In December over 1,000 Chinese fishing boats lined up to form an L shape in the seas north of Taiwan. Over the next few months they coalesced again on four more occasions. Our animated maps visualise the unprecedented activity https://t.co/rWSIFrx6LL pic.twitter.com/90Nb3pPOCF
— The Economist (@TheEconomist) July 26, 2026
In December over 1,000 Chinese fishing boats lined up to form an L shape in the seas north of Taiwan. Over the next few months they coalesced again on four more occasions. Our animated maps visualise the unprecedented activity
Source: Starboard Maritime Intelligence
From The Economist by
Big new formations north of Taiwan suggest officials are testing out its capabilities
The bays of the Zhoushan archipelago are crammed with blue-hulled fishing boats, laid up after a busy season scouring the East China Sea for crabs and croaker.
Some of the boats, though, have been doing more than just fishing.
In December over 1,000 vessels from Zhoushan and other parts of China’s eastern seaboard did something unprecedented.
They lined up to form an L shape in the seas north of Taiwan, held the formation for more than 12 hours, then dispersed.
Over the next few months Chinese fishing boats coalesced again in the East China Sea, on four more occasions.
Chinese state-run media claim all this is normal commercial activity.
Something fishier is surely going on.
China is unusual in having three separate maritime forces at its disposal.
The first two are the navy and the coastguard.
But since as far back as the 1950s, China’s leaders have also commandeered part of the country’s fishing fleet as a paramilitary “maritime militia”.
This shadowy force is made up of a mixture of normal fishing boats and larger, steel-hulled ones which appear to be purpose-built for aggressive manoeuvres.
It is notorious for its activities in the South China Sea, where militia boats are often sent to disputed reefs and islets to secure China’s sovereignty claims, sometimes violently.
Fishing boats in the East China Sea had largely stuck to trawling.
That may be changing.
The recent formations there were far larger than anything seen before, even in the South China Sea, so it seems likely they brought together many ordinary fishing boats alongside formal militiamen.
They were packed densely enough that some cargo ships appeared to change course to go around them.
The manoeuvres suggest Chinese officials are testing out their capabilities—and some fear that could give China an edge in a conflict over Taiwan.
Fishing boats set sail in August 2025 from the bays of the Zhoushan archipelago, south of Shanghai.Fishing ban lifted in China and 2,500 boats just stormed out of Zhoushan like a seafood army
Image: Getty Images
Image: Getty Images
NEW:
— Megatron (@Megatron_ron) August 7, 2025
🇨🇳 Fishing ban lifted in China and 2,500 boats just stormed out of Zhoushan like a seafood army
The great crab haul begins… pic.twitter.com/Biv27E54Rq
No official numbers are published on the size of China’s maritime militia.
State news outlets sometimes deny that it even exists.
But an article published in 2014 in a Chinese defence journal praised the force as “irreplaceable” thanks to its “wide distribution, disguised identities and familiarity with maritime conditions”.
Unlike its navy, China’s militia gives officials plausible deniability for ambiguous “grey zone” activities: they can claim, for instance, that violent spats with other countries’ ships were caused by “patriotic fishermen” acting independently.
For decades the maritime militia had a reputation as a ragtag bunch, with antiquated weapons and poor discipline.
The average fisherman has only a limited education and greying hair (only 5% are below the age of 30, according to a survey in 2024; fishing is tough and few Chinese youths want to do it).
That means training them to use the latest communications technologies can be a challenge.
Motivation can also be a problem because compensation is reportedly low.
That is partly because the militia is meant to act out of patriotic duty rather than for personal gain, says Collin Koh of Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.
Local governments and military authorities also sometimes squabble over who should foot the bill.
But since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China has been trying to build what it calls a “new-style” maritime militia—one that is better equipped, trained and organised.
How much is being spent on this militia is hard to say.
Provinces and cities contribute towards a variety of schemes, and state-owned firms are encouraged to chip in.
Some fishing boats can get daily subsidies of over 24,000 yuan ($3,500) to loiter in disputed areas, more than enough to cover their costs and allowing owners to profit without doing any fishing.
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Modernisation has gone furthest in the South China Sea, a vast body of water which China claims almost in its entirety (six other countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines, have competing claims over the region, which is rich in fish stocks and energy resources).
Some locals have become full-time militiamen, crewing large steel-hulled vessels equipped with big water cannons.
They swarm around the shoals and reefs that China claims while surveilling and harassing foreign vessels.
Militia activities are inherently hard to track, but appear to have been steadily increasing in the South China Sea.
The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, a programme at CSIS, an American think-tank, uses satellite images to check for telltale signs such as vessels loitering without deploying fishing gear, or tying themselves together to form a floating barrier.
Last year it counted an average of 241 Chinese vessels that it believes were militia sailing in disputed areas of the region every day.
That was the highest number since CSIS started monitoring in 2021.
State news outlets sometimes deny that it even exists.
But an article published in 2014 in a Chinese defence journal praised the force as “irreplaceable” thanks to its “wide distribution, disguised identities and familiarity with maritime conditions”.
Unlike its navy, China’s militia gives officials plausible deniability for ambiguous “grey zone” activities: they can claim, for instance, that violent spats with other countries’ ships were caused by “patriotic fishermen” acting independently.
For decades the maritime militia had a reputation as a ragtag bunch, with antiquated weapons and poor discipline.
The average fisherman has only a limited education and greying hair (only 5% are below the age of 30, according to a survey in 2024; fishing is tough and few Chinese youths want to do it).
That means training them to use the latest communications technologies can be a challenge.
Motivation can also be a problem because compensation is reportedly low.
That is partly because the militia is meant to act out of patriotic duty rather than for personal gain, says Collin Koh of Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.
Local governments and military authorities also sometimes squabble over who should foot the bill.
But since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China has been trying to build what it calls a “new-style” maritime militia—one that is better equipped, trained and organised.
How much is being spent on this militia is hard to say.
Provinces and cities contribute towards a variety of schemes, and state-owned firms are encouraged to chip in.
Some fishing boats can get daily subsidies of over 24,000 yuan ($3,500) to loiter in disputed areas, more than enough to cover their costs and allowing owners to profit without doing any fishing.
advertisement
Modernisation has gone furthest in the South China Sea, a vast body of water which China claims almost in its entirety (six other countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines, have competing claims over the region, which is rich in fish stocks and energy resources).
Some locals have become full-time militiamen, crewing large steel-hulled vessels equipped with big water cannons.
They swarm around the shoals and reefs that China claims while surveilling and harassing foreign vessels.
Militia activities are inherently hard to track, but appear to have been steadily increasing in the South China Sea.
The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, a programme at CSIS, an American think-tank, uses satellite images to check for telltale signs such as vessels loitering without deploying fishing gear, or tying themselves together to form a floating barrier.
Last year it counted an average of 241 Chinese vessels that it believes were militia sailing in disputed areas of the region every day.
That was the highest number since CSIS started monitoring in 2021.
Militia vessels have long swarmed Whitsun Reef, part of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The boats often tie themselves together, as in this image from April.
Image: Satellite image ©2026 Vantor
China has disputes in the East China Sea too, with Japan and South Korea in addition to Taiwan.
But militiamen have historically been much less aggressive in the region, instead focusing on civilian matters like emergency relief after typhoons.
The East China Sea is less than one quarter the size of the South China Sea, and China’s claims there are over specific areas such as the uninhabited Senkaku islands (known as the Diaoyu in Chinese, and which Japan controls) rather than over the entire body of water.
Its coastguard should, therefore, be able to patrol and handle confrontations with other countries’ vessels without relying on civilian boats.
All of this adds to the mystery surrounding the recent formations.
Five took place in less than six months, according to IngeniSPACE, a research company tracking their movements.
But militiamen have historically been much less aggressive in the region, instead focusing on civilian matters like emergency relief after typhoons.
The East China Sea is less than one quarter the size of the South China Sea, and China’s claims there are over specific areas such as the uninhabited Senkaku islands (known as the Diaoyu in Chinese, and which Japan controls) rather than over the entire body of water.
Its coastguard should, therefore, be able to patrol and handle confrontations with other countries’ vessels without relying on civilian boats.
All of this adds to the mystery surrounding the recent formations.
Five took place in less than six months, according to IngeniSPACE, a research company tracking their movements.
Nagasaki Shanghai Zhoushan East China Sea
TAIWAN SOUTH KOREA
JejuJAPANOkinawa (Japan) CHINA
Chinese vessels, last known position
- The first assembled over 1,000 ships into two parallel formations, stretching 450km, around Christmas Day.
- During the next formation, in January, some boats stayed in place for over 30 hours.
Days earlier China had conducted large-scale war games around Taiwan. - In late March a new formation appeared 100km to the east and closer to Jeju, a South Korean island.
- Boats congregated for the latest formation, in April, on the same meridian, shortly before the start of China’s annual summer fishing ban.
Co-ordinating so many ships to stay in place for so long is a technical challenge, but more importantly a political one, says Gregory Poling of CSIS.
Some countries struggle to make their fishermen broadcast their locations consistently (many prefer to keep their choicest fishing grounds a secret).
China has shown “a degree of political control that no other country on earth can claim” over its civilian fleet, notes Mr Poling.
Some countries struggle to make their fishermen broadcast their locations consistently (many prefer to keep their choicest fishing grounds a secret).
China has shown “a degree of political control that no other country on earth can claim” over its civilian fleet, notes Mr Poling.
What could such control be used for?
In a conflict over Taiwan, the militia might help the navy with reconnaissance or logistics.
Militia boats have also been accused of cutting undersea-communications cables.
If China launched an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, a callous commander might use swarms of fishing boats to overwhelm the enemy with potential targets.
A very large number of fishing boats could play a more important role if China tried to impose a full blockade of the island, or a more calibrated “quarantine” (blocking only some goods).
They could help disrupt the flow of shipping to and from its ports.
The fishermen of Zhoushan, at least, have no love lost with Taiwan.
In 1950 Zhoushan was one of the last regions of China held by the Kuomintang after their defeat by the Communist Party.
Thousands of local men were press-ganged to replenish its army, and forced to go to Taiwan.
Some locals are still bitter.
More prosaically, one grizzled captain says a conflict would be a disaster for business.
He would help only if the authorities demanded it.
One younger man, though, is confident that local fishermen would play their part.
“We Chinese are like scattered sand that would unite if the time came,” he said.
“We’d all become militia.”
Militia boats have also been accused of cutting undersea-communications cables.
If China launched an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, a callous commander might use swarms of fishing boats to overwhelm the enemy with potential targets.
A very large number of fishing boats could play a more important role if China tried to impose a full blockade of the island, or a more calibrated “quarantine” (blocking only some goods).
They could help disrupt the flow of shipping to and from its ports.
The fishermen of Zhoushan, at least, have no love lost with Taiwan.
In 1950 Zhoushan was one of the last regions of China held by the Kuomintang after their defeat by the Communist Party.
Thousands of local men were press-ganged to replenish its army, and forced to go to Taiwan.
Some locals are still bitter.
More prosaically, one grizzled captain says a conflict would be a disaster for business.
He would help only if the authorities demanded it.
One younger man, though, is confident that local fishermen would play their part.
“We Chinese are like scattered sand that would unite if the time came,” he said.
“We’d all become militia.”
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