Benjamin Sanchis. “This photo reminds me of the wave I would draw on my
notebook as a kid. It might be the biggest wave I’ve seen anyone ride.”
photo : Fred Pompermayer's marathon quest to capture the biggest wave
Links :
Saturday, January 11, 2025
Friday, January 10, 2025
Is Russia's 'shadow fleet' attacking Western infrastructure?
The shadow fleet "threatens security and the environment, while funding Russia's war budget"
(Image credit: Illustration by Stephen Kelly / Getty Images)
(Image credit: Illustration by Stephen Kelly / Getty Images)
Maybe you've heard of the "hybrid war" — Russian-sponsored attacks on European infrastructure, apparently designed to undermine support for Ukraine.
Now the maritime equivalent is emerging: the "shadow fleet."
Finnish officials say a "Russia-affiliated vessel" named the Eagle S appears to have cut an undersea power line that runs between Finland and Estonia, said NPR.
The tanker is suspected of being part of the shadow fleet, an armada of ships of "uncertain ownership" that has been used to help Russia evade oil sanctions.
The Eagle S is registered in the Cook Islands but had "set off from Russia" the day before the line was severed.
Russia is "stepping up pressure against the West," said Janne Riihelainen, a Finnish national security columnist.
The shadow fleet "threatens security and the environment, while funding Russia's war budget," Kaja Kallas, chief of foreign policy for the European Union, said to Politico.
Four telecom cables — between Finland and Estonia, and Finland and Germany — were also damaged.
In response, Finnish authorities have seized the Eagle S, while Estonian officials said they were stepping up naval patrols.
NATO will also "enhance its military presence in the Baltic Sea," Secretary General Mark Rutte said in a social media post.
A Russian shadow fleet tanker, Eagle S, detained in Finland
(Finnish Border Guard)
What is the shadow fleet?
After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Ukraine's Western allies imposed a price cap on Russian oil exports "aimed at limiting and controlling Russian revenues," Sergey Vakulenko said at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Russia countered by using hundreds of aging off-the-books tankers owned "outside of the Western coalition." Ship owners busted for evading sanctions can be forced to "scrap the vessel," Vakulenko said.
So it makes sense to use old tankers "with low residual value in order to limit the potential losses."
The fleet is designed to keep Russia's oil income flowing, but the idea of using it to "cause havoc may be proving irresistible to the Kremlin," Michael Schwirtz said at The New York Times.
The Eagle S incident would be a "clear escalation by Russia in its conflict with the West."
After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Ukraine's Western allies imposed a price cap on Russian oil exports "aimed at limiting and controlling Russian revenues," Sergey Vakulenko said at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Russia countered by using hundreds of aging off-the-books tankers owned "outside of the Western coalition." Ship owners busted for evading sanctions can be forced to "scrap the vessel," Vakulenko said.
So it makes sense to use old tankers "with low residual value in order to limit the potential losses."
The fleet is designed to keep Russia's oil income flowing, but the idea of using it to "cause havoc may be proving irresistible to the Kremlin," Michael Schwirtz said at The New York Times.
The Eagle S incident would be a "clear escalation by Russia in its conflict with the West."
But it would be a natural extension of the low-level conflict taking place across Europe.
Russia is "systematically conducting hybrid warfare against its neighboring NATO/EU countries," Estonian interior minister Lauri Läänemets said to the Times.
Russia is "systematically conducting hybrid warfare against its neighboring NATO/EU countries," Estonian interior minister Lauri Läänemets said to the Times.
Ship-to-ship transfers are a key characteristic of the "shadow fleet"
The shadow fleet is a "vexing challenge," said Elisabeth Braw at the Atlantic Council.
The longer it operates and the larger it grows, the more it threatens the "functioning of the global maritime order." One option: Governments of seagoing nations should establish a "monitoring hub" to identify and monitor shadow fleet ships.
The EU has sanctioned 79 ships from the shadow fleet, said Business Insider.
Those ships are "banned from accessing EU ports and services."
The list could grow — German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock is calling for expanded sanctions.
Russia-connected ships are "damaging major undersea cables in the Baltic Sea almost every month," she said.
The attack on the Finland-Estonia power line is an "urgent wake-up call for all of us."
Russia-connected ships are "damaging major undersea cables in the Baltic Sea almost every month," she said.
The attack on the Finland-Estonia power line is an "urgent wake-up call for all of us."
Links :
- Newsweek : China Deals Blow to Putin's 'Shadow Fleet'
- DefenseNews : British-led force to use AI in tracking Russia’s shadow fleet
- US Naval Institute : UK to Lead Joint Expeditionary Force, NATO Effort to Track Russian ‘Shadow Fleet’
- BreakingDefense : Joint European force launches AI-enabled tool to track Russia’s shadow fleet, monitor undersea cables
- Business Insider : Video shows a Ukrainian long-range drone strike on a Russian port used to support its 'shadow fleet'
- Maritime Executive : Report: White House Plans to Sanction 100 More Russian Dark Fleet Tankers
- Marine Insight : Russian Shadow Fleet’s Movements In Europe To Be Tracked By New AI System
- ABC : One of Russia's 'shadow fleet' may have sabotaged power cables in the Baltic Sea. But what is it?
Thursday, January 9, 2025
Trump’s Greenland purchase plan has been a U.S. ambition since 1868
Record date not stated. Arctic America : eastern sheet , Arctic regions, Maps, Canada, Northern, Maps, Greenland, Maps Norman B. Leventhal Map Center CollectionCopyright: xpiemagsx digcompie09122022-14431
From ArcticToday y Elías Thorsson, Marybeth Sandell
When President-elect Donald Trump once more floated the idea of purchasing Greenland, reactions ranged from ridicule to intrigue.
Critics dismissed the notion as another eccentric Trump proposal. However, history reveals that the United States’ interest in Greenland is far from new—it’s a strategy that dates back more than a century.
From territorial ambitions in the 19th century to Cold War military priorities, Greenland has repeatedly caught the attention of American policymakers.
From territorial ambitions in the 19th century to Cold War military priorities, Greenland has repeatedly caught the attention of American policymakers.
Greenland in the GeoGarage platform (DGA nautical raster chart)But while the U.S. has eyed Greenland as a strategic asset, the political and legal dynamics surrounding the island have evolved significantly over time.
Today, Greenland has self-rule and the right to declare independence from Denmark, fundamentally altering the terms of such discussions.
Arctic Today has compiled a timeline of key developments in the history of U.S. interest in acquiring Greenland.
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump is far from the first American official to cast a wanton eye on Greenland.
Brandon Bell/Pool via Reuters/File Photo
A Timeline of Greenland’s Ownership and U.S. Interest
1823: Monroe Doctrine
The Monroe Doctrine established U.S. opposition to European colonial expansion in the Americas. While it did not directly mention Greenland, the doctrine laid the groundwork for American territorial ambitions in the region.
The first official Danish map of Greenland where all sections of the coastline of Northeastern Greenland are charted.
(Royal Danish Library)
1868: Early Negotiations
William H. Seward, then U.S. Secretary of State, pursued the acquisition of both Greenland and Iceland.
Reports suggested that negotiations with Denmark for a $5.5 million purchase were nearly complete. However, no formal offer materialized.
1871-1872: Polaris Expedition
During the Polaris Expedition, American explorer Robert Peary claimed much of northern Greenland for the United States.
Although these claims were unofficial, they underscored the strategic interest in the Arctic region.
1910: Renewed Proposals
U.S. Ambassador to Denmark Maurice Francis Egan discussed acquiring Greenland in 1910.
While the idea gained traction in Washington, it did not progress to formal negotiations.
Francis Egan in 1923, wearing the Danish Medal of Merit
(United States Library of Congress)
1917: A Trade with Denmark
In a notable exception to the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. recognized Denmark’s ownership of Greenland in exchange for acquiring the Danish West Indies (now the U.S. Virgin Islands).
This agreement was intended to bolster American control over the Caribbean and protect the Panama Canal.
1941: World War II Occupation
When Germany invaded Denmark, the U.S. landed armed forces in Greenland to secure the territory. Denmark, under occupation, agreed to the arrangement, and Greenland became a key American military asset during the war.
The USCG cutter Northland operating off Greenland during World War II.
(U.S. Coast Guard)
1946: The $100 Million Offer
In the post-war period, U.S. interest in Greenland intensified. President Harry Truman offered Denmark $100 million (equivalent to $1 billion today) in gold bullion for the island. Senator Owen Brewster called the purchase a “military necessity” for Arctic defense.
Official portrait of Harry S. Truman as president of the United States.
(Harry S. Truman Library)
1953: Thule Air Base
As part of Operation Blue Jay, the U.S. constructed Thule Air Base in northern Greenland. The base became a vital hub during the Cold War, employing thousands of Greenlanders and hosting nearly 10,000 American personnel.
General view of Thule Air Base, Greenland, Denmark October 31, 2018. Picture taken October 31, 2018.
Ritzau Scanpix/Linda Kastrup via REUTERS
1979: Greenland Gains Home Rule
Greenlanders voted overwhelmingly in favor of home rule, leading to the establishment of a local parliament. This marked a turning point in Greenland’s autonomy, granting control over areas like education, health, fisheries, and the environment.
1985: Departure from the European Community
Greenland withdrew from the European Economic Community (EEC), reflecting its unique economic and political needs.
The move further solidified Greenland’s distinct identity within the Kingdom of Denmark.
2009: Self-Governance Act
The Self-Governance Act recognized Greenlanders as a distinct people with the right to self-determination under international law. The agreement laid out a pathway to full independence, contingent on Greenland’s economic viability—particularly revenues from mineral extraction.
Denmark’s Queen Margrethe hands over the law of Self government to the chairman of the Greenland Parliament, Josef Motzfeldt at a ceremony at the Greenland parliament, the Landstinget, in Nuuk June 21, 2009.
REUTERS/Keld Navntoft/Scanpix
2019: Trump’s first Proposal
Inspired by discussions with advisor Ron Lauder, President Trump reportedly considered offering Denmark a trade involving Puerto Rico for Greenland. The proposal, discussed in the White House Situation Room, highlighted Greenland’s strategic importance and the enduring allure of its untapped resources.
2024: A Push for Independence
In February 2024, Greenland formally declared independence as its ultimate goal. While Denmark continues to provide significant subsidies, Greenland’s vast mineral wealth—including rare earth elements—offers the potential for economic self-sufficiency.
Greenland’s Prime Minister Mute Bourup Egede speaks at a press conference during the opening of the European Commission’s new office in Nuuk, Greenland, March 15, 2024.
Ritzau Scanpix/Leiff Josefsen via REUTERS/File Photo
2025: Trump’s Renewed Interest
In late 2024, President-elect Trump reignited the discussion about purchasing Greenland.
The idea reportedly originated from conversations between Trump and his pick for ambassador to Denmark, Ken Howery.
Trump framed the proposal as a strategic investment to bolster U.S. Arctic dominance and access Greenland’s untapped natural resources.
The renewed push, however, was met with skepticism from both Danish and Greenlandic leaders, who reiterated Greenland’s right to self-determination.
Links :
- NYTimes : ‘Make Greenland Great Again’? No Thank You, Greenlanders Say.
- WSJ : What Trump Wants With Greenland
- BBC : Why does Trump want Greenland and what do its people think?
- Reuters : Greenland independence is possible but joining the US unlikely, Denmark says / Trump will not rule out force to take Panama Canal, Greenland / Why does Trump want Greenland and could he get it?
- CBS news : Why would Trump want Greenland and the Panama Canal? Here's what's behind U.S. interest
- CNN : Trump’s threats to Greenland, Canada and Panama explain everything about America First
- AP : Trump refuses to rule out use of military force to take control of Greenland and the Panama Canal
Wednesday, January 8, 2025
NATO-funded project to reroute internet to space in case of disruption to critical infrastructure
ON 18 FEBRUARY 2024, a missile attack from the Houthi militants in Yemen hit the cargo ship Rubymar in the Red Sea.
With the crew evacuated, the disabled ship would take weeks to finally sink, becoming an symbol for the security of the global Internet in the process.
Before it went down, the ship dragged its anchor behind it over an estimated 70 kilometers.
The meandering anchor wound up severing three fiber-optic cables across the Red Sea floor, which carried about a quarter of all the Internet traffic between Europe and Asia.
Data transmissions had to be rerouted as system engineers realized the cables had been damaged.
So this year, NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, will begin testing a plan to fix the vulnerability that the Rubymar’s sinking so vividly illustrated.
The world’s submarine fiber-optic lines carry more than 95 percent of intercontinental Internet communications.
These tiny, drawn-out strands of glass fiber stretch some 1.2 million km around the planet, each line with the potential to become its own delicate choke point.
Between 500 and 600 cables crisscross ocean floors worldwide.
“They’re not buried when they cross an ocean,” says Tim Stronge, vice president of research at the telecommunications consulting firm TeleGeography.
“They’re sitting right on the seafloor, and at oceanic depths, at deep-sea depths, they’re about this thick”—he makes a circle with his fingers—“less than a garden hose.
They’re fragile.”
NATO’s HEIST project is now investigating ways to protect member countries’ undersea Internet lines, including these 22 Atlantic cable paths, by quickly detecting cable damage and rerouting data to satellites.
Undersea fiber-optic cables, by some estimates, are used for more than US $10 trillion in financial transactions every day, as well as encrypted defense communications and other digital communications.
If one sinking ship could accidentally take out a portion of global data transmission, what could happen in an organized attack by a determined government?
Enter NATO, which has now launched a pilot project to figure out how best to protect global Internet traffic and redirect it when there’s trouble.
The project is called HEIST, short for hybrid space-submarine architecture ensuring infosec of telecommunications.
(“Infosec” is short for “information security.”)
The Houthis probably had no idea what damage they would do by attacking the Rubymar, but Western officials say there’s considerable evidence that Russia and China have tried to sabotage undersea cables.
As this article was going to press, two undersea cables in the Baltic Sea—connecting Sweden with Lithuania and Finland with Germany—had been severed, with suspicion resting on a Chinese merchant vessel in the region.
Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius, went so far as to call the outages “sabotage.”
“What we’re talking about now is critical infrastructure in the society.” —HENRIC JOHNSON, VICE-CHANCELLOR, BLEKINGE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, KARLSKRONA, SWEDEN
This year and next, the organizers of HEIST say they hope to achieve at least two objectives: First, to ensure that when cables are damaged, operators will know their precise location quickly in order to mitigate disruptions.
Second, the project aims to expand the number of pathways for data to travel.
In particular, HEIST will be investigating ways to divert high-priority traffic to satellites in orbit.
“The name of the game when it comes to enabling resilient communication is path diversity,” says Gregory Falco, the NATO Country Director for HEIST and an assistant professor of mechanical and aerospace engineering at Cornell University.
Ensuring a diversity of Internet pathways, he says, should include “something in the sky rather than [just] what’s on the seabed.”
With the crew evacuated, the disabled ship would take weeks to finally sink, becoming an symbol for the security of the global Internet in the process.
Before it went down, the ship dragged its anchor behind it over an estimated 70 kilometers.
The meandering anchor wound up severing three fiber-optic cables across the Red Sea floor, which carried about a quarter of all the Internet traffic between Europe and Asia.
Data transmissions had to be rerouted as system engineers realized the cables had been damaged.
So this year, NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, will begin testing a plan to fix the vulnerability that the Rubymar’s sinking so vividly illustrated.
The world’s submarine fiber-optic lines carry more than 95 percent of intercontinental Internet communications.
These tiny, drawn-out strands of glass fiber stretch some 1.2 million km around the planet, each line with the potential to become its own delicate choke point.
Between 500 and 600 cables crisscross ocean floors worldwide.
“They’re not buried when they cross an ocean,” says Tim Stronge, vice president of research at the telecommunications consulting firm TeleGeography.
“They’re sitting right on the seafloor, and at oceanic depths, at deep-sea depths, they’re about this thick”—he makes a circle with his fingers—“less than a garden hose.
They’re fragile.”
NATO’s HEIST project is now investigating ways to protect member countries’ undersea Internet lines, including these 22 Atlantic cable paths, by quickly detecting cable damage and rerouting data to satellites.Undersea fiber-optic cables, by some estimates, are used for more than US $10 trillion in financial transactions every day, as well as encrypted defense communications and other digital communications.
If one sinking ship could accidentally take out a portion of global data transmission, what could happen in an organized attack by a determined government?
Enter NATO, which has now launched a pilot project to figure out how best to protect global Internet traffic and redirect it when there’s trouble.
The project is called HEIST, short for hybrid space-submarine architecture ensuring infosec of telecommunications.
(“Infosec” is short for “information security.”)
The Houthis probably had no idea what damage they would do by attacking the Rubymar, but Western officials say there’s considerable evidence that Russia and China have tried to sabotage undersea cables.
As this article was going to press, two undersea cables in the Baltic Sea—connecting Sweden with Lithuania and Finland with Germany—had been severed, with suspicion resting on a Chinese merchant vessel in the region.
Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius, went so far as to call the outages “sabotage.”
“What we’re talking about now is critical infrastructure in the society.” —HENRIC JOHNSON, VICE-CHANCELLOR, BLEKINGE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, KARLSKRONA, SWEDEN
This year and next, the organizers of HEIST say they hope to achieve at least two objectives: First, to ensure that when cables are damaged, operators will know their precise location quickly in order to mitigate disruptions.
Second, the project aims to expand the number of pathways for data to travel.
In particular, HEIST will be investigating ways to divert high-priority traffic to satellites in orbit.
“The name of the game when it comes to enabling resilient communication is path diversity,” says Gregory Falco, the NATO Country Director for HEIST and an assistant professor of mechanical and aerospace engineering at Cornell University.
Ensuring a diversity of Internet pathways, he says, should include “something in the sky rather than [just] what’s on the seabed.”
Testing a Fail-Safe
In 2025, HEIST’s organizers plan to begin testing at the Blekinge Institute of Technology (BTH) in Karlskrona, on the southern coast of Sweden.
There, they will experiment with smart systems that they hope will allow engineers to quickly locate a break in an undersea cable with 1-meter accuracy.
The researchers will also work on protocols that quickly route data transmissions to available satellites, at least on an experimental scale.
And, Falco says, they will try to sort out the thicket of overlapping rules for the use of submarine cables, since there is no one entity that oversees them.
Researchers from Iceland, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, and other countries are involved.
“What we’re talking about now is critical infrastructure in the society,” says Henric Johnson, vice-chancellor of BTH and coordinator of the HEIST testbed effort.
Its location, on the coast of the Baltic Sea, is important: It’s a vital waterway both for NATO countries and for the Russians.
“We have had incidents of cables that have been sabotaged between Sweden, Estonia, and Finland,” says Johnson.
“So those incidents are for us a reality.”
TeleGeography’s Stronge says that even without any deliberate sabotage, there are about 100 cable cuts a year, most of them fixed by specialized ships on standby in ports around the world.
A single repair can take days or weeks and cost several million U.S.
dollars.
But up to now, telecom operators—and many countries—have had no choice.
“Think about Iceland,” says Nicolò Boschetti, a Cornell doctoral student working on HEIST.
“Iceland has a lot of financial services, a lot of cloud computing, and it is connected to Europe and North America by four cables.
If those four cables get destroyed or compromised, Iceland is completely isolated from the world.”
Satellite links can bypass damaged cables, but perhaps the biggest limitation of satellite backups is their throughput.
The volume of data that can be transmitted to orbit is orders of magnitude less than what fiber optics currently handle.
Googlesays some of its newer fiber-optic lines can handle 340 terabits per second; most cables carry less, but still dramatically outperform the 5 gigabits per second that NASA says can be sent via satellite in the Ku band (12–18 gigahertz), a widely used microwave frequency.
“[The undersea cables] are not buried when they cross an ocean. They’re sitting right on the seafloor, and at oceanic depths, at deep-sea depths.... They’re fragile.” —TIM STRONGE, VICE PRESIDENT OF RESEARCH, TELEGEOGRAPHY
The HEIST team plans to work on this, in part, by using higher bandwidth laser optics systems to communicate with satellites.
NASA has long been working onoptical communications, most recently with an experiment carried on board itsPsyche asteroid mission. Starlink has equipped its newest satellites with infrared lasers for intersatellite communications, and officials from Amazon’s Project Kuiper have said the company plans to use laser communications as well.
NASA says satellite lasers can carry at least 40 times as much data as radio transmissions—still far short of cable capacity, but it’s significant progress.
Laser transmissions still have limitations.
They’re easily blocked by clouds, haze, or smoke, for example.
They must be aimed with precision.
Delayed signals (also known as latency) are also an issue, especially for satellites in higher orbits.
The HEIST team says it will be testing out new ways to expand bandwidth and shrink signal delay time—for instance, by aggregating available radio frequencies, and by prioritizing what data gets sent in case of trouble.
“So there are ways around this,” says Cornell’s Falco, “but none of them are a silver bullet.”
Falco says a key to finding good answers is an open-source process at HEIST.
“We’re going to make it super-public, and we’re going to want people to poke a lot of holes in it,” he says.
He says give-and-take and repeated reinvention will be essential for the project’s next phase.
“We’re going to enable this capability,” he says, “faster than anyone would have believed.”
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