Octopuses use their arms to sense and respond to microbiomes on the seafloor

  

The California two-spot octopus (Octopus bimaculoides).
Photo by Anik Grearson.

 

From Mongabay by Pepper St. Clair

Octopus suckers can sense and react to microbiomes in their environment.
Distinct microbial populations on objects relevant to the octopus’s survival, like eggs and prey, inform the animal’s behavior.
Scientists found that in response to different microbial signals, chemotactile receptors trigger reflexive responses in octopus suckers and arms.

From the beginning of life on Earth, microbes, small but influential single-celled organisms, have shaped the environment that animals must adapt to in order to survive.
Distinct microbial populations, known as microbiomes, inhabit nearly every surface on Earth.
Now scientists have found that octopuses can detect signals from the microbiomes they encounter, revealing one of the ways these cephalopods navigate their environment.

Humans can also detect signs of microbial activity, such as when we smell that meat has gone bad or milk has spoiled.
But we can’t sense those microbes by touch.
Octopuses, on the other hand, touch and taste the world with their arms, which collectively have more neurons than their central brain. Those arms are also lined with chemotactile receptors, which enable them to reflexively react to specific chemical signals from microbiomes as they explore their environment, according to research published recently in Cell.

Microbes have long been known to influence internal animal development, disease, and digestion.
To explore whether the microbiomes in our environment also shape external animal behavior, a team led by biologist Rebecka Sepela, a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, chose as their subject the octopus — an animal that does a lot of exploring by touch.

“There’s a huge interest in this right now.
From human biology to animal biology, from agriculture to medicine,” said Spencer Nyholm, an invertebrate zoologist and microbiologist at the University of Connecticut, who was not involved in the study.
“We are surrounded by microbes, and they’re critically important for our health.”

 

The California two-spot octopus (Octopus bimaculoides).
Photo by Anik Grearson.

Sepela and her team exposed brooding California two-spot octopuses (Octopus bimaculoides) to microbes found on seafloor surfaces that the animals would likely encounter in their environment.
The scientists made fake octopus eggs out of a nontoxic gel derived from algae and loaded them with a molecule derived from bacteria that the researchers collected from octopus eggs that had been ejected from a clutch.
The octopus mothers rejected those fake eggs much quicker than fake eggs that were not treated with the molecule.

The scientists also isolated a molecule from the microbiome of decaying crabs to see how the octopus would respond to it.
The animals quickly dismissed plastic toy crabs doused in the molecule, exactly as they would react to an actual decaying crab.
When the team gave the octopuses the same plastic crabs without the decaying crab molecule, the octopuses grabbed and held on to them as if they were typical prey.

The results confirm that octopuses can detect and respond to microbial signals, which makes sense given their habitat, Sepela said.
“It’s living on a seafloor world that is completely coated in microbes,” she said.
“Most of the octopus’s body is dedicated towards arms that it uses to taste and touch every surface that it comes into contact with.”

When exposed to the microbial signals, individual octopus suckers reacted reflexively, such as retracting from or adhering to the surface where the molecule was detected.
These reactions were made possible by chemotactile receptors in the cells of octopus suckers that initiate a physiological response when they bind to specific molecules.
One of the receptors the team studied, called CRT1, is “especially sticky,” Sepela said.
“It detects a lot of different molecules.”

 

First author Rebecka Sepela and co-author Nicholas Bellono looking at a saltwater tank where octopus behavior is observed.
Photo by Niles Singer.

The findings are impressive but also important, Nyholm said.
The world is “a microbial sea,” and an animal’s ability to understand the microbiomes around it is critical not only for the individual or its species, but for the whole ecosystem, he said.

By studying the octopus’s insight into the microbial world, we can understand how microbes communicate with animal cells, Sepela said.
“I think it’s just really cool to think about how connected we are with a world that we can’t even see.”

 

Links :

• GeoGarage blog : What do we owe the octopus? / Eight reasons why octopuses are the geniuses of the ocean / World's largest deep-sea octopus nursery discovered / 'A symbol of what humans shouldn't be doing': the new ... / Dance of the Dumbo octopus / Watch baby octopuses hatch from a surprising deep-sea ... / Squid and octopus switch on camouflage / Deep Intellect : inside the mind of the octopus / Giant Pacific octopus babies: thousands of eggs hatch / Evolution of mimicry in octopuses
  

Giant 115-foot (35-meter) waves observed from space

Credit: ESA 

 

From Techno-Science by Cédric Depond

Source: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Observation satellites now offer an unprecedented view of ocean movements.
They allow for precise tracking of the trajectory of waves generated by distant storms, long after the winds that formed them have dissipated.
This ability to trace wave energy over thousands of kilometers provides information to better understand the impact of storms on shorelines, even distant ones.

The SWOT satellite mission, the result of an international collaboration, provided crucial data in December 2024.
By capturing ocean surface topography with unprecedented accuracy, the instrument enabled the quantification of the height and wavelength of swells generated by an exceptional storm in the North Pacific.

These direct observations fill a gap, as existing numerical models had until then relied on few concrete measurements for the most intense events.
The analysis of this information was the subject of a publication in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

The meteorological phenomenon and its oceanic footprint

The storm, identified as Eddie, produced a wave field of remarkable magnitude.
Measurements indicate a significant wave height reaching 64.6 feet (19.7 meters).
Some individual waves were even estimated to have crests exceeding 115 feet (35 meters).
These values place this event among the most powerful of the last three decades, rivaling the Hercules storm of 2014 in the Atlantic.

The particularity of this low-pressure system lies in the distance traveled by its energy.
The swells it generated crossed the Pacific, passed through the Drake Passage at the tip of South America, and continued their journey into the tropical Atlantic.
This journey of nearly 15,000 miles (24,000 kilometers) demonstrates the ocean's ability to transport a driving force over intercontinental distances, long after the winds that gave it birth have dissipated.

The energy contained in these long waves manifested spectacularly on the coasts of Hawaii and California.
The power of the swells allowed for the holding of surfing competitions requiring exceptional conditions, such as the Eddie Aikau Big Wave Invitational.
Beyond this spectacle, these breaking waves provided scientists with a tangible demonstration of energy propagation over long distances, validating satellite observations with observable physical manifestations.

Major developments in sea state modeling 

 
The data collected by the SWOT satellite led to a significant revision of the physical understanding of wave energy.
Previous models, which predicted a distribution of energy across a broad spectrum of wavelengths, seemed to overestimate the importance of the longest waves.
The precise analysis of the spectra revealed that the majority of the power was actually concentrated in a limited number of dominant waves, characteristic of the storm itself.

This discovery fundamentally changes the assessment of risk associated with distant swells.
The analogy proposed by researchers compares this energy to that of a boxer relying on the power of a few precise punches rather than a succession of less intense impacts.
This concentration of energy in the main waves explains their ability to retain erosive and destructive potential after thousands of kilometers of travel.

The implications for coastal forecasting and infrastructure design are major.
A better quantification of the actual energy transported by swells allows for the refinement of construction standards for dikes, ports, and offshore structures.
The scientific community now has an unprecedented validation tool to improve the accuracy of models used to anticipate the impact of extreme storms on coastlines, including those not directly hit by weather systems.

Links :

• GeoGarage blog : Science investigates freak waves / Chasing the world's biggest wave: Surfer turns to space ... / Researchers measure giant "internal waves" that help ... / Terrifying 20m-tall 'rogue waves' are actually real / The ocean's hidden waves show their power / Studying and surfing the ocean's monster waves / What is a Rossby wave?

NASA found a secret military base buried 100 feet deep in Greenland’s Ice Shelf

The U.S.Army's Top Secret Arctic City Under the Ice! "Camp Century" Restored Classified Film 

In the late 1950s, during the height of the Cold War, the US military constructed a secret base in the Arctic for "research" purposes. 

Some theorists claim that it was actually used as a covert nuclear weapons storage &/or testing facility as part of Top Secret "Project Iceworm" with the ultimate objective of covertly placing medium-range missiles under the ice sheet -- close enough to strike the Soviet Union, while remaining hidden from the Danish government. 

Others have made even grander claims - that Camp Century was actually a weather manipulation experiment ...
or a U.S. Military administered Alien / UFO base! 

The whole truth may never be known. 

This video is the actual declassified US ARMY FILM documenting the construction process. 

What really happened there afterwards remains a mystery.

From PopMechanics by Connor Lagore

The base is abandoned, but the U.S. Army left some waste behind.

Pictorial Parade//Getty Images

Here’s what you’ll learn when you read this story:NASA scientists have found the remains of a U.S.
military base buried 100 feet below the surface of the ice in Greenland.
Camp Century, as it was called, was a Cold War-era satellite for the U.S.
Army used as a front for a planned arsenal of nuclear missiles.
While the plan never came to fruition and the base was shortly abandoned, there are still thousands of gallons of nuclear waste buried beneath the ice.

Over the years, we’ve dug up a lot of stuff buried underneath layers upon layers of ice.
Ancient tools, animal corpses, World War II planes, volcanoes—you name it, ice has buried it, and we’ve found it.

During an April 2024 flight over the Greenland Ice Sheet, NASA scientist Chad Greene added a pretty surprising entrant to that list: a secret military base.
After taking radar images of the ice, Greene was surprised to see what was shortly thereafter confirmed to be Camp Century—a 65-year-old Cold War United States military base buried 100 feet deep in the massive ice sheet.

“We were looking for the bed of the ice and out pops Camp Century,” said Alex Gardner, a cryospheric scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), who helped lead the project.
“We didn’t know what it was at first.”

Built in secret between June of 1959 and October of 1960 by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, Camp Century—also known as “the city under the ice”—was comprised of 21 underground tunnels spanning 9,800 feet, according to Interesting Engineering.
In radar images of the site, Greene said, many of the base’s individual structures are clearly discernable.
To study the base, NASA used Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle Synthetic Aperture Radar (UAVSAR), a technology similar to LiDAR that is commonly used in searching for hidden structures like Maya ruins.
The difference is that where LiDAR uses laser light, UAVSAR uses radio waves. 

 

Localization with the GeoGarage platform (DGA nautical raster charts)

The U.S. and Denmark signed the Defense of Greenland agreement in 1951 “to negotiate arrangements under which armed forces of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may make use of facilities in Greenland in defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area,” according to the National Museum of Nuclear Science and History.
(Greenland was, at the time of the agreement, a county of Denmark).
This allowed the U.S. to build bases in Greenland.

Even without the -70 degree temperatures and 125-mile-per-hour winds that were possible on the ice shelf, the construction of Camp Century sounds like a total nightmare.
The camp was built from 6,000 tons of material, transported via heavy bobsleds that topped out at two miles per hour.
Materials were shipped to Thule, another U.S. base (this one above ice)—on the sleds, that trek was a 70-hour trip.

Army engineers first dug trenches—the longest of which was a 1,000-foot-long passageway called Main Street—deep in the snow and ice before wooden buildings and steel roofs built out Camp Century.

The crown jewel of the base was one of the first PM-2 medium-power nuclear reactors that, in the freezing conditions, had to be treated with the utmost care in order to power the site.

While operating at the base, scientists made major geological breakthroughs.
They were some of the first to study ice cores, and soil from Greenland itself revealed an ancient history of verdant forestry and diverse wildlife.

But that research was just a cover-up.

Camp Century itself was not a secret.
Its establishment was known, and the Army even made a promotional video for the project.
The scientific research angle, as significant as the discoveries were, was merely a front for a major U.S.
nuclear weapon strategy of which the Danish government wasn’t even aware.
Known as “Project Iceworm,” the plan was for Camp Century to house ballistic missiles under the Greenland ice.
An additional 52,000 square miles of tunnels were planned—enough to fit 600 missiles.
It would require 60 launch centers to be built, and would be manned by 11,000 soldiers living full-time in the city under the ice.

If that sounds impossible on a number of levels to you, you’re not alone.
Project Iceworm never came to be because of a litany of obstacles, almost all of them boiling down to some version of “well, this simply isn’t feasible.” By 1967, Camp Century was decommissioned and abandoned—a frigid fossil of the U.S.’s Cold War efforts.
The potential nuclear weaponplan was publicized by the Danish Institute of International Affairs in 1997.

So, now the remains sit alone, buried by even more ice and snow in the 57 years since the closure of the base and giving its ‘Camp Century’ name even more significance.
Ultimately, it’s just a harmless footnote in U.S. military history.
Right?

Well, not exactly.
As is U.S. tradition during international ventures, there were some residual drawbacks.
Remember that nuclear reactor that was lugged piece by piece below the ice, only to operate for 33 months? Well, during that time, it produced over 47,000 gallons of nuclear waste, according to the National Museum of Nuclear Science and History.
When the base shut down, they removed the reactor, but not the waste, which is still lying under the ice—ice that is in serious peril with a warming climate.
Right now, it’s just sitting there, frozen in time.
But a study by experts has projected that the base could begin losing ice by 2090.

“They thought it would never be exposed,” William Colgan, a climate and glacier scientist at Toronto’s York University and the leader of the study, told The Guardian in 2016.
“Back then, in the ‘60s, the term global warming had not even been coined.
But the climate is changing, and the question now is whether what’s down there is going to stay down there.”

Links :

• Business Insider : See photos of Camp Century, a secret US military base built beneath Greenland's ice sheet 

From Charybdis to Scylla: how an uncorrected maritime error traps Lebanon in a regional dilemma

From Libanaews by Bernard Raymond Jabre  (translated from French)

 

Point 1 is a fundamental geographical point that determines the course of Lebanon's maritime borders. Originally, this point was to be located on the mainland, exactly at the terminal point of the Green Line separating Israel and Lebanon before the sea. 

This position corresponded to the official land border between the two countries and served as the basis for calculating the maritime delimitation according to international law.

Here is a clear, structured, and comparative summary of the two major technical studies that provided the framework for Lebanon's southern maritime delimitation:

1.  The UKHO (United Kingdom Hydrographic Office) study
2.  The study by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Hydrographic Office
This is the key to understanding the origin of the discrepancies between “Point 1” chosen in 2007 and “Line 23/Line 29” claimed later.

 

 

1. UKHO study (2006–2011)

Mandate entrusted by the Siniora government to assist Lebanon in preparing a maritime delimitation in accordance with international law.

UKHO objective

• Determine a fair line in accordance with UNCLOS (Articles 15, 74, 83).
• Select relevant baselines on the Lebanese coast.
• Propose a technically defensible line for the EEZ declaration.

UKHO method

• High-resolution coastline analysis (orthophotos + UK Admiralty nautical charts).• Selection of base points according to:

o  mainland ,
o  natural projections ,
o  absence of artificial disturbances  (dikes, ports, artificial beaches, etc.).

• Calculation of the equidistance between the Lebanese and Israeli points.

UKHO conclusion: two options

UKHO presented  two possible routes  to the Lebanese government:

Option A — Line 23 (considered “conservative”)
• Based on  less aggressive  basepoints closer to the coast.
• Represents a moderate version that is  less politically contentious .
• Implies a loss of approximately  860 km²  compared to the interpretation most favorable to Lebanon.

Option B — Line 29 (considered “legally defensible”)
• Based on the most advanced and geometrically correct base points.
• Strictly follows the principle of equidistance unaffected by coastal distortions.
• Gives Lebanon ≈ 1,430 km² of additional EEZ compared to Line 23.
• Recognized by UKHO engineers as legally sound under UNCLOS.

 

 Key point:
➡  UKHO has clearly stated that Line 29 is defensible, but the political decision rests with Lebanon.

2. Lebanese Army Study (2011–2020)
Conducted by the  Lebanese Armed Forces Hydrographic Office (LAF)  + geodesy experts.

Army objective

 
• Verify the validity of the line submitted to the UN (Line 23).
• Determine whether a more favorable route exists under maritime law.
• Correct the errors made in 2007 during the Lebanon–Cyprus agreement.

Main conclusion  of the army

 
1. “Point 1” chosen in 2007 is incorrect.
• Lebanon accepted a point  artificially moved northward ,
•  not located on the actual land border ,
• contrary to the requirements of UNCLOS, which stipulates that the EEZ must begin  from the undisputed land border .

Consequence:

 
➡ This shift reduces Lebanon's projection angle towards the sea → loss vis-à-vis Israel  and  vis-à-vis Cyprus (geometric domino effect). 

 

 2. The LAF confirms that Line 29 is the only correct one.
• Military engineers demonstrate that the actual Lebanese base points (natural rock, no quay, no sand deposits) allow for a much more advantageous route.
• Line 29 is strictly compliant with undistorted equidistance.

• Supported by:

o terrestrial GPS surveys,
o UKHO charts,
o high-precision orthophotos.

Technical conclusion of the army:

 
➡ Lebanon is entitled to ≈ 1,430 km² more than indicated in its official declaration (Line 23).  

 

  3. The army requests amendment of Decree 6433/2011

• Decree 6433, which freezes line 23, should have been amended.
• The army prepared the technical documents for correction.
• But the government (Aoun–Diab then Mikati) never signed it, despite full technical support.

Comparison between UKHO and the Lebanese Army
Criterion                     UKHO                                                          Lebanese Army (LAF)
Objective                    Provide options in accordance                    Determine the  actual  line according                                        with the law                                                to UNCLOS
Politically accepted route     Line 23                                              Rejected – proposes Line 29
Baseline analysis       Technical + political caution                        Strictly technical
Position on Line 29    Legally defensible                                       Legally binding
Position on Point 1     No political decision                                   Confirms that Point 1 2007 is incorrect
Consequence              Loss of 860 km² compared to optimum      Cumulative loss of 1,430 km² if not                                                                                                              corrected

 

 

Final summary

✔  UKHO provided two solutions:
•  Line 23: politically prudent
•  Line 29: technically correct and defensible

✔  The Lebanese army confirmed that:
• Point 1 of 2007 is incorrect ,
•  Line 23 is suboptimal,
•  Line 29 is the only one that complies with international maritime law.

✔  By not claiming Line 29 at the UN,
Lebanon automatically lost its ability to claim the 1,430 km² — which Israel then exploited in the 2022 negotiations.  

 

Lebanon’s losses could exceed 5,000 km² of its exclusive economic zone.

 

Why did Lebanon give up its optimal maritime boundary?

Lebanon is located at a strategic crossroads, both geopolitically and in terms of energy.

Since the discovery of gas and oil reserves in the eastern Mediterranean, the issue of delimiting its maritime border with Israel has become central.

However, despite solid scientific and legal studies—notably those carried out by the Lebanese army and the British Hydrographic Office—the country has chosen not to claim its maximum maritime boundary, even though it is defensible under international law.

A legally defensible optimal line

The famous “Line 29” corresponded to the exact projection of the land border between Lebanon and Israel onto the sea. 

According to experts, this line would have allowed Lebanon to secure its entire exclusive economic zone, thus maximizing its access to natural resources.

Legally, it was based on solid foundations, in line with international conventions and expert recommendations.

 

Caution dictated by the political context

So why was this option not adopted?

The answer lies as much in Lebanon's political complexity as in the regional reality.

First, Lebanon remains a deeply divided state, where every strategic decision must achieve a fragile consensus among political factions, religious communities, and military actors.

Claiming Line 29 would have been perceived as an aggressive move by certain internal parties and could have potentially undermined the already precarious political balance.

The Israeli factor and international pressure

Externally, an ambitious claim would have almost automatically triggered tensions with Israel, which disputes this area.

Lebanese leaders had to weigh up the risk: open conflict could have had dramatic economic and security consequences.

Furthermore, international pressure, particularly from the United States and certain European countries, also pushed Lebanon to adopt a more cautious stance, favoring negotiation over direct confrontation. Strategic calculations

Beyond the fear of conflict, the decision reflects a strategic calculation: Lebanon was not yet ready to fully exploit its gas and oil resources.

Choosing an overly ambitious line would have meant not only diplomatic tensions but also immediate investment to secure and exploit the area, a luxury the country could not afford at the time.

Consequences of this choice

The refusal to adopt Line 29 had direct consequences on Lebanon's potential economy.

Part of its maritime zone, which could have brought in billions in gas and oil revenues, was left untouched.

In addition, this compromise had a domino effect on the delimitation with Cyprus and Israel, indirectly changing the energy and strategic map of the eastern Mediterranean.

In summary, Lebanon had an optimal, legally defensible choice, but political caution, the risk of conflict with Israel, international pressure, and internal complexity led successive leaders to abandon this option.

The history of Line 29 thus illustrates the constant dilemmas between legality, national interest, and political pragmatism in a country where every strategic decision is carefully weighed.

Point 1, currently adopted by Lebanon, was defined by former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in 2007 and has since been confirmed by successive presidents: Michel Sleiman (map of Line 23 sent to the UN), Michel Aoun (signs an agreement with Israel based on Line 23), Joseph Aoun, and Speaker of the House Nabih Berri. 

This official point is no longer located exactly on the Green Line, but slightly offset, which has direct consequences on Lebanese maritime space, particularly with regard to disputed areas with Israel, as well as maritime rights in relation to Cyprus and Syria. 

Because:  

• Moving Point 1 even a short distance along the coastline changes the position of the median lines because the equidistance rule is calculated based on these originals.
• When the median line shifts in favor of the neighbor (Israel, then Cyprus), the lost area is added: a loss to Israel can, depending on the angle/direction, alter the line of intersection with the Cyprus area and further reduce the available Lebanese surface area—hence the domino effect.
• In practice (on the actual map), these losses can amount to hundreds or even thousands of square kilometers depending on the actual geometry of the coastline and the precise location of the base points — hence the major strategic issue.

Thus, understanding the distinction between Point 1 of origin on the continent and Point 1 officially adopted is essential for analyzing the geopolitical and economic issues related to Lebanon's maritime resources.

In 2007, when Lebanon adopted the maritime boundary based on “point 1,” many warned that this was a major technical error.

The Lebanese army and the British company UKHO, which specializes in mapping international maritime boundaries, were among those who raised the alarm.

But between political inertia, diplomatic improvisation, and a lack of will to correct the mistake, this error turned into a geopolitical spiral.

Today, the country finds itself weakened, facing a cascade of claims from its neighbors, which it itself unwittingly triggered.

The first shock came from the map sent to Cyprus: more than 3,000 km² of potentially resource-rich maritime space was conceded without solid justification.

This “unintended gift” immediately set a precedent.

Ankara, on behalf of Northern Cyprus, rushed into the breach, claiming at least an additional 2,000 km², arguing that the Turkish part of the island had no reason to be less favored than the Greek part.

Thus, with a single ill-considered decision, Beirut found itself caught up in a double Cypriot conflict that did not concern it.

Israel, observing this Lebanese laxity, recalculated its own strategy.

If Beirut could concede 3,000 km² to Cyprus, why should it be satisfied with the 1,400 km² already gained thanks to point 1?

Tel Aviv now believes that Lebanon has opened the door to a total renegotiation and could demand even more than what was obtained in 2007.

Syria, in turn, followed the logic of the precedent.

Damascus considers that if Lebanon has offered space to Cyprus and Israel without compensation, there is no reason why it cannot also claim a larger share in the north.

Lebanon thus finds itself surrounded by four neighbors who are using its own mistake as an argument for their claims.

Caught in this spiral, the country is witnessing a continuous erosion of its maritime space.

Each concession, even if involuntary, becomes an argument for the next.

The inability of Lebanese officials to correct the initial mistake transforms a simple technical inaccuracy into a structural crisis.

The paradox is all the more striking given that the justification invoked for years—the need to move quickly to exploit gas and oil—does not hold up in the face of reality on the ground.

TotalEnergies has pointed out that no production is possible for at least six years, which is the time needed to explore, drill, evaluate, and build offshore platforms.

What was supposed to be a race against time is in fact turning out to be a marathon that Lebanon is unable to control.

Added to this is a major political obstacle that few dare to address head-on: the presence of Hezbollah weapons.

Western governments, like Qatar, believe that no large-scale exploitation can begin until the Lebanese state has full authority over its territory and strategic decisions.

In other words, even if Lebanon were to correct point 1 tomorrow, there would be no guarantee of rapid access to its resources.

The result: everything is blocked.

Maritime borders remain disputed, energy opportunities are slipping away, and the mistake in point 1 continues to prevent any way out of the crisis.

By refusing to acknowledge a bad choice, Lebanon has found itself between a rock and a hard place—sliding from a technical misstep into a diplomatic trap from which it now seems unable to extricate itself.

Webography:

Here is a summary of the role of the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO) in delimiting Lebanon's maritime waters—what it has done, its recommendations, and why this is important for Lebanon today.

Who is the UKHO?

• The UKHO is the British agency responsible for providing marine hydrographic and geospatial data, nautical charts, and services to the navy, shipowners, and maritime states.  Wikipédia+1

• These maps and data are used, among other things, to define coastlines, the baseline from which territorial waters are measured, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and other maritime rights.  Nations Unies+1

 What the UKHO has done for Lebanon

• In 2009–2010, the UKHO provided nautical charts used as the basis for delineating the southern coast of Lebanon.

The charts concerned were Admiralty chart No. 2634 (Beirut–Gaza) and No. 183 (Ra’s at Tin–Iskenderun).  الجيش اللبناني+2American University of Beirut+2

• At the request of the Lebanese government, the UKHO conducted an  assessment study of the maritime delimitation made in 2009 (in particular the proposed EEZ line).  LCPS+2Ici Beyrouth+2

• In its report, the UKHO proposed two options for Lebanon's southern maritime border. The second — known as “line 29” — would have granted Lebanon approximately 1,430 km² more than the line used until then (the “line 23”).  LCPS+2The National+2

 Why it matters (and why it's controversial)

• Had Line 29 been adopted, it would have given Lebanon a significantly larger maritime zone — which is crucial for its rights to explore offshore resources (gas, oil, etc.).  Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique+2Orient XXI+2

 • But—despite this recommendation—the government never officially submitted line 29 to the United Nations. Instead, in 2011, Lebanon issued a decree (Decree 6433) reiterating line 23 as its official position.  The Policy Initiative+2LCPS+2

 • Some Lebanese experts and military officials believe that this omission deprived the country of hundreds—even thousands—of square kilometers of potential territory, fueling controversy in maritime negotiations with Israel.  Orient XXI+2American University of Beirut+2

 Conclusions & current status

• The UKHO's work provides the technical and cartographic basis on which Lebanon can base its maritime claims.
• However, the extension recommendation (line 29) has never been officially adopted — which has reduced the country's weight in negotiations.
• Today, maritime delimitation remains a strategic issue for the exploitation of Lebanon's offshore resources (gas, oil)—and the UKHO's work remains a frequently cited reference point in debates.

Here is a realistic geographical diagram — based on publicly available maps — illustrating the difference between the “line 29” claim and the line officially adopted for Lebanon's sea/EEZ in relation to Israel (and — relevantly — the area of Cyprus).

What the map shows

 

• The Lebanese coastline in the northeast Mediterranean, with the southwestern point of Ras Naqoura (land border with Israel) as the starting point.

• The officially used maritime boundary—i.e., the “compromise” line between Lebanon and Israel (often referred to as “line 23” in negotiations)—drawn according to the coordinates submitted to the UN in 2010.  timesofisrael.com+2marineregions.org+2

 • The area claimed by Lebanon as “line 29” (or at least a more ambitious line than the official line), as defended by the Lebanese army and studies (notably according to the interpretation of a line more favorable to the Lebanese EEZ).  L’Orient Today+2trt.global+2

• The “lost zone” — that is, the additional maritime area that Lebanon could have claimed (and exploited) if line 29 had been adopted. This zone corresponds to the difference between line 29 and the officially adopted line.  trt.global+2globalsecurity.org+2

• Also, the impact—on the distribution of maritime zones—with regard to Israel and Cyprus, since the Lebanese-Cypriot and Israeli-Cypriot delimitation is influenced by this route.  marineregions.org+2UNDP+2

 Visible data & issues

• The disputed area (or “potentially claimable” in line 29) is estimated—in some analyses—to be approximately ≈1,430 km² larger than the official line.  trt.global+2globalsecurity.org+2

• According to sources, the agreement officially adopted by Lebanon in 2010/2011 (but without final ratification in some cases) started at Ras Naqoura and extended to point 23 (on the map submitted to the UN).  marineregions.org+2marineregions.org+2

 

 • However, this boundary has been contested—Lebanon considers it to be underestimated—particularly with regard to future offshore gas and oil potential (e.g., fields such as Karish, or the zoning claimed as belonging to it).  trt.global+1

 

Links :

• GeoGarage blog : Israel and Lebanon negotiate their maritime border
• Tehran Times : How Nawaf Salam’s cabinet is handing maritime resources to Israel! 
• Al Akhbar : US Grip Threatens to Hand Cyprus 5,000 km² of Lebanon’s Resources 
• NYTimes (2022) : Israeli-Lebanese Maritime Deal Marks a Milestone, With Limitations 

Antarctica’s Treaty in testing times

 Today, we celebrate the anniversary of the signing of the Antarctic Treaty (December 1, 1959), the international agreement that transformed this frozen continent into a sanctuary dedicated to Peace and Science.

No military bases
Global scientific cooperation
Ban on mineral exploitation until 2048 
Major player in climate and ocean regulation.

 

“Antarctica is not a continent for humans, but a continent for the Earth” Jean-Louis Etienne

 

From The Interpreter by Jeffrey McGee, Bruno Arpi and Richard Rowe 

 
In June, Australia and 57 other countries will come together in Milan, Italy for the 47th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting. 

This annual meeting of the Antarctic Treaty parties will occur at a time when the “international rules-based order” is under significant threat, via protectionist trade policies and the annexation of territory by conquest.

It is essential that this meeting protects the Antarctic Treaty System as a longstanding and successful example of international rules in action.

Australia has significant national interests in Antarctica.
Australia was one of the 12 founding countries of the Antarctic Treaty 1959, establishing the Antarctic Treaty System which has governed the region over the last six decades.
The Treaty protects Australia’s position regarding its sovereignty claim to more than 42% of the continent.
Australia also benefits strategically from the Treaty stating that “Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only” and there will be a prohibition on nuclear explosions in the region.
The Treaty facilitates scientific cooperation in Antarctica to which Australia contributes.

However, to protect those interests, there are three key geopolitical challenges that Australia will need to take account of in engaging in the upcoming Milan meeting.

Australia should engage with the United States to register the importance, strategically, of continued support for the Antarctic Treaty System especially at this time of global contestability.

Today is Antarctica Day, marking the 1959 signing of the Antarctic Treaty by 12 nations to protect the continent as a natural reserve dedicated solely to peaceful activities.

This chart highlights early navigation details and views of Antarctica. 

 

First, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings have historically been regarded as “exceptional” in the sense that countries have worked hard to keep wider political issues and disagreements from intruding.
However, this exceptionalism fell away during 2022–23 when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was raised directly.
While Russia’s action should rightly be condemned, the tension from this armed conflict is affecting the positions that countries are taking on key issues.
This includes applications by Belarus and Canada to become “Consultative Parties” – i.e. countries able to participate in the decision-making process – at the meeting.

A failure of the Antarctic Treaty meeting to reach consensus on such important issues invites public criticism that it is failing to live up to its decision-making role in governing the Antarctic region.
Building on such criticisms, and with a particular concern about climate change and other environmental impacts, some civil society groups have proposed radically new governance arrangements based on “rights of nature”.
Australia will need to continue supporting the integrity of the Antarctic Treaty System in this new politically charged meeting environment.

 

 

An ATCM Plenary session (J.L.Agraz/ATS Image Bank)

Second, the near future role of the United States in Antarctic affairs is unclear.
The United States has the largest Antarctic science and logistics program and operates three large research stations, including the McMurdo Station in the Ross Sea and Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station.
However, US commitment to the region appears to be scaling back, with the second Trump administration recently announcing significant funding cuts to US science and logistics, including for the McMurdo Station and the US National Science Foundation programs.

The specific impact of these cuts will become more evident over the next year.
However, this move by the United States may well be viewed by other Antarctic countries as a weakening of its commitment to the Antarctic Treaty System, which dates back to its inception when President Dwight Eisenhower initiated the 1959 “Washington Conference” which formed the Antarctic Treaty.
US influence in Antarctica and at the Consultative Meetings may well diminish over the next four years.

Australia will need to quickly adjust to this new diplomatic reality, as the United States has traditionally been an important partner on Antarctic matters.
Australia should engage with the United States to register the importance, strategically, of continued support for the Antarctic Treaty System especially at this time of global contestability.

Third, China and the Russian Federation are expanding their scientific and logistical footprint in the region.
In 2023 China commenced operation of its fifth research station, the year-round Qinling Station in the Ross Sea area.
China has also filed documents for the Milan meeting detailing plans to construct a sixth Antarctic summer research station at Cox Point in Marie Byrd Land.
The Russian Federation has also announced plans to recommission the Russkaya Station in Marie Byrd Land, which has been dormant since 1990.
It will be operated year-round by the Russian space agency Roscosmos to monitor Russian satellites and spacecraft.
The new Chinese station at Cox Point will be located only a short distance of approximately 17 kilometres from Russkaya.
Marie Byrd Land is also the area of Antarctica in which the United States has a deep historic connection of discovery, mapping, science and operations by the US military.

Together, these announcements by China and Russia may well signal an intention for closer coordination of their scientific and logistics presence in Antarctica.
A closer relationship between China and Russia in Antarctica would also be consistent with strengthening of their wider security and economic relationship.
This is significant for Australia, as China and Russia have a recent record of blocking key decisions on marine spatial protection issues in the Antarctic Treaty meeting and related meetings of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.

While these developments are not a direct threat to the Antarctic Treaty, it will be important for Australia and like-minded states to work hard to coordinate actions to build consensus within the Milan Antarctic meeting on key sticking points, such as Consultative Party applications and threatened species protection.
Continuing to strengthen Australia’s scientific and logistical commitments in Antarctica is also vital to maintain a position of influence in the region.

 

Links :

• IFLScience : Who Owns Antarctica? 
• CBC : Antarctica belongs to no one. But many countries are angling for a piece
• BBC : British man who perished in Antarctic glacier found 65 years later 
• GeoGarage blog : The fight to own Antarctica / What are China's long- term Antarctic ambitions? / Westarctica: The micronation with a real-world purpose / Why experts are worried about Russia's oil and gas ... / More than 100000 tourists will head to Antarctica this ... / Antarctica is like no other place on Earth / Climate change: Extremes committee validates Antarctic ...