Thursday, September 30, 2021

Fishing rights row: French anger as UK rejects most permits

French fishing vessels demonstrate in St. Helier, the capital of the Channel Island of Jersey, 
on May 6, 2021. 
Sameer Al-Doumy / AFP

From The Guardian by Chris Morris

Fresh tensions have surfaced between Britain and France over post-Brexit fishing rights.

In the latest round of applications, the UK granted just 12 licences from 47 bids for smaller vessels to fish in its territorial waters.

French sea minister Annick Girardin reportedly said: "French fishing must not be taken hostage by the British for political ends."

Meanwhile, Jersey refused licences to 75 French fishing boats.

The UK said it would consider further evidence to support remaining bids for fishing rights.

Overall, the UK has granted 117 EU licences for its inshore territorial waters and almost 1,700 EU vessels have been licensed to fish in the larger UK exclusive economic one, which stretches 200 nautical miles from shore.

Ms Girardin, quoted in French newspaper Le Monde, said: "It is a new refusal of the British to apply the conditions of the Brexit accord despite all the work undertaken together.
"I have only one watchword; to obtain definitive licences for our fishermen as the accord foresees."

Fishing was one of the most contentious issues in the post-Brexit trade talks between the UK and the EU, and it continues to be a source of tension.

Both sides have substantial bargaining chips: many European boats have traditionally relied on fishing in British waters, while many British companies rely on selling their catch in European markets.

 
There is a particular focus on the number of French boats that will be able to fish in British waters in the English Channel, and around the Channel Islands.

The French Prime Minister Jean Castex recently sent a letter to the President of the European Commission Ursula Von Der Leyen warning that the problem was far from over - so, a local dispute could quickly become a broader European issue.

After protests by French vessels in the waters around Jersey in May, the deadline for foreign boats to submit evidence that they have fished near Jersey in the past (which helps determine future access) was extended until the end of this month.
 
"Le Dolmen", a trawler based in Lorient, fishing in the North Sea on 7 December 2020.
 
But it's safe to say that France won't be impressed by the rejection of 75 boats.

Sporadic squabbling about how the new UK-EU trade agreement should be implemented looks set to rumble on for years, placing a nagging strain on what should be a close relationship.

A spokesman for the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) said the UK's approach "has been reasonable and fully in line with our commitments in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)".

The spokesman said that to get a licence for fishing in the UK territorial sea, which is between six and 12 nautical miles from the coast, EU vessels must provide evidence of a track record of working there.

It comes as Jersey said it had granted 64 licences out of 170 applications from French boats.

A further 31 boats have been given temporary licences to give them more time to show they have a track record of fishing in Jersey's waters, in line with the UK's post-Brexit trade deal with the EU.

The remaining 75 boats are being given 30 days' notice, after which they will no longer be allowed access to the island's waters.

Jersey became a flashpoint for tensions over fishing rights in May, when two Royal Navy ships were sent to patrol the area after French fishermen staged a protest outside the port of St Helier.

The fishermen complained about being prevented from operating in British waters because of difficulties in obtaining licences.

Under an agreement with the EU, French boat operators must show a history of fishing in the area to receive a licence for Jersey's waters.
But it has been claimed additional requirements were added without notice.

The row led Ms Girardin to threaten to cut off Jersey's electricity supply - 95% of which is delivered by three underwater cables from France.

Wednesday, September 29, 2021

The sea is not made of water by Adam Nicolson review – of mollusc and men

Digging deep: Adam Nicolson in Argyllshire. Photograph: Sarah Raven

From The Guardian by Alex Preston

This lyrical dive into rock pools illuminates the interconnectedness of all natural habitats

There’s a WTF moment about a third of the way through Adam Nicolson’s new book, The Sea Is Not Made of Water.
The first chapters largely follow in the footsteps of his last book of nature writing, The Seabird’s Cry, applying the same characteristic form of lyrical scientific investigation into the creatures of the rock pool that he’d deployed on the birds of the cliffs and wide oceans.
The opening section of this book is called Animals and we leap from sand hopper to winkle to prawn, understanding the complex interconnectedness of these underexamined lives, learning a new and perspective-altering fact on every page.
Then, all of a sudden, there’s a chapter on the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus.

It’s a segment of exquisite beauty, a bravura act of writing that seems not only to provide a model for the rest of this book, but changes the way you understand the whole dizzying Nicolson oeuvre.
This is a writer who has moved from memoir to literary criticism to nature writing via The Mighty Dead, one of the best books on Homer ever written.
In his chapter on Heraclitus, Nicolson reads a rock pool through the work of the great philosopher, bringing to the crucible of tidal life “a systemic understanding whose wholeness relies on its union of opposites”.
We begin to understand that the thread that links Nicolson’s books is precisely this – a philosopher’s wish to provide a way of comprehending the place of the individual in a vast and shifting world, the quest for a good life, the search for new answers to old questions.
The chapter on prawns makes us consider whether invertebrates have a consciousness, a right to dignity in life and death

The Sea Is Not Made of Water takes the reader on several journeys.
First, there is the contemporary story of Nicolson, in his 60s, deciding to dig rock pools on the shore near his wife’s family home in Argyllshire.
Nicolson writes off for official permission for his project and is slightly wounded to receive a response saying that he ought not to have bothered, as “they do not appear to be any different to anything built by local children during the holidays”.
Undeterred, Nicolson seizes his pickaxe and waterproof cement and sets to work.
The first pool fails – it is too far out of the water – but the next ones don’t, and are soon full of scintillating life.

With life comes drama.
There’s the slow-motion battle between two anemones – red foot and blue foot; there’s the self-sacrifice of young winkles so that their elders can escape (“the winkles speeded up from about an eighth of an inch a minute to about half an inch a minute, running for the hills”); there’s the remarkably tender, week-long lovemaking of green crabs.
The chapter on prawns is one of the best, doing for the cockroaches of the sea what David Foster Wallace did for their big brothers in his wonderful essay Consider the Lobster, making us consider whether invertebrates have a consciousness, a sense of self, a right to dignity in life and death.

The real journey of The Sea Is Not Made of Water occurs in its second and third parts, though.
We come to recognise that the chapters on rock pools have only been a rehearsal, a study for what is to come.
From the Lilliputian intimacy of the rock pool we spool out to chapters on the tides and the formation of rocks – vast in space and time, vertiginous in their scope and ambition.
The last part of the book provides a history of the humans who inhabited this wild and rocky Scottish shore from pre-history to the present, with Nicolson applying the same sympathetic scientific curiosity to these lives that he gave to the winkles. 
“Life is tidal, full of loss and arrival, a thing that makes and ebbs,” he writes at one point, and this is what we take away from the book – that we are all in rock pools, knitted within complex systems. We are part of nature, not separate from it.

Here’s an idea: the best books are never only, or even mainly, about the subject they claim to be about. The novelist John Barth said something like this when asked what kept people turning pages. 
“The question ‘Who am I?’ is what ultimately motivates the reader,” he said.
The greatest literature – and this unique and terribly moving title is great literature indeed – reaches beyond itself to speak to us of the most profound and essential things.
Spending time in Nicolson’s rock pool will change your life and the way you view the lives of others.

The Sea Is Not Made of Water: Life Between the Tides by Adam Nicolson is published by William Collins (£20).

Tuesday, September 28, 2021

France & misc. (SHOM) layer update in the GeoGarage platform

126 nautical raster charts updated
 
Main information :
 
As the needs of the Shom's civilian and military clients evolve and ENCs (electronic navigational charts) become more widespread, the Shom has decided to rationalise its portfolio of charts in foreign waters, mainly reproduced in facsimile (foreign charts reproduced in the French portfolio).
As a reminder, the Shom's cartographic offer in paper charts can be broken down as follows
  • French maps, produced by the Shom (including foreign maps reproduced in facsimiles);
  • maps from the supplementary portfolio, mostly of British origin, intended exclusively for the French Navy;
  • foreign charts, not included in the supplementary portfolio, intended exclusively for the French Navy.
  • from September to December 2021, the Shom will carry out a major evolution of its portfolio as follows
  • the deletion of 194 French nautical charts (mainly facsimiles) ;
  • the introduction of 180 charts to the complementary portfolio.
During the implementation of the rationalisation, information on the planned evolution of the portfolio will be disseminated:
- At the end of each month, a special notice will be published in the Notice to Mariners Group (NtM) indicating the changes planned for the following month for information purposes: this special notice does not change the portfolio;
- deletions and introductions will be announced to the GAN once they are effective;
- this document, presenting the forecasts, is available on diffusion.shom.fr.

 
SHOM changes for september 2021
in red, 18 charts withdrawn from the GeoGarage SHOM layer (NtM 2137)

SHOM changes for october 2021

SHOM changes for november 2021

SHOM changes for december 2021

So in september 2021 (compatible with NtM2137), 18 charts have been withdrawn in the GeoGarage SHOM update layer : mainly international UK (see examples below)
The GB original charts are included in the British Isles & misc. (UKHO) GeoGarage layer.
 
Coverage of South England in the previous update
 
New coverage of South England in the current update
 
Coverage of South England with the British Isles & misc. (UKHO) layer
 

Thailand perseveres with new vision for Kra Canal

The long-discussed Kra Canal route, in yellow
(Copyright Lowy Institute)

From The Lowy Institute by Shaun Cameron

In 1677, the Thai monarch Narai the Great had a dream.
He sent an engineer south to investigate the possibility of excavating a vast waterway through the narrowest part of the Malay Peninsula, known as the Kra Isthmus, with the hope of opening a direct trade route between Siam and Burma – imagine a Suez of Southeast Asia, if you will.

The engineer returned with the unhappy verdict that the project was impossible.
But this idea of a “Kra Canal” has persisted through the centuries since.
The canal is seen as an option to bypass the longer and congested route through the Strait of Malacca, the narrow sea lane that runs between modern-day Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore and carries 25 percent of the world’s traded goods.
At different times in history, the French wanted to build it, the British sought to block it, and successive Thai governments have investigated its viability in recent decades.

Now, according to one Thai parliamentarian, China might have an ambition to create it – but there’s a twist.

The concept of a sea passage linking the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea was dismissed by the government in 2020; the dream of a Kra Canal became a Thai Land Bridge, utilizing road and railway networks to transport goods to and from deep sea ports on each coast.
This land-based route would avoid major drawbacks involved in digging a canal, such as environmental waste and cutting off a southern part of the country embroiled in insurgency.
Supporters of the idea also estimated it would fit into a combined budget less than the extraordinary US$55 billion projected to be required to dig a canal.

Chumphon East entrance of the Kra canal project with the GeoGarage platform (Thai map)

Ranong Westentrance of the Kra canal project with the GeoGarage platform (Thai map)

If built, a Thai Land Bridge would provide an alternative route cutting approximately 650 nautical miles and two to three days from a journey through the busy Strait of Malacca, saving transport costs, reducing the risk of piracy and easing pressure on a waterway forecasted to exceed its capacity in the next ten years.

The “if” in this question is a big one.
One wry observer estimated a great number of Thai forest reserves have been logged over the years to supply the paper for canal feasibility studies, let alone the land bridge, and the last two Thai prime ministers to show interest also had their deliberations interrupted by coup.

But the attraction to China seems obvious.
Chinese energy security rests on a solution to the “Malacca Dilemma”, a term introduced by former president Hu Jintao.
An estimated 80 per cent of Chinese energy imports pass through the chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca.
It’s not difficult to envisage that a blockade or disruption of the Strait could be instigated by Indonesia or Malaysia in response to habitual Chinese encroachment into territorial waters, or by India due to conflict on the Sino-Indian border.

There is also the matter of “certain powers” that Hu saw as a part of China’s dilemma, generally interpreted to be a reference to the United States.
An energy blockade in the Strait of Malacca by the US Navy would significantly damage China’s economy, and such a prospect is seen as a driving motivation for Beijing to diversify its energy security, such as via oil and gas pipelines from Myanmar.
In 2005, a leaked report for US Defense Department outlined how China was considering investing in the Kra Canal.

One feature of China’s ideal plan for a “Malacca solution” would be control.
China has sought dominance and security over its maritime environment in the South China Sea through coercion.
This has been accomplished via the building of artificial islands and via seemingly benign economic means, such as the mooring of fishing trawlers in disputed waters.
Control over a transport route through Thailand would allow China not only to increase its energy security and resilience to blockade.
If it were a canal, it would also permit navy vessels easier access to the Indian Ocean.
This would align with China’s “String of Pearls” strategy of a series of strategic assets and influence stretching along oil routes from the Horn of Africa to China.

Whatever China’s interest may amount to has already – if reports are to be believed – drawn countervailing attention from the United States, as well as Australia and India.

But all these speculative advantages remain vulnerable to the same challenge that lead to the dream of the canal in the first place.
How much power does any route provide when it can simply become another chokepoint? The fate of the giant container ship Ever Given, stuck fast for almost a week in the Suez Canal this year, gave a sense of how easy it is to disrupt an essential artery of global trade.

The canal dream is nonetheless a stubborn one.
Since 2015, the prospect of a link across Thailand has been driven by the Thai Canal Association (TCA), a group of retired generals, politicians and business executives, and the Thai-Chinese Cultural and Economic Association, who reported support for the project from Chinese officials (although past claims of official deals have been swiftly denied).
The TCA states it has financing from Chinese investors and held a 2017 conference on the project, while as recently as June this year the Thai Transport Minister spruiked the idea as an avenue for Thailand to again become “Southeast Asia’s ‘economic tiger cub’.”

Whatever China’s interest may amount to has already – if reports are to be believed – drawn countervailing attention from the United States, as well as Australia and India.
Thailand is close to China, but is also a US treaty ally.
How Thailand would navigate the geopolitical ambitions and rivalry of such a major protect is open to question.

In the meantime, the government seems intent on pressing ahead with the idea of a Thai Land Bridge.
There is talk of crossing the Kra Isthmus once calls for investment close in 2023, with a six-year timeline for completion.
Maybe the strategic premonition of King Narai so long ago could finally come to fruition.
Or maybe the talk will continue for hundreds more years yet.

Links :

Monday, September 27, 2021

Navigating without GPS is one thing – so let's jam it and see what happens to our warship

The HMS Severn (click to enlarge), used with permission Pic copyright: Helen Harper 
 
From The Register by Gareth Corfield

WECDIS (Warship Electronic Chart Display Information System), the computer system at the heart of Royal Navy navigation, will preserve the ship's last precisely known position.
Should the GPS go down, WECDIS will continue automatically plotting the ship's heading and speed from that last known position.

Cdr Harper demonstrated the GPS jammer on the ship's bridge, a handheld gadget about the size of a 1980s mobile phone and with an aerial to match.
He turned it on.
The ship's two GPS units, (civilian) radar display and WECDIS immediately displayed little captions saying "position lost." Audio alarms began sounding on the bridge.
The ship's navigator cancelled them, and the FNO course students nodded and made notes.
Navigating accurately without GPS availability is something the Navy places a high premium on.

And that was that.
Severn kept on plodding along at a stately eight knots (nautical mph) through the late summer afternoon sea, her bridge crew and the FNO students completely unfazed by the jamming.

On top of equipment failures and loss of signal, there is the possibility of spoofing, or deliberately tampering with GPS.
The best-known example of this is in the James Bond film Tomorrow Never Dies when fictional warship HMS Devonshire is guided off course to start a war so the fictional media mogul can profit from breaking the news.

Meaconing [PDF] is the art of receiving and rebroadcasting GPS signals from another location.
This introduces a problem: while the original transmitter will give its own location as the signal's origin, the rebroadcast signal copies that precisely – meaning receivers picking up the meaconed signal pick up a position error.
Even with encrypted GPS for military applications, in some cases repeating the raw signal can generate the same position-finding problem.


The exercise took place off the Isle of Wight.
Although the handheld jamming unit "only has a range of a couple of hundred yards" as the captain put it, safety and prudence came into play.
For shipboard low-power jammers, navy regulations say no other ships should be within 1,500 metres.
Severn played it extra safe with a nautical mile and a half's clearance (2.7km) from other vessels nearby.

GPS jamming is a pain at sea and even more so in the air.
It's prevalent in the Eastern Mediterranean to the point where EU air traffic control organisation Eurocontrol wrote a formal report complaining about the amount of disruption to commercial airline flights.
While no nation state has made a firm attribution of GPS disruption to any one source, Russia has an increasing presence in and around Syria.

HMS Severn can be tracked on all good ship-tracking websites through her AIS.
Unless the crew turn it off or experiment with GPS jamming again, in which case you might find her vanishing or speeding through dry land at airliner velocities.

Your correspondent also learnt about the "cocked hat" of navigation.
After hearing the phrase several times and deducing that this wasn't in the same nature as "scran", "heads", or sundry other Jackspeak (naval slang) terms, a kindly officer explained.

The 'cocked hat', a nautical navigation concept.
The hat is at the arrow
 
When you take three bearings from landmarks to fix your position, there's always an element of uncertainty: was your bearing as precise as you hoped?
If you're cross-referencing it against other bearings, are those pinpoint accurate – or is there a known element of inaccuracy in your compass?
And if you're doing it by hand, how far has your ship travelled between bearings?

Plotting all the bearings on the chart gives you an area, rather than a precise spot, in which your ship is.
For three bearings this is triangular; the same shape as an 18th century cocked hat.
The size of the cocked hat gives an indication of how big your position fix error is – and in some circumstances it's possible for the ship's true position to be outside the cocked hat.