Security analysts find vessels could be turning off tracking systems to evade authorities
Ships from conflict zones and terrorist strongholds are covertly sailing into European waters on suspected smuggling missions while attempting to evade detection, security analysts have warned.
Research by the Windward maritime data company found that in the first two months of 2017, 50 vessels with invalid registration numbers entered the UK, and 245 more with “suspicious” gaps in tracking data.
Another 40 ships sailed into Europe from near Isis-controlled territory in Libya after unexplained black-outs on their automatic identification systems (AIS) during January and February.
Ami Daniel, the firm’s CEO and cofounder, warned that the cases found so far are just a small fraction of covert voyages in Europe.
A Cyprus-flagged cargo ship made several 'suspicious stops' while
tracking data disappeared off the coast of Algeria before journeying to
the Scottish island of Islay
(image : Windward)
(image : Windward)
“It’s frightening but it’s the reality.”
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) requires all ships to be assigned a unique reference number that can be combined with AIS data to avoid collisions and monitor movements, course and speed.
But Windward found numerous cases where fake IMO numbers were being assigned to large cargo vessels, as well as blips in tracking that appeared to lengthy to be accidental.
Mr Daniel said AIS equipment, which communicates with satellites, is mandatory for all large international ships and passenger vessels.
“These are safety transmissions so definition you would not turn that off,” he added.
“People who turn off transitions are doing a trade-off in their minds.”
Analysts believe such a trade would most likely be made for illicit reasons to evade authorities, possibly while carrying illegal cargo such as weapons, drugs or people.
A Tel Aviv startup company is distinguishing itself in Israel and with clients on four continents by its ability to clear away the clutter on loosely regulated, often fraudulent high seas.
Using what it calls activity-based intelligence, Windward, a five-year-old maritime data and analytics firm here, probes beyond the ship-tracking services available on today’s market to validate identities of ocean-going vessels.
It compares their patterns of behavior and past associations with other ships — even where they loaded or didn’t load in specific ports of call.
(image : Windward)
Using what it calls activity-based intelligence, Windward, a five-year-old maritime data and analytics firm here, probes beyond the ship-tracking services available on today’s market to validate identities of ocean-going vessels.
It compares their patterns of behavior and past associations with other ships — even where they loaded or didn’t load in specific ports of call.
(image : Windward)
One of the vessels tracked was a Cyprus-flagged cargo ship owned by a Russian company, which broke from its normal pattern of voyages between Northern Europe and West Africa last month.
It diverted via the Mediterranean Sea to make its first port visit in Ukraine in December, before sailing back towards Gibraltar and engaging in “12 days of suspicious drifting” where the AIS repeatedly stopped transmitting.
Cyprus-flagged cargo reefer visited Ukraine before entering the Mediterranean.
As it sailed towards Gibraltar it drifted for 12 days off the Algerian and Moroccan coasts, shutting down its AIS multiple times, on one occasion for 28 hours
(image : Windward)
On 9 January, it set sail for the UK and arrived in Scotland five days later, performing a “suspicious stop” off the coast of Islay for 11 hours, when analysts said illicit cargo may have been loaded on to smaller boats.
Ship Detection and Tracking
Localisation of vessels and small-sized boats with Pleiades satellite.
Localisation of vessels and small-sized boats with Pleiades satellite.
“The UK’s coastline is vulnerable,” a report by Windward found.
“The maritime domain is vast and laws are difficult to enforce.
“Ships with criminal or terror-related intentions can easily conceal their cargo – arms, drugs or people.
Although ships arriving in EU ports have to declare their last calling point, researchers say the measure does not take account of behaviour at sea including diversions and offshore transfers.
As well as fake registration numbers and disappearing location transmissions, more than half of all vessels entering the UK were using “flags of convenience” – linked to tax avoidance, regulation dodging and crime – as well as hundreds had ship-to-ship meetings just outside territorial waters.
Libya to Greece: A large bulk carrier travelled from Libya to southern Crete — a deviation of its normal route.
It stopped off at the tiny resort of Kokkinos, raising fears of a people smuggling operation
(image : Windward)
Identification of the hijacked MV Sirius Star anchored at the Somali port of Harardhere
(image : TerraSAR X)
(image : TerraSAR X)
“You might have ship come out of Libya, conduct a ship-to-ship transfer near Malta, change registration numbers and someone has done business with Isis,” Mr Daniel said.
Smuggling gangs based in the war-torn country packed disused cargo ships and fishing vessels with hundreds of refugees at the start of the Mediterranean crisis, sailing them into open water before calling for aid and abandoning what became known as “ghost ships”.
By mid-January the reefer was off the coast of Islay,
spending 11 hours at a spot where there are no ports
(image : Windward)
Mr Daniel, a former officer in the Israeli navy, said the world of shipping presented an easier method of expansion for terrorist groups and criminal organizations than more tightly regulated airports and land borders.
Libya to Greece.
An Italian-flagged oil tanker sailed north fromLibya towards Greece.
En route it made two unusual stops — one for seven hours near Crete, and the second for 15 hours close to the mainland
(image : Windward)
“It’s still the Wild West in these seas.”
European crime agency Europol said it was monitoring people smuggling as part of the refugee crisis but that the primary responsibility for maritime security lay with member states.
Example of vessels detected with RADARSAT-2 outside the coast of Somalia and correlated with AIS data.
Green circles indicate positions of vessel reported with Satellite AIS.
Green circles indicate positions of vessel reported with Satellite AIS.
Red circles indicate positions of non-reporting vessel, only detected in the satellite image (RADARSAT-2 SCANSAR Narrow Mode © MacDonald, Dettwiler & Associates Ltd., 2009)
(image : Kongsberg)
A Home Office spokesperson said: “Border Force monitors vessels sailing off our coastline for suspicious behaviour, including the disruption of AIS.
“The National Maritime Information Centre brings together officers from Border Force, the National Crime Agency, police, Royal Navy, coastguard and others to share intelligence, detect and respond to a range of threats.
“This approach is working. In 2015, a vessel carrying more than three tonnes of cocaine was detected despite turning off its AIS system.”
Links :
- The Times : All At Sea, Suspicious shipping activity must be investigated forcefully / Security fears over cargo ships ‘going dark’ near terror zones
- FT : Europe’s ports vulnerable as ships sail without oversight
- GeoGarage blog : Google's global fishing watch is using 'manipulated data' / Rising fraud in the high seas / Combatting maritime cyber security threats / Concern over 'high seas security loophole' / Loose blips sink ships: leaky communications threaten marine vessels / Boom in satellite ship tracking
- Windward : An anlaysis of the magnitude and implications of growing data manipulation at sea
- Pulse : Cyber Security and Maritime Industry : Securing the vessels, ports and sea / Problems encountered with AIS for lawyers and insurers
- Trend Micro : Vulnerabilities Discovered in Global Vessel Tracking Systems
- EC : Performance of AIS sensors in space
- SpaceNews : MDA to acquire DigitalGlobe
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