Credit: Shutterstock
From Safety4Sea by The Editorial Team
… commented Maritime Captain Ivana-Maria Carrioni-Burnett and chair of the RINs Maritime Navigation Group.
The Royal Institute of Navigation (RIN) has issued a report which exposes the vulnerability of critically important systems such as Global Maritime Distress and Safety Systems (GMDSS) and other SOLAS-mandated equipment that rely on satellite positioning and timing.
According to the “Impacts of GNSS Interference on Maritime Safety” report, intentional interference with GNSS radionavigation broadcasts takes many forms and is now a permanent feature of certain conflict zones and other geographical areas.
The Royal Institute of Navigation (RIN) has issued a report which exposes the vulnerability of critically important systems such as Global Maritime Distress and Safety Systems (GMDSS) and other SOLAS-mandated equipment that rely on satellite positioning and timing.
According to the “Impacts of GNSS Interference on Maritime Safety” report, intentional interference with GNSS radionavigation broadcasts takes many forms and is now a permanent feature of certain conflict zones and other geographical areas.
In the context of the report, interference encapsulates jamming (the intentional blocking of the GNSS signals), meaconing (the recording and later rebroadcasting of real signals) and spoofing (the broadcasting of fake signals designed to force a GNSS receiver into calculating an incorrect position, velocity and time).
The RIN Maritime GNSS Interference Working Group has assessed that the impact of GNSS interference on maritime safety, vessel operations, and port security is very serious, with 75% of the respondents to the survey of the opinion that the situation is not improving.
The report has highlighted serious safety concerns and has underlined the fact that these issues are rooted in significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and are not just disruptions to navigation
… said Director of the RIN, Dr Ramsey Faragher.
Key areas of concern
The publication demonstrates that the maritime industry has a widespread and deeply-integrated reliance on GNSS that needs to be carefully addressed and managed.
The RIN Maritime GNSS Interference Working Group has assessed that the impact of GNSS interference on maritime safety, vessel operations, and port security is very serious, with 75% of the respondents to the survey of the opinion that the situation is not improving.
The report has highlighted serious safety concerns and has underlined the fact that these issues are rooted in significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and are not just disruptions to navigation
… said Director of the RIN, Dr Ramsey Faragher.
Key areas of concern
The publication demonstrates that the maritime industry has a widespread and deeply-integrated reliance on GNSS that needs to be carefully addressed and managed.
Areas of urgent concern include:The vulnerabilities of Global Maritime Distress and Safety Systems (GMDSS) and International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) mandated equipment that use GNSS as their primary source of position and time.
The serious safety and liability implications associated with operating within areas of known GNSS interference using GMDSS and SOLAS equipment that are expected to fail or malfunction with high probability when in those regions.
The evidence for unnecessary dependencies between GNSS receivers and a variety of electronic systems onboard a modern vessel, many of which do not need to be connected to GNSS data to provide their primary function.
The serious safety and liability implications associated with operating within areas of known GNSS interference using GMDSS and SOLAS equipment that are expected to fail or malfunction with high probability when in those regions.
The evidence for unnecessary dependencies between GNSS receivers and a variety of electronic systems onboard a modern vessel, many of which do not need to be connected to GNSS data to provide their primary function.
These systems include the RADAR, VHF/MF/HF radios, NAVTEX, ship’s speed log, ship’s clock, and satellite communications systems.
Impact on maritime operations Credit: RIN
There are many well documented examples of various systems on a modern digital vessel malfunctioning during or after GNSS interference, including systems which are not primarily navigation systems.
These issues are therefore impacts on end-user equipment of cybersecurity vulnerabilities as well as navigation vulnerabilities, and their assessment and management must be considered within cybersecurity frameworks.
The masters of these vessels are not just dealing with the loss of access to a navigation source, they are dealing with invalid data being processed by a variety of digital systems that are vulnerable to these types of wireless attack.
The corruption of GNSS data can simultaneously compromise the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), Automatic Identification System (AIS), RADAR, and autopilot.
The masters of these vessels are not just dealing with the loss of access to a navigation source, they are dealing with invalid data being processed by a variety of digital systems that are vulnerable to these types of wireless attack.
The corruption of GNSS data can simultaneously compromise the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), Automatic Identification System (AIS), RADAR, and autopilot.
This can lead to a loss of situational awareness and vessel control, increasing the risk of collision or grounding, especially in congested waterways.
Collisions and groundings linked to GNSS interference have included the groundings of the Meghna Princess in December 2024 and the MSC Antonia in May 2025, and the collision between Adalynn and Front Eagle in June 2025.
Retired Commodore James Taylor OBE and fellow of the RIN advised: “Despite measures to improve resistance to jamming, spoofing and other harassment measures, the threat is real and growing.
Collisions and groundings linked to GNSS interference have included the groundings of the Meghna Princess in December 2024 and the MSC Antonia in May 2025, and the collision between Adalynn and Front Eagle in June 2025.
Retired Commodore James Taylor OBE and fellow of the RIN advised: “Despite measures to improve resistance to jamming, spoofing and other harassment measures, the threat is real and growing.
And this threat is not only to positioning and navigation; it is to every part of every transport and navigation means and to every part of national infrastructure where timing is derived from space-based timing signals.”
Key recommendations
The report’s recommendations include:
Key recommendations
The report’s recommendations include:
#1 Urgent addressing of the vulnerability to GNSS spoofing of SOLAS mandated systems, including GMDSS, EPIRB, AIS-SART, MOB quick-push buttons
These safety systems are mandated by the IMO but are not currently expected to operate as designed when undergoing GNSS spoofing attacks.
This impacts the safety of life at sea and puts both the mariner and rescue services at risk, including delaying assistance and rescue, which has the potential to result in the loss of life or irreparable environmental damage.
Equipment providers are urgently recommended to assess their products against these vulnerabilities and ensure their customers, the marine operator, is made aware of them.
It is further recommended that the IMO, in collaboration with the IEC, look to provide further guidance, policy and regulation on equipment standards to address the issue of GNSS interference.
Equipment providers are urgently recommended to assess their products against these vulnerabilities and ensure their customers, the marine operator, is made aware of them.
It is further recommended that the IMO, in collaboration with the IEC, look to provide further guidance, policy and regulation on equipment standards to address the issue of GNSS interference.
#2 NAVAREA Coordinators to use the World-Wide Navigational Warning Service to issue Navigational Warnings on the subject of GNSS interference in their areas
The report demonstrates the impact of GNSS interference on safety of life at sea and deems this interference to meet the criteria for “new navigational hazards and failures of important aids to navigation” as well as “significant malfunctioning of radionavigation services and shore-based MSI radio or satellite services”, as determined by the Joint IMO / IHO / WMO Manual on Maritime Safety Information.
#3 Establishment of a real-time, global GNSS monitoring and mapping capability in order to provide timely data to the mariner, which they can use for both passage planning and situational awareness
With the advent of the new S-100 data standards from the IHO, data layers, such as a GNSS interference map, can be overlaid on an electronic chart system or ECDIS.
#4 Adoption of industry-wide improvements to GNSS receiver designs and their validation and testing, especially when to be used in safety critical applications
This will reduce the probability of GNSS receivers succumbing to simple spoofing attacks and will reduce the overall effectiveness of the current GNSS interference techniques in use.
#5 The removal of unnecessary connections to open GNSS signals by hardware manufacturers
This will reduce the number of systems that can be disrupted by processing incorrect timing or positioning data from a spoofed GNSS receiver.
The issue of GNSS interference must be taken seriously.
It cannot be overcome by traditional navigation techniques when GNSS receivers are ‘baked in’ to modern ships’ critical systems, including safety systems.
These are no longer isolated incidents and pose a real risk to life: people, property and the environment. We must do more to safeguard our seas today and the shipping of tomorrow
Links :
No comments:
Post a Comment