Tuesday, September 23, 2025

Navigating a contested sea: ASEAN, Indonesia, and the future of the South China Sea

Detail of map showing maritime claims in South China Sea

From Eurasiareview by Simon Hutagalung

The South China Sea dispute poses an enormous obstacle to regional peace.
The competing maritime claims have transformed this strategic area into a major geopolitical conflict, challenging all diplomatic processes, legal systems, and regional frameworks for conflict resolution.

The dispute between China and Southeast Asian countries necessitates a thorough assessment of ASEAN’s institutional capabilities, as well as Indonesia’s position as a non-claimant state that faces significant consequences from the situation.
ASEAN stands essential for maintaining dialogue, yet its internal disagreements restrict its capabilities.
Indonesia can effectively mediate because it does not claim any territorial rights in the South China Sea.
The preservation of the UNCLOS-based rules-based order demands both regional unity and enforceable legal instruments.

The historical origins of this maritime dispute remain disputed, yet several fundamental aspects remain undisputed.
China presents maritime claims through the “nine-dash line”, which extends from mid-20th-century Chinese maps to encroach upon exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves of various Southeast Asian nations.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague declared in 2016 that China’s nine-dash line historic rights claims violated UNCLOS regulations.
The Chinese government rejected the legal decision while maintaining its maritime expansion through island creation and infrastructure expansion, and naval vessel intimidation, which intensified the difference between maritime regulations and actual ocean activities.

The unilateral actions of China have established a lasting power imbalance between China and other nations.
China possesses economic dominance and is developing maritime capabilities, which provide advantages that Vietnam and the Philippines and Malaysia, and Brunei lack.
The uneven power balance enables China to use coercive methods, which create excessive political and economic burdens for opposing nations.
ASEAN’s consensus-based approach creates difficulties for collective action because its member states maintain different threat assessments while depending on China to varying degrees economically.
ASEAN faces a “divide and conquer” situation because its member states have different positions, which hinders the organisation from playing its central role and hampers diplomatic unity.

Indonesia occupies a distinctive position because of its neutral status in the South China Sea dispute.
As a non-claimant state in the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos, Jakarta deals with Chinese intrusions into its EEZ surrounding the Natuna Islands, where Indonesian waters and Chinese claims intersect.
Chinese fishing vessels, together with coast guard ships, have operated inside or near Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone, prompting both diplomatic protests from Jakarta and Indonesian military actions to protect resources and territorial sovereignty.
Indonesia maintains its position as a non-claimant nation, which enables it to pursue lawful actions, yet it needs to protect its maritime territory without sacrificing essential principles for immediate bilateral benefits.

The current evolution of mapmaking practices has raised new security concerns.
The reported ten-dash extension of Chinese claims toward the east makes it difficult for nations to develop effective legal counterarguments while increasing tension in the region.
The 2024 maritime cooperation agreement between Jakarta and Beijing received criticism for its ambiguous terms regarding “joint development” despite being presented as a technical fisheries and resource management partnership.
All cooperative agreements need to include specific legal protections to prevent joint development initiatives from leading to sovereignty concessions.

The strategic rivalry between the United States and China creates more challenges for diplomatic efforts throughout the region.
The involvement of external actors helps prevent coercive behaviour and supports free navigation, but simultaneously introduces great-power competition into regional territorial disputes.
Regular US naval operations alongside expanding trilateral and quadrilateral security initiatives and defence partnerships between claimants and external nations raise the risks of conflict and miscalculations.
The external engagement must receive precise balancing to prevent coercion while staying clear of measures which could increase tensions or diminish ASEAN’s political authority.

A long-term resolution depends on achieving both legal precision and practical confidence-building actions.
The creation of a strong legal Code of Conduct (COC) between ASEAN and China remains the key to progress.
The ongoing negotiations have continued for an extended period with unclear terms for enforcement, so a non-binding instrument faces the risk of remaining symbolic only.
A substantial COC needs to incorporate specific provisions from UNCLOS together with an impartial dispute-resolution process and precise guidelines for maritime encounters, as well as systems to monitor and report, and enforce compliance.
Such provisions would foster predictable behaviour, minimise the risks of dangerous misinterpretation, and enhance legal recourse.

Revitalising ASEAN’s internal cohesion is equally crucial.
All member states need to show political commitment toward maintaining regional stability rather than following individual bilateral agendas.
ASEAN’s crisis management procedures need enhancement for better information sharing of maritime incidents and the development of joint measures to stop escalation.
The non-claimant status of Indonesia enables the country to reduce tensions through back-channel diplomacy and informal dialogues while upholding the defence of sovereign rights.

Practical non-political cooperation provides an immediate method to build confidence.
All parties can obtain benefits through joint environmental protection efforts, along with coordinated fisheries management and scientific research and search-and-rescue operations and illegal fishing, and transnational crime prevention initiatives.
Such projects promote maritime resource stewardship through incentives that transition from coercive measures to cooperative ones.

The international community needs to fulfil its part in this process.
The United States and Japan and Australia, and the European Union continue to support freedom of navigation and overflight while upholding the UNCLOS normative framework.
The provision of practical assistance should focus on strengthening ASEAN’s central position in the region instead of replacing its role.
The best results will emerge from constructive external involvement that supports diplomatic efforts in the region.

The verification process needs to become a top priority to prevent any misunderstandings or incorrect assessments.
The implementation of neutral observers together with transparent incident-reporting systems and mutual monitoring systems will reduce the chances of escalation.
A COC that includes provisions for verification and graduated responses to violations and agreed consequences for serious breaches will create measurable compliance and enhance deterrence.

The South China Sea dispute requires solutions beyond military posturing and diplomatic initiatives alone to achieve a resolution.
Long-term stability demands ongoing dedication to international law, together with institutional development and practical collaboration on common problems and political determination for rule enforcement.
ASEAN stands as the most appropriate institutional framework for joint action, and Indonesia’s status as an honest broker becomes crucial if the country maintains diplomatic relations with pragmatism while protecting national sovereignty.
The enduring settlement will demonstrate the durability of multilateral organisations and the power of the rules-based system.
 
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