From Libanaews by Bernard Raymond Jabre (translated from French)
Point 1 is a fundamental geographical point that determines the course of Lebanon's maritime borders. Originally, this point was to be located on the mainland, exactly at the terminal point of the Green Line separating Israel and Lebanon before the sea.
This position corresponded to the official land border between the two countries and served as the basis for calculating the maritime delimitation according to international law.
Here is a clear, structured, and comparative summary of the two major technical studies that provided the framework for Lebanon's southern maritime delimitation:
1. The UKHO (United Kingdom Hydrographic Office) study
2. The study by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Hydrographic Office
This is the key to understanding the origin of the discrepancies between “Point 1” chosen in 2007 and “Line 23/Line 29” claimed later.
2. The study by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Hydrographic Office
This is the key to understanding the origin of the discrepancies between “Point 1” chosen in 2007 and “Line 23/Line 29” claimed later.
1. UKHO study (2006–2011)
Mandate entrusted by the Siniora government to assist Lebanon in preparing a maritime delimitation in accordance with international law.
UKHO objective
• Determine a fair line in accordance with UNCLOS (Articles 15, 74, 83).
• Select relevant baselines on the Lebanese coast.
• Propose a technically defensible line for the EEZ declaration.
UKHO method
• High-resolution coastline analysis (orthophotos + UK Admiralty nautical charts).• Selection of base points according to:
UKHO conclusion: two options
UKHO presented two possible routes to the Lebanese government:
Option A — Line 23 (considered “conservative”)
• Based on less aggressive basepoints closer to the coast.
• Represents a moderate version that is less politically contentious .
• Implies a loss of approximately 860 km² compared to the interpretation most favorable to Lebanon.
Option B — Line 29 (considered “legally defensible”)
• Based on the most advanced and geometrically correct base points.
• Strictly follows the principle of equidistance unaffected by coastal distortions.
• Gives Lebanon ≈ 1,430 km² of additional EEZ compared to Line 23.
• Recognized by UKHO engineers as legally sound under UNCLOS.
Mandate entrusted by the Siniora government to assist Lebanon in preparing a maritime delimitation in accordance with international law.
UKHO objective
• Determine a fair line in accordance with UNCLOS (Articles 15, 74, 83).
• Select relevant baselines on the Lebanese coast.
• Propose a technically defensible line for the EEZ declaration.
UKHO method
• High-resolution coastline analysis (orthophotos + UK Admiralty nautical charts).• Selection of base points according to:
o mainland ,
o natural projections ,
o absence of artificial disturbances (dikes, ports, artificial beaches, etc.).
• Calculation of the equidistance between the Lebanese and Israeli points.o natural projections ,
o absence of artificial disturbances (dikes, ports, artificial beaches, etc.).
UKHO conclusion: two options
UKHO presented two possible routes to the Lebanese government:
Option A — Line 23 (considered “conservative”)
• Based on less aggressive basepoints closer to the coast.
• Represents a moderate version that is less politically contentious .
• Implies a loss of approximately 860 km² compared to the interpretation most favorable to Lebanon.
Option B — Line 29 (considered “legally defensible”)
• Based on the most advanced and geometrically correct base points.
• Strictly follows the principle of equidistance unaffected by coastal distortions.
• Gives Lebanon ≈ 1,430 km² of additional EEZ compared to Line 23.
• Recognized by UKHO engineers as legally sound under UNCLOS.
Key point:
➡ UKHO has clearly stated that Line 29 is defensible, but the political decision rests with Lebanon.
➡ UKHO has clearly stated that Line 29 is defensible, but the political decision rests with Lebanon.
2. Lebanese Army Study (2011–2020)
Conducted by the Lebanese Armed Forces Hydrographic Office (LAF) + geodesy experts.
Army objective
• Verify the validity of the line submitted to the UN (Line 23).
• Determine whether a more favorable route exists under maritime law.
• Correct the errors made in 2007 during the Lebanon–Cyprus agreement.
Main conclusion of the army
1. “Point 1” chosen in 2007 is incorrect.
• Lebanon accepted a point artificially moved northward ,
• not located on the actual land border ,
• contrary to the requirements of UNCLOS, which stipulates that the EEZ must begin from the undisputed land border .
Consequence:
➡ This shift reduces Lebanon's projection angle towards the sea → loss vis-à-vis Israel and vis-à-vis Cyprus (geometric domino effect).
2. The LAF confirms that Line 29 is the only correct one.
• Military engineers demonstrate that the actual Lebanese base points (natural rock, no quay, no sand deposits) allow for a much more advantageous route.
• Line 29 is strictly compliant with undistorted equidistance.
• Supported by:
Technical conclusion of the army:
• Military engineers demonstrate that the actual Lebanese base points (natural rock, no quay, no sand deposits) allow for a much more advantageous route.
• Line 29 is strictly compliant with undistorted equidistance.
• Supported by:
o terrestrial GPS surveys,
o UKHO charts,
o high-precision orthophotos.
o UKHO charts,
o high-precision orthophotos.
Technical conclusion of the army:
➡ Lebanon is entitled to ≈ 1,430 km² more than indicated in its official declaration (Line 23).
3. The army requests amendment of Decree 6433/2011
• Decree 6433, which freezes line 23, should have been amended.
• The army prepared the technical documents for correction.
• But the government (Aoun–Diab then Mikati) never signed it, despite full technical support.
Comparison between UKHO and the Lebanese Army
Criterion UKHO Lebanese Army (LAF)
Objective Provide options in accordance Determine the actual line according with the law to UNCLOS
Politically accepted route Line 23 Rejected – proposes Line 29
Baseline analysis Technical + political caution Strictly technical
Position on Line 29 Legally defensible Legally binding
Position on Point 1 No political decision Confirms that Point 1 2007 is incorrect
Consequence Loss of 860 km² compared to optimum Cumulative loss of 1,430 km² if not corrected
• Decree 6433, which freezes line 23, should have been amended.
• The army prepared the technical documents for correction.
• But the government (Aoun–Diab then Mikati) never signed it, despite full technical support.
Comparison between UKHO and the Lebanese Army
Criterion UKHO Lebanese Army (LAF)
Objective Provide options in accordance Determine the actual line according with the law to UNCLOS
Politically accepted route Line 23 Rejected – proposes Line 29
Baseline analysis Technical + political caution Strictly technical
Position on Line 29 Legally defensible Legally binding
Position on Point 1 No political decision Confirms that Point 1 2007 is incorrect
Consequence Loss of 860 km² compared to optimum Cumulative loss of 1,430 km² if not corrected
Final summary
✔ UKHO provided two solutions:
• Line 23: politically prudent
• Line 29: technically correct and defensible
✔ The Lebanese army confirmed that:
• Point 1 of 2007 is incorrect ,
• Line 23 is suboptimal,
• Line 29 is the only one that complies with international maritime law.
✔ By not claiming Line 29 at the UN,
Lebanon automatically lost its ability to claim the 1,430 km² — which Israel then exploited in the 2022 negotiations.
✔ UKHO provided two solutions:
• Line 23: politically prudent
• Line 29: technically correct and defensible
✔ The Lebanese army confirmed that:
• Point 1 of 2007 is incorrect ,
• Line 23 is suboptimal,
• Line 29 is the only one that complies with international maritime law.
✔ By not claiming Line 29 at the UN,
Lebanon automatically lost its ability to claim the 1,430 km² — which Israel then exploited in the 2022 negotiations.
Lebanon’s losses could exceed 5,000 km² of its exclusive economic zone.Why did Lebanon give up its optimal maritime boundary?
Lebanon is located at a strategic crossroads, both geopolitically and in terms of energy.
Lebanon is located at a strategic crossroads, both geopolitically and in terms of energy.
Since the discovery of gas and oil reserves in the eastern Mediterranean, the issue of delimiting its maritime border with Israel has become central.
However, despite solid scientific and legal studies—notably those carried out by the Lebanese army and the British Hydrographic Office—the country has chosen not to claim its maximum maritime boundary, even though it is defensible under international law.
A legally defensible optimal line
The famous “Line 29” corresponded to the exact projection of the land border between Lebanon and Israel onto the sea.
A legally defensible optimal line
The famous “Line 29” corresponded to the exact projection of the land border between Lebanon and Israel onto the sea.
According to experts, this line would have allowed Lebanon to secure its entire exclusive economic zone, thus maximizing its access to natural resources.
Legally, it was based on solid foundations, in line with international conventions and expert recommendations.
Caution dictated by the political context
So why was this option not adopted?
So why was this option not adopted?
The answer lies as much in Lebanon's political complexity as in the regional reality.
First, Lebanon remains a deeply divided state, where every strategic decision must achieve a fragile consensus among political factions, religious communities, and military actors.
Claiming Line 29 would have been perceived as an aggressive move by certain internal parties and could have potentially undermined the already precarious political balance.
The Israeli factor and international pressure
Externally, an ambitious claim would have almost automatically triggered tensions with Israel, which disputes this area.
The Israeli factor and international pressure
Externally, an ambitious claim would have almost automatically triggered tensions with Israel, which disputes this area.
Lebanese leaders had to weigh up the risk: open conflict could have had dramatic economic and security consequences.
Furthermore, international pressure, particularly from the United States and certain European countries, also pushed Lebanon to adopt a more cautious stance, favoring negotiation over direct confrontation. Strategic calculations
Beyond the fear of conflict, the decision reflects a strategic calculation: Lebanon was not yet ready to fully exploit its gas and oil resources.
Beyond the fear of conflict, the decision reflects a strategic calculation: Lebanon was not yet ready to fully exploit its gas and oil resources.
Choosing an overly ambitious line would have meant not only diplomatic tensions but also immediate investment to secure and exploit the area, a luxury the country could not afford at the time.
Consequences of this choice
The refusal to adopt Line 29 had direct consequences on Lebanon's potential economy.
Part of its maritime zone, which could have brought in billions in gas and oil revenues, was left untouched.
In addition, this compromise had a domino effect on the delimitation with Cyprus and Israel, indirectly changing the energy and strategic map of the eastern Mediterranean.
In summary, Lebanon had an optimal, legally defensible choice, but political caution, the risk of conflict with Israel, international pressure, and internal complexity led successive leaders to abandon this option.
The history of Line 29 thus illustrates the constant dilemmas between legality, national interest, and political pragmatism in a country where every strategic decision is carefully weighed.
Point 1, currently adopted by Lebanon, was defined by former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in 2007 and has since been confirmed by successive presidents: Michel Sleiman (map of Line 23 sent to the UN), Michel Aoun (signs an agreement with Israel based on Line 23), Joseph Aoun, and Speaker of the House Nabih Berri.
Point 1, currently adopted by Lebanon, was defined by former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in 2007 and has since been confirmed by successive presidents: Michel Sleiman (map of Line 23 sent to the UN), Michel Aoun (signs an agreement with Israel based on Line 23), Joseph Aoun, and Speaker of the House Nabih Berri.
This official point is no longer located exactly on the Green Line, but slightly offset, which has direct consequences on Lebanese maritime space, particularly with regard to disputed areas with Israel, as well as maritime rights in relation to Cyprus and Syria.
Because:
• Moving Point 1 even a short distance along the coastline changes the position of the median lines because the equidistance rule is calculated based on these originals.
• When the median line shifts in favor of the neighbor (Israel, then Cyprus), the lost area is added: a loss to Israel can, depending on the angle/direction, alter the line of intersection with the Cyprus area and further reduce the available Lebanese surface area—hence the domino effect.
• In practice (on the actual map), these losses can amount to hundreds or even thousands of square kilometers depending on the actual geometry of the coastline and the precise location of the base points — hence the major strategic issue.
Thus, understanding the distinction between Point 1 of origin on the continent and Point 1 officially adopted is essential for analyzing the geopolitical and economic issues related to Lebanon's maritime resources.
In 2007, when Lebanon adopted the maritime boundary based on “point 1,” many warned that this was a major technical error.
The Lebanese army and the British company UKHO, which specializes in mapping international maritime boundaries, were among those who raised the alarm.
But between political inertia, diplomatic improvisation, and a lack of will to correct the mistake, this error turned into a geopolitical spiral.
Today, the country finds itself weakened, facing a cascade of claims from its neighbors, which it itself unwittingly triggered.
The first shock came from the map sent to Cyprus: more than 3,000 km² of potentially resource-rich maritime space was conceded without solid justification.
The first shock came from the map sent to Cyprus: more than 3,000 km² of potentially resource-rich maritime space was conceded without solid justification.
This “unintended gift” immediately set a precedent.
Ankara, on behalf of Northern Cyprus, rushed into the breach, claiming at least an additional 2,000 km², arguing that the Turkish part of the island had no reason to be less favored than the Greek part.
Thus, with a single ill-considered decision, Beirut found itself caught up in a double Cypriot conflict that did not concern it.
Israel, observing this Lebanese laxity, recalculated its own strategy.
Israel, observing this Lebanese laxity, recalculated its own strategy.
If Beirut could concede 3,000 km² to Cyprus, why should it be satisfied with the 1,400 km² already gained thanks to point 1?
Tel Aviv now believes that Lebanon has opened the door to a total renegotiation and could demand even more than what was obtained in 2007.
Syria, in turn, followed the logic of the precedent.
Damascus considers that if Lebanon has offered space to Cyprus and Israel without compensation, there is no reason why it cannot also claim a larger share in the north.
Lebanon thus finds itself surrounded by four neighbors who are using its own mistake as an argument for their claims.
Caught in this spiral, the country is witnessing a continuous erosion of its maritime space.
Caught in this spiral, the country is witnessing a continuous erosion of its maritime space.
Each concession, even if involuntary, becomes an argument for the next.
The inability of Lebanese officials to correct the initial mistake transforms a simple technical inaccuracy into a structural crisis.
The paradox is all the more striking given that the justification invoked for years—the need to move quickly to exploit gas and oil—does not hold up in the face of reality on the ground.
The paradox is all the more striking given that the justification invoked for years—the need to move quickly to exploit gas and oil—does not hold up in the face of reality on the ground.
TotalEnergies has pointed out that no production is possible for at least six years, which is the time needed to explore, drill, evaluate, and build offshore platforms.
What was supposed to be a race against time is in fact turning out to be a marathon that Lebanon is unable to control.
Added to this is a major political obstacle that few dare to address head-on: the presence of Hezbollah weapons.
Western governments, like Qatar, believe that no large-scale exploitation can begin until the Lebanese state has full authority over its territory and strategic decisions.
In other words, even if Lebanon were to correct point 1 tomorrow, there would be no guarantee of rapid access to its resources.
The result: everything is blocked.
The result: everything is blocked.
Maritime borders remain disputed, energy opportunities are slipping away, and the mistake in point 1 continues to prevent any way out of the crisis.
By refusing to acknowledge a bad choice, Lebanon has found itself between a rock and a hard place—sliding from a technical misstep into a diplomatic trap from which it now seems unable to extricate itself.
Webography:
Here is a summary of the role of the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO) in delimiting Lebanon's maritime waters—what it has done, its recommendations, and why this is important for Lebanon today.
Who is the UKHO?
• The UKHO is the British agency responsible for providing marine hydrographic and geospatial data, nautical charts, and services to the navy, shipowners, and maritime states. Wikipédia+1
• These maps and data are used, among other things, to define coastlines, the baseline from which territorial waters are measured, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and other maritime rights. Nations Unies+1
What the UKHO has done for Lebanon
• In 2009–2010, the UKHO provided nautical charts used as the basis for delineating the southern coast of Lebanon.
The charts concerned were Admiralty chart No. 2634 (Beirut–Gaza) and No. 183 (Ra’s at Tin–Iskenderun). الجيش اللبناني+2American University of Beirut+2
• At the request of the Lebanese government, the UKHO conducted an assessment study of the maritime delimitation made in 2009 (in particular the proposed EEZ line). LCPS+2Ici Beyrouth+2
• In its report, the UKHO proposed two options for Lebanon's southern maritime border. The second — known as “line 29” — would have granted Lebanon approximately 1,430 km² more than the line used until then (the “line 23”). LCPS+2The National+2
Why it matters (and why it's controversial)
• Had Line 29 been adopted, it would have given Lebanon a significantly larger maritime zone — which is crucial for its rights to explore offshore resources (gas, oil, etc.). Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique+2Orient XXI+2
• But—despite this recommendation—the government never officially submitted line 29 to the United Nations. Instead, in 2011, Lebanon issued a decree (Decree 6433) reiterating line 23 as its official position. The Policy Initiative+2LCPS+2
• Some Lebanese experts and military officials believe that this omission deprived the country of hundreds—even thousands—of square kilometers of potential territory, fueling controversy in maritime negotiations with Israel. Orient XXI+2American University of Beirut+2
Conclusions & current status
• The UKHO's work provides the technical and cartographic basis on which Lebanon can base its maritime claims.
• However, the extension recommendation (line 29) has never been officially adopted — which has reduced the country's weight in negotiations.
• Today, maritime delimitation remains a strategic issue for the exploitation of Lebanon's offshore resources (gas, oil)—and the UKHO's work remains a frequently cited reference point in debates.
Here is a realistic geographical diagram — based on publicly available maps — illustrating the difference between the “line 29” claim and the line officially adopted for Lebanon's sea/EEZ in relation to Israel (and — relevantly — the area of Cyprus).
What the map shows
• The Lebanese coastline in the northeast Mediterranean, with the southwestern point of Ras Naqoura (land border with Israel) as the starting point.
• The officially used maritime boundary—i.e., the “compromise” line between Lebanon and Israel (often referred to as “line 23” in negotiations)—drawn according to the coordinates submitted to the UN in 2010. timesofisrael.com+2marineregions.org+2
• The area claimed by Lebanon as “line 29” (or at least a more ambitious line than the official line), as defended by the Lebanese army and studies (notably according to the interpretation of a line more favorable to the Lebanese EEZ). L’Orient Today+2trt.global+2
• The “lost zone” — that is, the additional maritime area that Lebanon could have claimed (and exploited) if line 29 had been adopted. This zone corresponds to the difference between line 29 and the officially adopted line. trt.global+2globalsecurity.org+2
• Also, the impact—on the distribution of maritime zones—with regard to Israel and Cyprus, since the Lebanese-Cypriot and Israeli-Cypriot delimitation is influenced by this route. marineregions.org+2UNDP+2
Visible data & issues
• The disputed area (or “potentially claimable” in line 29) is estimated—in some analyses—to be approximately ≈1,430 km² larger than the official line. trt.global+2globalsecurity.org+2
• According to sources, the agreement officially adopted by Lebanon in 2010/2011 (but without final ratification in some cases) started at Ras Naqoura and extended to point 23 (on the map submitted to the UN). marineregions.org+2marineregions.org+2
• However, this boundary has been contested—Lebanon considers it to be underestimated—particularly with regard to future offshore gas and oil potential (e.g., fields such as Karish, or the zoning claimed as belonging to it). trt.global+1
Links :
- GeoGarage blog : Israel and Lebanon negotiate their maritime border
- Tehran Times : How Nawaf Salam’s cabinet is handing maritime resources to Israel!
- Al Akhbar : US Grip Threatens to Hand Cyprus 5,000 km² of Lebanon’s Resources
- NYTimes (2022) : Israeli-Lebanese Maritime Deal Marks a Milestone, With Limitations
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