Knowing exactly where you’re sailing and where to sail next is the most important part of a vessel’s navigation which can be accomplished by the use of GPS.
Yet, what happens when your GPS gets spoofed?
GPS spoofing, often leading to GPS outages, causes major disruptions to the shipping industry impacting safe navigation, leading to paralyzed shipping lanes, collisions and untraceable attacks.
GPS spoofing
The attack tries to deceive a GPS receiver by broadcasting fake GPS signals, which resemble normal signals, or by broadcasting genuine signals captured elsewhere or at a different time.
This act causes the receiver to believe its position to be somewhere else than where it is, or to be located where it is but at a different time, as determined by the attacker.
Satellites: Satellites act like the stars in constellations—we know where they are supposed to be at any given time.
Ground stations: They monitor and control the satellites, and they help determine their locations—both where they were and where they are forecast to be.
Receivers: A receiver, like you might find in your phone or in your car, is constantly listening for signals from these satellites, which can be used like a giant tape measure between the receiver and satellites.
Last year, the maritime sector experienced disruptions in navigation caused by GPS interferences, with some, such as the GPS attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, being called ‘strategical’ attacks, with US believing that Iran was to blame.
2019 incidents
The most often places that the attacks occurred were Eastern, Central Mediterranean Sea, Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz. a) People’s Republic of China
The latest GPS outage that caught the shipping’s eye was in 2020, when it was reported that the People’s Republic of China observed a number of GPS spoofing incidents in and around coastal areas and ports.
What happened was that the Centre for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) examined the AIS data in the area and found out that hundreds of vessels were spoofed, with the activity being ongoing for months against vessels across Shanghai simultaneously and mostly vessels navigating the Huangpu River.
b) Eastern, Central Mediterranean Sea, Suez Canal
The US Maritime Administration (US MARAD) alerted the shipping industry that they received reports about GPS interference incidents in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean Sea, and Suez Canal resulting to lost GPS signals that seriously affected the vessel's navigation and operations.
The alert was about GPS interference reported between Libya and Malta, specifically in areas offshore of Libya and to the east and the northwest of Malta.
Also, in the Eastern Mediterranean, these reports were concentrated near Port Said, Egypt, the Suez Canal, and in the vicinity of the Republic of Cyprus.
Instances of similar interference were also reported between Hadera, Israel and Beirut, Lebanon.
c) Strait of Hormuz
The area was a hot spot for attacks either against ships or against their GPS systems; the attacks against commercial vessels, the shooting down of a US Navy drone and of an Iranian drone, while also the seizure of the UK-flagged 'Stena Impero' by Iranian authorities seriously affected shipping navigation and trade in the area.
Consequently, the US MARAD warned that ships operating in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman may also encounter GPS interference, bridge-to-bridge communications spoofing or other communications jamming with little to no warning.
C4ADS Research shows GPS spoofing detected via AIS data
Report states that Russia’s GPS spoofing threatens shipping
In the meantime, on the same year a report by C4ADS revealed that Russian GPS spoofing threatened the safe navigation of vessels.
C4ADS and UT Texas determine the location of a GPS spoofer in Syria via ISS GPS data
Specifically, the non-profit analytical group used publicly available data and commercial technologies, analyzed patterns of GNSS spoofing in the Russian Federation, Crimea, and Syria, which revealed that the Russian Federation is developing an advantage in the targeted use and development of GNSS spoofing capabilities to achieve tactical and strategic objectives at home and abroad.
Black Sea spoofing activity (Jan 2016 - Nov 2018)
GPS spoofing attack that caught shipping’s eye
A serious GPS spoofing incident took place in 2017 when approximately 20 vessels experienced GPS spoofing while sailing through the northeast portion of the Black Sea.
Concerning the incident, a master that was sailing in the Black Sea contacted the US Coast Guard Navigation Center (NAVCEN) to report the disruption, as his GPS put him in the wrong spot than where he actually was.
The master understood that there was something wrong with the GPS after contacting other vessels nearby, which experienced same problems.
Referring to the dangers of GPS spoofing incidents, CHIRP highlighted that crews should not be solely reliant to technological means and advises that they should cross-check with other independent and reliable navigation techniques.
CHIRP Maritime has repeatedly highlighted the importance of traditional navigation and keeping a good lookout. It is imperative that critical sections of every passage are carefully planned and executed.
Overall, GPS is a crucial tool for a safe navigation, helping the master and the crew understand the vessel’s position and direction.
Therefore, key shipping stakeholders provided recommendations and steps to be taken to deal with this kind of incidents.
The Fugro Oceanstar system detects when a vessel’s position is being manipulated, if there is a cyber-attack, it will trigger a spoofing alarm to alert the crew.
In essence, it is recommended to:
Report such incidents in real time, providing detailed information of the vessel, as the location, date, time and duration of the outage/disruption.
Provide photographs or screenshots of equipment failures that may help with the analysis of the incident.
Make sure that the navigators are fully aware of a potential GPS jamming and spoofing and the differences between the two and how and what ship's equipment they will affect.
Ensure navigators can use other means of fixing the vessel's position without the use of GPS.
Make sure that navigators have the knowledge on using a variety of position fixing methods in order to cross check the vessel’s position and accuracy of the GPS location being shown.
Be always informed of specific ‘sensitive’ areas that you are about to sail by and exercise caution.
Concluding, urging the shipping industry to take action against GPS outage, 14 maritime organizations sent a letter to the USCG’s Commandant Karl Schultz, asking that the issue of 'deliberate interference' with America’s Global Positioning System (GPS) and other Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) signals to be resolved.
We request that you raise the urgent issue of deliberate interference with America’s Global Positioning System (GPS) and other Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) signals at the upcoming 122nd session of IMO Council from July 15th to 19th 2019
Satellites and artificial intelligence are helping to pinpoint foreign fleets exploiting fish in the waters of African nations
Africa is a hotspot for illegal fishing by foreign fleets, and now for the first time, researchers have pinpointed where that illicit activity is happening around the entire continent – and identified the culprits.
Based on their map, which uses satellite technology to track boats’ movement and artificial intelligence to interpret it, researchers at Global Fishing Watch have singled out industrial trawlers operating unlawfully in inshore waters reserved for small-scale “artisanal” fishers.
Their findings show these big, foreign ships are targeting certain countries.
For instance, 93% of industrial fishing in Somalia between 2012 and 2016 occurred in a banned area – a zone stretching 24 nautical miles from the shore that had been set aside for small, local fishing boats.
All those industrial trawlers were flying South Korea’s flag, according to a new paper documenting the research.
Other large vessels most often making incursions into the inshore waters of African countries were flagged to the European Union (Greece and Spain) and China.
With the World Trade Organisation (WTO) missing a deadline in December to reach an agreement banning subsidies that fuel such industrial fishing, the technology could give African officials and other regulators an important tool to combat the marine crime that robs their citizens of food, livelihoods, and in some cases, their lives.
This map tracks commercial fishing vessels at sea in near real-time.
Blue dots indicate the presence of fishing vessels detected using AIS data, and yellow dots indicate vessels detected using Panama’s vessel tracking data.
The timeline at the bottom shows the total number of fishing hours over any given period.
Click play to follow fishing activity over the past 8 years, and hover over/tap any part of the map to reveal more information.
Global Fishing Watch This map tracks commercial fishing vessels at sea in near real-time.
Blue dots indicate the presence of fishing vessels detected using AIS data, and yellow dots indicate vessels detected using Panama’s vessel tracking data.
The timeline at the bottom shows the total number of fishing hours over any given period.
Click play to follow fishing activity over the past 8 years, and hover over/tap any part of the map to reveal more information.
“People are getting poorer,” says Dyhia Belhabib, the lead author of the paper and the principal fisheries investigator at non-profit Ecotrust Canada.
“Every year, 300,000 jobs are lost to illegal fishing.”
She noted that overseas fleets often target small foraging fish that are a staple of some African diets.
“The very fish that are caught to feed farmed salmon in the West are eaten by people in Africa, and often it’s their only source of protein.”
Belhabib’s research has also found that collisions between small fishing boats and industrial trawlers illegally operating in nearshore waters has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of African fishers.
“We hope countries will use this data to hold their own fleets accountable, whether we’re talking about China or Europe,” she says.
How does the system work?
The International Maritime Organisation requires vessels of a certain size to carry a transponder that broadcasts their live location to satellites.
This Automated Identification System (AIS) is designed to help ships avoid collisions.
Global Fishing Watch taps this and other location data to identify and track fishing boats across the globe, then analyses their movements to determine if they’re acting suspiciously.
“This is the first time we’ve looked at likely illegal activity around an entire continent,” says David Kroodsma, director of research and innovation at Global Fishing Watch.
“The thing I like about this study is that it’s part ‘Big Data’ and part really detailed policy research.
When you combine those things you can say something really useful.”
Belhabib and her colleagues reviewed laws and regulations governing inshore fishing in 33 African nations that border the Atlantic and Indian oceans, identifying zones where foreign industrial trawlers were partially or completely banned.
Then, to determine country of origin, Global Fishing Watch compared the AIS vessel locations between 2012 and 2016 with official ship registries.
That accounted for 75% of the trawlers fishing in prohibited waters.
The researchers then identified the remaining 25% as industrial fishing boats using an algorithm to analyse their movements.
The algorithm, which recognises fishing behaviour, is more than 90% accurate in spotting trawlers, according to the paper.
In Africa, 5.9% of industrial fishing occurred where it is prohibited, and 3% occurred where it was partially banned.
“I was really expecting much more than that,” says Belhabib.
However, the numbers were significantly higher in certain countries.
In addition to Somalia, where 93% of large-scale fishing occurred in restricted waters, 46% of such fishing was detected in Eritrea and 38% in Equatorial Guinea.
The researchers noted that those numbers may be conservative, given that trawler captains are known to turn off their AIS transponders when fishing illegally.
Why is this data needed?
Trying to ascertain who is actually profiting from illegal fishing is part of the challenge.
In Ghana, for instance, 28% of industrial fishing between 2012-16 occurred in waters where trawlers were banned.
Researchers found that 95% of those big boats were registered to Ghanaian companies.
“In our analysis, Somalia, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea and Ghana, where vessels spend a significant amount of their time fishing in prohibited zones, have either a limited capacity to monitor their coastal waters (Somalia and Eritrea), or have limited willingness” because of relationships with foreign fleets, the researchers wrote.
Isabel Jarrett, manager of the Pew Charitable Trusts programme to reduce harmful fishing subsidies, hopes the new research puts pressure on WTO negotiators to reach a deal to prohibit subsidies that promote illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
“It provides further evidence for the need for ambitious fishing subsidies rules,” she says.
“A lot of IUU activity is taking place off the coast of Africa by fleets largely from developed and big developing countries.
If you have an agreement on subsidies, you’ll no longer encourage that type of activity.”
The WTO has been negotiating the harmful fishing subsidies ban for nearly 20 years.
Jarrett attributes the failure to meet its December deadline in part to the resignation in July 2019 of the chair of the negotiations.
His successor was not chosen until November.
A new deadline has been set for June 2020, when the organisation holds its biennial ministerial conference in Kazakhstan.
The WTO operates on consensus, meaning that all 164 member states must agree on the terms of a fishing subsidies ban.
Still, Jarrett is hopeful an agreement will be struck, noting that the pressure will be mounting as the UN will be holding its second Ocean Conference in Lisbon, Portugal, the week before the WTO meeting begins.
And China, a significant player in the WTO negotiations, is hosting a high-profile meeting of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity in October, giving it further impetus to show environmental leadership by helping conclude the fishing subsidies negotiations.
The monitoring method deployed by Global Fishing Watch could also prove key in helping ensure compliance with a fishing subsidies agreement.
Kroodsma says the organisation’s maps are updated every three days but that it could be possible to detect illegal fishing in near real-time.
“It shows the real promise of this type of technology,” says Kroodsma.
“Developing countries need cheap ways to monitor their waters.”