resilience requires pairing open optical spectrum and disaggregated hardware with open cartographic visibility on the global map.

By taking up open seabed cartography as a primary mandate, the ITU Advisory Body and global stakeholders can eliminate gray-zone ambiguities, empower maritime security forces, and protect the physical circulatory system of the global internet.

“True digital openness requires physical visibility: Open Cables must no longer remain hidden beneath the waves.”

Google now owns the Atlantic Ocean

Map of submarine cables with British Empire in 1902

source : Atlantic cables maps 

From Pulse by Sunil Tagare

I hate to say I called it but yes, I did about 5 years ago.

The idea was very simple. Instead of running 10 submarine cables across the Atlantic, how about creating 2 Guams in the Atlantic Ocean: one in Bermuda and one Azores with a loop and then aggregate a bunch of cables on both continents?

That would save about 70% of CAPEX and more importantly make the network far more resilient and increase security by creating loops within both the continents.

This was my idea long time ago.

In fact, when Google first announced the Nuvem cable, they had Bermuda as a landing party but not Azores. 

I wrote to them and urged them to add Azores which to their credit, they did almost immediately. 

 

 

pc: Google; First announcement of the Nuvem Cable

 

pc: OpenCables, Inc.; My vision of a trans-Atlantic network

I have to admit.

Google has not only embraced the concept but they have gone far beyond my own expectations.

They announced a bunch of cables recently called Americas Connect.

 

pc: Google; Note: Map not to scale. Azores not labeled--maybe I should draw the maps for them

 

pc: Google; They really need to change their graphics dude or is it their AI rebelling?

 

pc: Google

 

pc: Google

I think this is brilliant.

I think the brilliance is that they have connected Panama to the Atlantic Ocean which is connected to Chile and the US West Coast.

That changes everything for South America connectivity especially as it pertains to connectivity to Europe.

Also, this is the first time, the West Coast and the East Coast of the US can be reached directly by a submarine cable. This may go unnoticed but is very important in times of disaster recovery situations.

With this masterstroke, Google now owns the Atlantic Ocean.

No one else will be able to compete with them on price, latency, resilience, security or connectivity.

Which brings up an interesting question.

Will Google allow 3rd party cables to connect to their Bermuda and Azores cable stations?

Basically are they open cable landing stations?

I had a long talk with folks in Bermuda and Azores governments and both were non-committal about the Open CLS issue.

Will Google sell the Bermuda to Azores fibers along with the Open CLS?

I doubt it.

Google's complete control over the Atlantic will shape the future of the trans-Atlantic AI industry for decades to come.

It will be impossible for anyone else to recreate what they have done especially since they have Bermuda and Azores in their pockets -- just like Cable & Wireless milked Bermuda and Azores for decades.

Also, they are just getting started.

Wait for significant more cable announcements on this route -- which will make it harder and harder for anyone to replicate this.

Interestingly, when I visited the submarine cable museum in Lisbon, I saw the ancient telegraph cable maps.

Guess what?

Azores was the central point for all the cables coming in from North America before they got distributed to every country in Europe.

Just a fun fact for the submarine cable nerds.

The wave everyone thinks is AI

Matahi Drollet at Teahupo'o filmed by Manea Fabisch

 

Tereva David at Teahupo'o filmed by Manea Fabisch

Man lives alone on island for 33 years to ‘avoid talking to people’

From Surfer by Dashel Pierson

 

When Mauro Morandi’s catamaran broke down off Sardinia, he chose a different life and spent three decades alone on Budelli’s pink-sand island.

• Mauro Morandi lived alone on Budelli island for 33 years, avoiding society.
• He maintained the island’s ecology, educating visitors about its natural beauty.
• “I’m the living proof that a second, new life is possible,” Morandi once said.

The modern age.

Cellphones, social media, consumerism, politics, war, and so on.

It can be exhausting, at times, simply existing in the world today.

As Jack Kerouac wrote in Big Sur: “We all agree it’s too big to keep up with, that we’re surrounded by life, that we’ll never understand it, so we center it all in by swigging Scotch from the bottle and when it’s empty I run out of the car and buy another one, period.”

For one man, he had enough.

In 1989, Mauro Morandi sailed for the South Pacific, but he didn’t make it. Instead, his catamaran broke down, and he ended up on the small island of Budelli off the coast of Sardinia.

 

Isola de Budelli with the GeoGarage platform (IIM ENC)

 

He decided to stay.

Why? To “avoid talking to anyone.”

A former teacher, Morandi wound up living on the island for 33 years.

He stayed in an abandoned World War II shelter, as the sole inhabitant of Budelli.
Thus, he was dubbed the “Italian Robinson Crusoe.”
It just so happened that the island’s caretaker was about to retire, so when Morandi arrived, he took over.

He kept the island clean, keeping its iconic pink sand beaches pristine, and often taught day-trippers to Budelli about the native ecosystem.

“I’m so used to living in the middle of nature,” he told the Guardian. 

“What would I do back in Modena? Play cards and go to bars like other people in their 80s? Give over! The thought of going back to live in a society that treats nature badly is very distressing. Nature needs to be loved and respected.”

Eventually, Morandi’s hermetic dream came to an end, when the island became a national park, and he was evicted.

Morandi moved into a one-bedroom apartment on La Maddalena, a large island off Sardinia.

And following a fall, his health started deteriorating.

He struggled with life back in the real world after over three decades of isolation.

“I became so used to the silence. Now it’s continuous noise,” he said.
Then, in early 2025, he died at the age of 85.
“I’m the living proof that a second, new life is possible,” Morandi once said. 

“You can always start all over again, even if you’re over 80, because there are other things you can experience, a totally different world. I’m happy and I have rediscovered the pleasure of living the good life and enjoying everyday comforts.”
Rest in peace.

 

Links :

• GeoGarage blog : Meet the man who has lived alone on this island for 28 years

Saudi Arabia steps into the battle for control of the Red Sea

From The Shipping Brief 

Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea moment has arrived

Saudi Arabia has announced the formation of a new multinational maritime coalition aimed at protecting commercial shipping routes across the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Gulf of Aden, some of the most strategically important waterways in global trade.

The initiative reflects growing concerns over the vulnerability of maritime corridors that connect Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

The Red Sea route is a critical artery for energy shipments, container trade and supply chains, with thousands of vessels passing through the region each year to access the Suez Canal and wider international markets.

The announcement follows a summit held in Riyadh attended by representatives from 43 countries and the European Union.

Fourteen countries have so far committed to participating in the Saudi-led framework, including Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey and Sudan.

The coalition is expected to focus on three core areas: intelligence sharing, coordinated naval operations and maintaining freedom of navigation.

While details of the operational structure remain limited, the initiative suggests a greater willingness among regional powers to take a more active role in maritime security.

Why the Red Sea has become a strategic flashpoint

The formation of the coalition comes amid a period of heightened instability around key maritime chokepoints in the Middle East.

Since late 2023, attacks by Yemen’s Houthi movement on commercial vessels in and around the Red Sea have disrupted one of the world’s busiest shipping routes.

Several major shipping companies have diverted vessels away from the Bab al-Mandab Strait, opting instead for longer routes around the Cape of Good Hope to reduce security risks.

The Bab al-Mandab Strait, located between Yemen and Djibouti and Eritrea, is a narrow maritime passage connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden.

Its strategic importance comes from its role as a gateway between the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal, through which a significant share of global trade normally passes.

At the same time, wider regional tensions — particularly concerns surrounding Iran and the security of the Strait of Hormuz — have added further pressure on Middle Eastern energy routes.

The Strait of Hormuz remains the world’s most important oil transit chokepoint, with a significant proportion of global crude and liquefied natural gas exports passing through it.

Any prolonged disruption in the area could have major implications for energy markets.

Saudi Arabia’s energy security calculations

For Saudi Arabia, maritime security in the Red Sea has a direct connection to national energy strategy.

The kingdom has invested heavily in diversifying its export routes through the East-West Pipeline, also known as Petroline, which transports crude oil from fields in the east of the country to the Red Sea port of Yanbu.

This infrastructure provides Saudi Arabia with an alternative pathway for exporting crude without relying entirely on the Strait of Hormuz.

As geopolitical risks increase in the Gulf, the Red Sea has become increasingly important to Saudi Aramco’s ability to maintain reliable access to international markets.

Protecting shipping lanes in the region therefore serves not only broader international trade interests but also Saudi Arabia’s own economic and energy security objectives.

A new layer in regional maritime security

The Saudi-led coalition adds another dimension to existing international efforts to secure Red Sea shipping.

The United States launched Operation Prosperity Guardian in late 2023 to coordinate maritime protection efforts in response to attacks on commercial vessels.

The European Union also established Operation Aspides, a defensive naval mission designed to help protect merchant shipping and ensure freedom of navigation.

The emergence of a Saudi-led initiative suggests a broader shift toward regional ownership of maritime security.

While international naval deployments remain important, Gulf and Red Sea states are increasingly seeking a stronger role in managing risks in their surrounding waters.
What this means for global trade

The security of the Red Sea is closely linked to the stability of global supply chains.

Disruptions in this corridor can increase shipping costs, extend delivery times and create additional pressure on energy markets.

The creation of a new multinational coalition does not immediately eliminate the risks facing commercial shipping, but it represents an important step toward improving coordination between regional and international actors.

As geopolitical competition intensifies across the Middle East, control and security of maritime chokepoints will remain a central factor shaping energy flows, trade routes and regional influence.

Links :

• Reuters : Turkey lays out plans for defence pact with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
• The Conversation : Saudi defence pact with Turkey and Pakistan is a verdict on the reliability of US security guarantees 

China’s ‘Xuelong 2’ begins first ice station survey in central Arctic Ocean

Chinese research icebreaker Xuelong 2 Photo: VCG

From Global Times by Lu Wenao

 

China's research icebreaker Xuelong 2 began its first ice station survey of its current voyage near 84 degrees north latitude in the central Arctic Ocean on Sunday, marking the start of an approximately half-month comprehensive survey of the region.

After completing the first stage of comprehensive ocean station surveys on Friday, Xuelong 2 sailed toward higher latitudes and selected a large, relatively flat piece of sea ice about 1.5 meters thick in a densely packed ice zone for its first ice station.

According to Lin Long, captain of the Xuelong 2 sea ice team, the ice station survey conducted by the vessel during this voyage will include six short-term ice stations and one long-term ice station, the Xinhua News Agency reported Sunday.

More than 20 types of scientific operations will be carried out, including the deployment of expendable ice-based buoys, snow and ice-core sampling, under-ice water sampling, sea-ice remote sensing, atmospheric profiling and under-ice oceanographic observations.

Lan Musheng, assistant to the chief scientist of the expedition, said the researchers will comprehensively monitor changes in parameters related to the atmosphere, sea ice, upper ocean and ecological processes beneath the ice as the sea ice melts.

The observations will provide scientific data for studying the rapid changes in Arctic sea ice, the mechanisms behind those changes and the evolution of Arctic ecosystems.

The ice station work is part of China's 16th Arctic Ocean scientific expedition, which was organized by the Ministry of Natural Resources. The expedition set sail from Dalian, Northeast China's Liaoning Province on July 3.

The mission is being carried out by four vessels - Xuelong, Xuelong 2, Jidi and Tansuo-3 - and is expected to be completed in early October. 

The expedition is focusing on comprehensive surveys of sea ice, hydrology, biology, ecology and the atmospheric environment in key areas of the Arctic Ocean.

The two icebreakers Xuelong and Xuelong 2 will work together on the ice station surveys. Xuelong completed surveys at 12 ice stations on Friday.

Lin said the ice station locations planned for Xuelong 2 will work in coordination with those of Xuelong to form an observation array.

The arrangement will allow researchers to more deeply investigate the interactions among the atmosphere, sea ice and ocean in the central Arctic Ocean amid rapid environmental changes, as well as their coupling effects with the ecosystem.

The expedition is being conducted against a backdrop of rapid changes in the Arctic environment.

When the mission was launched in July, expedition leader Wang Jinhui said that global warming was driving rapid and profound changes in the Arctic natural environment, with trends such as sea-ice melting intensifying.

The expedition is therefore designed not only to monitor environmental changes but also to investigate frontier scientific questions, including the dynamic evolution of the oceanic crust.

Working on sea ice also presents significant safety challenges.

Low temperatures and complex ice-surface conditions can pose risks to researchers, while polar bears are considered the biggest safety risk during ice station operations.

The expedition team has therefore formulated specific bear-prevention and emergency response plans and equipped personnel with various types of bear-deterrence equipment and emergency supplies to ensure their safety.

Links :

• People.cn : China's research icebreaker Xuelong 2 carries out operations at ice stations in Arctic Ocean
• CGTN : Xuelong 2 begins 1st ice station survey during 16th Arctic expedition
• CBC : Canada, U.S. shadow Chinese research ships in the Arctic as concern grows over Snow Dragons' presence 
• Financial Times : China bypasses shipping chokepoints with 'Ice Silk Road' through Arctic

Why the Aug. 12 total solar eclipse appears to move backward on maps

A global map of the shadow path for the Aug. 12, 2026, total solar eclipse.
(Image credit: NASA's Scientific Visualization Studio)

From LiveScience by Jamie Carter

While eclipse paths always move from west to east, this one seems to reverse direction on maps as it crosses the Arctic. Here's the geometry behind the illusion.

 
Every total solar eclipse travels from west to east, because the moon and Earth move in the same direction — counterclockwise, or from west to east.

Earth rotates eastward once every 24 hours, and the moon also travels eastward as it orbits our planet.

Because the moon's shadow moves across Earth faster than the planet rotates beneath it, the path of totality (the route of the moon's umbra, the darkest part of its inner shadow) always sweeps from west to east.

But if you've looked at maps of the Aug. 12, 2026, total solar eclipse, you may have noticed something puzzling. At first glance, the eclipse appears to do the exact opposite.

The path seems to begin in far northern Siberia, near the North Pole, before heading toward eastern Greenland, making it look as though the moon's shadow were traveling from east to west. It then appears to curve over western Iceland and northern Spain.

So what's going on?

The apparent reversal from Siberia to Greenland is an illusion.

It's created by geometry, but it's also a result of viewing the eclipse on a flat map instead of on a globe. The moon's shadow follows a smooth arc across Earth's curved surface and never changes direction, as shown by this animation.

This eclipse passes so close to the North Pole that the distortion caused by map projections makes the track appear to bend back on itself, when in reality, the shadow is simply sweeping over the top of the world.

An animation of the shadow path for the Aug. 12, 2026, total solar eclipse, from the point of view of the moon.
(Image credit: Michael Zeiler at EclipseAtlas.com/Fred Espenak at EclipseWise.com)

"The path of this eclipse also has a strong north-south component, the combined effect of Earth's rotation and the tilt of both Earth's axis and the Moon's orbit," experts at NASA's Scientific Visualization Studio explained. 

"Combined with Earth's rotation, the umbra's eastern motion during the first half of its travel is effectively canceled out."

This causes the shadow to sweep over the Arctic in a broad curve, instead of following the more familiar west-to-east path. 

On a flat map, that curved route can make it look as though the eclipse briefly reverses direction, even though it never actually does.

The moon's shadow has two parts — the narrow umbra, where observers experience totality, and the much broader penumbra, where only a partial eclipse is visible.

The widths of these shadows depend on the moon's distance from Earth, while their speed is influenced by the moon's orbit, Earth's rotation and the geometry of the eclipse.

If you are among the millions of people who will be in the moon's penumbra on Aug. 12, make sure to always wear a pair of certified solar eclipse glasses (or use a solar filter on your telescope or binoculars) to view the partial eclipse.

It is never safe to look directly at the sun, except during the moment of totality, when the sun is 100% covered.

 

Links :

• LiveScience :  Where and when to see the Aug. 12 solar eclipse — exact times for North America and Europe / Which solar eclipse viewing method is right for you? / How to make a solar eclipse viewer to safely watch the solar eclipse on August 12 / Why Aug. 12 could be the greatest single day and night for skywatchers for years 
• NASA : Total Solar Eclipse
• The Guardian : Europe’s total solar eclipse: the best place to see it and how to view it safely
• Sky&Telescope : Where to see the August 12th solar eclipse online 

How long can Iran weaponise Hormuz?

photograph: ap

From The Economist by 

 

Longer than the world hopes, according to our Hormuz dependency dashboard 

For years the world has feared that Iran has been pursuing nuclear arms.

Five months of war have taught the country’s rulers they were already in possession of a formidable weapon.

Geography and firepower give them de facto command of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil and liquid natural gas (lng) normally flows.

Choking that artery has given Iran’s leaders immense leverage over their adversaries.

Iran’s foes hope that Hormuz will prove to be a wasting asset.

Shutting Hormuz is “a card you can play once,” said Chris Wright, America’s energy secretary, in May.

 Gulf states are busily seeking alternative export routes.

Tom Barrack, Donald Trump’s envoy to Iraq and Syria, reckons the strait will be “an afterthought in two years”.

The Economist has interviewed experts and analysed data to build a “Hormuz dependency dashboard” to test these claims.

It points to three conclusions.

First, the staying power of the Iranian threat varies by commodity and country.

Second, Iran’s ability to cash in on the strait will diminish but may never vanish.

Third, even if the fees Iran can charge diminish over time, its strategic leverage will not necessarily fade in step.

Indeed, it may even deepen as the regime institutionalises its regional influence.

Start with how much Hormuz traffic could simply circumvent it.

Some 16m barrels of crude oil crossed the strait daily before the war.

That looks easiest to divert. Saudi Arabia’s east-west pipeline, which avoids the strait by crossing the peninsula to Yanbu on the Red Sea carried just 1m barrels a day (b/d) for export before the war.

Today it is running at its full 7m b/d capacity.

Nearly 5m b/d of that is exported; the rest feeds coastal refineries.

The United Arab Emirates (uae) has maxed out its Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, which carries 1.8m b/d, up from 1m b/d before the war.

Some 200,000 b/d flows through a smaller, once-idle Iraqi pipeline to Turkey.

 

chart: the economist

That narrows the crude-export deficit to 10m b/d. Now add new pipelines likely to be built as a result of the war.

Land acquisition poses no problems in the Gulf’s command-and-control economies, says a lawyer familiar with the subject.

The most advanced, in the uae, would run parallel to the existing line, adding 1.8m b/d by late 2027.

Iraq aims to raise the capacity of its pipeline to 1m b/d within a year.

It also plans a new one to connect its southern fields to existing routes to Jordan, Syria and Turkey.

Contracts for the 2.5m b/d project are being awarded and it should be done within four years, says Rahul Choudhary of Rystad Energy, a consultancy.

So by 2030 another 5m b/d of crude could bypass Hormuz.

But that still leaves the same amount with no alternative route.

And none of these fixes is foolproof.

Iraqi projects could be derailed by security risks and cross-border rows. Many dreamed-up pipelines never see the light of day.

Tankers leaving Yanbu for Asia usually sail via the Bab al-Mandab strait, where they are vulnerable to attacks by Iran-allied Houthi rebels.

Saudi crude could travel via the Suez canal or Egypt’s Sumed pipeline.

But even that route may not be safe: on July 29th a drone hit a tanker at Damietta, a port near Suez.

 

map: the economist

Iran—or its proxies—could attack any new infrastructure that it fears depletes Hormuz’s power. Barbara Leaf, who worked on Middle East policy in the Biden administration, reckons Iran would be less likely to hit such sites if the conflict ends in a negotiated settlement.

But the lingering risk of attacks could still push up insurance and financing costs for such projects.

Rerouting refined products is even harder.

Gulf countries shipped nearly 5m b/d of petrol, diesel and other fuels via Hormuz last year.

No overland pipeline alternatives exist for these.

Saudi Arabia has plans for one as part of a 2m-b/d expansion to its East-West corridor.

But that is still at an early stage and would need a similar increase in Yanbu’s capacity.

Iraq is sending 1,000 lorries of fuel oil to Syria a day, up from ten pre-war.

But that is slow and pricey.

Syria has earned $15m-20m in transit receipts from the traffic alone since the conflict began.

New refineries outside the Gulf would take even longer to build than pipelines and cost billions of dollars. 

 

chart: the economist

The problem is most acute for lng, exported almost exclusively by Qatar. No lng pipeline is under construction and no feasibility studies have been published. Qatar could in theory lay simpler gas pipes to Oman, but they would need to carry as much gas as Russia’s Nord Stream pipelines once delivered to Europe. More implausible still, Qatar’s entire liquefaction complex would need recreating on the Arabian Sea coast.

There is some room for hope. Most importers can, in time, wean themselves off Hormuz supplies. A few years of high prices could elicit an extra 2-3m b/d from the Americas and beyond. China’s refineries still hold ample spare capacity. lng is riding the fastest expansion in its history. So Iran’s leverage over global prices will weaken before the decade is out.

The same is not true of its hold over its Gulf neighbours—and not just because a sizeable share of their energy exports will still need Hormuz for years. Many also depend on the strait for imports. The Gulf Arab states rely on external suppliers for 95% of their grain but only Saudi Arabia has decent bulk-handling terminals, and these are not big enough to supply the whole region. Nor is moving lots of grain, iron ore or bauxite overland viable: a single Panamax vessel carries 60,000 tonnes of cereal, enough to fill 2,000 trucks.

 

chart: the economist

One obvious fix would be more regional railways but these would also be slow and costly to build.

Past mining-railway projects in Australia, built across similar desert terrain, have cost $12m-15m a kilometre. So a Red Sea-to-Qatar line could run to $25bn or more.

They have strategic grain stockpiles that typically cover four to six months of demand.

But there is no equivalent for containerised goods such as fresh food, medicines and appliances.

The region’s biggest container port, Jebel Ali, which has a capacity for nearly 20m 20-foot equivalent units (teu) a year, sits inside the Gulf.

Outside the strait, the largest is Jeddah which can hold 7.5m teu.

It was already running near full tilt before the war, says Alexis Ellender of Kpler, a data firm.

So our analysis suggests that Iran will be able to weaponise Hormuz for some time—and monetise it. Gulf states’ varying exposure may mean they diverge in what they will tolerate to get their ships moving.

Qatar has suggested that it could accept temporary fees; others have held a tougher line.

But now even the hawkish uae has softened: it is starting to trade with Iran again and their diplomats are talking.

Assuming it retains control of Hormuz, how much can Iran hope to make from it?

An Iranian mp claimed in June that the country was collecting $1.5m-2m per vessel transiting the strait.

That implies takings of more than $35bn a year, assuming traffic at about 70% of pre-war levels.
You cannot be serious

That figure is eye-popping—and implausible.

Rates set at gunpoint, in a market with nowhere else to go, will not survive a settlement allowing near-normal flows to resume.

Draft legislation submitted to Iran’s parliament in June envisages rates based on cargo volume, value and vessel type, with one constraint: the charge must stay below the cost of the next-best alternative.

Prices could also vary depending on the nationality of the owner or charterer.

Shahin Iraninejad of gssi, a sovereign-risk advisory, points out that another legislative proposal posits an average fee of €3 a tonne in Iranian waters and €2 in international waters.

He puts expected future income at a more modest $2-3bn a year.

As bypass capacity grows, that would drop—but not uniformly.

Crude tankers can hope for a bargain soon; oil-product, lng and bulk carriers may face higher fees for years.

Whether such revenue flows prove durable depends on shipping firms’ ability and willingness to pay.

As long as charges are predictable, easy to settle and below war-risk premiums, many probably will, says Richard Meade of Lloyd’s List, a shipping journal.

But that would change if vessels repeatedly manage to traverse the strait without paying Iran.

A tension emerges: Iran needs peace with America for its fee regime to function.

But it will need to keep up attacks on disobedient tankers to ensure the fees are paid—which could make peace hard to maintain.

On the brighter side, Iran might drop its fees faster than it needs to. Its strategic objective, says Mr Meade, appears to be maintaining market participation and reinforcing its role as gatekeeper, rather than maximising revenue.

More gloomily, it wants something more lasting: a governance system—whether a bilateral framework with Oman, a maritime-services architecture or a permit regime.

The ease with which Iran seized its new weapon shocked its foes. Its grip on Hormuz looks set to outlast the war.

 

Links : 

• The Economist :  Can Iran keep weaponising Hormuz? / Gulf states should make a deal with Iran on Hormuz 

Divers recover a bottle of Guinness from a 162-year-old shipwreck

The site of the shipwreck of the Mindoro, which sunk in 1864. (Stefan Panis)

From WashingtonPost by Miriam Waldvogel

The team discovered the bottle with a seal that says “Guinness Extra Stout, London” while exploring a shipwreck in the English Channel

The dark glass bottle was one of dozens strewn around the sunken ship when the divers spotted it. Unlike many others, though, its seal was intact, and up on the surface, they could make out the words: “Guinness Extra Stout, London.”

The antique ale is thought to be 162 years old.

The team discovered the bottle while diving a shipwreck in the English Channel last year but waited to publicize the find more extensively while they conducted research, including contacting the company itself. They hope, with the help of a lab at KU Leuven, a university in Belgium, there’s a chance the historical draft could even be re-created.
“It is quite rare to find something with a seal on it,” said Stefan Panis, one of the divers. “We are very, very excited to see what the test will reveal.”

 

A bottle has a seal that reads "Guinness Extra Stout London." (Stefan Panis)

 

A bell found at the site indicates that the wreck is a ship called the Mindoro, which set sail for Vancouver from London on Nov. 20, 1864. A week later, navigating through a treacherous part of the English Channel, it collided with another ship and sank to the bottom of the ocean, where its contents sat in cold and dark conditions — ideal for preserving a bottle of beer, like the back of a fridge.

If the bottle managed to keep out the seawater, there is a chance the Guinness might still be sippable — the alcohol would have prevented things from growing inside, said Kevin Verstrepen, who runs a lab at KU Leuven that studies yeast and fermentation.
But the Guinness brewed at the time might not have been quite as palatable as modern brews.
“In the old days, brewers were not as good working sterilely. Probably, from a microbial point of view, it was a bit of a zoo there,” Verstrepen said, which means the beer could have sour or funky flavors.
Additionally, Guinness made in that period would not have been carbonated by nitrogen, which was introduced in the 1960s and gives the beer its smooth texture and creamy head.

The company has been based in Dublin since 1759. But there is also evidence that at least some Guinness was bottled in London in the mid-19th century.

Diageo, the British alcohol conglomerate that now owns Guinness, did not respond to a request for comment. The company previously told the Irish Times that it was evaluating the find.
There is probably more Guinness to be discovered in the wreck. While the one recovered bottle was found out in the open, the divers also found wooden crates packed with bottles and stored upside-down. They also plan to examine records that they think will contain the ship’s manifest.

The divers plan to go back in two weeks to recover four additional bottles, two for the Verstrepen lab and two for the company, Panis said.
It’s unlikely that the lab will be able directly recover original yeast, Verstrepen said, because beer yeast does not have a long lifespan after bottling. However, he thinks they can find traces of yeast DNA in the hopes of finding a close living relative to re-create the brew.

“With sequencing the DNA … we can see exactly where it is on this family tree, and then we can look for modern living siblings of that yeast,” he said.
As rare as the find is, one of Panis’s partners, Pawel Truszynski, had experience in unearthing antique alcohol before. Truszynski was part of another team that in 2024 discovered a 19th-century shipwreck in the Baltic Sea laden with 100 sealed bottles of champagne.
In 2014, a different group of researchers recovered a 200-year-old bottle of distilled spirit from a shipwreck off the coast of Poland.
And a small brewery in Sunderland, England, at one point sold a porter made with yeast cultured from old bottles found in a different shipwreck in the English Channel, that one from 1825.

Surfin penguin

This is the moment a Cape penguin jumped onto a surfboard and rode the waves pic.twitter.com/IIfRYQExEH

— Science girl (@sciencegirl) August 6, 2026

Carlo Borlenghi

 “Navigo in mari inesplorati, ma c’è una bussola nel mio cuore che conosce la strada”.… 

 E. Dickinson

 

 Carlo Borlenghi has immortalized thirteen America's Cups, portraying, with his famous and iconic shots, the evolution of the event and the boats in over thirty years of career.

The power of the foils that slice through the water, the emotion in the eyes of the crew, the tension of a match race, they all become palpable in his photos that not only fix the moment, but transform it into art.

 

Links :

• Giornale della vela : Addio Carlo

How whaling strengthens the bonds uniting nation-states and Indigenous peoples

Jerry Arey, Moses Kayotuk and Larry Arey atop a landed bowhead.

 

From Arctic Today by Barry Scott ZellenJuly 24, 2026

Remembering the Great Bowhead Hunt of 1991

 

For more than four decades, my work as an Arctic scholar has been animated by a single, foundational truth: the global arena is not merely a collection of Westphalian states competing for structural dominance.
While classical international relations theory fixates on oversimplified structures such as Kenneth Waltz’s classic “three images,” it leaves an analytical void at the foundational level of human organization.

To fill this gap, I have advanced 4th Image Theory.
This framework recognizes that beneath and before the modern state lies a deeper, older reality: the tribal, sub-state, and indigenous polities that have survived millennia of change.
These are not mere domestic minorities; they are enduring sovereign entities whose governance models, land claims, and cultural practices provide a platform for enduring regional stability.

Nowhere is the intersection of state sovereignty and indigenous self-determination more sharply defined — or more routinely misunderstood —than in the deep blue waters of our global commons.
For decades, the international community, led by urban activists far removed from the realities of life on and by the sea, has viewed the harvest of cetaceans through the singular lens of prohibition.
Whaling has been falsely cast as an archaic, ecologically destructive relic of a bygone era.

This view is profoundly flawed.
It ignores both the success of modern conservation and the deep, constitutional evolution of native land claims.

When we look past the emotive rhetoric of anti-whaling campaigns, a startling paradox emerges.
The sustainable management of whaling is not a point of permanent division.
Instead, it offers a powerful framework for bridging the gap between sovereign nation-states and Indigenous peoples, forging a shared, collaborative international order.

Alternative:

To understand how whaling can unite rather than divide, one need only look to the Western Arctic.
In 1982, Canada made the decision to withdraw from the International Whaling Commission (IWC).
This move was not an act of environmental defiance; it was a pragmatic recognition of domestic political realities.

At the time, Ottawa was deep in negotiations over comprehensive land claims agreements with Arctic Indigenous peoples —treaties that would ultimately reshape governance of the Northwest Territories and lead to the creation of Nunavut.

By stepping away from the rigid, often deadlocked dictates of the IWC, Ottawa cleared a path to restore the traditional Inuvialuit and Inuit bowhead whale hunting.
It replaced distant, centralized and neocolonial governance with an innovative domestic model based on co-management.

Through boards composed of both indigenous hunters and federal biologists, decisions on quotas, sustainability, and ecosystem monitoring were co-produced.
Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) was elevated to equal standing with Western empirical science.

The foundational proving ground for this paradigm shift occurred on Sept.
3, 1991, in the waters off Shingle Point.
For over half a century, the Inuvialuit had been denied the right to hunt a bowhead whale (Arviq), a restriction born of global conservation anxieties that completely ignored the ecological balance maintained by the original inhabitants of the coast.



The 1991 hunt was one of many fruits of the historic 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) — the first Canadian comprehensive land claim settlement north of 60.
This treaty did not merely grant land rights; it erected a revolutionary, constitutionally protected architecture for wildlife co-management.
When the Inuvialuit Game Council and the newly formed Fisheries Joint Management Committee approved a license for a single bowhead, they were putting the constitutional teeth of their land claim to the test.

The hunt itself became a masterclass in cross-generational, cross-cultural collaboration.
Because a full 54 years had passed since the last local bowhead harvest, the Inuvialuit faced a profound rupture in practical whaling knowledge.
To bridge this historical chasm, they looked across the border to their Inupiat kin in Alaska.

Experienced whaling captains from the North Slope traveled to the Mackenzie Delta, bringing with them modern safety protocols, traditional tracking techniques, and specialized harvesting equipment.
This included penthrite projectile bombs designed to ensure a humane, efficient kill.

On Sept. 4, a crew led by Inuvialuit whaling captain Danny A. Gordon successfully landed a 36-foot, 40-ton bowhead whale.
The event was a profound cultural awakening, but its political implications were even greater.

The processing of the whale on the beaches of Shingle Point required the mobilization of whole communities — Aklavik, Inuvik, Tuktoyaktuk —distributing muktuk (skin and blubber) across the region according to ancient laws of sharing that reinforce social cohesion.

For the Canadian state, this was a watershed moment in regulatory flexibility.
Federal fisheries officers worked alongside indigenous hunters — not as adversarial enforcers, but as technical partners.
The 1991 harvest proved to a skeptical international community that an indigenous polity, armed with modern legal authority and rooted in traditional ecological wisdom, could safely manage a protected species without state paternalism.
It transformed the concept of conservation from a top-down mandate into a collaborative, treaty-based partnership between indigenous peoples and the state.

This historical lesson demonstrates that when a nation-state respects the maritime traditions of its Indigenous peoples, it does not weaken its own sovereignty; it actually strengthens the fabric of its domestic peace.

The restoration of the bowhead hunt in the Western Arctic did not spark ecological collapse.
Instead, it revitalized community cohesion, strengthened food security in an economically marginalized region, and integrated indigenous governance directly into the structural machinery of the state.

In recent years, we have seen history repeating itself, with Tokyo’s decision to exit the IWC in 2019, following in Canada’s footsteps so that Japan, too, could resume coastal whaling within its own territorial waters and EEZ.

Japan’s pivot offers a compelling point of alignment with northern Indigenous communities.
Small, historic whaling towns of coastal Japan —such as Taiji, Wada, and Ayukawa — possess a deep maritime heritage that mirrors the subsistence culture of the Inuvialuit.
For coastal communities of both the Arctic and the Pacific, the whale isn’t merely a resource to be extracted; it is an economic anchor, a dietary staple, and the focus of deep cultural veneration.

When modern states like Japan, Iceland and Norway defend their right to utilize abundant marine resources sustainably under international law, they are fighting the exact same battle against eco-colonialism that Indigenous communities have waged for generations.

By reframing the whaling debate around the principles of sustainability, food security, and cultural survival, we create a powerful common denominator: sovereign nations defending their maritime rights and indigenous polities protecting their ancestral subsistence traditions find themselves standing on the same side of the geopolitical ledger.
They are united by a shared commitment to what I call constructive realism—a pragmatism that recognizes that real-world stability requires balancing ecological limits with human survival and cultural continuity.

The international community must stop viewing whaling as a binary conflict between conservationists and exploiters.
Instead, it must be recognized as a sophisticated arena for co-management, where the sovereign rights of coastal states and the inherent rights of First Nations converge.
By honoring Native traditions through robust, collaborative, and scientifically sound frameworks, we do not fracture global unity.
Instead, we ground it in the realities of our shared environment, proving that international relations are at their most resilient when they honor the tribal foundations upon which our world was built.

From Hormuz to the Black Sea: Maritime battlefields are shaping ‘a new world order’

Satellite view of Tuapse Oil Refinery, Russia.
Ukrainian drones struck fuel storage tanks at the Rosneft‑operated facility, igniting a major fire visible for kilometers.
Gallo Images | Gallo Images | Getty Images

 

From CNBC by  

• Attacks and threats around the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Black Sea and Sea of Azov are disrupting commercial shipping routes.
  
• Roughly 80% of global merchandise trade by volume moves by sea, so chokepoint disruption can affect energy, food and consumer goods prices.
  
• Shipping companies are weighing rerouting, insurance costs, inventory buffers and emerging risks around routes including the Panama Canal.

The Strait of Hormuz is rattling global trade, but the waterway is just one example of a vital maritime corridor becoming a frontline, in a new age of drones and missiles targeting economic lifelines.

From the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea to the Black Sea, attacks on commercial vessels have disrupted trade, raised insurance and freight costs, and forced shipping companies to reconsider routes once treated as dependable.

The stakes are high: roughly 80% of global merchandise trade by volume moves by sea.
Disrupting even one major route can delay cargo, tighten supplies and drive up prices for energy, food and consumer goods thousands of miles away.

How drones are changing maritime warfare

“We have a new chokepoint and a new war,” David Roche, president and global strategist at Quantum Strategy, wrote in a July report, referring to the Sea of Azov, where Ukrainian drones have been striking Russian tankers, and the Black Sea.

 

Roche described this fighting as the first maritime offensive conducted almost entirely with drones, supplemented by missiles.
Such weapons give smaller military forces a cheaper means of threatening ships, ports and other infrastructure whose disruption carries a huge economic cost.

Quantum estimates that about 25% of Russia’s grain exports and 25% to 30% of its Black Sea oil exports could be disrupted.
Russia grows more than a fifth of internationally traded wheat, magnifying the potential consequences for global food prices.

Yevgeniya Gaber, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council think tank, said Russia’s move earlier this month to suspend shipping through the Kerch Strait, which connects the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, has effectively shut down a vital maritime corridor.

“Maritime transport through the Sea of Azov had become an increasingly important alternative to the land corridor connecting Russia with occupied Crimea,” Gaber told CNBC by email.

“The economic implications are equally important,” Gaber said, adding that the Sea of Azov has been used not only to transport sanctioned crude oil and petroleum products but also grain, coal and steel.

Gaber said Ukraine’s efforts to exploit Russia’s maritime and economic weaknesses constitute “one of the most significant blows to military and commercial fleets” since World War II.
Indeed, Ukraine says it has degraded roughly one-third of Russia’s Black Sea fleet since 2022. 

Why the Panama Canal could be the next flashpoint

In the Strait of Hormuz, commercial operators are contending with attacks and rapidly shifting signals over whether passage is safe.
Governments can declare a waterway open, but shipowners make their own decisions based on the likelihood of a vessel being hit and crew members being injured or killed.

“We often treat the Strait of Hormuz, the Black Sea, or Bab el-Mandeb as isolated events.
They are not,” said Daejin Lee, global head of research at Fertistream Freight.

“These waterways are increasingly becoming battlegrounds within the broader transition toward a new world order,” he told CNBC via email.

And the next threats are already emerging.

“If you’re talking about the next flashpoint, I wouldn’t look at the Strait of Hormuz,” said Lars Jensen, chief executive officer of Vespucci Maritime.
“I would look at the Panama Canal.”

The strategic passage, which has offered a shortcut for ships transiting between the Pacific and the North Atlantic for more than a century, is already caught in a geopolitical dispute involving the U.S., China and Panama over influence.
Potential weather-related restrictions toward the end of this year and early next year could compound those tensions by reducing capacity, Jensen added.
 

Impact on shipping ‘bigger than most realize’ 

For shipping companies, the challenge is preparing for a world where the next chokepoint can emerge before the last one has reopened.

Kevin O’Marah, co-founder and chief research officer at supply chain intelligence firm Zero100, told CNBC the Strait of Hormuz became the most critical part of the U.S.-Iran war after Iran discovered merely threatening traffic there was enough to stop it.

While none of Zero100′s clients had come under attack in the strait, O’Marah said some had decided to avoid that risk by actively managing inventories and rerouting shipments.

“It has added cost and delay for some of our clients in the energy, food, and electronics industries,” he said.
“As of now, traffic through the Strait looks to be running at about half the normal flow.
The recent breakdown in the ceasefire has definitely hurt the situation but no one is surprised.
Supply chain leaders, and in particular logistics specialists like Martin Brower and Maersk, are aware and have well established protocols for dealing with the risk.”

This photo obtained by AFP from the Iranian news agency Tasnim shows an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) boat allegedly taking part in an operation to seize ships attempting to cross the Strait of Hormuz, on April 21, 2026.
Meysam Mirzadeh | Afp | Getty Images

Mitigation strategies include rerouting across the Arabian Peninsula via pipeline for oil, overland into Turkey for certain kinds of commodities and avoiding the area completely as much as possible, O’Marah said.

The war in the Middle East “does not look like an escalating conflict to most supply chain leaders, but it does look likely to be a long-term problem in terms of freedom of movement through the Strait of Hormuz,” he added.

“We are planning on a steady state of transportation uncertainty and costs associated with reroutings, inventory buffering, and shipping surcharges.”

Alain Bejjani, a Dubai-based investor, business executive and judge on “Shark Tank Lebanon,” told CNBC shipping lanes would stay at the center of the war “because they are the conflict.”

“The war has migrated from territory to logistics.
A strait does not close when missiles fly; it closes when insurers stop writing cover,” he said.
“That makes disruption cheap to sustain and hard to price, which is exactly why it persists.”

 

A spokesperson for insurance broker Gallagher told CNBC war risk insurance — an add-on that covers financial losses caused by war, terrorism, and civil unrest — is still available.
But they noted that “a handful but not many” ship owners or charters are opting to travel through the Strait of Hormuz.

“Given the challenging maritime security environment, rates have increased from levels that owners and charterers will be used to.
The cost will vary depending on the vessel type, cargo and routing, however marine insurers are continuing to provide cover and helping to ensure marine commerce can continue with adequate coverage in place,” they added.

How companies are responding to shipping risks

Bejjani told CNBC that the structural consequence of maritime warfare “is bigger than most people realize.”

“The Gulf is bracketed by two straits, not one, and the region is now designing around both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb to the maximum extent possible,” he said.

“That is new. Past crises produced hedges. This one is producing an architecture: overland corridors, bypass pipelines, forward storage near the markets that matter most. It will cost heavily, take a decade, and ripple for decades more. I expect other strait-dependent regions to follow, though few with the same urgency or resources.”

Vessels transit the Bab el-Mandeb Strait off the coast of southern Yemen on July 25, 2026.
Khaled Ziad | Afp | Getty Images

He warned that, although shipping will maintain its edge in terms of volumes, it is likely to “lose its monopoly on trust” in the business world.

“Other modes of transport will be substantially enhanced where certainty matters most, and redundancy becomes a permanent, priced feature of logistics,” he said.
“The strait will reopen. The assumption that it stays open for free will not return.”

 

Links :

• The pioneer : The seas need rules, not just warships
• SeaNews : The New Normal in Hormuz: How Shipowners Plan for Permanent Uncertainty