From AMTI CSIS by Christopher Mirasola
We have all heard about
land reclamation by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the South China Sea, particularly the southeastern region known as the
Spratly Group.
But much less is being said about what the Permanent Court of Arbitration just
finished considering
for the past week: are artificial islands really islands?
According to
the Philippines, the answer is straightforward: No.
In its initial
statement of claim, the Philippines asked the Court to invalidate China’s Nine-Dash Line (click
here
for a good overview of that issue) and determine that eight
PRC-controlled maritime features are not islands.
Of these eight
features, seven are home to ongoing PRC
land reclamation.
The Philippines has a strong case for why the PRC’s artificial
islands should not be considered real islands.
The UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and past decisions by international tribunals
suggest that land reclamation will not affect the Permanent Court of
Arbitration’s decision because: (1) artificial islands don’t have the
legal significance afforded natural islands, and;
(2) land reclamation
occurred after the so-called “critical date” when the China-Philippines
dispute “crystallized” in international legal terms.
Why This Matters
Recent land reclamation has dramatically transformed seven disputed maritime features in the Spratly Islands.
These include
Mischief,
Gaven,
Subi,
Johnson,
Cuarteron,
Fiery Cross, and
Hughes (McKennan) Reefs.
For example,
in 1995,
Subi Reef was completely submerged at high tide.
Today, there are 3.9
million square meters of reclaimed land above water at high tide on Subi
Reef, and it is home to a pair of wooden barracks, communications
array, and helipad.
There are similarly stark changes at each of the
other reefs.
Since
UNCLOS
affords differing maritime based on the geographic characteristics of a
given landmass, at first blush these changes could have big
implications for both China and the Philippines.
In particular, the
Spratlys dispute involves three types of territorial objects at sea:
- Low-tide elevation: A landmass above water only at low tide. Outside an existing territorial sea it is not entitled to a separate maritime zone.
- Rock:
A landmass permanently above water but unable to sustain human
habitation or economic life on its own. It is entitled to a territorial
sea and contiguous zone, but not an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or
continental shelf rights.
- Island:
A landmass permanently above water that can sustain human habitation or
economic life on its own. It is entitled to a territorial sea,
contiguous zone, EEZ, and continental shelf rights.
Before land reclamation, Johnson, Cuarteron, and Fiery Cross Reefs
were rocks and the other reefs were, at most, low-tide elevations.
After
land reclamation,
all six features would be considered rocks,
if not islands.
So the key question becomes: do we define the reefs’
legal character by looking at the facts from before or after land
reclamation?
Artificial Islands Do Not Generate Maritime Entitlements
According to UNCLOS, an island is: “a
naturally formed area
of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.”
For
the Philippines to make its case, it must show that reclaimed land
should not be considered “a naturally formed area of land.”
You wouldn’t
have to break the English language to find some ambiguity in the UNCLOS
definition of an island. It could mean islands formed by natural
processes
or islands composed of naturally occurring objects.
[1] If the second definition is correct, reclaimed land would be entitled to all the maritime zones of an island.
But this expansive interpretation just does not hold water.
The
Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties says that we must give treaty provisions their
“ordinary meaning” while remaining mindful of their context, purpose
and, if necessary, negotiating history.
Let’s start with ordinary meaning.
The New Oxford American
Dictionary’s first entry for the verb ‘form’ defines it as to “bring
together parts or combine to create (something).” So UNCLOS’ requirement
that an island be naturally formed should mean that an island be
created naturally.
It would not make sense to interpret “naturally formed” as a noun.
We
can see this is true by looking at other UNCLOS provisions.
For
example,
Article 60
says that countries may “establish reasonable safety zones around …
artificial islands” and that “[a]rtificial islands, installations and
structures do not possess the status of islands.”
UNCLOS does not define
“artificial island” explicitly, but a definition is suggested by the
fact that Article 60 differentiates artificial islands, installations,
and structures.
Installations and structures ordinarily include objects
built of non-natural materials (like concrete and steel in an oil rig).
By using “artificial islands” as a separate term, UNCLOS states that
this is a different type of landmass, one that is made of natural
objects (i.e. sand) and
not man-made objects (i.e. steel).
If artificial islands are made of natural objects, it would not make sense for UNCLOS to define islands as a landmass
also made of natural objects.
The only solution, therefore, is for “naturally formed” to indicate the
process by which an island is created.
This interpretation is confirmed by the Convention’s negotiating
history.
Although there were initially some scholars who thought
artificially formed islands should be treated like natural islands, by
1958 they had largely lost the debate.
[2]
In fact, the United States specifically added “naturally formed”
before “area of land” during negotiations culminating in the UNCLOS text
to eliminate most maritime entitlements for artificial islands
.[3]
Since then, scholars have agreed that artificially formed islands should not be granted maritime entitlements.
[4]
China claims Hawaii-Micronesia : new 251 dash map
International Tribunals Do Not Consider Construction After the Critical Date
It is possible, however, that the tribunal will not even have to
consider this interpretive question because PRC land reclamation
occurred after what is called the “critical date.”
The critical date is
the time when “the dispute crystallized”
[5] between two parties (here, the PRC and Philippines).
In a dispute between
Nicaragua and Colombia
regarding Caribbean islands, for example, the critical date was when
the two countries exchanged diplomatic notes explicitly claiming
sovereignty over the islands after Nicaragua issued oil contracts in the
surrounding waters.
A tribunal will generally only consider the facts
of a dispute as they existed
prior to this date.
[6]
It is not clear if the Tribunal will fix a critical date in the
Spratlys dispute, or what it will be if it does so.
It may decline to
indicate a date because the Philippines is not arguing for territorial
sovereignty over these reefs.
But assuming that arbitrators do use the
critical date, there are three options: 1947 (when the Nationalist
government of China
first endorsed the Nine-Dashed Line) sometime in the 1970s (when the
PRC alleges that the Philippines first occupied maritime features in the region) or April 14, 2011 (when the PRC
responded to a diplomatic note
from the Philippines protesting the Nine-Dash Line).
Given the
Nicaragua/Colombia dispute this third option seems most likely, but much
could be disputed about the merits of each date.
Regardless, it is
clear that all three options occurred well before PRC land reclamation
began approximately 18 months ago.
The current geographic
characteristics of these reefs, therefore, simply would not matter.
It is important to note that the Tribunal has not released the
Philippines’ legal briefs, so we cannot be certain what topics have been
addressed.
But since more than
3000 pages
of briefing materials have been submitted, it is safe to assume that
the Philippines has addressed all plausible arguments (both UNCLOS
interpretation the critical date).
Final Thoughts
The China-Philippines arbitration implicates a region in which nearly
all neighboring states have sovereign claims.
But while there are a
number of difficult legal and strategic issues for the Permanent Court
of Arbitration to consider, the legal character of PRC-controlled reefs
is not one of them.
Here, if anywhere, a straightforward application of
UNCLOS should prevail.
No amount of land reclamation can change a reef
into an island, nor entitle them to an island’s maritime zones.
[1] Alfred Soons,
Artificial Islands and Installations in International Law,
22 Occasional Paper Series Law of the Sea Institute 17—18 (1974)
(Showing scholars have argued in favor of this second position).
[2] Hiran W. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in International Law 9 (1990)
[3] Id.
[4]
N. Papdakis, The International Legal Regime of Artificial Islands 96–97
(1977); Hiran W. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in International
Law 9 (1990).
[5] Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 p. 624, 652.
[6] Yehuda Blum, Historic Titles in International Law 219 (1965).
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