From Pulse by Christian Bueger
Welcome to Turbulent Seas, my new newsletter that provides deep dives on global maritime security developments based on academic research and travels to global ocean events.
I'm Christian Bueger, professor at the University of Copenhagen, research fellow at United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and author of 'Understanding Maritime Security'.
In this edition, I investigate recent developments in the protection of subsea data cables.
The global cable system is the critical infrastructure of digital life, yet, its protection has become a feature of the maritime security agenda only recently.
I became passionate about cable protection in 2020, and here I review recent global and regional initiatives.
Not all of them are productive.
Welcome to Turbulent Seas, my new newsletter that provides deep dives on global maritime security developments based on academic research and travels to global ocean events.
I'm Christian Bueger, professor at the University of Copenhagen, research fellow at United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and author of 'Understanding Maritime Security'.
In this edition, I investigate recent developments in the protection of subsea data cables.
The global cable system is the critical infrastructure of digital life, yet, its protection has become a feature of the maritime security agenda only recently.
I became passionate about cable protection in 2020, and here I review recent global and regional initiatives.
Not all of them are productive.
The Hidden Network Beneath Our Seas
If you send an email, prompt an AI, or book a flight, it is highly likely that your request travels through a subsea data cable using optical fiber technology.
The majority of data exchanges use terrestrial networks, yet the moment a service or data center on a different continent is involved, your request will depend on maritime connections.
Almost 1.5 million kilometers of submarine fiber optic cables—comprising more than 400 active systems—lie hidden under the waves at the bottom of the Earth's oceans to provide this connectivity.
While satellite internet is expanding, it cannot handle the world's total internet traffic, which equals filling up about 6 billion smartphone storage capacities every year.
When Cables Break: From Accidents to Attacks
Like other industrial infrastructures, the global subsea data cable system is also prone to failure.
Submarine cables break all the time—on average, two to four break somewhere in the world every week, with fishing and anchoring incidents accounting for 86% of the cable faults.
Most network operators use redundancy to prevent service disruptions, and most of the time such breaks go unnoticed.
If you live in a remote place, like an island, that might look different.
In October 2022, two cables connecting the remote Shetland Islands, situated 100 miles off Scotland's northern coast, were cut, leaving citizens without cash machines or mobile phone connections for days until services were restored.
The incident affected the island's population of about 23,000 people and required police to declare a major incident with additional emergency services deployed to the islands.
While this is an extreme case, ensuring fast repair, resilience and redundancy in the system is important to cope with accidents.
Yet, cables have come into focus for other reasons.
There is growing suspicion that cables are deliberately damaged as part of broader inter-state contestations.
Most directly this has been observed in the Baltic Sea, where following the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and heightening tensions between Russia and NATO, a series of cable connections were damaged in 2023 and 2024.
While it was not possible to fully establish whether the incidents were the result of very poor seamanship, or deliberate attacks of sabotage, they clearly established the vulnerabilities of cable systems.
Like other industrial infrastructures, the global subsea data cable system is also prone to failure.
Submarine cables break all the time—on average, two to four break somewhere in the world every week, with fishing and anchoring incidents accounting for 86% of the cable faults.
Most network operators use redundancy to prevent service disruptions, and most of the time such breaks go unnoticed.
If you live in a remote place, like an island, that might look different.
In October 2022, two cables connecting the remote Shetland Islands, situated 100 miles off Scotland's northern coast, were cut, leaving citizens without cash machines or mobile phone connections for days until services were restored.
The incident affected the island's population of about 23,000 people and required police to declare a major incident with additional emergency services deployed to the islands.
While this is an extreme case, ensuring fast repair, resilience and redundancy in the system is important to cope with accidents.
Yet, cables have come into focus for other reasons.
There is growing suspicion that cables are deliberately damaged as part of broader inter-state contestations.
Most directly this has been observed in the Baltic Sea, where following the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and heightening tensions between Russia and NATO, a series of cable connections were damaged in 2023 and 2024.
While it was not possible to fully establish whether the incidents were the result of very poor seamanship, or deliberate attacks of sabotage, they clearly established the vulnerabilities of cable systems.
From Nord Stream to Global Awareness
The September 2022 explosions of the Nord Stream pipelines were the catalysts of such concerns.
In that case, it was quickly established that the pipelines were deliberately sabotaged.
It became clear that underwater infrastructure - pipelines and cables - are a potential target of malign actors.
Since then, critical maritime infrastructure protection has become a major new domain on the maritime security agenda.
Reported incidents occurring off Taiwan attributed to Chinese vessels demonstrated that such risks are not limited to the Baltic Sea.
Another type of incident occurred in the Red Sea and further strengthened the need to place cable protection high on the maritime security agenda.
In 2024 the MV Rubymar was attacked by Houthi forces operating from Yemen.
Fire broke out, and the crew was evacuated.
The vessel drifted for weeks, and its anchor cut crucial cables connecting Europe, Africa and Asia.
This case demonstrated how armed conflict at sea threatens the arteries of digital life.
The September 2022 explosions of the Nord Stream pipelines were the catalysts of such concerns.
In that case, it was quickly established that the pipelines were deliberately sabotaged.
It became clear that underwater infrastructure - pipelines and cables - are a potential target of malign actors.
Since then, critical maritime infrastructure protection has become a major new domain on the maritime security agenda.
Reported incidents occurring off Taiwan attributed to Chinese vessels demonstrated that such risks are not limited to the Baltic Sea.
Another type of incident occurred in the Red Sea and further strengthened the need to place cable protection high on the maritime security agenda.
In 2024 the MV Rubymar was attacked by Houthi forces operating from Yemen.
Fire broke out, and the crew was evacuated.
The vessel drifted for weeks, and its anchor cut crucial cables connecting Europe, Africa and Asia.
This case demonstrated how armed conflict at sea threatens the arteries of digital life.
Regional Responses: NATO, EU, and Beyond
The growing awareness of the vulnerability of cables has led to a substantial response on regional and global levels.
In Europe, NATO and the European Union have launched extensive initiatives.
NATO was proactive. It established a network of security officials, experts and industry representatives to develop common policies and protocols, to enhance information sharing and develop the trust needed for cooperative incident responses.
A new coordination cell based at the NATO Maritime Command supports member states through information sharing, analysis and operational coordination.
As a reaction to the cable cuts in December 2024 in the Baltic Sea, NATO launched a dedicated naval operation, known as Baltic Sentry, in the region.
Germany opened a new NATO headquarters for the Baltic Sea to strengthen future naval operations and deterrence.
Given its nature, NATO's response was military, while the EU has aimed at tackling the issue more comprehensively.
It incorporated cable protection in the EU Maritime Security Strategy of 2023, installed an expert body to review how existing EU policies, including in broader Critical Infrastructure Protection can be used, and launched in spring 2025 a comprehensive Action Plan for Cable Security, which includes provisions for global cable diplomacy.
As part of its Ocean Pact announced in summer 2025, the EU is developing a massive drone surveillance network to better monitor European waters.
Other regional organizations likewise have started to develop frameworks for enhanced cable protection.
The Indian Ocean Commission, which was arguably the first to develop a regional cable protection approach by agreeing on a joint framework for the Western Indian Ocean already in November 2021, is conducting a comprehensive update of its approach to cable protection with results expected for 2026.
Its main coordination center - the Regional Center for Operational Coordination based in Seychelles - started to monitor suspicious activities in cable locations.
In Southeast Asia, the key maritime security information sharing mechanism - the Information Fusion Center based in Singapore - is tracking suspicious activities and offers a coordination mechanism.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is expected to develop a cable protection framework, and a major workshop to be held in Singapore in September (organized by NUS Centre for International Law) this year is expected to provide the first input for it.
The growing awareness of the vulnerability of cables has led to a substantial response on regional and global levels.
In Europe, NATO and the European Union have launched extensive initiatives.
NATO was proactive. It established a network of security officials, experts and industry representatives to develop common policies and protocols, to enhance information sharing and develop the trust needed for cooperative incident responses.
A new coordination cell based at the NATO Maritime Command supports member states through information sharing, analysis and operational coordination.
As a reaction to the cable cuts in December 2024 in the Baltic Sea, NATO launched a dedicated naval operation, known as Baltic Sentry, in the region.
Germany opened a new NATO headquarters for the Baltic Sea to strengthen future naval operations and deterrence.
Given its nature, NATO's response was military, while the EU has aimed at tackling the issue more comprehensively.
It incorporated cable protection in the EU Maritime Security Strategy of 2023, installed an expert body to review how existing EU policies, including in broader Critical Infrastructure Protection can be used, and launched in spring 2025 a comprehensive Action Plan for Cable Security, which includes provisions for global cable diplomacy.
As part of its Ocean Pact announced in summer 2025, the EU is developing a massive drone surveillance network to better monitor European waters.
Other regional organizations likewise have started to develop frameworks for enhanced cable protection.
The Indian Ocean Commission, which was arguably the first to develop a regional cable protection approach by agreeing on a joint framework for the Western Indian Ocean already in November 2021, is conducting a comprehensive update of its approach to cable protection with results expected for 2026.
Its main coordination center - the Regional Center for Operational Coordination based in Seychelles - started to monitor suspicious activities in cable locations.
In Southeast Asia, the key maritime security information sharing mechanism - the Information Fusion Center based in Singapore - is tracking suspicious activities and offers a coordination mechanism.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is expected to develop a cable protection framework, and a major workshop to be held in Singapore in September (organized by NUS Centre for International Law) this year is expected to provide the first input for it.
Global Coordination Efforts
On a global level, the United Nations General Assembly has called for many years through its annual resolution on Oceans and the Law of the Sea for more awareness of cable security and protection.
International lawyers have long proposed that the issue could be addressed through a new implementation treaty of UNCLOS, which is an idea that has recently gained new momentum, including through the publication of a draft treaty text by Raul Pedrozo.
This is however unlikely to become reality any time soon.
In November 2024, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) established the International Advisory Body for Submarine Cable Resilience to strengthen the protection of global undersea cable infrastructure.
The Advisory Body's 40 members include ministers, heads of regulatory authorities, industry executives, and senior experts on the operations of telecommunication cables, but lacks a strong maritime security focus.
The advisory body will address ways to improve cable maintenance, prevent damage from natural hazards and accidental human activities, ensure faster recovery times after disruptions, increase redundancy and promote sustainable practices in the industry.
The body will meet at least two times a year.
It held its first virtual meeting in December 2024 and a physical meeting in spring 2025 in the format of a Submarine Cable Resilience Summit in Abuja, Nigeria.
The Challenge of Too Much Attention
Accompanying these activities is an almost overwhelming array of workshops and panels around the globe where cable protection is either a new feature or the exclusive focus.
As someone analyzing cable protection since 2020, I can personally attest to that proliferation as my inbox is frequently flooded with invitations and requests.
This new attention is a double-edged sword.
On one side, more awareness of the strategic importance is a good thing, yet on the other, there is a risk overplaying the threat, and as colleagues in the cable industry frequently argue, not all the activities are actually productive.
A key problem is that there remains a lack of understanding of how the cables actually function, how the industry is organized and how different sources of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), can be interpreted for operations.
The ambiguous language of 'hybrid threats' and 'greyzone warfare', employed by security officials and academics alike, is also not helping.
While I have been guilty of adopting such terminology myself, I have come to the conclusion that they hide more than they illuminate and we need more precise language to grasp what is happening with what strategic effect.
Accompanying these activities is an almost overwhelming array of workshops and panels around the globe where cable protection is either a new feature or the exclusive focus.
As someone analyzing cable protection since 2020, I can personally attest to that proliferation as my inbox is frequently flooded with invitations and requests.
This new attention is a double-edged sword.
On one side, more awareness of the strategic importance is a good thing, yet on the other, there is a risk overplaying the threat, and as colleagues in the cable industry frequently argue, not all the activities are actually productive.
A key problem is that there remains a lack of understanding of how the cables actually function, how the industry is organized and how different sources of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), can be interpreted for operations.
The ambiguous language of 'hybrid threats' and 'greyzone warfare', employed by security officials and academics alike, is also not helping.
While I have been guilty of adopting such terminology myself, I have come to the conclusion that they hide more than they illuminate and we need more precise language to grasp what is happening with what strategic effect.
Seven Key Measures for Cable Protection
In many ways it is by now also clear what must be done.
This is to the degree that we already joked at a workshop held in Copenhagen in 2023 that we could easily play a form of bingo with the recommendations frequently mentioned.
The commonly emphasized measures include:
The Path Forward: From Workshops to Operations
More workshops and gatherings certainly will help to strengthen trust, and enhance knowledge and understanding of the cable system and realistic assessments of the risks and costs linked to protecting it.
- establishing clear lines of communication between everyone involved in a cable, that is the different state agencies with regulatory capacity and security roles in countries that are connected by the cable, but also the industries involved in laying, operating and maintaining it;
- common information sharing systems and protocols among security agencies tasked with cable protection to identify suspicious activities and respond quickly to incidents;
- enhanced maritime surveillance to attribute any incident to a vessel and potential perpetrators;
- agreements and transparency regarding how the international law of the sea (including UNCLOS and IMO conventions) is interpreted in cable protection;
- investments in cable resilience and repair;
- common understandings of who pays for what in cable protection (consumers, tax payers, or shareholders);
- strategic signaling and deterrence towards any adversaries that have declared intent to deliberately damage cable connections in peace time.
The Path Forward: From Workshops to Operations
More workshops and gatherings certainly will help to strengthen trust, and enhance knowledge and understanding of the cable system and realistic assessments of the risks and costs linked to protecting it.
On a regional level, it is time that the initiatives become more effective and focus on operations and exercises.
On a global level, the ICPC/ITU process is a productive new pathway.
It will be difficult and time consuming to establish a major agreement and whether the process has the necessary political gravitas is questionable.
Other international bodies, including the International Maritime Organization or even the Security Council are arguably needed to strengthen the process.
On a global level, the ICPC/ITU process is a productive new pathway.
It will be difficult and time consuming to establish a major agreement and whether the process has the necessary political gravitas is questionable.
Other international bodies, including the International Maritime Organization or even the Security Council are arguably needed to strengthen the process.
Links :
- SAN : Undersea cables face rising sabotage risk, analysts warn
- TheCipherBrief :
- Cyberscoop : FCC tightens rules on foreign firms building undersea cables, citing security
- Sustainability Times : The US Is on High Alert After “Steel Jaws Slice Through Lifelines” as China’s Colossal Cable Cutter Endangers 95% of World Connections
- Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists : To keep the world’s data flowing, countries need to quickly fix broken undersea cables
- GeoGarage blog : China’s new deep-sea weapon: How dangerous is its cable-cutting tech?
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